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Ghana, as an emerging oil and gas producing country, is expected to have an improved, or a 
new approach to manage safety to prevent major hazard incidents in the industry. Given the 
country’s experience of poor risk governance regimes before the emergence of the upstream 
oil and gas industry, it has become imperative to develop a robust safety management regime 
that can deal with the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk associated with upstream 
oil and gas operations. The current safety management regime is underpinned by an 
engineering risk assessment approach which is inherently inadequate in handling uncertainties 
of knowledge and potential surprises relative to major hazard incidents. This study aims at 
developing a framework for robust safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
industry. The study followed design science research as its methodological approach, which 
involved six data collection stages. Data collection methods included documents, quantitative 
safety data, questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews, workshop and focus groups. It 
must be indicated that the questionnaires recorded a 70.7% — response rate of 300 samples. 
There were 14 participants involved in the semi-structured interviews, 12 participated in the 
workshop and 9 for the focus group validation. Data analysis included content analysis, 
descriptive statistical analysis, factor analysis, and multiple regression analysis. The key 
findings of the review of the safety statutory and regulatory documents indicated that Ghana’s 
regulatory regime is not robust as there is incoherence and limited scope of the existing 
regulatory and institutional framework. Main findings of the analysis of the safety statistical 
data shown a rising trend of incidents mainly triggered by hydrocarbon releases, struck 
by/impact, falls from height/dropped objects and equipment failure. The key findings of the 
questionnaire surveys indicated that safety climate factors such as safety supervision, 
management of change, safety empowerment, safety policies, safety rules and procedures, 
safety behaviour, safety priority, supportive environment, equipment maintenance and safety 
communication have a predictive influence on incidents risks. The semi-structured interviews 
indicated weak risk governance in the industry. The critical safety barriers to the 
implementation of safety management systems related to poor safety culture issues and lack of 
investment in safety research and development. A conceptual framework was developed and 
evaluated to improve safety management in Ghana’s oil and gas industry. The study 
contributed knowledge towards improving the management of complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity of risk associated with the upstream oil and gas industry in Ghana.
   




This chapter presents the introductory part of the study which introduces the research 
background, research justification, the research aim and objectives, research scope, research 
methodology, organisation of the study and the summary of the chapter.  
 
 
1.2 Research Background 
The global economies and infrastructure continue to depend mainly on petroleum products to 
achieve other important societal goals. This makes the oil and gas industry to be an essential 
part of the world energy system. The upstream oil and gas industry (i.e. exploration, 
development, and production and decommissioning related activities) involves complex 
operations including include large-scale investment, application of sophisticated analytical 
methods, heavy engineering, and complex projects that need to be managed well to avoid major 
accidents in the industry. Many aspects of the upstream activities are inherently hazardous that 
pose risks to human lives, properties and the environment. Managing the safety of these 
operations entails a partnership of all the performances of the regulatory authorities, industry, 
labour and other stakeholders to ensure that activities are conducted safely (Lindøe et al., 
2014). However, several operations in the past had been marred by the sporadic occurrence of 
major hazard incidents which resulted in multiple consequences such as the loss of human 
lives, damage of properties and environmental pollutions (Baram et al., 2014; Attwood, 2017). 
Even though many advances have been made to the process of safety management in the 
industry, human and organisational factors continue to contribute to most of the hazard 
incidents and process failures today (Pariyani & Reniers 2018). This poses a challenge to 
developing oil and gas countries with weak risk governance structures. 
  
Ghana’s industrialisation continues to expand with the existence of several different types of 
industries. After a successful discovery of commercial quantities of oil and gas in 2007, the 
upstream oil and gas sector had received many investments from the government and 
multinational companies for the development of the industry. However, the ambition of any oil 
and gas organisation is to commence production and maximise recoverable hydrocarbon 
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resources for markets quickly. Ghana became an emerging oil and gas producing country after 
its first oil production in 2010 from the Jubilee field. The offshore oil and gas operations are 
located approximately 60 km off the coast of the Gulf of Guinea with water depth ranging from 
1200 to 1500 meters (Bergeron & Mutimer, 2012). Currently, the industry is operating with 
three different oil fields such as Jubilee, Tweneboa, Enyenra and Ntomme (TEN), and Sankofa. 
This indicates that the upstream oil and gas industry would be critical to Ghana’s economic 
development agenda. Given the need to maximise production, there is also a requirement 
placed on these organisations to ensure that they conduct their hazardous activities in a manner 
to prevent humans, facilities and the environment from unacceptable risks.  
  
However, the upstream oil and gas industry commenced under the country’s pre-existing weak 
risk governance structure. Unlike matured oil and gas regulated countries where government 
defines the Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) regulatory regime for the industry, Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas activities were conducted under fragmented and limited pre-existing 
safety regulatory infrastructure under weak regulatory bodies. In this regard, the upstream oil 
and gas operations had been executed in an integrated team fashion along with internal safety 
controls. After several years of lack of government effort to develop a befitted safety regime 
to prevent major hazard incidents from the industry, a new regulatory authority was established 
in 2013 under the Petroleum Commission Act (Act 821) with the subsequent safety enactments 
of Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act (Act 919) and Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) HSE Regulations (L.I. 2258) in 2016 and 2017 respectively.   
  
The current safety regime for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry is underpinned by the 
safety case approach. This regime requires every oil and gas company in the industry to submit 
a prepared assessment document that justifies the risk acceptability of their hazardous activities 
to the regulatory authority for approval. An engineering probabilistic risk assessment approach 
mainly drives existing safety management. This approach features potential complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity of risk issues. However, earlier experience of risk governance in the 
country’s industrial environment had always created negative consequences to human lives, 
facilities and the environment (Norman et al., 2015). Despite pre-existence of all the regulatory 
bodies in the country, industrial accidents in the Ghanaian industry sectors continue to rise due 
to poor implementation of safety management systems (Atombo et al., 2017). The literature 
indicated that the economic cost of these industrial accidents in the country is estimated to be 
$16 million annually. An earlier paper by Kotey (2016) reported some occurrence of incidents 
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in the development phase of the Jubilee field that included near-misses, injuries, process safety 
events and environmental events. These incidents were attributed to the lack of “operational 
discipline” or “management deficiencies” in the industry. Operational discipline is about 
performing all tasks correctly every time. These issues are related to safety management. 
  
Safety management is a matter for both the state and the industry that involves the prescription 
of norms and activities to see to it that these norms are duly complied (Kaasen, 2014). Safety 
management is a control problem. There are several organisations in the industry, including 
state and non-state actors involved in the oil and gas operations. Currently, the government of 
Ghana has passed a local content law that requires the majority of the local workers and 
companies to be recruited to participate in the industry. This policy seeks to drive maximum 
benefits from the exploitation of oil and gas resources. However, it is reported that a gap exists 
between knowledge and professional practices of the indigenous workforce trained for Ghana’s 
oil and gas activities (Benin, 2017). It is reported that most local organisations lack the 
technical expertise to undertake oil and gas activities in a way that meet international standards 
(Ackah & Mohammed, 2018). This has implication for safety management in the country’s oil 
and gas industry. Given the pre-existing risk governance challenges in the country, a proactive 




1.3 Research Justification 
Several major accident enquiry reports (e.g. Cullen, 1990; CSB, 2014) and scientific studies 
(e.g. Niven & McLeod, 2009; Broni-Bediako & Amorin, 2010; Baram et al., 2014; De Almeida 
& Vinnem, 2020) have indicated the inherently hazardous nature of the upstream oil and gas 
operations. These upstream oil and gas operations are associated with risks that have multiple 
potential consequences to human lives, properties, environment as well as economic costs. 
Generally, the industry had been marred by major accidents resulting in the erratic occurrence 
of blowouts, explosions and fires with multiple injuries and deaths among workforce, destroyed 
or damaged facilities, triggered major oil spills that polluted vast offshore and coastal areas 




It is established that 20-50% of workers in developed countries have access to sufficient 
occupational health and safety services, whereas developing countries have only 5-10% 
(LaDou, 2003; cited in Ncube & Kanda, 2018). Studies have indicated that Ghana, as one of 
these developing countries, is lagging behind effective safety practices (Annan et al., 2015 
Agyekum et al., 2018). There are many challenges with existing safety management practices 
in the country including lack of comprehensive national safety policies, current safety laws 
remain outdated, fragmented, and none-deterrent; weak safety infrastructures, lack of resources 
for existing regulatory institutions and many others (Dwumfour-Asare & Asiedu, 2013; 
Mustapha et al., 2016; Atombo et al., 2017; Acheampong & Akumperigya, 2018). Given the 
critical importance of the upstream oil and gas industry to the energy needs and economic 
growth of Ghana coupled with the increasing investment in exploration and production-related 
activities, safety needs to be given adequate attention in the industry.  
  
It must be indicated that after several years of oil and gas production in the country, the real 
picture on safety performance has not been adequately established. As required by the global 
forum, every member country must submit its yearly safety key performance indicators to the 
International Association of Oil and Gas producers (IOGP). As it stands now, no safety 
indicators had been provided yet by the country. However, an earlier indication by Kotey 
(2016) on some reported incidents during the development phase of the Jubilee field, could not 
provide an account of the safety indicators of the exploration and production-related activities. 
Although these reported incidents were less severe in terms of their consequences, Heinrich’s 
(1931) accident Triangle theory clearly indicates that unsafe acts and conditions may begin 
with minor incidents, and surprisingly lead to less frequent but significant major accidents. 
According to Bellamy (2012), near-misses or minor injuries have less severe consequences but 
expose the weaknesses in the system. These preliminary results provide a significant basis for 
an in-depth empirical study to be carried out to define the safety problem adequately in the 
industry.  
  
The introduction of local content policies in the upstream oil and gas industry in Ghana has 
implications for safety management. Local content refers to the “added value brought to a host 
nation or region locally through workforce development (employment and training of local 
workforce) and investments in supplier development in terms of developing and procuring 
supplies and services locally” (Daher, 2015, p.3). Given the globalisation nature of the 
industry, the majority of the operating companies bring along expatriates with the technical 
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know-how and experience. Contrarily, the local content policies allow the majority of the local 
workers to be employed in the industry. As shown in Table 1.1, in ten years, the majority of 
the workforce (70-80%) in both managerial and technical levels must be local people in any 
organisation in the industry. It also allows more outsourcing of local companies into 
construction-related activities in the industry. The construction-related activities including 
maintenance and fabrication activities are indicated to be growing mainly in the development 
and production phases of the upstream oil and gas industry (Misiti & Hebert, 2016; Popat et 
al., 2018). For example, in the annual report of Tullow Ghana (Tullow Ghana, 2014), 86% of 
the workforce recruited for the TEN oilfield projects represented Ghanaian workers and many 
local companies were involved in: supply of support activities (in exploration stage); 
fabrication activities (in development stage); maintenance and repair of equipment activities 
(in production stage) demolition, waste management and fabrication activities (in 
decommissioning & restoration stage). As shown in Figure 1.1, the local requirement has been 
relevant in involving more Ghanaian contracting companies in the upstream oil and gas 
industry. Studies on local content in the Ghanaian upstream oil and gas industry have 
established that local workers and companies lack the technical expertise required by the 
international standards (e.g. Peter & Arthur, 2014; Ackah & Mohammed, 2018). The 
implications for safety management may include compromising the quality of training and 
competence and the right attitudes to safety. This is because these are important influences to 
assure operational integrity (SPE, 2014). Human and organisational factors still continue to 
contribute to many of these hazard incidents and process failures today (Pariyani & Reniers, 
2018). The consistent quality of local human and organisational performance is critical in the 
operational safety of Ghana’s Oil and Gas industry. This makes local labour and contracting 
organisations essential in the risk governance of the industry.  
  
 
Table 1.1 Ghana’s local content requirements for the upstream oil and gas industry 
Human Resource Component Inception   Five Years’ Time Ten Years’ Time 
Management staff 30% 50-60% 70–80%, 
Core technical staff 20% 50-60% 70-80% 
Other staff 80% 90% 100% 
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Fig. 1. 1 Fabrication activities in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry 
                Source: J & P Engineering Ghana 
 
However, there is no adequate empirical research that had explicitly defined the safety 
management problem in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. The current probability-based 
risk assessment approach underpinning the existing safety management is found inadequate to 
capture background knowledge linked to the hazards. As a result, uncertainties of knowledge 
and potential surprises characterised operations (Aven & Renn, 2018). Given these challenges 
in the industry, there is a need to provide an integrated research that would develop a 
framework to address these challenges in the industry. 
 
 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this study is to develop a framework for robust safety management in the 
upstream oil and gas industry in Ghana. 
 
As indicated earlier, the problem confronting safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and 
gas industry has not been defined adequately. In establishing awareness of the safety 
management problem, the issues relating to risk governance must be examined. In this regard, 
the robustness of existing safety regulatory regime, safety performance indicators, safety 
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climate and safety management systems are worth considering in this research. The robustness 
of the safety regulatory regime, industry safety performance, safety climate perception and the 
implementation of existing safety management systems are critical for safety management. 
Given the aim of this research, the following research objectives are to be achieved:  
1. Assess the robustness of existing safety regulatory regime of Ghana’s upstream oil and 
gas industry. 
2. Identify the safety regulatory issues in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. 
3. Examine the safety performance indicators of Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. 
4. Assess workers’ perceptions of the influence of safety climate on hazard risks in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. 
5. Explore the drivers and barriers to a robust implementation of safety management 
systems in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. 




1.5 Research Scope  
This study focuses on establishment of the safety management problem and development of a 
framework that would serve as a practical guide to manage safety in the upstream oil and gas 
industry in Ghana. Safety management involves the prescription of safety norms and activities 
to ensure the safety norms have complied. It covers the contents and practices of safety in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The concept of risk governance is critical in this study 
as it forms the safety perspective in the upstream oil and gas industry. The robustness of safety 
regime, industrial safety performance indicators, safety climate and safety management 
systems are the main themes of this research.  
 
The oil and gas industry involve three major operation stages: upstream, midstream and 
downstream (ICSD, 2018). The upstream sector is defined earlier (section 1.1) but in this study 
covers exploration and production related activities. The midstream includes transportation 
(pipelines, rail cars and tankers), storage and marketing-related activities. The downstream 
covers refining, processing and distribution of petroleum products-related activities. However, 
the decommissioning aspect of the upstream oil and gas industry is not covered. This is because 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry is an emerging one and has not reached the 
decommissioning stage. Thus, no decommissioning activities are currently undertaken. The 
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upstream oil and gas operations involve large workforce (OGUK, 2019), and several activities 
have potential consequences to human lives, property damage, environmental pollution (Broni-
Bediako & Amorin, 2010; Oppong, 2014) and disruption of energy supply. These have 
implications to the multiplicity of stakeholders involved in the safety management of the 
upstream oil and gas industry. 
 
The risk governance in the industry covers and integration of the aspects of health, safety, 
security and quality. However, this study focuses on the aspect of safety, which will enable the 
researcher to avoid a broader scope of the study. Whether compliance or integration, safety 
management is a control problem. In this regard, this study focuses on developing a framework 
for addressing the fundamental safety control problem in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
industry. In terms of the types of organisations, this study will involve state regulatory 
institutions, operating companies, and contracting companies. 
 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
This study follows Design Science Research (DSR) as an approach to the research. This 
approach helps to define the safety management problem and creates a conceptual solution to 
improve the defined safety problem in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. Design science 
employs scientific study and develops artefacts to solve a practical problem (Kuechler & 
Vaishnavi, 2004). As emphasised by Heesom et al. (2008), there is a need to bridge the gap 
between research and industry. The DSR fulfils these two goals: truth and utility of knowledge. 
It goes to the extent of changing the world, improve it, and create new worlds through the 
creation of artefacts that can help people to fulfil their needs, solve their problem and grasp 
new knowledge (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014).  
  
In this study, four steps of the DSR process are adopted: establishing awareness of the 
problem, defining the requirements of the artefact, developing the artefact and evaluating the 
artefact. A pragmatist philosophical position underpins this study because it seeks to fulfil the 
truth and relevance of the knowledge outcome of the research. The study adopts both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods for these DSR activities. In terms of the data 
collection methods, the study employs the following techniques: documents, safety statistical 
data, questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews, workshop and focus group. The 
documents cover all the safety statutes and regulations relevant to Ghana’s upstream oil and 
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gas industry. The safety statistical data include fatalities, injuries, incidents, near-misses, 
medical treatment cases, reported diseases, restricted work cases and first aid cases. These are 
key safety performance indicators applicable to the upstream oil and gas industry (IOGP, 
2019a). The questionnaire data are obtained from 212 workers that include engineering 
professionals, operation management, contractors, maintenance/craft technicians, maintenance 
management and other related job categories in the upstream oil and gas industry. However, 
the semi-structured interview data are obtained from 14 professionals working in the industry 
in different managerial and supervisory roles. The participants worked in different organisation 
types that included regulatory institutions, government agencies, operating companies, 
contracting companies and the Labour union. The same participants were used to collect the 
data for the workshop and the focus group. It must be indicated that 12 and 9 participants 
participated in the workshop and focus group, respectively. The data analytical techniques 
included literature review, descriptive statistical analysis, factor analysis, multiple regression 
analysis and content analysis. This study applies this software IBM SPSS (version 25) and 
Nvivo (version 12) to perform the analysis. 
 
 
1.7 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured into six chapters which are summarised as follows: 
• Chapter 1 - Introduction: This chapter provides the introductory part of the study 
which covers the research background, research justification, research aim and 
objectives, research scope, research methodology and the organisation of the thesis.  
 
• Chapter 2 – Literature Review: It provides the theoretical background of the study. 
This chapter offers a critical review of the literature relevant to safety management. It 
covers the risk governance in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry, the robustness of 
safety regime and its assessment, safety performance indicators, safety climate 
influences on hazard incident risk and safety management systems and its 
implementation. 
 
• Chapter 3 – Research Methodology: This chapter presents the research methodology 
of the study. It covers the methodological approach that defines the philosophical 
position, the design science research as the research approach, research methods and 
the ethical consideration of the study.  
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• Chapter 4 – Data Analysis and Research Findings: It presents the data analysis and 
the research findings for the four steps of the DSR activities adopted for this study. The 
data analysis and key findings of documents, safety statistics, questionnaire surveys, 
semi-structured interviews, workshop and focus group are presented to fulfil these DSR 
steps establishing awareness of the problem, defining the requirements of the 
framework, developing the framework and evaluating the framework. 
 
• Chapter 5 – Discussion: It presents the discussion of the key research findings. It 
bridges the gap between the literature findings and the empirical findings of the study. 
The discussion is structured into two parts: problem facing safety management and 
conceptual solution to address the problem.  
 
• Chapter 6- Conclusion and Recommendations: This chapter provides the conclusion 
of the study. It covers the synthesis of the research objects, contribution to knowledge, 




The upstream oil and gas industry is inherently hazardous as many aspects of the exploration 
and production activities pose risks to human lives, properties and the environment. This 
chapter provided the background of the research and its justification. The aim and objectives 
of this study were stated. The adopted research methodology was summarised and justified. 
The next chapter provides the theoretical background of this research.  
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This chapter provides a crtical review of the literature relevant to safety management in the 
upstream oil and gas industry. Safety management involves prescription of safety norms and 
compliance activities of these norms. The review covers safety regulatory regime of Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry, robustness of safety regime and its its assessment, safety 
performance indicators, safety climate influences on hazard incident risk and safety 
management systems and its implementation.  
 
 
2.2 Safety Management in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry 
Safety is defined as the state of being free from unacceptable consequences (Li & Guldenmund, 
2018). There are several defintions of safety management in safety literature. The concept of 
safety management is linked to practices, roles and functions towards realising safety in an 
organization (Kirwan, 1998; cited in Mearns et al., 2003). In Grote’s (2012) review of the 
defintions of safety management, conceived it as a means to several ends that relates to 
promoting safety culture and organisational safety performance. Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2011) 
referred it as, the policies, strategies, procedures and activities implemented or followed by the 
management of an organisation targeting safety of their employees. Li and Guldenmund (2018) 
see it as the process of actualizing the safety functions. Safety is differentiated from safety 
management. The former is the condition, whiles the latter is the process of activities to realise 
it. The primary functions of safety management are the protection of human beings, property 
and the environment from unacceptable risks (Noy &Yonson, 2018; Li & Guldenmund, 2018). 
This is because safety management is as a systematic control of employee performance, 
machine performance and the physical environment (Heinrich et al., 1980). In this study, these 
functions are applied.  
 
The literature traced the origin of safety management from the maiden Workmen Compensation 
Act of 1908 which indicated that irrespective of the nature of faults, management is responsible 
for injuries occurrence at the workplace (Petersen, 1978; Li & Guldenmund, 2018). Since this 
 12 
period, occupational accidents were understood from a technical perspective. The industrial 
revolution was powered by boilers. In United States, the stream boilers exploded with terrifying 
frequency that caused 50,000 deaths and two million injuries of workers annually which led 
professional bodies in 1915 to quest for the development of safety codes for designs, testing 
inspecting and operating the boilers (Baram & Lindøe, 2014). However, scientific development 
of safety management is believed to have commenced with Heinrich’s publication entitled 
“Industrial Accident Prevention: A scientific approach” (Heinrich, 1931). His research 
developed the domino model of accident causation, which viewed unsafe conditions and acts 
as the fundamental causes of industrial incidents and accidents. Heinrich’s model ascribed the 
role of management in actualising industrial safety and efficient production. In this period, the 
cause of accident was more linked to human error or human factor. 
 
In the upstream oil and gas industry, safety management started to gain more attention in 1980s 
after several accidents had occurred in several operations and that there was the need to manage 
safety. The inquiry report of the Piper Alpha disaster in 1987 recommended safety management 
systems for the oil and gas industry organisations (Cullen, 1990). This safety management 
system has become a critical regulatory requirement underpinning various safety regulatory 
regimes in the industry. Safety management seeks to address a multiple control problem (Björn 
& Rollenhagen, 2014; Li & Guldenmund, 2018). This requires prescription of safety norms 
and control that these norms are duly complied with (Kaasen, 2014). According to Yang et al. 
(2009), an effective safety management requires an optimal control of risk that are based on 
the multiplicity of uncertainty attributes. In this study, safety management is understood to 
cover risk regulations and implementation of those activities to achieve the safety functions. 
The risk regulation relates to those policies and rules that are made to address a particular risk. 
Implementation in this context relates to means to achieve the safety functions. Safety 
management are based on different regulatory regimes as these regimes establish the rules and 
standards that must govern how risks are dealt with within a specific regulatory context. The 
concept of regulatory regime is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
2.2.1 The Concept of Regulatory Regime 
The concept of regulation has several meanings in the literature. According to Levi-Faur 
(2011), the idea is hard to define due to its myriad application for discursive, theoretical and 
analytical purposes that requires clarification. For Koop and Lodge (2017), it is because of the 
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lack of shared understanding. Levi-Faur (2011), in his discussion of the concept, captured 
meanings of the idea, is often employed in the literature. Sociologists and criminologists 
conceived regulation as a social control that emphasised shaming, issuing restorative justices 
and responsive command. Legal scholars viewed it as a legal instrument. Progressive 
Democrats understood it as a public good in the form of a tool that seeks to control profit-
hungry capitalists as well as social and ecological risks. Koop et al. (2017, p. 3) categorised 
the conceptualisation of regulation documented in the literature (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004; 
Baldwin et al., 2012) into the following three meanings: 
1. “Promulgation of an authoritative set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism for 
monitoring and promoting compliance with these rules”.  
2. “All the efforts of state agencies to steer the economy”. 
3. “All mechanisms of social control – including unintentional and non-state processes”. 
However, variations in the conceptualisation of regulation are mainly linked to the differences 
in disciplinary concerns. Political scientists, lawyers and economists underscored the first two 
meanings, while the socio-legal scholars stressed the third meaning. For this study, the third 
meaning of the regulation is applied. Regulation is one of the several social controls that are 
used to prevent major industrial accidents (Baram & Lindøe, 2014). Regulation as a critical 
social control has the potential in minimising risks posed by industrial hazardous activities to 
human life as well as injuries and other health-related impacts, destroy or damage to assets in 
society or systems, and environmental pollutions. Such an effort in minimising these risks 
requires regimes that can withstand or survive perturbations or external shocks. Regime implies 
inclusive way risk is regulated in a specific policy domain (Hood et al., 2001). Regulatory 
regimes become a crucial concept in the safety management of industrial hazardous activities. 
  
Hood et al. (2001, p. 9) defined a regime as “the complexity of institutional geography, rules, 
practices, and animating ideal that are associated with the regulation of a particular risk or 
hazard”. This understanding suggests three fundamental features of a regime: as 
a system which has emergent property, has a degree of continuity over time and relatively 
confined systems that is possible to be specified at different levels in the organisation. Given 
this meaning of regime, the regulatory regime is translated to be conceived as the “systems for 
achieving regulatory goals” (May, 2004, p. 2). The system is made up of institutional structures 
and the actions taken by the regulatory agencies. The institutional structures composed of three 
elements: (1) rules governing expected behaviour of an individual or organisation, (2) 
standards representing the benchmarks for compliance and (2) sanctions for non-compliance 
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with these rules. However, it is pointed out that alteration in any of these elements may change 
the nature of the regime.  In both research and professional contexts, instead of coordinating 
the social controls, the practice is always to provide a coherent and efficient institutional system 
that would concurrently promote the application of technological advances in the industry in 
maximising production while protecting humans, facilities and the environment from 
unacceptable risk. This practice is consistent with democratic principles, legal basis, societal 
values and norms. In the current practice, government’s role of controlling the risk of industrial 
hazardous activities is to delegate this obligation to the industry. There are various modes of 




2.2.2 Modes of Regulation for Prevention of Major Incidents 
For several years, there have been vigorous controversies regarding government’s rigidity in 
the application of command-and-control prescription of norms for controlling the risk of 
hazardous industrial activities and the suitability of alternative modes of regulations. Much of 
these controversies are well documented in the literature (e.g. Levi-Faur, 2011; May, 2011; 
Baram & Lindøe, 2014; Kringen, 2014). Various regulatory regimes exist for countries to use 
to control the risk of hazardous industrial activities. There are three main forms of regulatory 
regimes. As shown in Figure 2.1, there are three main modes of regulations that vary in terms 
of regulatory foci, compliance determination and their nature of rules and standards. They are 
public regulation (prescriptive regulation), co-regulation (performance-based regulation) and 
the hybrid regulation. The prescriptive regulation develops regimes that provide prescribed 
actions, inspect that organisations adhere to the prescribed actions and provide particularistic 
and detailed specific rules and standards to control hazardous industrial activities. The United 
States reflect this regime type. The co-regulation is a derivative of the collaboration between 
government and the industry which seeks to fulfil the performance-based regulation. It is a 
self-regulatory regime that focuses on objective or outcomes, ensure that organisations achieve 
the desired results and specifies the goal-oriented outcomes. The United Kingdom, Australia 
and Norway reflect this form of a regulatory regime. The hybrid regulation features aspects of 
prescribed actions, process and outcomes, considers ensuring compliance with alternative 
provisions and accepts alternatives or codes of practices. The Canadian regime reflects this 





Fig. 2. 1 Modes of regulation for prevention of major incidents 
                        Source: Adapted from May (2011). 
 
The application of the traditional government prescriptive regulatory approach is less attractive 
to ensure robust control of industrial hazardous activities in these days. Many of the limitations 
of the government command-and-control approach have been discussed in Baram and Lindøe 
(2014). It lacks the ability to keep pace with the speedily emerging technologies and 
incorporate the continuous flowing of new risk information and lessons learnt. Because of the 
governmental dearth of technical expertise in terms of prescription of suitable designs and 
operations for ensuring the safety of complex systems, it requires alternative modes of 
regulation. The strict application of one-way prescriptive rules is not appropriate for 
organisations with particular operational situations and affect their in-house expertise to 
provide a more cost-effective superior approaches to safety. Traditional command-and-control 
prescriptive approach involves costs and resources in developing regulations and monitoring 
and controlling compliance. The need for deregulation and privatization of government 
obligation to control the risk of industrial hazardous activities had been more fueled by major 
accidents in the industry. Several factors have been indicated in support for the development 
of performance-based regulations. They include the following: the changed values and attitudes 
from bureaucratic processes that are inherent in the traditional command-and-control 
prescriptions, the fear of international competitions and the propensity of transferring of 
industrial market to flexible regulated areas abroad, and accidents have emasculated the 
confidence in government regulators.  
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However, the development of alternative modes of regulation which had led to the use of 
performance-based rules to achieve the safety management functions had failed to bring an end 
to these controversies. This is because the delegation of self-regulatory responsibility to private 
companies has raised three main contested issues in the literature: legitimacy, accountability 
and legality (Baram & Lindøe, 2014; Kringen, 2014). The robustness of safety management 
would also depend on the following: legitimacy in terms of delegating the state responsibility 
of safety control to private companies undertaking the hazardous activities, the accountability 
that ensures that private companies self-regulate in a way that satisfies government’s 
obligations and the legality of implementing the decision made by the regime.  
 
This study argues that to address the knowledge of uncertainty, which is inherent in the risk 
governance, the regulatory authority must define the risk acceptance criteria. This argument is 
based on the societal safety view and the basic economic principles (the expected utility 
theory). The government has a primary responsibility to protect society from the negative 
externalities of the hazardous industrial activities. The consequences of accident may not fully 
be taken to consideration by private organisations (Abrahamsen & Aven, 2012). Therefore, 
delegating government’s full responsibility of controlling risk of hazardous industrial activities 
to private companies may lead to compromising societal safety. This is because it is noted that 
private organisations have historically indicated to have gravely compromised societal safety 
and caused several harms due to their economic interests and opportunism (Baram & Lindøe, 
2014). These private companies capitalize the weakness of weak regulatory authorities to fulfil 
their own economic interest. In the application of the expected utility theory to decision making 
analysis of risk acceptance criteria (Aven & Kørte, 2003; Abrahamsen 2011; Abrahamsen & 
Aven, 2012), it clearly underscores that the marginal rate of substitution for society in terms of 
negative externalities is higher than that of the operating organisations. In other words, 
investing in self-protection relative to negative externalities is more effective than that for the 
operating organisations. The hazardous industrial activities undertaken by private companies 
always will cause risk to society and therefore the regulatory authority must define the risk 




2.2.3 Assessment of Safety Regulatory Regimes 
This section examines studies on evaluation of safety regulatory regimes in the upstream oil 
and gas industry with a view to explore for the existing approaches for assessment and ascertain 
whether there is a consensual approach for determination of superiority of a safety regulatory 
regime. In his review of causes of major accidents in the oil and gas industry, Attwood (2017) 
emphatically stated that those causes could have been avoided if there had been implementation 
of an effective regulatory regime. The concept effectiveness has been the basis for such 
evaluation of regulatory regimes. Windle et al. (2008) defined an effectiveness within the 
context of safety regulation as the relationship between the regulatory change and trends in 
respect of the occurrence of incidents. In other words, the effectiveness of safety regulatory 
regimes is contingent on the trends of occurrence of incidents. Some researchers have 
employed safety performance indicators to evaluate the efficacy of existing safety regulatory 
regimes in the oil and gas industry. To investigate such efficacy of existing regulatory regimes, 
comparative analyses are made on regimes between prescriptive and performance-based 
regulations.   
 
Barua et al. (2016) conducted a quantitative comparative analysis of regulatory regimes in 
United Kingdom and United States based on an offshore oil and gas recorded incidents data. 
They sought to provide some understanding of the effectiveness of the two different matured 
regulatory regimes. In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) data shown 
that fatality cases were low (e.g. 2008 - 2011 = 0 fatality; 2012 = 2 fatalities, & 2014 = 1 
fatality).  Incident cases that resulted in major injuries and hydrocarbon release appeared 
constant within the period from 2008 to 2014, and the number of dangerous occurrences also 
declined in the last three years. Whereas in the United States, Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) submitted recordable incidents of the Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS) from 2008 to 2014 indicated relatively higher fatality rates (i.e. 2008 to 2010 = 
8.7). The average fatality rate declined to 2.75 from 2011 to 2014. Barua et al. analysis 
indicated that the United Kingdom’s regulatory regime appeared successful mainly because 
fatality rate was relatively lower in the offshore oil and gas production activities. Although 
they could not directly conclude from their study whether prescriptive regulatory regime was 
less effective to performance-based regulatory regime, it became apparent that the new 
regulation which was constituted in November 2010 incorporated some aspects of 
performance-based regulation that actually improved incidents rates.  
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Mendes et al. (2014) conducted a comparative analysis of the Brazilian safety regulatory 
framework for its offshore oil and gas operations to that of other experienced regimes (i.e. 
United Kingdom, United States & Norway). They adopted both safety performance data from 
2010 to 2012 (i.e. major injuries, fatalities, major & minor collisions, & fires) and key 
regulatory features (i.e. tripartite collaboration, barrier management, safety case, & safety 
research). The tripartite collaboration is about the three-way corporation among the 
government, employees and companies. The barrier management is a risk management 
approach that provides understanding on the critical control systems, and their assessment and 
monitoring of the regular status of operations (PSA, 2013).  The safety case works under the 
principle that the state establishes the broad safety goals to be achieved and the operator 
develop specific most suitable means of achieving those stipulated goals.  In this case the 
operator submits a document containing a comprehensive analysis of all the hazards and their 
risks of the facility in question.  Investment in safety research and development forms a key 
requirement of both the government (regulator) and the industry to make a significant 
investment in research and development in system safety (see NAENRC, 2012). From the 
analaysis, each country has its own strengths. Regulatory effectiveness was determined by 
safety performance indicators and the emphasis was placed on the regulatory features. 
 
Jain et al. (2017) investigated the process safety performance of four countries under regulatory 
regimes between safety case regimes and government prescriptive regimes. These regulatory 
regimes were analysed in relation to their effectiveness of preventing process safety events in 
the oil and gas industry. It became indicative from their analysis, that countries (e.g. United 
Kingdom, Australia) under safety case had relatively lower incidents cases as against United 
State regulatory approach. In other words, with respect to safety performance indicators, 
United States’ regulatory approach appeared indicating lower process safety performance. 
However, it must be pointed out that even these countries under safety case regulatory approach 
recorded differences in process safety performance as Australia was better than United 
Kingdom. It can be indicated that there are many differences of process safety incidents 
performance among countries under the same regulatory approach. It was apparent that no 
country or region was overwhelmingly better in terms of safety performance indicators. 
Although there was no conclusive evidence from their analysis to suggest superiority of a 
regulatory regime, the available safety performance indicators clearly shown that United States 
performed relatively lower than those countries under safety case regulatory approach. There 
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was paucity of evidence in determination of superiority of a regulatory regime and this was 
attributed to the lack of publicly available process safety data for the studied countries as well 
as for the industry for a more detailed quantitative analysis. 
 
Attwood (2017) examined the safety performance indicators of the regulatory regimes under 
the following countries: Denmark, Nigeria, China, United States, Canada, United Kingdom, 
Australia, and Norway. The safety performance indicator used for the analysis included the 
Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR). The TRIR was calculated as the summation of 
fatalities, lost workday cases, restricted workday cases, and medical treatment cases per million 
hours worked. Attwood argued that the differences in process safety regulatory approaches are 
not significant as having a justifiably defined and enacted form of regulation. The main 
assertion is that the root causes of such major incidents could have been avoided if there had 
been existing effective regulatory regimes with rigorous implementation. It is indicative in 
Attwood’s study that the focus on determination of regulatory effectiveness should be placed 
on implementation of safety programs.  
 
Acheampong and Akumperigya (2018) presented a comparative analysis of two countries 
operating under performance-based regulatory regimes (United Kingdom & Norway) and used 
the benchmarks to determine the strength of Ghana’s existing regulatory regime for prevention 
of major hazard incidents in the offshore oil and gas industry.  In contrast to the use of safety 
performance indicators in determination of the effectiveness of regulatory regimes, they 
conducted a review analysis based on regulatory features that included: legal framework and 
structures, regulatory authority, workforce involvement, compliance, cost sharing, and objects 
covered.  
 
From the above examination of the literature, there appeared to be no consensus on what 
constituted effectiveness of a regulatory regime and how to determine it. Some researchers 
used safety performance indicators to determine the effectiveness of exiting safety regulatory 
regimes. Some also used regulatory properties to form a benchmark framework analysis to 
determine the effectiveness of safety regulatory regimes. Whereas other used both to evaluate 
the effectiveness of existing safety regulatory regimes. It must be pointed out that indicator for 
safety has different meanings and for different purposes (e.g. “safety performance indicator”, 
“safety outcome measures”, “safety indicator”). For the purpose of making comparative 
analysis for changes in level of safety performance, safety performance indicator is preferably 
used (Blakstad, 2014). Safety performance indicator is defined as an avenue for evaluating the 
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changes in level of safety in terms of major incident prevention, preparedness and response 
(Skogdalen et al., 2010, cited in Blakstad, 2014). However, using safety performance indicator 
to evaluate the effectiveness of a regulatory regime between countries is may be associated 
with several difficulties. Much of these difficulties have been discussed in the literature (e.g. 
Hood et al.,2001; Blakstad, 2011, 2014). As found in the literature, there are differences in 
scope of oil and gas operation activities among different regulatory regimes that may affect the 
quality of unified safety indicators for the analysis of the effectiveness of regulatory 
performance.  
 
Despite a recent attempt by Burton et al. (2017) to provide a benchmark against which 
comparison of safety performance indicators should be made to determine the effectiveness of 
existing safety management systems, they failed to establish the link between safety 
performance indicators and regulatory effectiveness. It must be indicated that good safety 
performance indicators must have a direct link to regulatory system status (with complexity to 
manipulation), relate to the future system states and performance, and must give real time 
information (Fleming, 2010; cited in Blakstad, 2014). Again, in the developing countries, data 
for safety performance indicators may usually be underreported (Mearn & Yule, 2009; Mendes 
et al., 2014). Given this practice of underreporting of safety performance indicators, the true 
reflection of the safety performance in developing countries may not be established. Therefore, 
a comparative analysis of low incident rates under a regulatory regime of a developing country 
against higher incident rates under an advanced regulatory regime may possibly results to 
misleading analysis in determination of effectiveness of a regulatory regime. This is because 
there are issues associated with underreporting of safety data, differences in definition and 
reporting of safety indicators. Moreover, national characteristics are noted to influence safety 
performance indicators that makes comparative analysis difficult to conclude (Blakstad, 2014). 
Although there is paucity of empirical knowledge on how national culture influence safety 
performance in the upstream oil and gas industry, the differences in national characteristics 
(e.g. culture, values, regulatory properties) under the regimes may affect the quality of data for 
comparative analysis of regulatory performance.   
 
From the literature, there is no empirical evidence suggesting superiority of a safety regulatory 
regime. It must be pointed that the regulatory characteristics underpinned by the prevailing 
national cultural influences, disparities in scope of upstream oil and gas activities, differences 
in definition and reporting of safety data, and differences in regulatory architecture features 
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may contribute to the conclusion that determination of regulatory regime superiority is 
problematic in comparative analysis. Several regulatory improvements that had taken place in 
the global upstream oil and gas industry were largely driven by lessons learned from major 
incident events. Such lessons emerged from scientific studies on retrospective analysis of the 
link between existing safety regulatory regime and the major incident events which 
subsequently resulted to the need for incremental modifications within the remit of existing 
regime’s premises, designs, and implementations, or the passage of a new safety regulatory 
regime (Baram et al., 2014). The way forward is to focus our attention on the issues associated 
with the governance of risk in the upstream oil and gas industry. This is because the issue of 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity associated with risk are not adequately addressed in 
existing safety management approach (Marjolein et al., 2011; Renn, 2014). This brings to the 
essence of risk governance concept which started becoming popular in the last two decades.  It 
describes the structures and processes relating to collective decision making in dealing with 
risk issues (Marjolein et al., 2011). It relates to how regulations, institutions and processs 
interact in decision making to address risk issues. Such processes and structures involve 
government and non-governmental actors. The central ideal of risk governance is how relevant 
are the involvement of stakeholders in the gathering, assessing, evaluating, managing and 
communicating the risks knowledge. Given the context of this study, the next section reviews 
the current risk governance pertained to Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
2.3 Risk Governance in Ghana’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry 
This section critically reviews existing risk governance related to the upstream oil and gas 
industry. The purpose of this section is to examine existing safety regulatory and institutional 
framework as well as the current knowledge gap in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. It 
begins by providing an overview of industrial safety development and practices in Ghana.  This 
is to understand the issues linked to existing safety regulatory and institutional frameworks that 
preceded the emergence of the new Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. 
 
 
2.3.1 An Overview of Industrial Safety Development in Ghana  
The development of safety in Ghana can be traced back to the 1930’s, a period where there was 
no existing designated body for the labour administration, and also occupational safety 
practices were limited to the processing and payment of compensations to workers who were 
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accidentally injured (Asiedu, 2010; Dwumfour-Asare & Asiedu, 2013). In 1938, the British 
Colonia Administration established a Labour Department and legally empowered it to deal 
with general labour administration. In 1951, a fully qualified and experienced factory British 
inspector was appointed to oversee the health, safety and welfare of workers at the various 
workplaces. During that period, workers in the mining and wood processing industries were 
protected by the first enactment of the Factories Ordinance of 1952, which aimed at providing  
protection to industrial workers from being harmed at the workplaces (Dadzie, 2013). It must 
be indicated that prior to Ghana’s political independence in 1957 from the British colonial 
administration, the country’s safety laws were inherited from the British legal and institutional 
framework. The Factories Ordinance of 1952 was the single safety law which only focused on 
occupational injuries in then mining and wood processing industries until it was replaced by 
the Factories, Offices, and Shops Act (Act 328) of 1970.  The Factories, Offices, and Shops Act 
(Act 328) continues to exist today as a general safety law in Ghana. However, there are other 
regulations that were subsequently enacted to promote health, safety and environmental 
protection (e.g. Mining Regulations of 1970, L.I. 665; Workmen’s Compensation Law of 1987; 
Ghana Health Services and Teaching Hospital Act 526 of 1999; Ghana Atomic Energy Act 204 
of 1963; Environmental Protection Agency Act of 1994, Act 490) in some few specific 
industries in the country. These safety statutes had existed in fragmentation, incoherence and 
with limited coverage to provide guidance for the provision of safety services in the country 
(Mustapha et al., 2016; Agyekum & Simons, 2018). This points to several inadequacies of 
existing safety regulatory framework for the general industrial activities in Ghana.  
 
 
2.3.1.1 Existing Safety Institutional Framework 
The Labour Department had Factories Inspectorate Unit in 1985 and was transformed to an 
independent body known as the Department of Factories Inspectorate (DFI) with the mandate 
of promoting health and safety of persons within the purview of the Factories, Offices, and 
Shops (Act 328) of 1970. The DFI subsequently became a department under the Ministry of 
Employment and Labour Relations (MoEL) with the following core functions:    
• Inspection of workplaces to ensure maintenance of reasonable standards of health and 
safety; 
• Prosecution of offences under the Factories, Offices and Shops (Act 328);  
• Investigation of reportable occupational accidents and dangerous occurrences. 
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The review of the literature as summarised in Table 2.1 clearly points to several weaknesses 
associated with existing safety institutional framework governing the general industrial 
activities in Ghana. Existing institutions relevant to the governance of risk in the general 
industrial activities in the country appeared inffective.  There appeared to be no or little effort 
by government to improve enforcement practices of general safety norms in the country.  
 
 
2.3.1.2 Existing Industrial Safety Practices  
Ghana’s industrialization continues to grow with the presence of different types of industries 
leading to existence of large workforce being exposed to hazardous conditions (Annan et al., 
2015). In Ghana, industrial accidents and fire outbreaks data obtained in the past two decades 
indicate an increasing trend of work-related injuries, fatalities, property damages, process 
losses and alarming frequency in fire outbreaks across the various workplaces in the country 
(Norman et al., 2015). In examination of extant literature on safety practices in Ghana as 
summarised in Table 2.1, the literature clearly points to several gaps in the implementation of 
safety management system in various industries in the country. The literature also indicates 
increasing trends in accidents which suggests poor safety performance in the Ghanaian 
industries. Several studies have linked the causes of these accidents to poor safety culture in 
the Ghanaian industries. Several of these issues have been summarised as follows:   
• Lack of national comprehensive safety policies 
• Ineffective safety institutional framework  
•  Lack of government and industry commitment to safety 
• Poor safety culture  
• Non-compliance of safety  
• Lack of training and supervision  
The studies (e.g. Ofosu, et al., 2014; Mustapha et al., 2016; Donkoh & Aboagye-Nimo, 2017; 
Agyekum et al., 2018) have revealed poor safety practices among the workers and the local 
construction organisations. Several factors have been identified from these studies that affect 
risk government in the construction industry in the country which included the following:  
• Limited safety communication 
• Lack of workers’ PPE  
• Contractors ignorance of safety due to pressures to meet production deadlines. 
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• Poor personal attitudes 
• Ineffective safety laws and  
• lack of safety enforcement 
•  Poor equipment maintenance 
• inadequate safety meetings 
• Inadequate evaluation of safety programme 
• Lack of emergency response plans 
• Lack of safety investment 
• Poor incidents or accident data management 
• Uncooperative clients  
• Inadequate work procedures 
• Inefficient training  
From the review, existing studies have well documented the issues confronting safety 
regulation and implementation of safety management systems in the generality of Ghanaian 
industries. The central issue is the existence of an ineffective risk governance framework 
governing safety in the country. With the emergence of upstream oil and gas industry, which 
is more inherently hazardous, the governance of risk becomes critical in dealing with the 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity associated with the upstream oil and gas operations. In 
this regard, to what extent indicates that safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
industry would be robust given the existing experience? The next section examines existing 
risk governance framework governing Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. 
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Table 2. 1 Summary of literature review on Ghanaian industrial safety practices 
 Study                             Industry          Aim                                                 Methods                                                Findings 
Acakpovi &                    Energy           Investigate the level of                      Questionnaires and interviews              Factors influencing workers’ safety include: 
Dzamikumah (2016)                             compliance of OHS                           interviews of managers,                        (i) lack of management commitment; 
                                                              management systems and                  supervisors, safety officers                   (ii) lack of training and supervision; 
                                                              standards set by international            and technician engineers.                      (iii) lack of periodic checks on machines operations 
                                                              and local legislation in power                                                                          (iv) non-observance of safe work procedures 
                                                              producing companies in Ghana 
 
Tulashie et. al. (2016)    General          Outline the various applicable           Quantitative analysis using                  (i) workers have little information about national 
                                       Industries       exposure assessment strategy            basic statistics of the sample                     requirements to ensure effective management  
                                                              and recommend controls and             sizes of the Similar Exposure                   of workplace safety; 
                                                              conditions that makes the                  Group’s (SEG’s) in the                       (ii) no specific standards on what employers and workers                                     
                                                             process work better in Ghana             country                                                     should meet in order to ensure acceptable management 
                                                                                                                                                                                           of OHS in the country; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    (iii) it is not unclear to a Ghanaian worker                  
                                                                                                                                                                                          what at is considered safe and unsafe; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    (iv) no national policy on OHS; 
                                                                                                                                                                                     (v) the country has not still ratified the   
                                                                                                                                                                                          ILO convention.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Amponsah-Tawiah      Transport        Explore the impact of safety              Cross sectional survey                        (i) Young drivers in more risky driving 
& Mensah (2016)          (Road)           climate, age and tenure as a                design of 350 drivers.                               behaviours relative to adult drivers; 
                                                             driver on safety related                                                                                  (ii) Tenure of a driver did not   
                                                             behaviours among 290                                                                                         significantly affect work related  
                                                            company drivers in Ghana.                                                                                   driver behaviours;  
                                                                                                                                                                                  (iii) Ghana’s commitment to safety is        
                                                                                                                                                                                          lackadaisical because there is no                                                                                                                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                                          national health and safety policy     
                                                                                                                                                                                          that stimulates safety behaviour and                          
                                                                                                                                                                                          sanctions for different sectors of  
                                                                                                                                                                                          the country’s economy. 
 
Amponsah-Tawiah     Mining           Examine the relationship                     Cross sectional survey                        (i) An inverse correlation existed between the dimensions  
et al. (2016)                                       between the dimensions of                  design collected                                       of OHS management (leadership, supervision, safety  
                                                          OHS management systems                  quantitative data from 255                       facilities and equipment, and safety procedures) 
                                                          and turnover intention in                      mine workers conveniently                     ad turnover intention of workers; 
                                                          in the mining sector of                         sampled.                                             (ii) turnover intension of workers was influenced by the                  
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                                                          Ghana.                                                                                                                   commitment of safety leadership to ensure effective  
                                                                                                                                                                                        formulation of policies and supervision 
                                                                                                                                                                                        of OHS at the workplace. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Annan et. al.            General           Identify the areas of                              Literature review                                    Ghana’s OHS legal requirements are fragmented, under      
  (2015)                    Industries        opportunities for                                                                                                   different jurisdictions with unclear responsibilities 
                                                        improvement OHS                                                                                                and accountabilities. No comprehensive national OHS 
                                                        management in Ghana in                                                                                       policy     
                                                        terms of national legal                               
                                                        requirements 
                                                                                                                                
Oppong (2014)     Oil & Gas         Explore the literature to                        Literature review                                 The review shows that: 
                                                        identify common occupational                                                                          (i) Contusion, cuts and laceration are that  
                                                        injuries, diseases and                                                                                               commonest occupational injuries suffered 
                                                        psychological wellbeing on                                                                                     by oil rig workers; 
                                                        oil rigs and negative                                                                                          (ii) The commonest occupational injuries  
                                                        environmental impacts                                                                                            are musculoskeletal disorders, respiratory 
                                                                                                                                                                                  (iii) Offshore workers experience higher  
                                                                                                                                                                                         level of stress, burnout, anxiety,  
                                                                                                                                                                                         depression, low level of job satisfaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                         and sleep disorder; 
                                                                                                                                                                                 (iv) The commonest negative environmental  
                                                                                                                                                                                         impacts are oil spills, leakages, ecosystem 
                                                                                                                                                                                         disruption, climate change, air pollution, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         acid rain, environmental degradation and 
                                                                                                                                                                                         land-use problems. 
   
Amponsah et. al.   Mining          Examine the effects of physical              Cross-sectional survey                           Mining conditions, equipment, ambient conditions, support 
(2013)                                         and psychological risk factors on            of 307 workers from 5                            and security, and work demands, and control are significant 
                                                   workers’ safety experience in the             mining companies.                                predictors of near misses, disabling injuries, and accidents                              
                                                    mining industry.                                                                                                     experienced or witnessed by workers.                        
                                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Dadzie (2013)   Construction    Identify how clauses in the                         Survey questionnaires                     (i) The clauses in the Labour Act 651 addressing the health 
                                                   Labour Act 651 address appropriate          of 200 workers (architect                      and safety standards were poorly followed; 
                                                   Health and safety standards used                quantity surveyors, site                   (ii) Key challenges confronting the adaptation of the Labour 
                                                   in the construction site and                         and structural engineers)                     Act are: poor risk assessment, inadequate training, 
                                                   possible challenges facing.                                                                                      poor workers’ attitudes towards health and safety, cost,                               
                                                   adaption of the                                                                                                          reporting shortfalls, lack of health and safety professionals 
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                                                   the were used for the study                                                                                      inadequate health and safety policies, data collection 
                                                   adaption of the requirements of                                                                               shortfalls, and lack of health and safety education. 
                                                   health and safety in the Ghana’s  
                                                   Labour Act. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Achaw &       Oil & Gas           Investigate safety practices to                    Industrial and institutional                 (i) No national policy of OHS to guide operations of   
Boateng                                     ascertain if the industry has the                 visits, interviews and                                the industry; 
(2012)                                        wherewithal to safeguard health                questionnaires and desktop               (ii) Lapses were observed in the way companies practice 
                                                  safety of workers and properties                workshop were used to                               safety; 
                                                   and environment.                                       investigate designated                      (iii) Existing regulatory and monitoring institutions were  
                                                                                                                      personnel management.                             under resourced.                 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Gyekye             Mining             Develop and test a model on the               Questionnaires were used                  (i) Workers perceptions of workplace safety shows the 
et. al.            Manufacturing     relationship between workers                    for the study to develop                           strongest impact on accident frequency in the industries. 
(2012)           & Wood               personal characteristics and                       and test a model from                        (ii) workplace fatalities are as a human and work  
                                                  organisational variables, and                     a sample of 320 industrial                       environmental factors and therefore managers should 
                                                  safety outcomes.                                        workers.                                                   pay attention to social factors in order to reduce accident 
                                                                                                                                                                                      frequency in the workplace. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Amponsah-          General        Examine OHS issues in                             Literature reviews.                             (i) Lack of a comprehensive OHS policy;                     
Tawiah &            Industries      Ghana.                                                                                                                  (ii) Poor infrastructure and funding 
Dartey-Baah                                                                                                                                                           (iii) Insufficient number of qualified OHS practitioners; 
(2011)                                                                                                                                                                     (iv) General lack of sufficient information to provide                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                                      OHS services. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Broni-Bediako &   Oil & Gas     Identify major areas of                         Literature reviews                                (i) The setting of pipe at the drill floor, 
Amorin (2010)                             drilling fluid exposure and                                                                                     manual handling of the sack at the sack 
                                                     health hazard associated with                                                                                room are major areas of drilling exposure: 
                                                     the use of drilling fluid.                                                                                    (ii) Dermatitis, irritation, neorological body  
                                                                                                                                                                                     are associated with drilling fluid exposure 
                                                                                                                                                                                     mainly through inhalation, skin contact and  
                                                                                                                                                                                     oral exposure. 
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2.3.2 Ghanaian Upstream Oil and Gas Industry Context 
This section critically reviews the risk governance pertained to the Ghanaian upstream oil and 
gas industry. It seeks to identify the risk governance issues that affect safety management in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. It covers the following: an overview of Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry, discussion of Ghana’s safety case regime, an examination of 
existing regulatory and institutional framework and existing studies. The literature gap relating 
to safety management in Ghanaian upstream oil and gas industry is highlighted. 
 
 
2.3.2.1 An Ovierview of the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry 
The history of Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry can be traced back to 1896, where several 
exploration activities took place in the Tano and Keta fields, including the Volta basin. 
The Saltpond field had been operating since the 1970s with no significant commercial quantity 
of hydrocarbon resources found. It must be pointed that after 120 years of considerable 
investment in rigorous exploration of hydrocarbon resources, Ghana eventually discovered its 
commercial amounts of hydrocarbon resources from the Jubilee field in 2007 which was 
estimated to be 700 million barrels of oil and 800 billion cubic feet of gas (Osei-Tutu, 2013; 
Skaten, 2018). 
  
The first oil production was made in 2010, which put Ghana on the global map as an oil and 
gas producing country. There have been two major additional offshore fields developed in 
the TEN field (estimated to be 240 million bbl of oil and 396 billion cf of gas) and the Sankofa 
field (estimated to be 500 MMbbl of oil and 1.45 Tcf of gas) which commenced production in 
2016 and 2017 respectively (Skaten, 2018). As shown in Figure 2.2, most of the upstream oil 
and gas activities are offshore. More discoveries have been reported in both offshore and 
onshore (Soko, 2018; ENI, 2019) as an aggressive exploration of hydrocarbon resources 
continues to take place in the country. Moreover, oil production continues to increase since the 
country’s first oil production (Figure 2.3). Given the current expansion of exploration activities 
coupled with the maximum daily oil production (120000 bbl/d), the government estimated 





Fig. 2. 2 Jubilee, TEN and Sankofa oil fields at the Cape Three Points              





Fig. 2. 3 Ghana annual oil production from 2010 to 2018 
                              Source: PIAC (2018) 
 
Despite the steady growth of Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry, there have been several 
challenges in terms of partisan political polarisation, corruption investigations and the maritime 
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border dispute with Côte d’Ivoire (Skaten, 2018). It is indicated that this partisan political 
polarisation may likely have an impact on institutional stability as well as the limit of a 
sustained potential for state-owned organisations in the oil and gas industry. It pointed out that 
corruption speculation remains in the industry may have an influence on institutional 
effectiveness. The three-year-long border dispute at International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) had been resolved in favour of Ghana but demonstrated the initial rush of 
development of the industry, lack of readiness and technical expertise in existing institutions 
in the country.  
 
At the beginning of the country’s first oil and gas production, various legislations (such as 
legislations on revenue management, and exploration and production) were enacted to ensure 
that the state derives maximum benefits from the new oil and gas resources. However, safety 
regulations were not part of the initial enactments. In the absence of industry-specific safety 
regulations, Ghana’s Jubilee Field operators agreed with the state participating agencies such 
as the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the Ministry of Energy to adopt, where applicable these international Environmental 
Health and Safety (EHS) Standards: Safety Case Regulation of the UK; World/IFC Standards/ 
MARPOL; US Coast Guard Regulations; International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
(IOGP); and American Bureau of Shipping Classing Standards (ABSCS). Ghana developed its 
regulatory and institutional framework six years after its first oil pour. The country adopted the 
safety case approach to regulate its upstream oil and gas industry.  
  
 
2.3.2.2 Ghana’s Safety Case Regime 
Paterson (2014) defined a safety case as a living document designed to ensure the ongoing safe 
operation of an installation. Safety case is seen as a form of a structured argument that is 
supported by evidence which seeks to justify that a system is acceptably safer for a specific 
operating environment. This structured argument is made to the regulator, which can be 
accepted or rejected. A safety case regime requires organisations to identify all major hazards 
and develop plans in terms of how these hazards could be managed (Hopkins, 2012b). Hopkins 
stated that a safety case regime must require the adoption of a systematic hazard management 




Before the passage of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act in 2016, the safety 
regulatory regime was more of a prescriptive regulation. The current safety regulatory regime 
for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry is based on performance-based or goal-setting 
shaped by a safety case approach. It requires all oil and gas organisations to show that they can 
take measures to reduce risk as low as possible. Ghana safety case regime is defined in clause 
73 and regulations 10 of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act and the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) HSE Regulations, respectively. Clause 74 requires organisations 
to perform a risk assessment to identify the hazards and evaluate the risks associated with their 
oil and gas activities. Article 10 of the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety 
and Environmental Regulations requires the operators, contractors, sub-contractors and the 
state entity to submit a Safety Case to the regulator for approval in not less than six months 
before beginning upstream oil and gas operation and decommissioning. The Safety Case must 
indicate the following:  
• description of the facility, technical and control measures, risk analysis, emergency 
preparedness analysis including emergency preparedness plan, and information on the 
management systems that are in compliance with existing safety legislation and 
regulations.  
• It requires the duty holder to identify hazards, evaluate risks, and demonstrate that 
measures will be or have been taken to control the risks in such a way that the residual 
risk level is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP).  
  
However, the effectiveness of Ghana’s safety case regime has not received adequate research 
attention yet. An earlier study by Acheampong and Akumperigya (2018) noted that its 
effectiveness is unconvinced because it lacks robustness. But it had been argued that there is 
no existence of evidence to suggest the effectiveness of a regulatory regime. This is because 
there are considerable difficulties in terms of acquisition of empirical data on the effectiveness 
of the safety case regimes generally (Hopkins, 2012b). The literature recognised the importance 
of human and organisational factors as critical issues that go beyond the safety regulations, 
which must be given attention. In this regard, risk governance issues are worth examining. The 




2.3.2.2.1 Existing Safety Regulatory Framework 
The power to control the risk of industrial activities in Ghana is inherent in the state’s 
sovereignty which is exercised through enactment of laws and and establishment of regulatory 
authorities.  The safety for the complex upstream oil and gas operations is governed by different 
statutes and regulations in different sectors. Table 2.2 presents the existing HSE statutes and 
regulations that are to some extent applicable to Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. These 
statutes and regulations are examined.  
 
 
Table 2. 2 Safety regulatory framework governing Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry 
Safety Statutes and Regulations Industry 
 Factories, Shops and Offices Act General 
 Labour Act General 
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act Oil & Gas 
The Environmental Protection Act   Environment 
The Petroleum Commission Act Oil & Gas 








2.3.2.2.1.1 The Factories, Offices, and Shops Act 
This statute (Act 328) provides the main onshore regime as far as registration of factories, and 
the welfare, health and safety of employees are concerned. In terms of orientation, the Act is 
highly prescriptive in its content, as are the regulations expected to be made by the Minister 
responsible for labour. Additionally, its implementation is characterized by high-level 
bureaucracy, which calls into question its effectiveness in emergencies. However, it has hardly 
been tested given that the regulatory support and the inspectors envisaged under the Act have 
not so far been put in place. This law is highly limited in terms of its regulatory content 




2.3.2.2.1.2 The Labour Act 
The Labour Act (Act 651) provides a general statutory duty to all industries in Ghana in terms 
of imposing on all employers to ensure that every worker under his or her employment works 
under satisfactory, safe and healthy conditions. The Act imposes specific obligations on 
employers in very exacting and unattainable standards by providing that every employer must 
provide and maintain at his workplace, plant and system of work that is safe and ‘without risk 
to health systems of work that are safe and without risk to the health of employees. Employers 
also have a duty to provide necessary information, training and supervision of employees with 
regards to health and safety. Act 651 equally imposes responsibility on employees by requiring 
them to use the safety equipment provided by their employers in compliance with the 
employers’ instructions. Given this provision, the Act limits the liability of employers to the 
extent that an employer shall not be liable for injury suffered by a worker who contravenes his 
duty to use safety equipment and who suffers injury solely by his non-compliance of the Act. 
The scope of the health and safety needs in this Labour Act, particularly its applicability to the 
oil and gas industry is limited and incoherent. 
 
 
2.3.2.2.1.3 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 
This Act (Act 919) was passed in 2016 to regulate the upstream oil and gas activities in Ghana. 
It is a legislation that was enacted by an act of Parliament to replace an earlier statute known 
as the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law (P.N.D.C.L. 84). Although this Act mainly 
regulates the exploration and production activities, it makes provision to address some limited 
safety needs as contained in Clauses 73-80. The relevant safety needs covered the following 
areas: safety requirements and standards, safety precautions, emergency preparedness, safety 
zones, suspension of petroleum activities in case of a safety issue, measures to ensure safety, 
and safety training. The Act requires in Clause 73 that the safety of upstream operations should 
be conducted in accordance with technological development, international best practices and 
applicable laws relating to health, safety and labour. It defines the regulatory regime approach 
that must be used to regulate the safety of the upstream oil and gas industry. Thus, it requires 
the application of the Safety Case approach for the conduct of all the upstream oil and gas 
activities. The requirement for the safety case approach is clearly defined in Clause 73(2-3).  
  
The provisions in Clause 74 require a licensee, contractor, sub-contractor and the state to 
perform a risk assessment to identify the hazards and evaluate the risks associated with their 
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oil and gas activities. This regulatory provision only defines one dimension of risk for in 
offshore petroleum activities. It must be indicated that the preparation of a Safety Case requires 
the duty holder to identify hazards, evaluate risks, and demonstrate that measures will be or 
have been taken to control the risks in such a way that the residual risk level is ‘as low as 
reasonably practicable’ (ALARP). According to Vinnem (2007), when an accident occurs in 
offshore petroleum facility, the consequences are related to personnel, to the environment, and 
assets and production capacity. These are referred to as the dimensions of risk. The dimensions 
of risk for offshore petroleum accidents include personnel risk (include fatality and impairment 
risks), environmental risk and asset risk (include material damage and production delay risks).  
 
However, this Act does not contain the requirements of a Safety Case to demonstrate that the 
operator or the contractor has in place HSE management systems which must be sufficient to 
ensure compliance with all the safety regulatory requirements. A management system includes 
the necessary organisational structures, resources, accountabilities, policies, and procedures to 
achieve that objective. Carefully designed and well-implemented management systems are 
essential to keep people safe and protect the environment. Although this statute contains legal 
Clauses (e.g. clauses 73-80) for safety needs, it is succinctly prescriptive in content which also 
does not address in detail how safety should be regulated in the oil and gas industry. These 
requlatory gaps have to be covered by the new safety regulations to address the critical safety 
operational needs in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
2.3.2.2.1.4 The Petroleum Commission Act 
The Petroleum Commission Act (Act 821) was passed in 2011 to set up a regulator to regulate 
and manage the use of oil and gas resources and to co-ordinate the policies to ensure efficient 
utilisation of these resources in a safety manner. This legislation establishes the Petroleum 
Commission (PC) as an agency for advisory policy role under the Ministry of Energy to 
regulate the petroleum activities in the upstream sector. The PC serves as the regulator for both 
the licensing and safety of upstream oil and gas activities. This dual role is provided in Clauses 
2 and 3 of the Act. It further specifies numerous functions that the PC is required to under 
which are provided for in Clause 3 of the Act. The only provisions relevant to the safety needs 
in the upstream activities as stipulated in Clause 3(d) (1). The PC must ensure compliance of 
HSE standards in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and agreements.  
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Two main issues warrant further discourse that must be informed by empirical evidence. The 
issues have to do with the lack of independence of the Petroleum Commission as a 
regulator; and the inherent contradicting role of the Petroleum Commission in terms of having 
to manage petroleum resource development as well as regulating safety needs of Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas sector. This will be established in the empirical analysis of the current 
study.   
 
 
2.3.2.2.1.5 The Environmental Protection Act   
The Environmental Protection Act (Act 490) was set up to provide the regulatory authority 
specifically on the formulation of general environmental policies, issuance of environmental 
permits, regulation of pollution and prescription of environmental standards in the country. 
Under the auspices of this Act, environmental regulations and several guidelines have been 
made to ensure adequate general environmental protection in Ghana. The Environmental 
Assessment Regulations (L.I. 1652) amended in 2002 requires every activity that has the 
likelihood to cause adverse effects on the environment to be subjected to environmental 
assessment. The Act requires the following process to be made: Preliminary Environmental 
Reports (PER) on the activity, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) which is a mandatory 
requirement to be conducted on the activity, Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) must be 
produced, production of Environmental Management Plan (EMPs), Environmental 
certification and Environmental Permitting. These processes have to be completed before a 
permit is issued for the commencement of the activity. Several environmental guidelines have 
also been produced including the Environmental Assessment Procedures (1995) which guides 
the conduct of EIA, the Environmental Quality Guidelines for Ambient Air which indicates the 
permissible level of air pollution and other general guidelines for industrial or facility effluents 
including noise levels and air quality. The EPA law ensures that upstream oil and gas activities 
are conducted in an environmentally friendly manner. However, Achaw and Danso-Boateng 
(2013) studies revealed several gaps in the application of this Act in the oil and gas industry as 
most organisations failed to adhere to the environmental regulatory and guidelines 




2.3.2.2.1.6 Petroleum (Exploration and Production) HSE Regulations 
The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) HSE Regulations (L.I. 2258) was developed in 
2017 to specifically prevent adverse effects on health, safety and environment in the upstream 
oil and gas activities in Ghana. That is, it was established under the authority of the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act to provide the minimum health, safety, environmental 
requirements applicable to operating, contracting and sub-contracting organisations in the 
upstream oil and gas industry. These regulations are related to the design and operation of 
facilities in both onshore and offshore, drilling and well systems, load-bearing structures, 
management systems, risk analysis, maintenance of facilities, decommissioning and 
emergency preparedness and reporting systems. In terms of the prevention of human lives and 
facilities from unacceptable risks, the recurrent regulations are much improved over the 
previous regulatory regimes. In terms of its scope of environmental protection, it provides for 
emissions and discharges. Articles 81 to 84 provide for environmental principles and 
protection, environmental impact assessment, liability for pollution damage and compensation 
for pollution damage in upstream oil and gas operations. However, it has a limited scope of 
environmental protection of the upstream oil and gas activities. These regulations have to be 
supported by a new development of HSE guidelines. 
 
 
2.3.2.2.2 Existing Institutional Framework 
There are various institutions whose roles are essential for managing safety in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. As pointed at the beginning of this chapter, safety management 
is a matter for both the state and the industry. Through the enactment of various safety 
legislations in the country, these safety laws have established various regulatory authorities to 
control the risk of industrial activities in Ghana. In the context of the Ghanaian upstream oil 
and gas activities, various regulatory agencies have been established through different 
legislations. It must be indicated that the DFI and PC constitute the main regulatory authorities 
relevant to safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry, respectively.  
  
DFI was established by the Factories, Offices, and Shops Act with its primary responsibility to 
ensure that industries comply with the best safety standards in the country. Dwumfour-Asare 
and Asiedu (2013) and Atombo et al. (2017) investigated the effectiveness of this regulatory 
authority. The research findings indicated that DFI had not been effective in its core role of 
compliance monitoring of safety standards in the general industries in Ghana. Among many 
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challenges confronting the DFI, resource constraints and knowledge gap continue to be the key 
issues affecting this regulatory authority. Though DFI appeared to be the only independent 
safety supervisory authority for all industries, its activities are not much extended to the 
upstream oil and gas operations.  
  
The PC is established by the Petroleum Commission Act as the regulatory authority with dual 
roles in licensing and safety compliance monitoring in upstream oil and gas industry. Two 
critical concerns have been raised on its core mandates: who regulates the safety of the 
upstream oil and gas industry and the independence of the PC. Few studies have examined the 
role of the PC in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. Akumperigya (2015) and Abdulai 
(2016) examined the role of the PC. These studies indicated that PC has conflicting roles and 
lack independence in safety compliance monitoring in the upstream oil and gas upstream. It 
was noted that the PC appeared to be more of coordinating agency that a regulator as several 
agencies in the industry also contributes to preventing human lives, facilities and the 
environment from unacceptable risks. 
 
Other regulatory authorities have a role to play so far as the safety of the upstream oil and gas 
activities is concerned. The Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) is responsible for monitoring, 
regulating and coordinating the activities taking place in the marine environment. The offshore 
oil and gas operations and assets are covered as mobile offshore mobile drilling unit must have 
to take place with prior approval of the GMA. The EPA is another regulatory authority 
responsible for environmental protection which in its activities, develop environmental policies 
and regulations, prescribe standards and guidelines for the EIA. In this regard, there is a 
mandatory requirement of all upstream oil and gas exploration, field development, production, 
and decommissioning activities to be submitted for prior approval by the EPA. However, such 
multiple agency regulations may conflict with the PC’s mandate of HSE compliance 
monitoring.  
  
The independence of the PC can be critically examined from three key areas that include 
legitimacy, accountability and legality. According to Baram and Lindoe (2014), the societal 
concerns for these three areas play a critical role in determining the matter of independence of 
a regulator. The legitimacy in this context is about delegation of government safety 
responsibility to a private organisation in undertaking hazardous activities. The accountability 
contextually means ensuring that companies self-regulate in a way that fulfils their obligations. 
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The legality aspect refers to the authority of decisions made by the regulatory regime for the 
implementation of safety needs.  
 
On the concern for legitimacy, the power to control any industrial activities is the sovereignty 
of Ghana, and this sovereignty is protected by the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. 
This Constitution, in Article 73 vests the legislative powers to Parliament to enact laws, 
regulations and adoption or acceptance of rules and practices developed by professional, 
industrial and international organisations. This legislative power is delegated to the government 
agencies to create a regulatory regime that delineates the mode of regulating hazardous 
activities. In this sense, the issue of legitimacy is rarely raised, and furtherly the independence 
of the regulator is not established. The legitimacy issue cab is raised when regulatory authority 
is delegated to private entities (Baram & Lindoe, 2014). According to Rosness and Forseth 
(2014), in seeking a more complex answer to who regulate, it is crucial to consider patterned 
network actors or constellation of actors who contribute to the effect that may call for 
“regulation of risks”. On could understand the Ghanaian democratic political settings which 
there could be obnoxious tendencies of compromising the legitimacy in terms of government 
agencies engaging in corruptions. The concern is about the accountability of the regulator. It 
has been a good practice to separate the regulatory role of managing petroleum resource 
development from safety regulatory function. An example is UK where Health and Safety 
Executive is separated from the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) whose 
role is to regulate the energy business enterprises and climate change. An independent safety 
regulatory will promote transparency and accountability, and legality of regulating hazardous 
activities in the self-industrial regulation environment and delineate the authority of decision 
to allow the industry to implement safety needs respectively. In this regard, the safety 
regulatory authority for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry must be established separately 
and independently from the current arrangement.  
 
 
2.3.2.2.3 Extant Studies on Risk Governance  in the Industry 
Earlier literature review summarised in Table 2.1 focused on the safety of the general 
industries. This section examines the existing literature relevant to risk governance in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. 
 
Dadzie (2013) examined Ghana’s Labour Act concerning safety in the construction industry. 
The study aimed at identifying how the clauses in the Labour Act (Act 651) address appropriate 
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safety issues in the construction industry and the adaptation to the requirements of safety. His 
research findings indicated that the safety requirements in the Labour Act (Act 651) were 
poorly complied by contractors. The results further reported the following as the main 
challenges confronting the adaptation of the health and safety requirements in the Labour Act 
(Act 651): inadequate training communication shortfalls, lack of safety professionals, poor 
risk assessment, lack of safety policies and poor attitude of workers towards safety. Although 
the empirical findings of Dadzie’s study are worth considering for further research in safety 
compliance and enforcement in Ghana, it is important to point out that the scope of the study 
was only limited to clauses of safety found in the Labour Act. Other safety legislation 
applicable to the construction industry were not examined. Importantly, it must be indicated 
that Dadzie’s research sample was only limited to experts’ opinions about contractors’ 
compliance with the safety requirements in the labour Act. The views of the workers and 
managers in the construction industry were not considered in the study as these views are 
important to strengthen further the empirical knowledge about the contractors’ poor 
compliance of the safety requirements in the Labour Act. In light of the increasing proliferation 
of local contents regulations required in the extractive industries in developing countries, local 
contractors play a significant role in the oil and gas operation activities (Daher, 2015; Ackah 
& Mohammed, 2018). In Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry, there are several kinds of 
local contractors which included contractors from the construction industry. Dadzie’s empirical 
findings have potential implications for the quality of contractors’ safety knowledge and safety 
behavior in the country’s upstream oil and gas industry. When there is a prima facie empirical 
indication of poor compliance of safety requirements by contractors in the construction 
industry, it points to the need for research in contactor safety management in the country’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. 
 
Annan et al. (2015) examined the existing legal requirements for safety in Ghana. The objective 
of their study was to identify and understand the key issues on safety practices in the country 
and their legal requirements for Ghanaian industries. Their findings indicated that there exist 
fragmented safety laws in Ghana under different jurisdictions with unclear responsibilities and 
accountabilities. In their study, what is conspicuously missing is the examination of existing 




Akumperigye (2015) examined the inherent conflicting regulatory roles and the absence of 
independence of the PC. The study argued that the current arrangement in terms of the dual 
roles of the PC made it not adequately competent to oversee robust safety regulation of Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. The regulatory conflict was examined from the view that the 
desire to attain revenue and profit target particularly as stimulated by a rising price of oil 
products, could undermine its role in safety compliance monitoring. It was also analysesed 
from regulatory capture concept. The capture was exaplined as the persisitent failure of the 
regulatory agencies to enforce the law against regulatory organisations which may be 
manifested in three forms: the sysmpathy with the issues confronting the regulated 
organisations in fulfilling the standards, association with the industry and the stiffness of the 
regulated organisations. The current arrangement exposes the PC into the risk of these three 
mechanisms of regulatory capture. The discussion of the mechanisms of regulatory capture is 
well documented in Mitnick (2011). The absence of independence of the PC was analyses from 
the ground that the law that established it conferred discretionary powers on the executive (the 
minister) which does not provide a formal requirement. Again, the lack of independence was 
also analysed from the general sense of the Constitutional source of the PC as it is inherently 
subjected to political and external controls. However, it must be indicated that in advancing 
robust regulation in the upstream oil and gas industry, it requires dialogue and collaboration as 
discussed in the literature (e.g. Renn, 2014; Aven &Ylönen, 2018).  Independence of the 
regulatory agencies can also be examined in the context of self-regulatory perspective where it 
does not require ‘policing’ of compliance monitoring of safety standards.   
 
Addulai (2016) examined existing safety regulatory regime in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
industry. His analysis focused on the regulatory architecture and orientation of safety 
regulation. In terms of regulatory architecture, it was mainly characterised by fragmented 
agencies under piecemeal legislation. He pointed out that existing regulatory authorities lack 
decision making independence as independence and visibility is needed for a robust safety 
regime. In the analaysis of the regulatory orientation, it found that Ghana’s safety regime was 
self-regulatory and further recommended Ghana to adopt the United Kingdom’s safety case 
region shaped by management-based approach. However, it must be indicated that the main 
elements that characterised robustness of a regulatory regime were not captured in the analysis. 
This robustness concept is well documented in the literature (van Oss & van’t Hek, 2011; Hale, 




Kotey (2016) examined the operational safety lessons from the Jubilee and TEN field after five 
years of oil production in Ghana. The author focused on the challenges that confronted the 
Jubilee oil field development stage. Some few incidents were recorded, which included near-
misses, injuries, process safety events and environmental events. The main issue attributed to 
these incidents was the lack of ‘operational discipline’ or ‘management deficiencies’. The 
study offered a prima facie impression about the weakness of existing safety management in 
the industry after five years of oil production. However, the author failed to adduce adequate 
empirical support on the causes of these incidents. Moreover, exploration and production-
related activities were not covered by the study. 
 
Acheampong and Akumperigya (2018) examined existing safety laws pertaining to Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. Their research attempted to contribute to the discourse on the 
emerging controversy surrounding the offshore risk regulation in new oil and gas producing 
countries. The findings of their comparative analysis show several weaknesses of existing 
safety regulatory regime. However, it was not clearly indicated what constituted robustness of 
a safety regulatory regime. In view of the hazardous nature of the oil and gas industry coupled 
with the existing weak safety regulatory regime in the country, Ghana needs a robust safety 
regulatory regime to proactively manage safety to avoid major hazard-incident risks in the 
upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
From the above examination of the literature, there appears to be inadequate research on 
robustness of safety regulatory regime for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The extant 
literature predominantly focused on safety issues in general industries such as the construction, 
transport, agriculture and manufacturing. There are few studies that are relevant to risk 
governance in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. However, these studies were not 
empirically based and also their scope did not cover defining what constitute criteria for 
evaluation of the robustness of existing safety regulatory regime for Ghana’s upstream oil and 
gas industry. Empiricism is important because it provides evidence of experience (direct or 
indirect) and observation. Empirical evidence in legal research are both pragmatic and policy 
driven, and theoretical or critical (Bell, 2016). The empirical impulse is to measure the gap 
between formal law and practical reality. Assessing the robustness of existing safety regulatory 
regime for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry would help to identify the issues to 
proactively address them to prevent major hazard-incident risks. The inadequate research on 
defined criteria in the extant literature on Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry also point to 
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one basic thing, which is the vagueness of the regulatory gap found in the literature. If gaps are 
identified through defined reviewed criteria would easily help in improving existing safety 
regulatory regimes towards its robustness. 
 
 
2.3.2.3 The Gap 
From the literature review on risk governance in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry, it 
emerged that few studies have examined the current safety regime. The existing literature 
focused mainly on examining the safety regulatory architecture and orientation. The current 
modes of safety regulatory style for the prevention of major accidents in Ghana’s upstream oil 
and gas industry is self-regulation shaped by the safety case regime. This safety case regime is 
mainly rooted in the engineering risk assessment, which is associated with knowledge 
uncertainty and potential surprises. Although there have been few studies that focused on the 
safety, there is no adequate empirical research has been provided to define and the safety 
management problem in the upstream oil and gas industry in Ghana. Existing safety 
performance indicators in the industry have not been sufficiently examined yet. In short, not 
much has been contributed toward how safety should be managed to avoid major hazard 
incidents in the country’s oil and gas industry. Importantly, existing studies have limited 
knowledge on how to address the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk associated 
with Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The present study seeks to fill this gap. The next 
sections examine the literature on the most appropriate approach to address the risk governance 
issues in the industry.  
 
 
2.4 Approaches to Address the Risk Governance Issues   
Given the search for a better approach in addressing the issues associated with the risk 
governance in the upstream oil and gas industry, the resilience thinking has become more 
popular in the safety literature as one of the ways to approach safety. Generally, current actions 
towards driving improvement in the industry have followed resilience thinking. These 
advances were mainly introduced after major incidents or accidents have occurred in the 
industry. However, uncertainties of knowledge and potential surprises continue to be 
associated with the complexity of the upstream oil and gas operations. Some researchers have 
considered robustness thinking as an alternative approach to deal with these issues. Currently, 
these two concepts have increasingly dominated the risk governance literature as the ‘official 
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solutions’ for addressing the risk governance issues in the industry. These two concepts vary 
in foundation and practice.  
 
The purpose of this section is to critically review the literature on these two approaches with 
the view to adopt the robustness perspective as a suitable approach that must be applied to 
manage safety in the upstream oil and gas industry. In other words, it reinforces the argument 
that robustness thinking is a more appropriate approach to address the complexity, uncertainty 
and ambiguity risk-related issues in the upstream oil and gas industry. In fulfilling the purpose 
of this section, this study begins with examining the meaning of these two concepts and their 
implications to risk governance.  
 
 
2.4.1 Resilience versus Robustness Thinking in Risk Governance 
Since the last three decades, the concepts of resilience and robustness have received increasing 
interests among researchers of risk governance. Several of these researchers had been 
interested in the design of policies to deal with uncertainties particularly in the areas of 
environmental policy (e.g. Funke & Paetz, 2011; Yang et al., 2018), climate change (e.g. Ruhl, 
2011; Bhave et al., 2016) and risk management (e.g. Herwig, & Simoncini, 2016; Hoffman & 
Hancock, 2017). The reason for such growing interest stems from the fact that these two 
metaphors have been actualized as ‘official solutions’ for dealing with potential policy issues 
(Capano & Woo, 2017). Similarly, in the oil and gas industry, these two concepts are also 
continuing to gain more traction in the risk management literature (e.g. Lindøe et al., 2012; 
Hale, 2014; Lindøe, 2016; Aven & Ylönen, 2018b). In response to the history of the oil and 
gas industry that had been blemished by the sporadic occurrence of major hazard incidents, 
there is a growing global discourse on how to regulate the oil and gas operations in a safe way 
to avoid these sporadic major events. Following the trends of safety regulatory reforms that 
had taken place in the global oil and gas industry since the last four decades, there still appeared 
to be paucity of adequate approaches for provision of proactive measures in dealing with the 
emerging hazard incident risks that are associated with the undergoing organisational change, 
technological development, and organizational business management in view of gaining 
competitive market advantage. It is indicated that imbuing the concepts of resilience or 
robustness into existing safety management that had been shaped under different safety 
regulatory design modes is associated with several challenges (Lindøe, 2016). This section 
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clarifies the distinction between resilience and robustness concepts and discusses the 
implication of these concepts to risk governance.  
 
2.4.1.1 The Meaning of  Resilience and  Robustness  
The mentioning of these two metaphors, resilience and robustness seems to appear cognate on 
the impression that they are used to substitute for each other. According to Capano and Woo 
(2017), these two metaphors seems to unveil interconnection, but the link between them is not 
inevitably positive. The former comes from the Latin word, “resilire” that means ‘leaping 
back’. Whereas latter comes from the Latin word “robustus” that means ‘firm and hard’. The 
Oxford Dictionary meaning of resilience is linked to the ability to recover quickly from 
difficulties. Whereas robustness relates to the ability to withstand or be strong and healthy to 
adverse conditions. From the etymological perspective, these two words have different 
meanings: the former strongly express recovery of weaknesses, while the latter clearly 
expresses vigorousness and healthy to endure attacks.    
 
Some researchers have attempted to differentiate these two concepts in different discipline. 
Hale (2014) conceived resilience as connoting to ‘bending’ or ‘adapting’ and ‘bouncing back’. 
Whereas the robustness connotes to ‘standing up to’ or ‘resisting attack’ and ‘weathering 
storms unchanged’. Capano and Woo (2017) conceived resilience as the action of ‘returning’ 
or ‘bouncing back’ to some extent of equilibrium from the confrontation of external 
perturbations or shocks. This relates to the understanding that stems from disciplines such as 
ecology (Folke, 2006), engineering (Hollnagel et al., 2006), socio-ecological systems (Folke, 
2006; Schoon et al., 2015) and disaster management (Mack, 2014). The key elements that 
characterize resilience performance include the ability to respond, monitor, learn, and 
anticipate (Hollnagel, 2017).  Resilience is a ‘borrowed’ metaphor to the social sciences 
because of its systemic ontological application to policy design. On the other hand, robustness 
is broadly conceived as the ability to "withstand" or "survive" perturbations of external shocks. 
The emphasis here is the capacity of a complex system to maintain its functionality in the 
confrontation of disturbance or shocks.  Two main elements must characterize robust 
performance across all different disciplines:  the ability to withstand shocks and systemic 
functioning. From the literature, the two concepts expressed different meanings as well as 




2.4.1.2 Resilience versus Robustness Concepts 
Hale (2014) examined the concept of robustness about risk governance and further made a 
comparative analysis of the United Kingdom, the United States and Norway regulatory 
regimes. Although Hale’s comparative analysis was only limited to the concept of robustness, 
earlier studies (e.g. Hollnagel et al., 2006; Wreathall, 2006) illuminated some challenges 
associated with the adoption of resilience thinking in risk management. Some of the challenges 
may include the following:  
• Lack of flexibility in terms of decision-making in the organisation which can lead to 
several failures for the systems to respond swiftly in augmenting protection as against 
the pressure of production;  
• opacity where information about safety concerns are confined to a few  individuals;  
• ‘just culture’ where there is a limited extent for permitting and encouraging people to 
report safety concerns and problems (the fear for penalisation or victimisation for 
raising safety concerns and issues in the organization;   
• Lack of real leadership commitment where management is not able to invest in safety 
consistently and also allocate resources to improve safety timely in the balance of the 
‘chronic’ pressures for production.  
Hale's comparative analysis was only limited to the Norwegian regulatory regime as against 
other regimes that operated under different modes of regulation. 
 
Capano and Woo (2017) examined the concepts of resilience and robustness in the context of 
risk governance. The authors presented the fundamental empirical challenges associated with 
these two concepts given a contribution to their thinking development towards policy process 
and policy design. They indicated that the direct application of the resilience concept might not 
be useful to address policy complexity. This is because social systems have inherent 
complexity and dynamism feature. The complexity concept affects different dimensions of the 
making of social policy and implementation processes (Özer & Şeker, 2013). The systemic 
ontological application of resilience between ecology and social systems are different in terms 
of policy complexity as the presence of the human agency through various ways may cause 
several and unpredictable possibilities of social adaptation to shocks. There are three critical 
dimensions (i.e. structure/agency, policy change, and manipulability) examined based on 
dealing with the complexity and changes of public policy. In these dimensions, it became 
indicative that resilience concepts may not be useful and also could be misleading in dealing 
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with complexities and changes in public policy whereas the idea of robustness appeared to 
strongly demonstrate high potential for proactiveness in policy structure and implementation. 
 
Aven and Ylönen (2018) discussed resilience and robustness thinking within the context of a 
sociotechnical systems perspective to risk management.  They conceived the resilience concept 
as the capacity of a system to restore its fundamental functionality in response to shocks. They 
pointed out several weaknesses in the literature (e.g. Groth et al., 2010; Luxhøj et al., 2017) 
that are associated with the current risk management framework used in the oil and gas industry 
that is mainly rooted in engineering risk assessment perspective (probability risk estimates). 
The current risk management approach is unable to capture knowledge uncertainties and 
potential surprises. Because of the inherent complexity associated with the upstream oil and 
gas operations, they considered the robustness - sociotechnical system linked perspective as 
the most appropriate approach to safety management in the industry. They emphasised an 
opinion that resilience management can be conducted without necessarily identifying the 
hazards and threats and estimating their probabilities because the literature (e.g. Park et al., 
2013; Linkov et al., 2016; Aven, 2017) acknowledged resilience management and risk 
management as supplementary instruments. The weaknesses associated with probability-based 
risk management are well documented in the literature (see, e.g. Le Coze et al. 2017; Capano 
& Woo, 2017; Ylönen et al., 2017) that indicated that such an approach is limited in terms of 
its proactiveness in addressing the complex emerging situations.   
 
Amir and Kant (2018) examined the concept of resilience from a socio-technical perspective 
to conceptualise resilience as an inherent attribute of a sociotechnical system. They 
acknowledged the earlier definition of resilience as the ability of a system to return or bounce 
back to disturbances or shocks. The authors argued that the application of the concept of 
resilience in the sociotechnical perspective is fundamentally dependent on its transformability 
that is anchored by three constituents: informational relations (Information organisation and 
management give to support operation), socio-material structures (reciprocal entanglement of 
human organization and material structures), and anticipatory practices (construction of daily 
operations for anticipation of occurrence of shocks).  Thus, the ability of the sociotechnical 
systems to cope with disturbances or shocks is articulated in its transformability. 
Transformability was defined as “how quickly and robustly a sociotechnical system transforms 
from one state to another” (p. 11). Informational relations offer an awareness of how the 
dynamic vulnerabilities emerge and breed throughout the system. They indicated that this 
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required the following: effective design of information network, implementation of cross-scale 
information couplers, control the flow of information and proactive dissemination of 
information to the targeted audience. It recognised that every sociotechnical system has socio-
material structures that underscored the concurrent hybrid fashion of social realities of the 
stakeholders (i.e. individuals, groups, institutions, & government) and the material realm of 
machines (i.e. electronic-mechanical networks). They identified two key aspects of socio-
material: the hybridity and interpretation of flexibility along with the interaction between 
human and machines; the design for correct functioning and resistance to disturbance or 
shocks.  As a result, to obtain knowledge of a resilient sociotechnical system, these two aspects 
of socio-material that have to be concurrently taken into consideration. In their view, the 
human-machine interaction creates socio-material modes that offer control and governance for 
risk reduction and prevention of incidents. Due to the gradual emergence of incidents (see 
Reason,1997; 2016), anticipatory practices are required so that culture is developed where 
stakeholders drive coordinating actions at faster and slower temporal scales towards the 
anticipation of the possibilities of occurrence of disturbance or shocks. Much discussions of 
this sociotechnical resilience concept coupled with the analysis of its strengths and weaknesses 
are also well documented in Amir (2018). 
 
From the above examination of the literature on resilience versus robustness concepts, it is 
clear that the two metaphors have different meanings as well as offer different theoretical 
implications to safety management. This study argues that robustness concept tends to offer 
more proactive measures in dealing with complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk. This 
argument follows the next discussion. 
 
 
2.4.1.3 The Researcher’s Argument for Robustness Thinking 
In the theoretical context, this study relates resilience thinking development to what Holgnall 
(2016) describes as Safety-I that reflects reactiveness in safety improvement. Whereas, 
robustness refers to Safety-II that reflects proactiveness in safety improvement. The current 
safety regulatory regime is underpinned by the reactive strategies where it commences from 
the manifestation of the absence of safety. Thus, safety is appraised by counting the number of 
cases where it fails. However, there is a need to shift to where there is the capacity to succeed 
under changed conditions. Safety must be appraised by counting the number of cases that goes 
right.   
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One important thing that has to be explicitly made clear in both the research and professional 
literature is that the reliance on the current approach in managing safety in the upstream oil and 
gas operation is inadequate in dealing with complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. The current 
safety management approach in the upstream oil and gas industry is mostly underpinned by an 
engineering risk assessment perspective (Aven & Ylönen, 2018). This approach aims at 
providing system understanding by employing simple linear models. The knowledge gained 
through the application of these linear models is quantified and used to compare with 
predefined criteria which resultantly serves as inputs to the decision-making process. This risk-
based approach focuses on following: the risk reduction strategy mainly defined as the ALARP, 
the application of risk assessment (probability-based) and the risk acceptance criteria. Today, 
most existing safety regulations for the upstream oil and gas industry explicitly requires the 
operating companies and regulatory agencies to use the risk acceptance criteria. Despite the 
relevance of the current risk assessment approach in providing both logical framework and 
systematic procedures to improve “consequence-driven” decision making, there are several 
limitations, skepticism, disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the existing probability-based 
risk assessment that have been well documented in the literature (Cox, 2009; Villa et al., 2016; 
Aven & Ylönen, 2018). Some of these issues are summarized as follows: 
• the omission of relevant social, political and cultural realities; 
• failure to capture emotional responses that significantly influence individuals' 
perceptions, judgments, and behaviours in response to risks; 
• failure to adequately deal with the realistic uncertainties, complexities, and value 
judgments;  
• it can be easily manipulated politically for a hidden agenda. 
However, the current approach is not adequate to deal with the system complexity related 
issues. The problem is that the linear models do not identify hazards and threats in a complex 
system as causal links to systems that provide a complicated understanding of their boundaries 
against a single chain (Jensen & Aven, 2018). The use of these linear model techniques, for 
examples, HAZOPS, HAZIDS, Event Trees, Fault Tree used in the oil and gas industry are not 
adequate to capture the threats and hazards associated with the upstream oil and gas operations. 
There is a need for the application of a sociotechnical system thinking to safety regulation and 
industrial safety management. It must be established primarily that the integrated upstream oil 
and gas activities are more sociotechnical characterised (Rasmussen, 1997; Liyanage et al., 
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2006; Le Coze et al., 2017) with inherent complex interactions (Bento, 2018; Jensen & Aven, 
2018). Fundamentally, every sociotechnical system has an emergent property in which there 
exist complex interactions between technology, humans, and organization components (Baxter 
& Sommerville, 2011; Reiman & Rollenhagen 2014; Carayon et al., 2015) with the general 
goal of fulfilling social functions (Geels, 2004). The fundamental problem with the 
sociotechnical systems is its inherent complexity (Leveson, 2017; Aven & Ylönen, 2018). The 
complex interaction of a sociotechnical system has implication for human performance as the 
capacity to capture adequate knowledge of threats and hazards in this complex interaction is 
the current fundamental challenge (Klinke & Renn, 2012; Hale, 2014; Kyriakidis et al., 2018). 
This complexity emanates from the several networks of relationships, interactions and 
interconnectedness of the components of the systems. Consequently, the boundaries of these 
systems become not clear in term of their understanding (Dekker et al., 2011). Therefore, 
relying on only engineering linear model techniques will always produce uncertainty of 
knowledge and potential surprises.  
 
In linking the resilience and robustness concepts to system complexity within the context of 
sociotechnical perspective for addressing uncertainties, there is limited research attention that 
has been given to the area. Amir and Kant (2018) discussion of resilience concepts as an 
inherent attribute of a sociotechnical system was fundamentally based on its reliance on 
transformability. This means that the ability of the sociotechnical systems to cope with 
disturbances or shocks is articulated in its transformability. The human-machine interaction 
creates socio-material modes that offer control and governance for risk reduction and 
prevention of incidents. In contrast, robustness is a crucial quality of complexity, in which 
complexity is a process that orients towards the General System Theory, a concept developed 
by Von Bertalanffy (1969). Safety is an emergent phenomenon made up of several interacting 
components which cannot be detached from the other core functions of an organization. 
Robustness concept is an essential specific characteristic of a system that can retain its 
fundamental functional features, albeit its confrontation of uncertainties. The review study by 
Capano and Woo (2017) points to the relevance of the robustness concept in the provision of 
conceptual and empirical room in policy and institutional design. Robustness thinking is 
mainly associated with the policy process (Capano & Woo, 2017) and policy design (Howlett 
et al., 2018; Capano & Woo, 2018). It is an essential concept for a policy process because it 
has a significant influence on the dimensions that characterized policy process (structure and 
agency, policy change, and manipulability) in the confrontation of uncertainties or potential 
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shocks. Again, robustness thinking contributes significantly to policy design (design process 
and output). 
From a public perspective, institutions are key concepts because their structures and rules 
influence the state and political actors (Knill & Tosun, 2012). The social structure functions 
through the action of the agents in the form of allotment of roles and meanings. Social structure 
and its agency constitute a vital part of every sociotechnical system as Upham et al. (2018) 
pointed out, strong structuration stimulates the actors' situated knowledge that may have a 
potential influence on technological reformation or correction. The understanding of the 
characteristics and processes of the agency relative to the general structural features will have 
potential relevance in capturing the knowledge that contributes to manipulating the agent-level 
processes. Resilience and robustness are associated with structure and agency in influencing 
policy process but in different ways. Resilience thinking in safety regulation has its challenge 
due to the inherent complexity and dynamism of the sociotechnical system (Patriarca et al., 
2018) as its holistic dimension (e.g. structure/agency, policy change, manipulability) is 
challenging to grasp and unpack (Capano &Woo, 2017). Owing to its reactiveness nature 
where there are always inherent biases of bouncing back to an earlier equilibrium state 
(Davoudi et al., 2012; Bond et al. 2014), it is noted that, in terms of structure and agency, such 
return to systemic stability may ironically lead to counterproductive in response to shocks 
because it impedes organizational flexibility (Pidgeon, 2010; de Walle, 2014; Capano & Woo, 
2017). Therefore, resilience thinking does not permit a significant role for the agency. 
Robustness provides an inherent proactive capacity for the system to prevent the consequences 
of shocks due to its ability to offer means to control and manage bureaucratic institutional and 
actors' behaviours specifically. 
 
Notwithstanding in view of policy change the two concepts may have the propensity to sustain 
the status quo or drive an incremental change, it must be indicated that a major or radical 
change seem highly impossible for a policy that is driven by robustness thinking. This is 
because the concept of robustness has the capacity to always retain the principal function of 
the policy in confrontation to disturbance or shock either internally or externally. Therefore, 
the two concepts offer different implications in policy to regulate uncertainties. Due to the 
reactiveness nature of resilience thinking, it fundamentally focuses on anticipatory practices 
where there is always a construction of operations for the anticipation of possibilities of 
occurrence of shocks with concurrent exploitation of the experiences through learning to adapt 
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to the changed situation (Amir & Kant, 2018; Amir, 2018). On other hands, robustness thinking 
is naturally more "proactive and design-centric" (Capano & Woo, 2017, p. 414) because it 
influences the development of rigidity and resistance to change, and at the same time providing 
avenues for the development of policy to adapt to change towards the confrontation of 
disturbances or shocks. In terms of policy manipulability (flexibility), resilience thinking is 
characteristically noted as having structural rigidity and drives growth in change. Studies (e.g. 
Hollnagel et al., 2006; Wreathall, 2006) have pointed out that resilience application has 
flexibility limitation in terms of decision-making in the organisation which may contribute to 
several failures for the systems to respond swiftly in augmenting protection as against the 
pressure of production. 
 
Therefore, it can be established that robustness thinking can maintain the functions of a 
sociotechnical system (policy, political system, institution/organisation) with concurrent 
continuity in adaptation to details of priorities and changing situations. This requires the 
government's capacity to demonstrate satisfactory policy analytical and managerial 
competence in the safety policy process and policy design (Wu et al., 2015). Resilience 
thinking emerges less promising in terms of policy application with a primary focus on 
developing anticipatory cultural practices towards constructing daily operations for the 
anticipation of possibilities of occurrence of disturbances or shocks. Contrarily, robustness 
emerges more promising in two ways: improvement in understanding of policymaking and also 
improvement in policy designs. Robustness thinking is a crucial proactive strategy in the 
application of a sociotechnical system perspective to the regulation of hazards and threats in 
the oil and gas industry. This is because its potential capacity of adaptability provides 
continuous room for improvement in technological, human and organizational policy designs 
without experiencing adverse occurrence before adapting. Despite its associated challenges 
(i.e. diversity of issues, modularity and redundancy) in application to policy design, research 
(e.g. Capano & Woo, 2018) has indicated that elements such as institutionalisation of 
polycentric decision process, and provision of political and technical capacities would help to 
ensure robustness of the performance of policy design in confrontation of disturbances or 
shocks. Currently, there appears to be limited research on how robustness thinking has been 
applied to develop a framework to manage safety in the upstream oil and gas industry. To what 
extent can safety regulatory regime reflect the characteristics of robustness concept? The next 




2.4.2 A conceptualisation of Robustness of Safety Regime  
The previous section reinforces the need to adopt robustness thinking in addressing the threats 
and hazards associated with the upstream oil and gas operations. The design of the safety 
regulatory regime must reflect the characteristics of the robustness concept. 
 
Robustness of safety regime is defined as “a regime that has survived for a considerable period 
with its principles intact, but with adaptation in its detail to changing situations and priorities” 
(Hale, 2014: p. 421).  This definition relates to an earlier definition of robustness from 
organizational theory by van Oss and van’t Hek (2011, p. 34) as, “capacity of an organization 
to retain its fundamental pattern at core characteristics under changing conditions".  This 
definition underscores two critical elements: the capacity to sustain the core functions of the 
system and the adaptability to changed situations. What it means is that the regime must 
incorporate the measures to ensure the sustainability of the functionality of the sociotechnical 
system while adjusting to changed situations. In looking for a way to drive the required capacity 
to retain the functionality of the system, Hale extended his definition to include all the steps of 
Renn's (2014) model for adaptive and integrative risk governance as key characteristics 
underpinning a robust regulatory regime. He stated emphatically, that for one to call a 
regulatory regime a robust, one “must have dealt with all of the steps in that model explicitly 
and achieved a stable balance in each” (p. 420).  As presented in Figure 2.4, Renn’s model is 
based on five key steps: pre-estimation of the risk, interdisciplinary estimation of risks, risk 
evaluation, monitoring and controlling, and communication.  
 
 
Fig. 2. 4 Renn’s model for adaptive and integrative risk governance 
                    Source: Klinke & Renn (2012). 
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2.4.2.1 A Synthesis of Renn’s Model 
The link between the Renn's model for adaptive and integrative risk governance and the 
characteristics of the upstream oil and gas industry have not received sufficient discussions in 
the literature. There are two essential characteristics associated with the upstream oil and gas 
industry: multi-layered in structure and multi-playered in actors (Rasmussen, 1997; Hale, 
2014).  Several layers are constituting the structure (both vertical and horizontal) for the 
management of the upstream oil and gas operations. These layers are managed by several 
industry players involved in the upstream oil and gas operations. Each element in the model 
emphasises its requirements for improvement in risk governance. These requirements include 
the following:  
• A suitable frame to capture all the hazards and threats from the multi-layered structure 
of the industry. 
• Interdisciplinary assessment of hazards and threats as well as other issues of individuals 
and societies that relate to a particular risk. 
•  Institutionalisation of transparency on the judgement of risk acceptability or 
tolerability.  
•  Monitoring and controlling of high-level safety.  
•  Effective risk information sharing.  
These requirements are discussed in the next section. 
 
 
2.4.2.1.1 Framing of Risk Emphasising Multiple Actor-Network Involvement 
Risk is only comprehended through mental constructions that originates from people's 
perception of uncertain phenomena which is dependent on the presumption that human agency 
can prevent them (Rosa et al., 2013). Those perceptions, interpretations and responses are 
influenced by political, economic, social and cultural factors (IRGC, 2005 cited in Renn, 2014). 
Those mental constructions are shaped by people's experience and knowledge about the events 
and developments that are associated with real consequences. Therefore, comprehending risk 
as a construct has an implication on how it is considered. This implies that given the previous 
vast experience and knowledge gained on incidents or accidents, it is only required that 
screening is made to consider those experiences and knowledge that are relevant to the risk 
candidates. This points to the criticality of the framing process in risk governance.   
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According to Bengtsson (2011, p.14), “to frame means to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation for the item 
described". Framing implies screening to select from an extensive collection of actions and 
problems that constitute the risk candidates. Given the critical features of the upstream oil and 
gas industry as multi-layered in structure and multi-playered in actors, it is only necessary that 
the framing process is linked to these features. According to Lindøe (2016), a risk regulatory 
system must fit into those elements and dimensions that characterise a production system. In 
the production system, these dimensions may include the following level of actors: government 
(state agencies), industry (operating organisations), contractors (contracting, sub-contracting 
and service organisations), labour unions, public (communities whose activities shape the risk 
candidates) and media. The framing process must be linked to the "multi-actor and multi-
objective governance structure whereby the actors are all involved in the selection of the 
suitable frame for the conceptualisation of the problem. However, there are some critical issues 
identified by Klinke and Renn (2012) that affect the upstream oil and gas operations as far as 
the frame analysis is concerned: 
• The legitimacy of trading off the value between societal risks and economic benefits. 
•  The relative weight allotted to each of the values upon the need for a balanced 
judgement is accepted.  
• The treatment of remaining uncertainties as to the effort in balancing risk and benefits 
always varies significantly. 
It must be indicated that the establishment of a framing process towards upstream oil and gas 
operations is critical in terms of the understanding of the risk nature. What is essential in this 
case is that safety regulatory regime must incorporate the aspects of setting up institutions and 
procedures that will be able to capture all issues emanating from the complex actor-network 
involved in the upstream oil and gas operations. Any safety regulatory regime that ignores the 
essence of framing emphasising actor-network involvement will find it challenging to design 
risk assessment management strategies that will be supported and accepted by all the major 
stakeholders in the industry. It is therefore vital that a safety regulatory regime must make 
provision for a frame structure that indicates the establishment of institutions and procedures 
to collect all the risk candidates that captures the hazards and threats emanating from the 




2.4.2.1.2 Interdisciplinary Risk Estimation 
Interdisciplinary estimation of risk forms the second step of Renn model. This step requires 
risk estimation to be conducted in a multidisciplinary approach. This interdisciplinary approach 
emphasises a risk assessment (i.e. reviewing all scenarios that makes the facilities vulnerable 
to hazard risks) and concern assessment (i.e. identification and analysis of issues of individuals 
or society that are linked to the risk). In other words, the interdisciplinary risk estimation 
requires the incorporation of human and organizational factors into the risk assessment.  
 
This risk assessment, as referred in Renn's model, is understood and described along with the 
perspective of purely probabilistic-based expression of uncertainty of events and 
consequences. This perspective has been a long tradition of the oil and gas industry. Existing 
risk assessment in the oil and gas industry mainly relies on the probability-based estimation 
that is limited in terms of its capacity to establish the causal links to those quantitative 
estimates. This risk assessment is not able to capture the adequacy of the risk issues from the 
complex sociotechnical system (Flage et al., 2014; Amundrud & Aven, 2015; Aven & Ylönen, 
2018b; Jensen & Aven, 2018). There is the need to look beyond the numbers. Therefore, to 
understand the concerns of the stakeholders, risk perception plays a critical role.  
 
There is always the knowledge of uncertainties and potential surprises in the complexity of the 
sociotechnical system. This is because the state and the quality of the available knowledge 
about the hazards and risk are not usually known (Renn, 2008). The emphasis here is how to 
obtain all the knowledge of human and organizational issues embedded in the complex 
sociotechnical system. According to Amundrud and Aven (2015), the risk assessment must be 
conducted to obtain risk understanding within the sense of knowledge - justified beliefs. The 
concern assessment relates to those evaluations of organisational and human influences that 
shape the hazard risks. This refers to safety culture or better state the safety climate perceptions, 
which are much discussed in the subsequent section 2.6. The main point in these two types of 
risk estimation is the ability of the existing assessment to capture the risk understanding in 
sense-making within the context of decision-making. These assessments of knowledge must 
be obtained through scientific investigation. Renn et al. (2011) identified several scientific 
methods to assess the concerns that may include survey, focus groups and interviews of the 
stakeholders. 
 
Linking this feature of Renn's model to the upstream oil and gas operations, the industry is a 
sociotechnical system that recognises the human agency and social institutions as a critical part 
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of the technical systems. This implies that the actualisation of organisational safety goal cannot 
only be optimized by the technical systems but largely inclusion of the human agency and 
social institutions. However, the interdisciplinary risk estimation step in Renn's model has 
several limitations. The conceptual distinction between threats, vulnerabilities, hazards, and 
risk are not adequately dealt with in Renn's model. Noy and Yonson (2018) have made these 
conceptual distinctions as vulnerability relates to conditions that are predetermined by physical, 
social, economic and environmental factors or process with the possibility of augmenting the 
susceptibility of a person, assets and community to the impacts of the hazards. Hazard relates 
to a process, human activity or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury including other 
health-related issues, destroy or damage asset, socio-economic disruption and pollution of the 
environment. Risk relates to potential loss of injury, life, destroyed or damaged assets, and 
community within a specific time. Risk perception plays an essential role in bringing to light 
some of these vulnerabilities, hazard and risk-related issues. However, Aven and Ylönen 
(2018) noted that its application to decision making must be consciously considered.   
 
This study asserts that risk estimation in the upstream oil and gas industry must cover both 
aspects of the assessments. Risk perception application in various working groups in the 
working environment may contribute to exposing several issues that are linked to human and 
organizational influences. The human and organisational factors remain critical issues because 
they continue to contribute to many of these hazard incidents and process failures in the 
industry today. This requires that interdisciplinary estimation of risk must be carried out to 
expose vulnerabilities and hazards that will have potential consequences to the risk of human 
fatalities and injuries, destruction of assets in systems and pollution of the environment.  
 
 
2.4.2.1.3 Risk Acceptability or Tolerability Criteria 
One important heavily debated issue in both the academic and professional literature has to do 
with the approach in which risk is evaluated. The classical approach of risk evaluation is 
focused on the rank and prioritisation of risk based on a combination of probability and 
consequences (Renn et al., 2011; Renn, 2014).  Most of the existing safety regulations 
explicitly have been built on this classical approach to risk evaluation. Thus, the safety 
regulations are shaped by a risk assessment method linked to the RAC. It is often referred to in 
safety regulations or standards as ALARP which are usually expressed mathematically by 
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comparing the calculated values of the probabilities derived from the risk analysis with the 
predefined acceptable limit and drawing the conclusion for decision making. 
 
However, Renn's model underscored the need for the legitimisation of an open and democratic 
process regarding the judgement on risk acceptability or tolerability. This view is based on the 
fact that the judgement on the RAC is a political decision that had to be taken in the interest of 
the public. Kringen (2014) identified two main problems relating to the legitimisation of the 
risk acceptability or tolerability criteria: (1) the legitimisation of the regulatory goals relative 
to how much risk is the regulatory regime ready to tolerate; (2) the legitimisation of the 
regulatory means and instruments contrived for actualising these goals. Kringen stated that the 
issue relating to tolerance is usually found embedded and hidden in legal decision making, 
even though the existence of a defined value judgement is at stake. Obfuscating the value 
judgement often results in the consequences relating to delegitimization since there is no 
information regarding the trade-offs.  
 
It can be argued that the classical risk evaluation approach itself is associated with inadequate 
knowledge about risk that are inherent in the complex sociotechnical system. The current 
practice of risk assessment is characterised by a high level of arbitrariness and wrong focus for 
decision making. The calculation of probabilities that is derived from the risk analysis must be 
based on background knowledge. The values of the probability that must be linked to the 
strength of the knowledge are not adequate captured in the current classical risk assessment 
approach applied in the upstream oil and gas industry. In practice, the industry (i.e. operating 
companies) focuses mainly on meeting the risk acceptance or tolerance criteria. Many of the 
application of the risk appraisal tools are mechanistic as they seek to fulfil a regulatory 
requirement. These criteria are the minimum requirements that are required to be met by the 
industry. The critical issue is that the industry mainly focuses on satisfying the minimum 
requirements for risk acceptability or tolerability criteria.  
 
However, experience indicated that it is challenging to actualise significant improvement in 
safety so far as there is the existence of such minimum criteria (Aven & Ylönen, 2016).  This 
challenge becomes exacerbated when existing regulatory style requires the industry to set the 
Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC). Despite the long heavily disputed issue on risk acceptability 
or tolerability, not much attention has been made in terms of offering the best strategies to deal 
with these issues related to the classical approach that shaped the current safety regulatory 
regime. Two strategies  have been suggested by Aven & Ylönen (2016): 
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• Adjusting the current safety regulations to deal with the hazards and threats inherent in 
the sociotehncial system (i.e. moving in line with the new risk perspective). 
• Removing the use of (ALARP) provided in the current safety regulatory regime. 
These two strategies are essential for dealing with knowledge of uncertainties and potential 
surprises. However, practically, such challenges may take time to be dealt with because of the 
complexity in reaching consensus.  Given these challenges, this study argues that in a 
government-enforced self-regulatory regime, the government must set the RAC to limit the 
complete freedom granted to non-state actors in terms of privatisation of the state obligation to 
protect the public interest. If the probability risk-based approach is the way forward, then the 
safety regulation must be made to explicitly provide for method and processes to assess the 
knowledge in which these probabilities are based including the strength of the background 
knowledge of the hazards. These processes must be legitimised to provide transparent, 
accountability, trust and democratic process on the judgement of risk evaluation. 
 
 
2.4.2.1.4 Management - Monitoring and Controlling of Risk 
There are two essential elements involved in safety management: the prescription of safety 
norms and the control that makes these safety norms being complied. Among other players, 
the state and the industry form the two main players for this safety management.  Safety 
management is based on different regulatory regimes as these regimes establish the rules and 
standards that must govern how risks are dealt with within a specific regulatory context. The 
goals of these regimes are to achieve regulatory outcomes (Renn, 2014). According to Renn 
(2008), this robustness of a regime is mainly determined by how the regulatory agencies and 
the industry manage the issues of complexity, uncertainties and ambiguity. There are two main 
emphases in managing risk-related issues: safety culture or safety climate and the monitoring 
and controlling of risk. Safety culture or safety climate is much discussed in the subsequent 
section 2.6. The monitoring and controlling of risk play a critical role in the sustainability of 
high-level safety in the industry. Renn (2014) discussed that relaxation of inspections, 
overconfidence with staff and incomplete and inadequate monitoring could trigger negative 
influence on safety performance. This is because incidents or accidents are also caused by lack 
of oversight. It is stated that “normalisation of deviations" (e.g. reduction of cost, convenience, 
etc.) in safety regulatory program or safety management systems can cause or trigger major 
incidents or accidents. From the Swiss-cheese model (see Reason, 1997) such deviations form 
norms in the organisation which gradually create conditions for major incidents or accident 
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occurrence. Two main contested issues in the literature are based on monitoring and controlling 
of risk: How and Who to monitor and control risk. Thus, what kind of monitoring and 
controlling mechanisms should be adopted for different regulatory regimes, and who should 
be responsible for monitoring and controlling risk? These issues are important for improving 
safety oversight role of the state.  
 
It must be indicated that in term of the How (mechanisms) to monitor and control risk, Addulai 
(2016) examined two main strategies: Deterrence and Compliance. The deterrence strategy 
premises on the sanctioning of the violators in an adversarial and confrontational way. It seeks 
to deter violations, establish guilt and penalise violators for wrongdoing. This deterrence 
strategy mainly works under an extreme detailed prescriptive regulatory requirement within 
the command-control regime style. Given the several limitations of the prescriptive regulatory 
approach, as highlighted in Baram et al. (2014), the deterrence strategy cannot survive well in 
Self-regulatory and Co-regulatory regimes. However, most of the existing regimes continue to 
rely on the ‘Compliance monitoring tool’ as the primary enforcement strategy in the upstream 
oil and gas industry that characterised detailed prescription rules. Achieving the compliance 
requirements may mislead safety performance. The traditional compliance monitoring tools 
used by regulators lack adequate technical competence as was noted in the investigation of the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster, that compliance monitoring turned into ‘rituals’ that obscures the 
industry from the knowledge of uncertainties and potential surprises (Hopkins, 2007, 2012). 
There is the need to move away from the mere compliance monitoring practice to more of 
cooperation of parties (regulators and actors). As the literature indicated, there is lack of 
judgement, experience, professionalism, leadership, and competence in both the public and 
private sector (Hopkins, 2012; Hayes, 2014). This affects the quality of oversight role required 
by the industry internal safety controls and the state control mechanisms. Hopkins (2007) 
provided the following strategies that can help to move beyond compliance monitoring: 
• Auditing the auditors. 
• Proactive investigation. 
• Supporting organisation safety staff. 
• Advising on organisational design. 
• Exposing performance. 
• Promoting regulatory crisis. 
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The usual safety auditing is increasingly reducing into ‘tick-a-box exercise as there is a limited 
effort by auditors to ask more probing questions regarding the effectiveness of existing safety 
management systems. It is revealed that the usual checklist questions are not adequate, which 
had led to weak responses resulting in major incidents (Hopkins, 2007). The auditors need to 
be technically trained and competent to probe challenging questions that will elicit responses 
on hidden system failures. There is a need for proactive investigation of the system to identify 
failures so that it can be corrected. The investigation needs not to be conducted reactively. All 
incidents or accidents whether minor or major are preceded with early warnings (Reason, 
1997), and if they had attended to them, they would have been prevented. It is also indicated 
that large organisations may have internal staff with specific safety responsibility.  Such 
internal safety staff are to ensure compliance with regulations in their organisations. Given the 
degree of ‘clout' the internal safety compliance staff wield, regulatory agencies can support the 
organisations' internal compliance staff. The regulators advise on companies' organisational 
design in terms of locating safety staff to several points of the organisational hierarchy where 
they report to the line manager. Regulators needs to also pay much attention to exposing 
process safety performance indicators. Researchers have indicated that when regulatory crisis 
are promoted it helps to strengthen the intimate link between public opinion and enforcement 
towards the motivation of compliance. This is because the poor reputation of the companies 
may fuel the public demand for strict enforcement of safety (Gunningham et al., 2004). 
However, this must be strategically created with extreme carefulness. In all these strategies as 
discussed, what can drive their implementation is availability of adequate resources. When 
safety prioritisation is truly driven by the regulators’ values and actions, adequate resources 
would be available for implementation of these strategies.  
 
In terms of Who monitors and controls risk, it has been contested in the literature that is between 
the operators of the technical facilities (or closely observed) and the public regulatory agencies. 
Renn (2014) stated that this role is now assumed in the form of ‘Joint Responsibility’ (public-
private partnership). However, it must be noted that such a decision is contingent on the modes 
of regulatory regime. For examples, the Safety Case regime of United Kingdom and Australia 
puts the task of monitoring and control of risk in between the state and the industry but with 
the emphasis on the industry (operating companies). Norway has government enforced self-
regulation regime that is based on internal control. United States has detailed prescriptive 
regulatory regime with the emphasis on government. It had been suggested that given the 
limitations of the public sector safety compliance performance, government's compliance 
 61 
responsibility should be delegated to private organisations. However, the literature has 
indicated evidence of mismanagement of the privatisation of the government's safety control 
role by the private organisations. This study argues that a great emphasis on public oversight 
and check and balance are essential for the public interest in whether self-regulation or co-
regulation approaches underpin the choice of the regime style. 
 
Moreover, what is of more critical is the independence of the regulator in improving safety 
performance and not necessarily ensuring compliance. Satisfying compliance requirements 
cannot guarantee sustainable safety performance. In sustaining regulatory oversight 
performance, some researchers (e.g. Mendes et al., 2014; Renn, 2014) have linked the 
following measures as important factors: high wages, investment in safety training, research 
and development. There must be an independent and competent regulator that will seek to 
improve regulatory culture under a joint responsibility approach as it required trust and 
dialogues with the industry actors that will help to enhance risk governance in the upstream oil 
and gas industry.  
 
 
  2.4.2.1.5 Risk Information Sharing 
One key challenge facing risk governance is lack of effective communication among all 
relevant stakeholders (Renn, 2014).  Effective communication is critical to any successful risk 
governance. A meaningful exchange of knowledge, interpretations, experiences, concerns and 
views about risks among all the relevant stakeholders defines the communication concept 
(Lofstedt, 2003). Renn (2014) identified several purposes of communication that may include: 
sharing information about risk and dealing with it, supporting the development and 
sustainability of trust among several stakeholders in dealing with uncertainty, engagement of 
several actors in risk-related decisions with the view of gain ownership of the process. This is 
not a simple task of having an accurate risk assessment, bring people together, having just 
effective communication, but requires more than these. It principally involves establishing 
procedures to facilitate discourses on uncertainties that involve multiple actors in interactions 
emanating from a different background (Rosa et al., 2013). In risk governance, effective 
communication accentuates featuring multiple actors. In the context of risk governance, the 
critical challenge is the inclusion of stakeholders in the participation in risk deliberations. The 
literature defined inclusion concept to mean the important role the actors play in the framing 
of the risk. Several forms of inclusiveness have been suggested including open forums for 
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discussion on risk, mediation, negotiated rule-making exercises and advisory committees 
involving amalgamation of stakeholders and scientists.  
 
The basis for the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders in risk governance has been discussed 
in the literature to including the following: 
• It serves as a means to an end. This stems from the requirement for exploration of 
various sources of information about risks and identification of several perspectives on 
them. It seeks to establish procedures for integrating all relevant knowledge as well as 
the concerns. 
• It serves as an end in itself. Stakeholders affected by the risk, within their democratic 
right, ought to participate in the decision making of the risk. They need to involve these 
stakeholders in the designing of principles and rules that must be accpeted in the 
processes and structures of the collective decision making about the risk 
• It provides checks and balances between the stakeholders and the society as more actors 
are involved in the evaluation of the risk, the more socially robust outcome of safety. 
The inclusion of actors will help in the co-production of the knowledge of risk, 
coordination of risk assessment and the collective design of the risk management. 
 
The modes of safety regulatory regime define the style of communication and inclusion. This 
is because the degree and types of inclusion may vary in respect of the governance level and 
the risk context. Renn (2014) indicated that such variation might stem from the nature of 
conciliatory, educational, insistent, accommodative, legalistic and persuasive enforcement 
practices. However, each style requires a specific approach to deal with internal and external 
communication and involvement of actors in safety management. Therefore, every safety 
regulatory regime must provide for a procedure for communication and inclusion of actors in 
the deliberation of hazards, threats and other issues that may affect the personnel, facilities and 
the environment. This requires incorporation of procedures in the existing regulatory regime 
to facilitate discourses among the various stakeholders that emanate from different background 
to promoting meaningful interactions towards the confrontation of uncertainties.   
 
 
2.4.2.2 Critique of  Renn’s Model  
This study recognises the significance of Renn’s model as an approach to improve risk 
governance in different fields of study. It contributes to the risk research and provides a highly 
interdisciplinary scope of the risk governance field. However, there appeared to be some 
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limitations associated with the model of which the present study will seek to address in its 
application to the upstream oil and gas industry.  
  
Firstly, the model of risk governance is over-simplified relative to the body of knowledge 
required in managing safety in the complex upstream oil and gas operations. It must be 
indicated that safety is not a system component failure (Leveson, 2011). An accident is viewed 
as an emergent property that must take into consideration its whole parts. Safety is a control 
problem which means that the hierarchical safety control structure must be explicitly identified 
(Rasmussen, 1997; Leveson, 2017). There are hierarchical safety control levels in upstream oil 
and gas industry that include the government, regulatory agencies, company, management, 
staff and work. There are interactions between humans, machines and organisational processes 
in the systems to produce the safety outcomes. Such sociotechnical systems are not explicitly 
underscored in Renn’s model.  
  
Secondly, safety culture was highlighted in the risk management level of the model. However, 
safety culture was not given much attention in the model. The differences in national 
characteristics, particularly in regulatory properties underpinned by its style of the regime may 
limit the adoption of the model. There is limited empirical knowledge of how national culture 
influence safety performance in the oil and gas industry. It can be suggested that safety climate 
which is viewed as a manifestation of organisational culture must be emphasised to improve 
regulatory, organisational and workers’ safety performance. 
 
 
2.4.2.3 Research on Assessment of Robustness of Safety Regulatory Regime 
An earlier review (see section 2.2.3) on assessment of regulatory regime found that large body 
of the literature mainly focused on assessing effectiveness of regimes. Effectiveness in context 
was defined as the relationship between the regulatory change and trends in respect of the 
occurrence of accidents. There is no consensus on the criteria for evaluating effectiveness of 
regulatory regime. Some researchers used safety performance indicators to determine the 
effectiveness of exiting safety regulatory regimes. Others used regulatory properties to form a 
benchmark framework analysis to determine the effectiveness of the regimes. However, basing 
the evaluation of the superiority of regulatory regime on effectiveness may be misleading. 
There are differences in reporting safety data (safety performance indicators) as well as 
national characteristics (e.g. culture, values, regulatory properties) among the regimes. The 
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emphasis must be on developing strategies for two important areas: sustainability of the 
functionality of the safety regulatory regime and learning capability.  
 
Lindøe et al. (2012) identified two main approaches to define the criteria for the assessment of 
regulatory regime: (1) the influence of major accidents on the legal and administrative 
structures, and (2) regulatory processes (i.e. collection of information on risk, establishing the 
norms and standards, and enforcement strategies). Hale (2014) on other hand, based his 
asseesment on the following criteria: framing of the risk, interdisciplinary risk assessment 
(quantification and cost-benefit), and management and monitoring. Hale’s analysis reflected 
the integrative risk giovernance model by Renn (2014). In this study, these two categories of 
criteria must be considered in other to cover much of the characteristics that reflects regime 
functionality and adaptability elements. The legal and administrative structures give some 
impressions about the regulatory culture underpinning the regime. Every regulatory regime is 
influenced by the prevailing national characteristics of its culture. Therefore, the legal and 
administrative regulatory structure of the regime must form part of the criteria for the 
evaluation 
 
However, there appeared to be limited studies that had provided adequate review critera for 
appraisal of robustness of safety regulatory regime. From the literature, it must be indicated 
that the comparative analyses were limited to developed countries (i.e. United Kingdom, 
United States and Norway). These countries had improved their regulatory systems after 
having gone through several major accidents in the upstream oil and gas industry. These 
regimes were shaped by the history of their complex differences in technology, political 
institutions, history, legal systems, culture, industrial structure and management. It appears 
from the literature that no study had focused on assessing robustness of safety regulatory 
regime in developing countries. Based on this review, this study presents review criteria for an 
assessment of robustness of a regulatory regime in a developing country (table 2.3).  The review 
criteria cover four main elements that include: (1) the legal and administrative regulatory 
framework, (2) the requirements of Renn’s model, (3) sustainability of the functionality of the 
regulatory system and (4) adaptability to changed situations. These review criteria covered 16 
elements which can be based to assess the robustness of a safety regulatory regime. The scope 
of the legal and administrative regulatory framework governing the safety of upstream oil and 
gas operation covers the following topics: safety and health protection of personnel and 
facilities, environmental protection, oil spill preparedness (i.e. covering spill preparedness 
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planning, their roles and responsibilities in spill response, and the capacity for response), 
emergency planning, employment standard and work environment, liability for accidents and 
management system requirements with clear responsibility. These areas are basically regulated 
either in the form of a single comprehensive statute and associated regulations or separate 
statutes that comprehensively deal with the individual areas. In whatever form it may take, in 
terms of ensuring coordination and effectiveness of these topics in regulations, a single statute 
can enable an integrated approach that provides a ‘single window’ to the regulatory regime. 
For multiple statutes specific measures can be provided to ensure its effectiveness (Dagg et al., 
2011). 
 
Table 2. 3 Review criteria for an assessment of a robust safety regulatory regime 
Criterion Key Elements Assessed on the 
Criterion 
Source(s) 
Scope of legislative and 
administrative 
regulatory framework 
governing upstream oil 
and gas operatins 
Existing legislations and 
regulations must cover the 
following topics:  
Ø Safety and health 
protection of personnel 
and facilities; 
Ø environmental protection; 
Ø employment standards & 
work environment; 
Ø emergency planning; 
Ø oil spill response; 
Ø liability for accidents. 
Ø Existing legislations and 
regulations must provide 
for the following: 
Ø management system with 
clear responsibilities; 
Ø Regulatory approach 
Lindøe et al. (2012), 
Dagg et al. (2011), 
Acheampong & 
Akumperigya (2018), 







Ø Provision of procedures 
for establishment of 
framing framework that 
captures all the relevant 
actors involved in the 
operations. 
Ø Risk asessment must 
include both quantitative 
and qualitative approach. 
Ø Legitimisation of the 
methods and processes on 
the judgement of risk 
evaluation. 
Ø Monitoring and 
controlling of risk through 
cooperation, adequate 
resources and separate 
competent regulator.  
Ø Provision of procedures 
for communication that 
emphasises inclusion of 
all relevant actors in the 


























Sustainability of the 
functionality of the 
regulatory Regime 
Sustainability of the functions of 
the regime type 
Hale (2014) 
Learning capability Requirement for management of 







2.5 Safety Indicators for the Upstream Oil and Gas Sector  
The previous section examined robustnesss concept as a suitable approach to assess safety 
regulatory regime. Indicators are important to reveal system deficiencies for improvement. 
This section examines the safety indicators applied to the upstream oil and gas industry. The 
purpose is to identify the most appropriate dimensions to measure how well safety is managed 
in the high-hazard industry. One necessary means is to be incessantly vigilant through the use 
of indicators (Øien et al., 2011a). However, there are issues about offshore safety statistics: 
data that can capture the essential factors within the regulatory regime, and the development of 
comparative data across different regulatory context with different culture and history. The 
lack of scientific knowledge was one of the reasons that had driven the reliance on empirical 
data of regulatory approach emanating from the various regulatory regime (Blakstad, 2014). 
The industry had developed its own indicators. Safety performance data is indicated to be a 
challenge for the regulatory authorities in the oil and gas industry. Regulatory bodies need 
safety performance data for many reasons including notification of actions for improvement, 
resource decisions and determination of successes or failures (Walker, 2010, cited in Blakstad, 
2014). There are several perspectives and dimensions when applying indicators. This section 
discusses those perspectives and aspects that are more applicable to exposing weaknesses and 
gaps in system control within upstream oil and gas operations. 
 
 
2.5.1 Meaning and Purpose of Indicators 
The term indicator is used in several ways and therefore has varied meanings. Øien (2001b; 
cited in Øien, 2011a,  p.149) defined it as “a measurable/operational variable that can be used 
to describe the condition of a broader phenomenon or aspect of reality”. The literature 
identified two meanings here: (1) as a measurable/operational definition that reflects theoretical 
foundation; and (2) as an extent to describe the condition of a broader phenomenon or aspect 
of reality. An indicator must have a theoretical foundation and represents an aspect of reality. 
Research on indicator development had been taking place within the fields of social and natural 
sciences. However, an indicator is a new concept in the safety domain, but before the 1980s, 
safety assessment took the forms of indexes, rates and measurements (Øien et al., 2011a). There 
are different indicators in safety as discussed in Blakstad (2014) such as 'safety outcome 
measure', 'safety performance measure' as well as 'safety performance indicator', are 
occasionally used interchangeably. Safety indicators are developed to monitor the level of 
safety in a system mainly, to motivate action, and to provide the relevant information for 
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decision-makers about where and how to act (Skogdalen et al., 2011). Harms-Ringdahl (2009) 
indicated that the demand for safety indicators varies considerably, and one approach is by 
beginning to look at it from the purpose and application. The real use of indicators is to assess 
the effectiveness of a system of risk controls (Hopkins, 2009a). Different safety indicators have 




2.5.1.1 Safety Performance Indicators 
Safety performance is defined by two categories: safety outcomes and safety behaviours 
(Christian et al., 2009). Safety outcomes relate to historical information or statistical data on 
indicators of incidents, accidents, injuries and fatalities. Safety behaviour has two aspects: 
safety compliance and safety participation. These two components of safety behaviour are 
examined in the section (section 2.6.3.2.14). A safety performance indicator is defined as 
"observable measures that provide insights into a concept – safety – that is difficult to measure 
directly (OECD, 2008, p. 5). Skogdalen et al. (2010, p. 109) defined it as “a means for 
measuring the changes in the level of safety as a result of actions taken“. According to Kjellén, 
(2009), it is the metric employed to measure the ability of an organisation to control the risk of 
incidents occurring. It measures either directly or indirectly, the level of incident risks and how 
it develops over time. Safety performance indicator reflects the changes that had taken place at 
the safety level. According to Hopkins (2009a), a description of the safety level of an 
organisation constitutes the critical function of a measure of safety performance. Safety 
performance indicator can be used to indicate an early warning of significant accidents (Øien 
et al., 2011a). These measures provide indicators that are proactive to deal with major hazard 
incidents before an accident occur.  
 
The main emphasis of safety performance indicators is its ability to monitor system 
performance. The literature has used safety performance indicators to measure early warnings 
of system performance. Monitoring system performance requires both reactive and proactive 
indicators. The former relates to the identification and report on incidents to check the adequacy 
of existing controls. It indicates the safety outcomes of the control systems. The later is more 
related to active monitoring of risk control systems to provide feedback on performance before 
an incident occurs. Much of these are safety climate measures that provide early warning 
indicators on the performance of the system. In the context of this study, safety performance 
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indicators are applied to only measure reactive or safety outcomes that identify and report the 
incidents. Safety climate measurement will be used to indicate the active monitoring on the 
system performance. Given the challenges associated with measuring system performances, 
there is the propensity to put 'everything' under the umbrella of indicators (Blakstad, 2014). An 




2.5.1.1.1 The Safety Domains of the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry 
Personal safety and process safety constitute the domains for the oil and gas safety (Swuste et 
al., 2016). Both the professional and research literatures have recognised the critical relevance 
of these domains in developing indicators to measure safety performance in the oil and gas 
industry. Each domain has its hazards and potential consequences. Their differences and issues 
form the next discussion. 
 
 
2.5.1.1.1.1 Personal Safety  
Hopkins (2007, 2009a) discussed the distinction between personal safety and process safety as 
the safety domains in a hazard industry like the oil and gas industry. He pointed out that the 
difference constituting these two safety domains is simply the different types of hazard that 
emerged from them. These different types of hazard have implications for managing safety in 
high hazard industry. Several studies (e.g. Horbah et al., 2017; Tang et al., 2018a, 2018b) have 
differentiated these two safety domains in terms of the hazards they constitute. Personal safety, 
also known as occupational safety, seeks to protect the health and safety of individual worker 
at the workplace. It relates to exposure of workers to noise, vibration, chemicals, mechanical, 
electrical hazards and among other hazards that lead to injuries and fatalities of an individual 
at the workplace. Such exposures have been examined by Broni-Bediako and Amorin (2010) 
in terms of the areas of upstream oil and gas operations that are associated with workers’ 
exposure to drilling fluid. From their discussion, the health consequences emanating from the 
drilling fluids are triggered by the hazardous components of the fluids, additives and workers' 
exposure to those components. They indicated that skin irritation and contact dermatitis 
constitute the most common occupational health consequences that are observed from drilling 
fluids exposure to workers, with eye irritation, headache, coughing, and nausea appeared 
infrequently. These consequences are instigated by the physico-chemical properties of the 
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drilling fluid and the inherent properties associated with the drilling fluid additives. They are 
all contingent on the route of exposure to inhalation, oral, dermal, and others. Hopkins (2007) 
indicated hazard incidents associated with personal safety to include falls, trips, electrocution 
crushing, and vehicle accidents. The report of the IOGP (see IOGP, 2019a) captured the 
common personal safety performance indicators commonly used may include Fatal accident 
rate, Lost time injury frequency, and Total recordable injury rate, Number of restricted 
workday cases, Number of medical treatment cases. These safety performance indicators 
represent the outcomes of safety performance. 
 
 
2.5.1.1.1.1 Process Safety 
Process safety relates to major hazards that could cause major incidents. Amyotte et al. (2016, 
p.1) defined major incidents as “adverse events such as major leaks/releases, fires, explosions 
or loss of structural integrity, leading to multiple deaths and major damage to the environment 
or property”. In the upstream oil and gas industry, major hazards (see section 2.6.4.2) that 
included:  hydrocarbon releases, explosion, fire, blowout, and just to mention a few, may cause 
major incident that have potential multiple consequences to the workers’ fatalities and injuries, 
asset loss or damage and environmental pollutions. Horbah et al. (2017) examined the literature 
on the common characteristics associated with major incidents which included the following: 
• they have relatively low frequencies but extremely severe consequences;  
• their occurrences were not due to unknown physical or chemical process hazards, but 
in all cases, the hazards were known for a long time; 
• why they continue to occur are mainly characterised by management quality, 
organisational and human factors; 
• They are caused by a multiplicity of flaws, lacks and deficiencies. 
 
 The long assumption of personal safety indicators as relevant measures for process safety 
management is indubitably shown to be misleading.  The reason is that evidence of past major 
incidents in the oil and gas industry such as Shell's chemical Company Plant Explosion in 
Texas in 1997, BP Texas City refinery disaster in 2005 and Deepwater Horizon accident in 
2010 have pointed otherwise. The lessons from these major incidents in the oil and gas industry 
have indicated that more emphasis should be put on process safety indicators.  How is process 
safety linked to asset integrity?  
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Tang et al. (2018a) notably linked process safety to asset integrity. They understood the latter 
as the management of people, systems, process and resources to reduce operation hazard risks 
that have many consequences to the workers, assert, and the environment. Managing process 
safety hazards is to safeguard systems assert integrity. Assert integrity and process safety 
hazards management seeks to achieve the same purpose – safeguarding systems' major hazard 
incidents. An occupational accident is associated with personal safety defects, whereas major 
events related to process safety defects. The management of safety hazards cannot guarantee 
system process safety. However, the management of process safety hazards can help to 
improve personal safety performance as much of its defects, or latent conditions are associated 
with safety culture. Although the two safety domains are essential for safety performance in 
the upstream oil and gas industry, process safety hazards need more attention to improve the 
control the system operations. From this discussion, the distinction between personal safety 
and process safety is made which safety performance indicators must reflect these. The debate 
about the use of safety performance indicators needs to be looked around their difference in 
perspective and focus of attention. 
 
 
2.5.1.1.2 The Perspectives and Focus of Attention 
Researchers (Øien et al., 2011a; Blakstad, 2014) have examined the development of safety 
indicators and their utilisation by regulatory authorities in the oil and gas industry. They 
pointed out that the development and use of safety indicators should be discussed along with 
the difference in perspectives and focus of attention. The perspectives are categorised into 
lagging versus leading perspective and technical-human-organisational perspective. The focus 




2.5.1.1.2.1 The Lagging versus Leading Perspective 
The lagging and leading indicators are terminologies borrowed from the field of economics 
and adopted in the field of safety to describe the safety level of a system (Lingard et al., 2017; 
Oswald et al., 2018).  Kjellén (2009) asserted that these terminologies were introduced to the 
field of safety without consideration of their full meaning relating to safety performance. 
Because of this, researchers have used these terminologies inconsistently which appeared 
unhelpful sometimes. In the industry, the use of lagging and leading safety performance 
indicators to evaluate safety level continues to receive increasing attention among the 
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professional and research communities. However, the distinction between these two safety 
performance indicators and their practical implication to safety management in the prevention 
of major hazard incidents have become contentious in the safety literature.  
 
The original Hopkins’ (2007) paper (i.e. working paper 53) presented at the Oil and Gas 
Conference in Manchester ignited the controversy characterising safety indicators 
measurement involving whether managing indicators for occupational accidents the same way 
as managing indicators for major disasters and how these safety indicators are measured 
(lagging versus leading).  As pointed in earlier in this section that the distinction between 
personal safety and process safety indicators are well understood in the literature — the 
essentiality in the understanding of the distinction between lagging and leading indicators. The 
main thrust of this difference is made between the indicators to determine the causes or 
contributing factors in the post-incident or near-misses evaluation and the indicators to predict 
possible major incident occurrence. The distinction between lagging and leading safety 
performance perspective is well documented in the safety literature (e.g. Hopkins, 2009a, 
2009b; Hale, 2009a, 2009b; Vinnem, 2010). However, this distinction of safety performance 
indicators has not been a clear-cut issue in the safety literature.  
 
Lagging safety performance indicators measure safety outcomes (Hopkins, 2009a). They are 
reactive indicators that measure the potential contributing factors after incidents or accidents 
occurrence using retrospective analysis. In Guo and Yiu (2015) conceptual framework of 
developing safety performance indicators, they defined safety outcome to broadly included: 
incidents, near misses, accidents and safety. Examples of such lagging safety performance 
indicators can be found in offshore safety statistics (HSE, 2010), Outer Continental Shelf 
Performance Measures (OCSPM), Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA, 2009b) and International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP, 2019). Review of these lagging indicators 
indicated no unified reporting system by regulatory authorities. However, some organisations 
have established their safety performance indicators for its member countries. For example, 
IOGP provides a set of safety outcome reporting criteria, including incidents classification, is 
defined for its member countries. The essence of these lagging safety performance indicators 
is that they measure the direct outcomes of incidents or accidents. The measure of lagging 
safety performance indicators is easier to be conducted simply because previous event data are 
available (Oswald et al., 2018) and provide valuable information about how the system has 
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performed in the past. However, these lagging safety performance indicators are limited in 
terms of the ability to capture the knowledge of the causal links to these safety outcomes.  
 
In contrast, leading safety performance indicators are predictive indicators that seek to measure 
potential contributing factors involving active monitoring to achieve organisational safety 
outcomes. However, there are several other definitions of leading safety performance 
indicators in the safety literature. For instance, a list of such explanations is documented in 
Guo and Yiu (2015).  Guo and Yiu (2015) and Lingard et al. (2017) examined two different 
categorisations associated with leading safety performance indicators in the safety literature: 
• Leading safety performance indicators that measure the direct aspects of safety 
management systems; 
• Leading safety performance indicators of abstract safety constructs. 
Safety management systems relate to a rationalisation of procedures that takes the form of 
management systems defining the safety policies, procedures and practices. The concept of 
safety management systems is examined in subsequent section 2.7. Safety performance 
indicators for safety management systems only measure safety practices and activities as well 
as offering information about the safety management system implementation. Given this, its 
central relevance lies in its compatibility with the safety management processes that enable 
remedial actions to be readily proffered. However, it is pointed out that such indicators do not 
establish why a worker did not do what he or she is supposed to do in improving system safety 
performance (Guo & Yiu, 2015). In other words, it does not establish the theoretical and 
empirical causal link to safety deviations. 
 
The leading safety performance indicators of abstract safety constructs serve as precursors to 
harm that provides early warning signs of potential failure of the system. Guo and Yiu (2015) 
examined this type of leading safety performance indicators and pointed out that its causal link 
to safety outcomes is relatively robust and precise. They defined safety constructs as 
explanatory tools employed by safety researchers to understand the safety world, whereby 
several measurement scales are developed to measure safety constructs. They further stated 
that this type of leading safety performance indicators provides a more rigorous scientific 
understanding of the safety phenomena.   Example of such leading safety performance indicator 




It is clear from the discussion that the distinction between lagging and leading safety 
performance indicators is not a straightforward task. Some researchers (e.g. Hopkins, 2099; 
Hale, 2009; Manuele, 2009) argued that the distinction between the two different types of 
safety performance indicators is not all that relevant, but they should be used as a continuum. 
Manuele (2009) criticised the applicability of lagging and leading safety indicators as these 
terms do not provide value to safety practices. Other researchers are of the view that (e.g. 
Reiman, & Pietikäinen, 2012; Guo & Yiu, 2015) safety performance indicators should be 
explicitly distinguished as they create confusion for safety management. 
 
However, much of the discussion of this distinction between lagging and leading safety 
performance indicators in the safety literature is driven by the epidemiological perspective of 
safety that underscores the relevance of the Swiss-cheese model (Reason, 1997) where latent 
failures create the condition for incidents occurrence. In this study, both lagging and leading 
safety performance indicators are for safety management. The reason is that safety performance 
indicators that reflect safety outcomes that are reactive and objective that cannot be ignored as 
they provide valuable information about the past safety performance of the system. However, 
leading safety performance indicators give information on safety management deficiencies as 
they specify the avenues for detection and resolution of safety deviations to be made before 
incidents occur. Given the aim of the present study, robustness thinking driven by a 
sociotechnical perspective requires the establishment of the background knowledge that links 
to risks. The measure of safety culture (i.e. safety climate) provides early warning indicators 
to improve system weaknesses. It provides background knowledge of the threat, which helps 
to minimise risks. However, from the safety literature, two different meanings appeared to 
characterise leading safety performance indicators. They include leading safety performance 
indicators that reflect management activities (safety management systems) and early warning 
signs (safety climate constructs).  
 
The categorisation of these leading safety indicators appeared to have been driven by the 
epidemiological perspective of safety. This perspective on safety performance indicators is 
insufficient to improve safety management as they seek to correct individual safety behaviour 
without considering the whole system. Such safety performance indicators are mostly 
associated with knowledge uncertainties and potential surprises as they do not view safety as 
system control. This study argues that safety performance indicators must be developed along 
with a sociotechnical perspective where safety is understood as an emergent property which 
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has technical, human and organisational components that interact to fulfil a corporate goal. 
Given this sociotechnical perspective of developing safety performance indicators, the most 
appropriate approach of measuring safety performance is to employ robustness strategies. 
Robustness thinking in developing safety performance indicators emphases background 
knowledge on which the consequences and the uncertainties are based on (see Aven & Ylönen, 
2018b; Jensen & Aven, 2018). As safety evaluation seeks to gain an understanding of system 
vulnerabilities in the sense of knowledge – justified beliefs, they must be obtained through the 
application of scientific investigation process (Amundrud & Aven, 2015). What is of relevance 
is to explore the causal links to the safety outcomes under a robustness strategy underpinned 
by sociotechnical perspective. Since safety is conceived as a control problem that involves 
decision-making at a different hierarchical system level, the concerns of all the relevant 
stakeholders as well as the information of their risk perceptions is essential and must be 
captured. Therefore, leading safety performance indicators must reflect the background 
knowledge that links to the risks. Several studies (e.g. Zohar, 2010; Horbah et al., 2017; Guo 
& Yui, 2017) found safety climate constructs as major hazard risk predictors. According to 
Guo and Yui (2017), the link between safety climate constructs and safety outcomes is 
relatively robust and precise. 
 
In linking the ideas of Rasmussen’s model to leading indicators, the following broadly 
constitute the decision-making hierarchical levels in safety management: the government, 
regulators, industry and workforce. Leading safety performance indicators should be designed 
to capture the knowledge from these hierarchical levels to deal with the knowledge of 
uncertainties and potential surprises.  In terms of using leading safety performance indicators 
to measure the deficiencies associated with companies' safety management systems, Guo and 
Yui (2015) pointed out two main limitations. The first limitation has to do with the existence 
of the knowledge gap regarding the effectiveness of the safety management systems. Due to 
the fact the safety management systems only accentuate its processes and procedures without 
emphasising the factors (i.e. the knowledge about the human element and cultural factors) that 
drive the implementation of the safety management systems. The second limitation is that 
leading safety performance indicators have weakness in analytical soundness and predictability 
in measuring safety management systems' intrinsic deficiencies. In empirical support of this 
limitation, Hopkins' (2007) analysis of Gretley mine disaster shown that the development of 
safety management systems is inadequate for incident prevention. In this study, qualitative risk 
assessment is essential to capture the issues that drive the implementation of safety 
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management systems in line with the Rasmussen's hierarchical level of decision making in 
safety management. Because of this, more attention is required to be directed towards 
developing leading safety performance indicators that practically contribute towards improving 
the functionality of the safety system 
 
 
2.5.1.1.2.2 The Technical-Human-Organisational Perspective 
Safety performance indicators can also be looked at within the technical, human and 
organisational perspective. Blakstad (2014) examined this perspective and linked the safety 
investigation in the nuclear industry to it. This perspective is about developing safety 
performance indicators to capture the technical, human and organisational factors influencing 
incidents risks. Blakstad stated that assessment of plant safety is conducted in two levels: by 
evaluating the physical system designs and performance, and the operating system designs and 
performance. The former is linked to the technical system deviations. Whereas, the latter 
denotes the human and organisational contributing factors that cover human performance, 
operational safety and safety culture. However, in several investigative reports (e.g. Cullen, 
1990; Baker, 2007; CSB, 2014) and scientific studies on the analysis of hydrocarbon leaks 
(Sklet, 2006; 2010; Vinnem et al, 2007a; Okstad et al. 2009; Haugen et al, 2010) have pointed 
out that human and organisational factors constitute the main causal factors. Therefore, safety 
performance indicators should also focus on capturing the human and organisational factors. 
 
 
2.5.1.1.2.3 Aspects of Health, Safety and Environment 
Blakstad (2014) discussed the different aspects of health, safety and environment that safety 
performance indicators should be directed towards. She identified several issues of health, 
safety and environment in the oil and gas industry: personal hazards and illnesses, helicopter 
transportation hazards, major hazards, physical and psychosocial working environment 
hazards, risk perception as well as workers' behaviours, attitudes and safety culture. However, 
Øien et al. (2011b) stated that safety performance indicators differ in terms of the types of 
damage made to personnel, assets and the environment. Much discussion on the hazard risks 
associated with each kind of damage (risk dimensions) is made in the previous section 2.6.4.  
It must be pointed out that safety performance indicators should focus on clarifying the 
distinction of the type of damages that have effects on personnel, assets and the environment. 
This is because applying safety performance indicators for one aspect of safety among several 
aspects is problematic. 
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In short, this study applies safety performance indicators to measure reactive or safety 
outcomes that identify and report the incidents in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas operations. The 
safety outcome classifications as shown in table 2.4 are applied in this study to measure the 
reactive indicators of the industry. Safety climate measure will be used to indicate the active 
monitoring of the system safety performance of Ghana's upstream oil and gas operations. 
 
 





Medical treatment cases 
Reported diseases 
Restricted work cases 
First aid cases 





2.6 Safety Climate Influences on Hazard Risks  
Having reviewed that safety climate is as an active indicator for monitoring system safety 
performance in the preceding section, the current section examines the literature on the safety 
climate measures and hazard incident dimensions relevant to the upstream oil and gas industry. 
It begins by discussing the conceptual relationship between organisational culture and 
organisational climate, the antecedents and multi-level measurement of safety climate as well 
as its potential measures. It examines the link between safety and risk and further identifies the 





2.6.1 Safety and Culture Relationship 
 The link between safety and culture was first introduced in the International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group (INSAG) report on the Chernobyl accident in 1986. A fundamental 
assumption in the safety literature is that workers’ safety or unsafe behaviours are a function 
of the prevailing safety culture of the organisation. Safety culture as a new concept in the safety 
field at that time had to be given much attention by both safety professionals and researchers 
because it was a golden opportunity to expand the view on safety to include the intangible 
aspects of human behaviour (Guldenmund, 2010). Since then, safety culture and safety climate 
have become essential concepts that had attracted much research interest in the broader 
concepts of organisational culture and organisational climate. An organisation context has an 
influence on safety outcomes as several reviews of major accidents consistently identified the 
elements of organisational management as direct or indirect contributors to incidents (Griffin 
& Curcuruto, 2016). Several accident enquiry reports related to the upstream oil and gas 
industry (e.g. Cullen, 1990; DHSG, 2011; CSB, 2016) and scientific studies on hydrocarbon 
releases (e.g. Sklet et al., 2010; Cox et al., 2016) have established that human and 
organisational influences are the main important causal factors to major. Various studies have 
found safety culture as the main driver that shapes organisational safety performance (Flin et 
al., 2000; Mearns et al., 2003; Mearns & Yule, 2009; Mearns, 2014). However, given the 
conceptual challenges of measuring safety culture (Guldenmund, 2000; 2007; Glenton & 
Stantan, 2000), most studies have used the term safety climate to describe the tangible outputs 
or indicators of an organisation’s safety culture. Safety climate’ has been established in the 
literature as an indicator that predicts organisational safety performance. However, many of 
the existing safety climate assessment relating to the high-risk industries focus on personal 
safety indicators which have limited scope to capture proactive indicators of major accident 
risk factors. 
  
Guldenmund (2000), in his review of safety culture, noted that no study of safety climate would 
be meaningful without a discussion of aspects of organisational culture and climate. Because 
of this, this section begins by looking at an organisation from the generic culture concept. These 
concepts of organisational culture and organisational climate have different meanings, 
particularly when the focus is specifically more on safety. However, neither the research nor 
the professional literature has provided for an explicit or consistent distinction between 
organisational culture and organisational climate, which has led to a considerable definitional 
confusion (Hecker & Goldenhar, 2014). Safety climate has its meaning from organisational 
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climate concept. This review attempts to clarify this seemingly definitional confusion of the 
distinction between organisational culture and organisational climate. The current section seeks 
to explore the potential factors (also known as dimensionalities or constructs or determinants) 
for assessing safety climate. Safety climate is viewed as a multi-dimensional and multi-level 
concept in organisational culture theory.  
  
 
2.6.2 Organisational Culture versus Organisational Climate 
The link between the concept of culture and organisational study is well documented in both 
the professional and research literature. This relationship has been triggered by the indication 
of the symbolic aspect of organised settings (Smircich, 1983). Smircich attempted to clarify 
the differences in ways many researchers have linked the concept of culture to an organisation. 
In her review of the literature on the linkage between culture theory and organisational theory, 
the following five main research themes emerged from the intersection: “Comparative 
Management”, “Corporate Culture”, “Organisational Cognition”, “Organisational 
Symbolism”, and “Unconscious processes and Organization”. Researchers have advanced 
these research themes for many different purposes and grounded on many different 
assumptions. It is indicated that a cultural framework for analysis is required to help to 
stimulate organisational researchers and managers to question the ends its serves than to 
appreciate organisation as a value. However, it noted that it is difficult for researchers and 
professionals to live within their cultural context and also question their assumptions and value. 
Whatever the challenges that would emanate, a cultural framework of analysis for researchers 
and managers requires such questioning. 
  
The term organisational culture was firstly introduced in the academic literature by Andrew M. 
Pettigrew in 1979, a pioneering paper entitled “On studying organisational culture” (see 
Pettigrew, 1979) published by Administration Science Quarterly (Chatman, 2016). Pettigrew’s 
(1979) understood culture as a system of publicly and collectively established meanings that 
work for a certain group of people at a specific time, He understood the emergence and 
development of organisational culture from typical concepts in sociology and anthropology. 
Martin and Siehl (1983) defined organisational culture as shared values, attitudes, beliefs and 
customs of the members of the organisation. Deshpande et al. (1993) reviewed over 100 studies 
in organisational culture. They understood organisational culture as a pattern of shared values 
and beliefs that make individuals of an organisation to understanding the functions of the 
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organisation and offer them the norm in which the individuals behave in the organisation. 
Cameron and Quinn (1999) conceived organisational culture as what is valued, the procedures 
and routines, the language and symbols, the dominant leadership styles as well as what defines 
success to make an organisation unique. Schein (1985) explains organisational culture from 
three dimensions: assumptions, values and artefacts. Ramachandran et al. (2011) noted from 
their review work on organisational culture that research on culture focused on organisational 
values. Zammuto and Krakower (1991) see organisational values to be more visible 
representation of culture. From the literature, shared values are more reliably accessible in 
measuring organisational culture than assumptions and artefacts. This study adopts the 
perspective that organisational culture is a pattern of shared values and beliefs that offer 
members of an organisation an understanding of the organisational functions that informs their 
behaviour. 
  
Organisational climate is defined as the workers’ perception of work environment events and 
the expectations that the organisation has of workplace behaviour, attitudes, and norms 
(Ostroff, 1993). According to Schneider (2017), organisation climate is made up of shared 
perceptions among employees regarding the procedures, practices and the kind of behaviour 
that is rewarded and supported relating to the specific environment in question. From these 
definitions, the key attribute of the organisational climate is the shared employees’ perceptions 
regarding the work environment. Zohar (2000) argued that this attribute emerges as a group- 
level property, which actually develops from individual members’ experiences and perceptions 
of the work environment and progressively become socially shared. Organisational climate 
arises through individual perceptions of order in the workplace. It is a multidimensional 
construct that is made up of individual evaluation of the work environment.  
  
Several scholars have conceived the debates on the difference or link between organisational 
culture and climate. Denison (1996) argued that the seeming difference between organisational 
culture and climate stems from their respective theoretical foundation as the former emerged 
from the social constructionism and the latter emerged from the Lewinian field theory. Climate 
depicts the situation and its relationship to thoughts, feelings, and behaviours of the 
organisational members. Whereas, culture denotes an evolved context within which a situation 
may be embedded with an entrenched history, collectively held, and sufficiently complex to 
withstand manipulation. According to Schein (1992, p. 230), “climate will be a reflection and 
manifestation of cultural assumptions”. Several studies (e.g. Guldenmund, 2000; Schein 2010; 
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Schneider et al. 2013; Schneider et al. 2017) have conceived climate as the tangibles on which 
are focused to produce or shape behaviour, whereas culture offers the intangibles (abstracts) 
that are possibly accrued to provide a deeper psychological understanding of people in a given 
organisational setting. In the review work on safety climate by Hecker and Goldenhar (2014), 
they recognised climate as a “snapshot” of culture. There is still no clear demarcated boundary 
between the two concepts in the research literature. However, in terms of their connection, the 
two concepts offer metaphors that describe the complex social systems that are organisations 
which address the meaning people assign to their values, attitudes and experiences of that 
setting. Organisational climate is the shared meaning organisational employees attach to their 
experience and behaviours relating to events, policies, practices and procedures, and are being 
rewarded, supported and expected. This key attribute of shared employees’ perception of the 
work environment has been relevant to safety studies. Organisational climate provides the 
context in which specific individual evaluation of the values of safety is made. This implies 
that the organisational climate can predict a particular safety climate.  
  
 
2.6.3 Safety Climate as a Robust Predictor of Safety Performance 
Safety Climate is defined as “shared employee perceptions about the relative importance of 
safe conduct in their occupational behaviour” (Zohar, 1980, p. 96). It is viewed as a specific 
facet of the social climate in an organisation relative to employees’ perceptions of the priority 
of policies, procedures and practices of safety (Kvalheim & Dahl, 2018; Bergman & Payne, 
2018). It is described as the “molar and unified set of recognition” that is held by the workers 
of the organisation relating to their safety in the organisation (Zohar, 1980, p. 101). Safety 
climate is mainly identified as social consensual or shared cognition in an organisation. Safety 
climate emerged from organisational climate concept. The general view that emerged from the 
understanding of organisational climate as discussed in the preceding section is that it is a 
collective phenomenon explicated by shared meanings workers give to their experience and 
behaviours regarding organisation’s policies, procedures and practices that are rewarded and 
supported towards a specific goal of the organisation.  
 
To review the development of safety climate as a construct, Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) 
highlighted two key features of perception that explains the constitutionality of safety climate. 
The first feature is that the emergence of perception is shared across individuals. The term 
sharedness points to the understanding that climate is a collective characteristic of groups. 
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Linking the sharedness nature of perception to distinguish the difference between 
psychological climate (i.e. the individual perception of the workplace) and safety climate (i.e. 
shared perception by individuals within a group or an organisation), the understanding is that 
perception serves as a collective frame of reference for workers that give indications of or cues 
about the expected behaviour and outcome of organisational safety. The second feature of 
perception that explicates safety climate is that it is characterised as inherently descriptive and 
cognitive. Their inherent descriptive and cognitive nature is recognised with reference to 
observable characteristics of the safety of the organisation experienced by the workers in their 
day-to-day interactions.  
  
 
 2.6.3.1 Antecedents of Safety Climate 
One pertinent theoretical issue regarding how perception becomes shared and gradually 
emerged as climate. This can be explained from these antecedents: symbolic social 
interactionism (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Gonzalez-Roma et al., 2002; Ostroff et al., 2003; 
Weick, 2005) and supervisory leadership (Lewin et al., 1939; Dragoni, 2005; Zohar, 2010). 
This symbolic interactionism also labelled as a social sense-making process is explained from 
a philosophical view that meaning of things and interpretation of events emanating from 
cognitive exchanges among people seeking to understand their environment (Zohar, 2010). 
Sense-making processes develop the emergence of climate. It is a process through which 
experiences of an individual accumulate to form the collective phenomenon. During this 
process of cognitive exchanges, individual perception is being checked and also modified in 
view of the observation and assessment of others. In such a situation, an attempt would be 
made to reach a consensual interpretation of the meaning of events, procedures and practices 
at the work environment, leading to a process of convergence of group members’ perceptions 
and resembling of newcomer socialisation (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Zohar, 2010). In this 
process, the members of the group come to share the meaning of their work environment, and 
this promotes the emergence of climate.  
  
Leadership had been identified as one of the antecedents that explain climate emergence. This 
mechanism originally had its conceptualisation from the earlier publication by Lewin et. (1939) 
that “leaders create a climate”. Dragoni (2005) explains this climate –leadership relationship 
as a social learning process in which group members severally observe and exchange 
information with their leader in the way of interpreting their work environment. Zohar (2010) 
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explains further that, supervisor practices or group leaders are relatively easy to observe as a 
result of the leader’s proximity and availability, they routinely inform their group members as 
to relative priorities. With such shared perception arising from the commonality of the leader’s 
instructions and practices, they form the core meaning of domain-specific climate. 
  
Given these antecedents explaining how climate emerges, the use of safety climate as an 
indicator to assess workers’ perception of safety policies, procedures and practices in the work 
environment is essential in the oil and gas industry. In today’s world, which is driven by 
competition and decreasing earning capacity, the process industry like the oil and gas industry 
puts the emphasises on cost reduction and time-saving. According to Knegtering and Pasman 
(2009), this can produce conditions in which risk awareness fades away. The typical 
characteristic of the oil and gas industry is that frontline leaders are assigned to workgroups for 
operational activities. The effects of such social interactionism and leader’s supervisory 
practices with the group members would inform the relative priority of safety with other 
competing operational demands at the work environment. 
  
Nevertheless, the literature has established the influence of safety climate in organisational 
safety performance. Given the multi-dimensionality of the safety climate measure, several 
constructs have been applied in a safety-critical organisation such as the oil and gas industry. 
Much of these constructs reflect personal safety related indicators. It must be indicated that not 
adequate research attention has been directed to factors that could predict major incidents in 
the upstream oil and gas industry. 
  
  
2.6.3.2 Measuring Safety Climate 
The main challenge in safety research is to find the factors and process that influences safety 
climate (Zohar, 2010; Hystad et al., 2014). What climate factors can predict major accidents in 
high-risk organisations have not received much attention in the scientific literature (Andreas et 
al., 2016). Some studies (e.g. Kines et al., 2011; Hosny et al., 2017) have developed safety 
climate measures to be applied in the upstream oil and gas industry. Such measures adopted in 
their study do not reflect major hazard incident risks. Safety climate measurement must indicate 
the dimensions of the nature of hazards that characterise the specific industry (Flin 2000). 
Currently, no consensus has been reached on categories of constructs that are specific to the 
upstream oil and gas industry. Given this challenge, this study explores the existing literature 
on potential constructs that can be used to measure safety climate in the upstream oil and gas 
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industry. There are several constructs established by the literature (see table 2.5) that can be 
used to measure safety climate. They may include the following: safety policies, safety priority, 
safety training, management commitment, safety rules & procedures, management of change, 
safety communication, equipment maintenance, safety involvement, safety supervision, 
supportive environment, safety empowerment, safety motivation and safety behaviour. These 
constructs are discussed as potential factors that can be applied to measure the predictive 
influence of safety climate on major hazard risks.  
  
 
2.6.3.2.1 Safety Policies 
A safety policy is defined as the management’s expression of the decisions to be followed in 
the organization (Kuusisto, 2001, p. 35). Safety is integrated into the overall organisation's 
function. Every organisation is required to protect workers from accidents. This requirement 
means that there must be in place of safety policies. The safety policies commit the 
management at all levels of the organisation and show which tasks, responsibilities and 
decisions are to be carried out or made towards fulfilling the requirement that workers, the 
facilities and the environment are protected from unacceptable risk. The safety policies are in 
a written statement form that must be succinct, clearly written, signed by the management and 
indicated primary responsibilities and plans to implement them (Othman, 2010). Safety 
policies in an organisation become enacted when the safety plans and procedures are 
implemented by the supervisors and the workers (Petitta et al., 2017). According to Mearns et 
al. (2003), safety climate influence organisational safety performance in the offshore oil and 
gas operations environment. They indicated that the knowledge of organisational safety 
policies must improve a positive safety climate. Mearns et al. suggested the following elements 
to assess safety policies influences: the ability of workers to read their companies' safety 
policies, understood them, understand what the policies statements require them to do. 
 
 
2.6.3.2.2 Safety Priority  
The Cambridge English dictionary defined the word priority to mean "something that is 
important and must be dealt with before other things”. According to Spicker (2009), the idea 
of priority is linked to the exercise of judgement between competing demands. He noted that 
there are many different understandings of the term, which requires a priority setting to be 
worked out. This is because a system that seeks to establish a priority is not likely to reflect the 
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intended issues and concerns which needed to be resolved.  In context, safety priority means 
management making safety at the workplace more important than production-related activities. 
This requires a commitment to their safety values and actions. It can be stated that the true 
meaning of safety priority is when leadership backs the importance of workplace safety 
improvement by real their efforts. Several studies have found safety priority to influence 
workplace safety climate (Cox & Lacey, 1998, 1999; Cox & Cheyne, 2000). The literature 
measured safety priority by ranking adherence to safety over operation cost, production 
pressures and an indication of actions and not just safety slogans. 
 
 
2.6.3.2.3 Safety Training 
Safety training and competence (herein referred to as safety training) is a critical ingredient for 
a robust safety management. According to Gao et al. (2019), for safety management practice 
to devise a well-functioning safety culture in the oil and gas industry is to have an effective 
safety training. Wright et al. (2003) defined competence in safety to cover three key areas: (1) 
underpinning knowledgeability to understand major accident hazards that are associated with 
the process, equipment, plants and the understanding of the correct operating procedures and 
practices; (2) skill - ability to demonstrate the interpretation of the process instrumentation 
readings, identify faults, operate controls, pass a procedure; and (3) behaviour – covering the 
ability to show safety leadership, coach team members of potential hazards,  raise their risk 
awareness and consistent behaviour in terms of following safety procedures at all time. Several 
studies have reported that organisations that have low accident rate have practically 
implemented safety training effectively.  
 
Kvalheim and Dahl (2016) found a causal link between safety training and competence and 
safety compliance in the oil and gas industry. Mearns et al. (2003) investigated the relationship 
between safety management practices and accident rates in 13 offshore oil and gas installations 
which established safety competence as a causal link to accident rates. Dahl and Olsen (2013) 
found safety training (workers' competence) as one of the key characteristics for an important 
investigation of hazard incidents in the offshore oil and gas industry. Alruqi et al. (2018) found 
safety training significantly correlated to workplace injuries. Dahl and Kongsvik (2018) 
established safety training (safety competence) as a positive predictor of mindful safety 
practices in the oil and gas industry. From the safety literature, effective implementation of 
safety training in an organisation may drive a low hazard incident. 
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However, in terms of a unified itemised factor structure to assess safety training in the oil and 
gas industry is not clear in the literature. In a reviewed work by Davies et al. (2001) on 
assessment of safety climate in the oil and gas industry, the following areas were established 
for organisations to assess their safety training and competence in the industry: effectiveness of 
training, availability of training, competency assessment, training coverage or content, and 
training priorities. For training to be effective, workers should be able to demonstrate a clear 
understanding of the aspects of the operations critical to safety. The coverage or content of 
safety training must indicate all the responsibilities for a worker to ensure safe operations. 
Safety training is required to be organised for both new and existing workers to have 
competence for their job. Safety competency must be evaluated on the individual level and the 
methods of assessment must be indicated. 
 
 
2.6.3.2.4 Management Commitment 
Management commitment to safety is defined as the extent to which a manager puts high 
priority to workplace safety and how effectively he or her communicates and takes actions in 
relation to safety issues (Neal & Griffin (2004). Zohar (1980), in his original paper, identified 
management commitment as part of the seven dimensions for measuring safety climate. Since 
his paper, meta-analyses have identified several studies indicating a perceived managerial 
commitment to safety as a critical dimension for measuring safety climate (e.g. Guldenmund, 
2000, 2007; Zohar, 2008). A high level perceived managerial commitment to safety is an 
indicator for a positive organisational safety climate.  
 
Tappura et al. (2017) linked management commitment to leadership behaviour as leadership is 
key to influence workplace accidents. Studies have examined the relationship between safety 
leadership and workplace accidents (e.g. Pilbeam et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2016; Mullen, 2017; 
Willis et al., 2017; Stiles et al., 2018). These studies indicate that leaders' behaviours influence 
organisational safety performance. There exist several levels of leadership in an organisation. 
In suggesting criteria for safety excellence, Petersen (2000) indicated that management 
commitment to safety is reflected at different levels in an organisation such as top management 
practically demonstrating that safety is valued, middle managers' involvement in supervisory 
performance (ensuring quality supervisory performance) and safety system enforcement in 
supervisory performance. However, in a practical sense, workers typically do not have a direct 
engagement or contact to their top executive managers, rather their middle managers and 
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supervisors of the organisation (Tappura et al., 2017). In the industry, operations are mostly 
executed in work-groups led by a leader or supervisor. What is important here is the 
manifestation of the real commitment from leaders to safety at each level of the organisation. 
The safety attitudes and values of leaders must be demonstrated in actions at each level of the 
organisation. Actions must drive leaders' commitment to safety. 
 
Few studies (O'Dea & Flin, 2001; Wu et al., 2011; Kilaparthi, 2014; Zuofa & Ocheing, 2017) 
have examined the influence of safety leadership behaviour on organisational safety 
performance in the oil and gas industry. O'Dea and Flin (2001) investigated the link between 
the level of experience of managers and leadership style to safety attitude and behaviour in the 
oil and gas industry.  They found that managers' experience level was not a key factor in the 
determination of leadership style or attitude to organisational safety performance. Wu et al. 
(2011) examined the relationship between safety leadership, safety climate and safety 
performance in the oil and gas industry. Their results indicated that safety climate mediated the 
link between safety leadership and safety performance. Kilaparthi (2014) identified effective 
leadership as a key factor to drive safety culture in the oil and gas industry. This leadership 
drive the workforce to participate in safety initiatives of the organisation. Zuofa and Ocheing 
(2017) examined senior managers' perception of the role of safety leadership on safety 
performance in the oil and gas industry. They found that leadership style influences the 
effective implementation of safety management systems in offshore oil and gas construction 
operations. Although these studies have examined management commitment as an essential 
factor in promoting a positive safety climate, in terms of assessing what defines management 
commitment from the leadership perspective has received limited research focus. What actions 
define leaders' (e.g. managers, supervisors, work-group leaders) commitment to safety at all 
levels of an organisation has not been adequately addressed in previous studies focusing on the 
oil and gas industry. 
 
Davies et al. (2001) identified the following areas to measure management commitment to 
safety: resource availability, manager willingness to act and swift implementation, trust and 
support, managers' attitude towards rules breaking, and encouraging workers participation. 
Fruhen et al. (2019) provided a systematic review to identify the following six components that 
demonstrate real management commitment to safety: communication, resource allocation, 
managerial participation, support and guidance, and policies and decision making, workers' 
involvement. This study adopts the following areas to define management commitment to 
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safety: communication, resource availability, managerial participation, policies and decision 
making, support and guide, managers’ attitude towards rules breaking and workers' 
involvement. These areas are essential elements that can drive active management commitment 
to safety.   
 
 
2.6.3.2.5 Safety Rules and Procedures 
Safety rules and procedures are essential terms often used in the workplace. The two terms are 
not used the same; differences exist between them. In general sense, safety rules are defined as 
all rules with the objective of, among other things, keeping people safe from the risk of being 
injured and damaged (Hale et al., 2012). There are several objectives that these rules are linked 
to, such as efficiency, production, quality, health, environmental protection or sustainability. 
However, this study supports the view to integrate these objectives into rule sets that must 
relate to the organisational process and activities. Procedures are defined as plans that establish 
a routine method of undertaking future activities (Marume et al., 2016). Procedures guide 
actions and provide details of the exact way in which a particular activity should be 
accomplished. The essence of procedures is to provide a chronological sequence of needed 
actions. Safety procedures refer to the approved step-by-step sequence of instructions that must 
be followed to accomplish safe operations. Safety rules and procedures have become key 
concepts in both the research and professional literature as indispensable elements of safety 
management, particularly for high-risk industries. 
 
From the research literature, Hale et al. (2012) review of the literature from 1986 relating to 
the management of safety rules and procedures in organisations ignited the debate on two 
contrasting models of safety rules and procedures. The first model is rooted in Scientific 
Management principles developed from the rationalisation idea mainly associated with top-
down classical approach (Taylor, 1911). The main idea underpinning the designing of safety 
rules and procedures is the assumption that work tasks must be designed and controlled in a 
top-down fashion that requires an organisational control to identify and eliminate safety risks 
(Weichbrodt, 2015). This model viewed safety rules and procedures as static, strict limitation 
of freedom of choice, and violations considered as negative behaviour that ought to be curbed 
(Hale & Borys, 2013; Vidal-Gomel, 2017). Studies have established that workers adherence to 
safety rules and procedures helps to improve workplace safety climate (Hale & Boris, 2013a, 
2013b; Weichbrodt, 2015; Vidal-Gomel, 2017). The literature indicated that safety rules and 
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procedures must be useful, adequate to prevent the occurrence of incidents and must be 
enforced by the supervisors or line managers at the workplace.   
 
 
2.6.3.2.6 Management of Change 
Management of change is a subset of organisational influence (Theophilus et al., 2017) which 
forms one of the elements of safety management systems (see Levovnik, & Gerbec, 2018). 
Within the context of the high-hazard industries, U.S. Department of Labour Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) defined management of change as “modifications 
to chemical processes, technology, equipment, procedures and changes to a facility that affect 
a covered process" (OSHA, 2000, p. 22; cited in Theophilus et al., 2017). Daily changes in 
technology and organisational business management have become rampant in recent high-
hazard industries to gain competitive market advantage.  However, several studies have 
indicated that such changes increase the complexity of the processes and systems operations as 
well as contributing to the changes in hazards which may have significant potential 
consequences to the risk of major industrial incidents (Yang & Mannan, 2010; Gerbec, 2017; 
O Johnsen et al., 2017; Zio, 2018; Jain et al., 2018). Management of change has been reported 
to be a significant cause of many of the catastrophic incidents that have occurred in the history 
of the oil and gas industry. The essence of the implementation of management of change is to 
ensure that the changes process does not deliberately bring new hazards or increase the risk of 
existing hazards at the workplace.    
 
Bell and Healey (2006) conducted a review of the causes of major hazard incidents to identify 
relevant control measures and behaviours to prevent the incident occurring in the high-hazard 
industries. The oil and gas industry was a key part of these high-hazard industries that were 
understudied. The results of the study indicated circumstantial evidence from case studies that 
link management of change issues to major hazard incidents. Singh et al. (2010) reviewed some 
of the critical safety lessons from the North Sea Piper Alpha disaster that occurred in 1988. 
The Piper Alpha disaster was reported as the world's worst offshore oil and gas industry which 
resulted in 167 dead, dozens severely injured and worst environmental pollution. Management 
of change was identified as the main issue that contributes to the cause of that catastrophic 
event. They suggested that the industry disassociation between, urgency to build, knowledge 
transfer, and management of change, were the key lessons that have to receive much attention. 
Theophilus et al. (2017) carried out a study to propose an improved framework of Human 
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Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) for use in investigating incidents in the 
oil and gas industry. Management of change was indicated as a critical organizational 
deficiency that influences the occurrence of major hazard incidents resulting from the failure 
to plan, communicate, and coordinate the changes process effectively. As acknowledged by 
Theophilus et al., several studies (e.g. SPE, 2014; Hayes, 2012) have indicated that when 
decision-making on changes are not adequately communicated to employees and also managed 
effectively, it could lead to hazard incident occurrence. The study showed that management of 
change in the oil and gas industry must cover the following areas; process hardware and 
software modifications, temporary process changes, operating procedures changes, and 
organizational process changes.  Gerbec (2017) indicated that the daily changes in the industry 
have a potential influence on major hazard incidents. The changes that occur in the facilities or 
operations are complex and involve technical and organisational influences which must be 
managed effectively to avoid incident occurrence.   
 
Although management of change is one of the elements of safety management systems in many 
of the existing safety management standards used in the industry, there are limited scientific 
studies that have investigated it as part of safety management (Gerbec, 2017). Moreover, there 
appears to be limited empirical research on how employees' perception of management of 
change deficiencies influences hazard risks. It must be indicated that the circumstance 
employees find themselves to have potential implications for the quality of their decision 
making. Operations in the industry are tightly coupled and involve complex processes which 
require effective communication of the changes processes to the workers. As indicated by SPE 
(2014), mostly certain factors such as time pressure, poor information presentation, the 
ambiguity of information and conflicting goals lead to poor decisions. The quality of decision 
making can affect the effectiveness of organisational safety management of change at the 
workplace.  According to Theophilus et al. (2017),  measures to address management of change 
deficiencies require the following: an effective organisational safety management of change 
must have robust safety procedures that specify the roles and responsibilities of workers during 
operations; the changes in working procedures that must be effectively communicated to 
workers; the changes in the facilities must be effectively communicated to the workers; there 
must be effective process to continue, resource, and control outsourced arrangement at the 
workplace; and there must be efficient management of the implementation of the changes at 
the workplace. Therefore, effective implementation of management of change will reduce the 




2.6.3.2.7 Safety Communication 
Communication is defined as “the process of sharing information, thoughts and feelings 
between people through speaking, writing and body language" (Velentzas, 2014: p. 130).  
Velentzas indicated the goals of communication to include the creation of a common 
perception, changing behaviours and the acquisition of information. Velentzas' discussion of 
communication mainly based on the sharing of information between people. It must be 
indicated that communication must not only be limited to the exchange of information but 
importantly, a precondition for learning, and for new, innovative ideas to emerge (Kines, 2011). 
Communication can have a great influence on the quality of relationship emergence in the 
workplace through the Social Exchange Theory (Blau, 1964). The principles of the Social 
Exchange Theory have been used to explore the development of a relationship between an 
individual and organization (see, e.g. Eisenberger et al., 1990). The quality of communication 
practices can create inherent social interaction which eventually may lead to the creation of 
social construct like organizational climate. Reporting culture is one of the sub-climates 
(Reason, 1997). The critical importance of communication practices in workplace safety is well 
documented in the safety literature (e.g. Wold & Laumann, 2015; Nixon, 2018; Newnam & 
Goode, 2019). According to Vinodkumar and Bhasi (2011), the frequency of communicating 
safety issues between workforce, supervisors and management indicates effective management 
practice for safety improvement at the work environment. An effective safety communication 
practices in the workplace help to reduce incidents occurrence.  
 
Many of the oil and gas operations are executed in workgroups led by supervisors or group 
leaders. These supervisors or group leaders play an essential role in conveying relevant safety 
working practices in the form of encouragement of participation, compliance and motivation 
in safety management among the members of the team (Newnam & Goode, 2019). Several 
studies on the review of major incidents in the oil and gas industry have highlighted safety 
communication as a critical contributory factor to many of the catastrophes (Bell & Healey, 
2006; Baker et al., 2007; Christou & Konstantinidou, 2012). Poor communication among 
personnel is found to contribute to incidents of occurrence in the oil and gas industry (Veland 
& Aven, 2015). They found a huge difference in terms of workers' understanding of the hazard 
risks due to lack of information. When there is a lack of knowledge, usually it leads to poor 
communication at the workplace. The measure of safety communication issues in the oil and 
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gas industry had been mainly conducted through safety climate-related research due to its link 
to organisational climate construct. In what approaches are safety communication measured to 
promote a positive workplace safety performance? 
 
Bell and Healey (2006) identified a two-way safety communication approach to improve safety 
performance: top-down communication and horizontal communication approach. The top-
down communication involves communication (i.e. visible safety policy statement, stressing 
safety issues and procedures, sharing information on major incident risks, feedbacks to respond 
to reporter) from the top management to the workers. The horizontal communication involves 
the provision of a system that effectively transfers information between workers and 
departments. Given the importance of supervisor-worker relationship in safety promotion at 
the workplace, Newnam and Goode (2019) defined communication in the area of supervisor-
worker relationships. Given this, communication was measured along with the following: task-
related communication (focusing on productivity and efficiency aspects) and safety-related 
communication (focusing on interaction relating to compliance activities required to actualize 
safety performance at the workplace), safety-related communication is a more appropriate 
approach. Workplace safety behaviour requires active participation and compliance of safety 
activities (Griffin & Neal, 2000). While the literature has documented the issues related to poor 
safety communication, approaches and interventions required to be adopted by workers and 
supervisors to drive an effective communication among workers appeared to have received 
limited research attention. Davies et al. (2001) identified six elements to measure safety 
communication for a positive organisational safety climate: effective communication in the 
workplace, communication with superiors, communication between employee groups, 
communication at shift handover and crew change, communication in terms of near-
misses/incidents/accidents, and communication systems. Given the nature of the upstream 
operations, which involves work-groups, work-shifts, temporal contractors and the complexity 
of the processes, these elements are essential to define the effectiveness of safety 
communication in the oil and gas industry. Given this, most studies have not considered these 
elements in determining safety communication as a dimension for measuring safety climate in 





2.6.3.2.8 Equipment Maintenance  
The frequency of maintenance is an essential activity that must be conducted to keep equipment 
and work environment safe and reliable. Equipment maintenance is a high-risk task with 
associated hazards and risks. The analysis of World Offshore Accident Database in terms of 
the distribution of events shows that equipment malfunction constituted the main accident 
cause for the event (34%) in the oil and gas industry (Christou & Konstantinidou, 2012). 
Maintenance activities may involve inspection, testing, measurements, replacement, 
adjustment, repairs and upkeeping. The human element in maintenance operations is critical as 
workers get contact with the processes. Other studies (e.g. Dhillon & Liu, 2006; Sheikhalishahi 
et al., 2016) have indicated that the human factor in maintenance activities is a pressing 
problem in industries. ILO (2015) reported that causes related to safety systems (technical 
factor) rarely triggered the occurrence of incidents or accidents in the offshore oil and gas 
industry. However, it is the human and organisational factors that have to be addressed to 
improve the safety of equipment and facilities in the oil and gas industry. This is because most 
of the occurrence of the events were attributed to the absence of unsafe rules and procedures 
followed by workers. 
 
Several studies have highlighted the lack of adequate equipment maintenance as the cause of 
industrial incidents. Skroumpelos (2010) conducted a study in industry operations that 
experienced incidents and revealed that these incidents occurred during maintenance activities. 
The study revealed the following as the cause of the incidents from the workers and supervisors' 
perspectives. In terms of the workers perspective, the following were the causes: violation of 
safety rules and procedures, lack of housekeeping, the use of defective hardware, unanticipated 
start-up, and bantering. The perspective of the supervisors included the following causes: 
hastiness, inadequate job specifications and familiarisation with dangers. How equipment 
maintenance factor has specifically contributed to the cause of incidents in the oil and gas 
industry has also been established by researchers. Okoh and Haugen (2013) examined how 
maintenance influenced the occurrence of some major hazard incidents high-hazard risk 
industries. They found that maintenance activity or deferment of maintenance can create barrier 
vulnerability and deficiency that may contribute to the improper functioning of the safety 
barriers in terms of risk control. 
 
Despite there is a well-documented evidence linking lack of maintenance to the cause of 
incidents in the oil and gas industry, how researchers have measured equipment maintenance 
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in safety, climate-related research appeared to have received limited research attention. The 
measure of perception of equipment maintenance in the oil and gas operations is one of the 
ways to obtain knowledge on existing organisational safety performance. Most of the existing 
studies (e.g. Ratnayake, 2012; Christou & Konstantinidou, 2012; Okoh & Haugen, 2013; ILO, 
2015) only highlighted the deficiencies or deferments of maintenance practice as a critical 
cause of the many major incidents in the oil and gas industry. However, how equipment 
maintenance is defined and measured in safety climate-related studies appears to have received 
inadequate empirical research attention in the oil and gas industry. For example, Binch et al. 
(2012) identified equipment maintenance as an essential dimension that has to be used to 
measure process safety climate research. However, the elements that define the equipment 
maintenance dimension for safety climate measure was not indicated in their study. In Baker 
et al. (2007) study that investigated the BP's Texas City refinery explosion in 2005, equipment 
maintenance was identified and measured in terms of the following elements: regular testing 
and maintaining of alarms, interlocks and other process safety-related devices; easy and 
clearly understanding of the use of checklists and procedures related to maintenance of 
equipment; and prioritisation of regular inspection and maintenance of equipment. Given the 
ground that Baker et al. (2007) measure on equipment maintenance was linked to process 
safety, it is appropriate for this study to adapt these elements to measure the shared workers' 
perception of the relative importance of equipment maintenance at the workplace. 
 
 
2.6.3.2.9 Safety Involvement 
The essence of workforce involvement in organisational decision making has been advocated 
in the management literature for several decades. The interest in workforce involvement in 
safety management in the oil and gas industry became only recognised in the investigative 
report of the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 (Cullen, 1990).   However, in an earlier review by 
Bryden and Gibson (2000), indicated a limited application of the principle of workforce 
involvement in safety management in the industry. The safety literature (e.g. Hart, 2000; 
Bryden & Gibson, 2000) indicates that the application of the principle of workforce 
involvement helps in communication, motivation and operational efficiency in the oil and gas 
industry. Because of its relevance, workforce involvement had been considered as an aspect of 
organisational climate mostly investigated in safety climate research (e.g. Yule et al., 2007; 
Ghahramani, & Khalkhali, 2015; Horbah et al., 2017).  A positive organisational influence 
establishes a consultative link between management and the workforce. When there is an 
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existence of such a framework of association, employees will be actively involved in safety 
management of the organisation, especially where they will always be consulted on the 
development of safety management systems programs. 
 
Klein and Vaughen (2008) identified workforce involvement as one of the DuPont's four 
elements that characterised operational discipline. Workforce involvement involves 
employees' activeness and enthusiasm for safety management practices. They pointed out that 
an effective workforce involvement at the workplace must exhibit the following features in 
employees: they must know and share the safety core values and goals of the organisation, 
volunteer and active in safety activities and workgroup, provide feedback and suggestions for 
workplace safety improvement, and demonstrate pride in being part of the organization. Yule 
et al. (2007) investigated the link between the role of managers and supervisors in risk-taking 
behaviour. They found a negative association between perception of risk-taking behaviour and 
supervisor involvement and a positive relationship between safety responsibility and 
management commitment. In other words, the study establishes a negative correlation between 
organizational climate variables (i.e. management commitment, safety involvement) and risk 
perception. They also indicate positive relationships among the organizational safety climate 
variables. A similar link was established between workforce involvement and changes in work 
procedures (see Nielsena, & Randall, 2012). Kouabenan et al. (2015) examined the relationship 
between safety climate, risk perception and involvement in safety management. They found 
that the safety climate appeared mediating the influence of perceived risk.  Kvalheim et al. 
(2016) investigated the strength of safety climate tools to evaluate the major accident risks in 
the oil and gas industry. Workforce involvement was one of the constructs of their safety 
climate tool, which measured workers' perception of a communication link between workforce 
and management. They found a negative association between workforce involvement and 
major accident risks. Given the benefits of workforce involvement in providing 
communication, motivation and operational efficiency in the oil and gas industry, research need 
to measure how the principle of workforce involvement empowers employees to work around 
process safety  concerns rather than reporting: how individual employee can voluntarily carry 
out tasks or activities to improve process safety, how management  involves employees in 
updating (including revising and reviewing) safety policies,  and how employees give feedback 
on important  safety issues at the workplace. Despite the earlier interest in the application of 
the principles of workforce involvement in the oil and gas industry, much empirical research 
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is still needed to strengthen the inverse relationship between workforce involvement and 
perception of major hazard risk.  
 
 
2.6.3.2.10 Safety Supervision 
There are several ways researchers have defined the term supervision in the research literature. 
One popular definition of supervision is given as someone coordinating the work of others 
which include including planning, scheduling, allocating, instructing and monitoring actions 
(Mintzberg, 1979; cited in Ward et al., 2004).  This implies directing the work of others towards 
achieving the organisational goal. In establishing the link between supervision and leadership, 
Ward et al. (2004) examined supervisors as team leaders. Earlier studies have linked 
supervisory behaviour to organisational safety performance (Mattila et al., 1994; Ward et al., 
2004). In Bell and Healey's (2006) review of literature on the causes of major hazard incidents 
in the oil and gas industry, safety supervision became a key factor in most of the hazard 
incidents. Several studies have established the importance of safety supervision in promoting 
a positive organisational safety climate (e.g. Flin et al., 2000; Kouabenan et al., 2015; Haung 
et al., 2017; Pandit et al., 2019). Despite there is a growing body of research supporting the 
relevance of safety supervision to organisational safety performance, the factors that drive 
active supervisory behaviour are under-explored.   
 
Kvalheim and Dahl (2016) investigated the link between safety compliance and safety climate 
in the oil and gas industry. Safety supervision was identified as part of the four dimensions that 
measured safety climate. Safety supervision was measured with four items which were 
assessed on the perception of the extent to which leaders are committed to working with safety, 
appreciate the effort of raising and discussing safety topics at the workplace. Haung et al. 
(2017) investigated the predictive influence of safety supervisory communication on safety 
performance. They found that a supervisor's communication of safety-related information to 
subordinates helps to reduce work-related incidents. They argued that supervisor 
communication of safety-related information is a contingency factor as it affects how safety 
climate is linked to safety outcomes. There are two ways that supervisor safety communication 
has to take place:  workers' perception of how effective their supervisor provides them with the 
information (i.e. top-down approach safety communication) and the creation of ‘free-
environment’ by supervisors where workers feel free to discuss safety-related issues that can 
influence the organisation safety performance (i.e. bottom-up approach safety 
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communication). Pandit et al. (2019) evaluated the effect of safety climate on hazard 
recognition and risk perception. Supervisor support was identified as a key dimension to 
measure safety climate. The elements that measured supervisor support included: the adequacy 
of safety knowledge of the supervisor, supervisor's ability to encourage the reporting of safety-
related issues for redress, supervisor's ability to ensure that safety-related rules and procedures 
are followed by the workers and safety prioritisation against production or deadline.  
Supervisor support was found significantly related to safety climate. 
 
Although the literature confirmed the predictive effect of supervisor safety communication on 
incidents occurrence, the alacrity to respond to process safety-related issues against others has 
become a challenge in the oil and gas industry. The review of the causes of major hazard 
incidents in the oil and gas industry by Bell and Healey's (2006) highlighted this issue. The 
measure of perception of safety supervisory support must also include the alacrity of safety 
leaders or supervisors to address reported process safety-related issues. In this study, the 
following elements measure safety supervision: supervisors taking swift and appropriate action 
in response to suggestion for improving process safety, the adequacy of supervisor's process 
safety knowledge, encouragement of safety communication including both information and 
discussion of safety relates issues, supervisor safety participation, and supervisor ensuring that 
safety-related rules and procedures are followed by the workers. 
 
 
2.6.3.2.11 Supportive Environment 
The social environment of a workplace may be driven by a supportive environment and 
involvement of all workers. Supportive environment refers to the nature of the prevailing social 
environment at the workplace as well as the support derived from it. The supportive 
environment has become an important factor that promotes a positive safety climate at the 
workplace (Arghami et al., 2014; Flin et al., 2000). The relationship between supportive 
environment and workplace safety performance is established in safety climate-related studies. 
Mohamed (2002) identified a supportive environment as a key dimension for measuring safety 
climate. Ghahramani and Khalkhali (2015) developed and validated a safety climate scale 
made up of seven dimensions which included a supportive environment for the manufacturing 
industry. The supportive environment was empirically measured based on three elements: a 
workplace that prioritises safety, the existence of adequate rules for workplace safety and 
effective communication of safety information by managers and supervisors. These elements 
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defining a supportive environment appeared inadequate to capture the essence of involvement 
and motivation of the co-workers to support the safety promotion at the workplace. 
 
Cox and Cheyne (2000) discussed the joint industry and UK HSE research project that focused 
on an approach to assess safety culture in offshore oil and gas environment. In the assessment 
tool, a supportive environment was one of the dimensions to measure safety culture. The 
elements that define supportive environment included the following: encouragement to report 
unsafe conditions at the workplace, the ability for a worker to influence safety performance at 
the workplace, motivation to work safety at the workplace, and communication of safety 
information particularly how to work safely at the workplace. Several studies have applied this 
safety climate assessment tool which included Amiri et al. (2015). Amiri et al. (2015) 
investigated the link between safety climate and demographic factors in the oil and gas 
industry. The supportive environment was a significant dimension that measured the safety 
climate. Given the review of the safety literature on the supportive environment as a dimension 
to measure safety climate, researchers have given limited attention to it in safety climate-related 
studies. Although supportive environment as one of the important aspects to measure safety 
climate in the oil and gas industry, the elements that define the measure of a supportive 
environment in safety climate-related research must include the involvement and motivation 
of co-workers towards safety performance at the workplace. Because of this, this study adapts 
Cox and Cheyne's (2000) elements but with greater emphasis on co-worker's involvement and 
motivation for working safety at the workplace. 
 
 
2.6.3.2.12 Safety Empowerment 
Empowerment of workers to work safety became more relevant in the safety climate research 
when Nordic Safety Climate Questionnaire (i.e. NOSACQ-50) was developed. This 
questionnaire model has been applied in safety climate research, including Bergh et al. (2013). 
Kines et al. (2011) examined safety empowerment as a key dimension for assessing workers' 
perception of the relative importance of safety at the workplace. They explained that the 
empowerment of employees is one of the avenues for managers to convey trust to workers. 
They defined empowerment as a delegation of power such that management trust the ability, 
judgement of the workers and values their contributions. In a safety context, they viewed that 
empowerment strengthens social exchanges and also provides conditions where safety is highly 
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valued that encourage reciprocation and reinforcement of safety behaviour in an organisation. 
Today, safety empowerment has been used in several safety climate studies. 
 
Shannon et al. (1997) examined the link between organisational factors and injury rates. They 
found that management empowerment of workers and delegation of safety tasks were 
significantly related to lower injury rates. Törner and Pousette (2009) conducted a qualitative 
study that involved front-line supervisors and safety representatives in the construction 
industry. In their opinion, empowerment was identified as one of the main constituents of 
workplace safety. Larsson et al. (2018) found safety empowerment as an important dimension 
of safety climate that correlated with personal perception of safety, mental strain and injury 
rate. Gillen et al. (2013) identified safety empowerment as a key factor (representing the top 
second and the third choice of the evaluation at the workshop) that constituted organisational 
safety climate measure. Lee et al. (2019) examined the relationship between safety 
empowerment in leadership perspective and safety climate. Their study found safety 
empowerment a pre-requisite for safety behaviour. They asserted that empowering leaders 
empowers workers' safety behaviour that enhances their willingness for safety participation, 
safety compliance and knowledge sharing behaviour at the workplace. Probst et al. (2019) 
measure safety empowerment in their Safety Climate Assessment Tool (S-CAT) from the 
following elements: the building of trust for workers to work safety, involving workers in 
safety-related planning and decision-making, and encouraging workers in the discussion of 
potential hazards that could affect safety performance at the workplace. 
 
Despite the safety literature recognised safety empowerment as one of the critical dimensions 
for measuring organisational safety climate, not much has been found in the oil and gas 
industry. In an attempt to advance for the development of leading indicators for effective 
organisational safety performance, Javad et al. (2017) developed a scale for measuring safety 
climate in the oil and gas industry which included safety empowerment. However, what defines 
the actions that drive management's attitude for empowering workers to work safely in the 
industry has not been well documented in the literature. In this study, the encouragement of 
workers' participation and compliance in safety, supporting and trusting of workers to work 
safety. Workers in the industry must be encouraged to participate in hazard reviews and 
assessment as well as participation in incident and accident investigations. When workers are 
supported and trusted that they can influence safety positively at the workplace without any 




2.6.3.2.13 Safety Motivation 
Safety motivation became recognised as a key factor in preventing industrial incidents 
occurrence since the early period of Heinrich's (1930) work that found the motivation of 
workers to work safely at the workplace as a relevant factor that can prevent incidents at the 
workplace (Scot, 2016). Safety motivation is commonly defined in the literature as the 
willingness of an individual to put effort to enact safety behaviours and the valence linked to 
those behaviours (Neal & Griffin, 2006). Thus, it is the level of effort that an individual is 
willing to exert to work safety. Safety motivation is one of the important determinants of a 
good safety climate in an organisation. A motivational mechanism is a way through which 
safety climate can employ subjective-normative influence on individual behaviour or groups 
behaviours in an organisation (Zohar, 2010). Safety motivation is linked to a psychological 
process that is established to provide direction, energy and sustainability of an individual action 
(Latham & Pinder, 2005; Scott et al., 2014). Safety motivation is a proximal determinant of 
employee safety behaviours and that safety climate which is a distal factor that has an indirect 
effect on organisational safety behaviour (Griffin & Neal, 2000). When there is a clear 
understanding of workers' motivation to work safely in an organisation, it mainly helps in 
augmentation of workers' participation in safety activities and the reduction of the level of 
unsafe behaviour at the workplace (Conchie, 2013). 
 
Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) reviewed some theoretical perspectives that underpinned the 
concept of safety motivation. The derivation of safety motivation can be linked to subjective-
normative influence of safety climate (Zohar, 2010; Curcuruto et al., 2013; Scott et al., 2014), 
self-determination theory (Scott et al., 2014; Zohar et al., 2015), psychological empowerment 
(Zohar et al., 2014; Curcuruto et al., 2015) and social-exchange theories (Mearns & Reader 
2008; Tucker et al., 2008). The conceptual link between safety motivation and subjective-
normative influence of safety climate is explained that subjective meaning of safety 
underscores the safety motivation, which its meaning has relatively emerged through the means 
of normative influence. Safety climate indicates the normative value of safety relative to other 
competing demands of the organization. As conceived by Zohar (2010), individual safety 
behaviour is perceived to be valued and rewarded in the organization. A self-determination 
theory underpins safety motivation through the two types of motivation: intrinsic (engaging in 
or performing work for its own sake rather than a desire for external rewards) and extrinsic 
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(engaging in work behaviours with expected instrumental value for gaining tangible rewards) 
motivations. Furtherly, Griffin and Curcuruto (2016) argued that because of climate 
perceptions related to the role of rewarded behaviour, it was reflective to indicate that the 
substantive safety climate-behaviour link should be elucidated in respect of the motivation for 
working safety. Psychological empowerment drives safety motivation. Zohar et al. (2014) 
asserted that particularly in a high-risk environment when prevailing work is psychological 
meaningful, safety behaviours turn out to intrinsically stimulate investment in self-protection. 
Other studies (e.g. Zohar, 2008; Curcuruto et al., 2015) have indicated that safety climate 
stimulates safety behaviours through the feeling of empowerment, personal engagement, 
psychological ownership and passion for actualising challenging organisational goal. Social-
exchange and social reciprocation perspectives explain the link between safety climate and 
safety motivation. The social-exchange principle explains that the perceived support and 
investment of the employer breeds an implied obligation in workers that leads to a positive 
reciprocal effort favouring the organization (DeJoy, 2005). In linking this principle to safety, 
perception of management commitment and investment in the safety of workers can be 
reciprocated by the workers through their active commitment to compliance and participation 
in their discretional activities towards safety promotion at the workplace (Griffin & Curcuruto, 
2016). This implies that the extent of managerial style in active support and participation in 
organisation and workgroups is reciprocally correlated with a more significant commitment by 
the workers in safety promotion. 
 
Some studies had demonstrated the relationship between safety motivation and safety 
behaviour. However, there is a limited empirical research on the link between safety motivation 
and safety performance (Panuwatwanich et al., 2016). Several empirical research findings on 
the effects of safety motivation on workers safety behaviours appeared inconsistent and lacked 
a theoretical foundation in the research literature. Earlier safety climate measures (see, e.g. 
Davies et al., 2001; Mearns et al., 2003) that focused on the oil and gas industry, failed to 
captured safety motivation as one of the key factors that influence organisational safety 
performance. Al-Harthy (2008) found motivation as a challenging issue in the oil and gas 
industry. In recent times, safety motivation has been identified as an essential determinant of 
safety climate. This has reflected in some few empirical studies identifying safety motivation 
as a key factor for organisational safety performance in the oil and gas industry. For examples, 
Hystada et al. (2014) identified safety motivation as one of the key determinants of safety 
climate that correlated to safety outcome in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. Boughaba et 
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al. (2014) found safety motivation (incentives) as an essential factor that should be emphasized 
to improve safety culture in the oil and gas in Algeria. Musa et al. (2015) noted safety 
motivation as one of the factors that influenced the low workers' perception of safety values in 
the oil and gas industry. It appears there is little research that has empirically investigated the 
influence of safety motivation on workplace safety performance in the oil and gas industry. 
Based on the literature on the theoretical perspectives underpinning the link between safety 
motivation and safety performance, self-discipline theory is recognised as a distinct from other 
human motivation perspectives because it reckons that the relevance of the type or quality of 
motivation is the same as the amount or quantity of motivation in understanding and prediction 
of human behaviour. This makes the self-determination perspective as a useful theoretical 
framework that must guide researchers seeking to establish the influence of safety motivation 
on workers' safety behaviours (Scott, 2016). Given this, workers' self-determination can 
influence organisational safety policies implementation. Workers' self-determination can 
encourage co-workers to engage in safety practice. Workers' self-determination can drive them 
to reduce incidents at the workplace. These would drive a positive organisational safety 
behaviour and safety outcomes. 
 
 
2.6.3.2.14. Safety Behaviour 
Safety behaviour is defined as the actual behaviour enacted by an individual at the workplace 
(Christian et al., 2009). Given the Borman and Motowidlo's task performance typology 
(Borman & Motowidlo, 1997), Neal and Griffin (2002) identified two main components that 
form safety behaviour: safety compliance and safety participation. Safety compliance denotes 
those core activities that are required to be conducted by individual workers to maintain safety 
at the workplace, examples such as having a positive attitude regarding working safety, 
attending a meeting as well as helping co-workers. Whereas, safety participation denotes 
behaviours that indirectly yield to an individual worker's safety, but also contribute to the 
development of workplace environments that support safety, examples such as wearing PPE as 
well as complying with safety rules and procedures (Neal & Griffin 2004; Lyu et al., 2018).  
These components have been adopted in safety behaviour related research (e.g. Lu & Yang, 
2010; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2010; Lyu et al., 2018). Safety behaviour must have a direct link 
to an individual's compliance with safety rules and procedures as well as active participation 
in working safety at the workplace. 
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Some prior studies have found a significant and positive link between safety climate and safety 
behaviour in the research literature. Lyu et al. (2018) investigated the relationship between 
safety climate, safety behaviour and safety climate using ethnic minority workers in the 
construction industry. Their study found a significant positive correlation between safety 
climate and safety behaviour. Wang et al. (2018) investigated the relationship between safety 
awareness, safety behaviour and safety climate in the construction industry in China. Their 
study found that organisational safety climate influenced individual safety behaviour. These 
studies could not explore other factors that could contribute to establishing the mechanisms 
underlying workers' safety, as several antecedents could determine the relationship between 
safety climate and safety behaviour. Examining the relationship between safety behaviour and 
incidents occurrence in safety climate-related studies in the area of the oil and gas industry, 
relatively limited empirical research attention has been given in the safety literature. Davies et 
al. (2001) study on safety climate tools captured safety behaviour as a critical factor for 
measuring safety behaviour in the oil and gas industry. Mearns et al. (2001) conducted a study 
to investigate the offshore workers' attitude to safety as well as the feelings of safety and 
satisfaction with safety in the UK oil and gas industry. The study found that the unsafe 
behaviour of workers was the "best predictor" of accidents. Although the literature found safety 
behaviour positively related to safety climate, the factor structure of the safety behaviour 
measure did not adequately reflect the safety compliance and safety participation components 
identified by the Neal and Griffin (2002). The measure of safety behaviour in safety climate-
related studies must specifically reflect these two components as they define safety behaviour 
of an individual.  
 
Moreover, it appears there is limited research attention on the mechanisms by which safety 
behaviour influence safety climate in the industry. In view of Neal and Griffin (2002) defined 
components of safety behaviour, workplace condition must be designed to promote an 
individual to comply with safety regulations, discourage an individual worker to take shortcuts 
involving little or no risk implications, create a working environment to allow an individual to 
willingly participate in safety-related activities and an individual worker must not be put under 
pressure for production that could  lead to non-adherence to code of practice at the workplace. 




Table 2. 5 Literature summary of organisational safety climate factors 
Safety Climate Factors Literature Sources 
Safety Policies Kuusisto (2001), Mearns et al. (2003), Othman (2010), Petitta et 
al. (2017) 
Safety Priority Cox & Cheyne (1999), Cox & Cheyne (2000), Cox & Lacey 
(1998) 
Safety Training Davies et al. (2001), Mearns et al. (2003), Wright et al. (2003), 
Kvalheim & Dahl (2016), Alruqi et al. (2018), Dahl & Kongsvik 
(2018) 
Management Commitment Davies et al. (2001), O’Dea & Flin (2001), Wu et al. (2011), Zuofa 
& Ocheing (2017), Fruhen et al. (2019). 
Safety Rules & Procedures Hale et al. (2012), Hale & Boris (2013a), Hale & Boris (2013b), 
Weichbrodt (2015), Vidal-Gomel (2017) 
Management of Change Hayes (2012), SPE (2014), Theophilus et al. (2017), Gerbec (2017) 
Safety Communication Davies et al. (2001), Bell & Healey (2006), Kines (2011), Wold & 
Laumann (2015), Nixon (2018), Newnam & Goode (2019). 
Equipment Maintenance Binch et al., 2012; Ratnayake, 2012; Christou & Konstantinidou, 
2012; Baker et al., 2007; Okoh & Haugen, 2013; ILO, 2015) 
Safety Involvement Klein & Vaughen (2008), Nielsena, & Randall (2012), Kouabenan 
et al. (2015), Kvalheim et al. (2016) 
Safety Supervision Kouabenan et al. (2015), Kvalheim & Dahl (2016), Pandit et al. 
(2019), Haung et al. (2017). 
Supportive Environment Cox & Cheyne (2000), Mohamed (2000), Amiri et al. (2015), 
Ghahramani & Khalkhali (2015).  
Safety Empowerment  Kines et al. (2011), Bergh et al. (2013), Javad et al. (2017), Larsson 
et al. (2018), Lee et al. (2019), Probst et al. (2019)  
Safety Motivation  Boughaba et al. (2014), Hystada et al. (2014), Griffin & Curcuruto 
(2016). 





2.6.4 The Link Between Safety and Risk 
The link between safety and risk has been contentious one in the research literature (see Moller 
et al., 2006; Aven, 2009; SRA, 2015a). Safety has been looked at in two different thinking: an 
absolute versus a relative. In terms of expressing the absolute concept of safety, the presence 
of safety means that there is no risk.  This thinking expresses safety as an absence of accident 
(Tench, 1985; Leveson, 1995; 2004). This thinking is problematic as it is arguably impossible 
to actualize “no risk” in real life situation (Hansson, 2012). This is because a future accident is 
associated with uncertainty as it is unknown today. In contrast, the relative concept of safety 
expresses safety in relation to risk. From the standard theory of safety, safety is defined as an 
antonym of risk (Aven, 2009; SRA, 2015a). The nature of this inverse relationship implies that 
safety cannot be referred to as low or high. It is rather a probability or uncertainty of safety that 
can be expressed as low or high. A lower risk level implies a higher safety level. However, this 
definition has been challenged by some researchers including Moller et al. (2006) who claimed 
safety as an antonym of risk, is not an exhaustive one but goes beyond this. This is because 
epistemic uncertainty was linked to probability on the basis that probability of safety or risk is 
not known with certainty.  
 
These views are complicated by the convolution of the risk conceptualization. The focus on 
combination of probability and harm as the understanding of risk is inadequate because it does 
not address the critical safety issues in complex sociotechnical systems. The issues of 
unknowledge of uncertainties and potential surprises are inadequately captured by existing 
applications of probability (Aven and Ylönen, 2016, 2018; Jensen & Aven, 2018). Viewing 
safety and risk as inversely related point to the need to all always ascertain the background 
knowledge of these probabilities. In the risk understanding and decision-making context, the 
knowledge from justified beliefs is mainly applied. To a large extent, risk assessment seeks to 
“gaining risk understanding in the sense of knowledge – justified beliefs” (Amundrud & Aven, 
2015, p. 44). By application, ascertaining the background knowledge of hazard risks is a critical 
way to improve safety performance in the upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
2.6.4.1 Risk Perception 
Risk perception is also known as a subjective risk assessment. Mearns and Flin (1995, p. 300) 
defined risk perception as “the study of people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgements and feelings 
about hazards, danger and risk-taking, within the wider context of social and cultural value”. 
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Subjective risk assessment goes beyond as a simple intuitive estimation of probability or 
magnitude of the loss. Risk perception is intimately linked to human decision making. The 
basic assumption underpinning the risk perception research is that individuals’ knowledge and 
certainty about risk lie on how they perceived risk. According to Dong et al. (2018), an 
adequate information reduces the perception of higher risk of hazards. When an individual is 
possessed with enough information about a particular hazard, he or she is more likely to be 
well-informed of its negative consequences. Workers remain critical factors in high-hazard 
industries because their unsafe behaviour affects incident risks in the work environment. These 
hazard risks have potential consequences to the individual workers, facilities and the 
environment.  
 
However, research has shown that cognitive biases can influence individual risk-taken 
behaviour in human decision-making, the psychological factors and organisational conditions 
(Rundmo, 2000). The technical report of Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) has indicated 
that the application of rational decision-making in a point where there are adequate time and 
information becomes problematic in highly safety-critical situations (SPE, 2013). It indicated 
that decision-making process in the oil and gas industry involves the process of situational 
awareness (i.e. the perception of a potential hazard or failing to recognise hazard), projecting 
the consequences, planning the possible course of remedies, and choosing what to do. The 
rational decision making involves applications of models in which humans are assumed 
systematically in the risk analysis. Individuals make quality decisions in response to situations 
in the workplace when there are adequate time and information.   
 
There are well-documented evidences in the literature that have established the link between 
risk perception and safety. These can be found in the following: workforce trust in safety 
management was associated with workers’ risk perception (Kivimaki et al., 1995), workers’ 
safety experience was linked to risk perception (Marek et al., 1985), offshore workers ‘safety 
behaviour was associated with perception of accident risks (Flin et al., 1996; Rundmo, & 
Sjöberg, 1998), organisational safety influencing factors were found linked to perceived 
nuclear risk (Kivimaki et al., 1995), safety behaviour was found associated with employees’ 
risk perception (Arezes & Miguel, 2008) and safety climate influences on hazard risks (Pandit 
et al., 2019). From these studies, it was established that risk perception at workplaces can 
influence workforce safety behaviour. How workers’ safety behaviours influence subjective 
perception of hazard risk dimensions in the oil and gas industry have not received adequate 
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empirical contribution in the extant literature. The present study provides empirical support to 
strengthen this link. The risk dimensions in the oil and gas industry have various hazard sources 




2.6.4.2  Risk Dimensions Applicable to the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry 
The risk literature has indicated that the hazards associated with upstream oil and gas 
operations have potential consequences to three main areas: injuries and fatality to the workers 
(Human risk), damage or loss of facilities (Equipment risk) and environmental pollutions 
(Environmental risk). These areas are known as the ‘Risk dimensions’ (Vinnen, 2007). These 
dimensions of risk can be assessed in both objective and subjective ways. The various hazards 
found in the literature that have potential consequences to these risk dimensions are 
summarised in Table 2.6.  
 
 
2.6.4.2.1 Human risk 
Human risk is defined only to include the risk to workers which is often known as the ‘first 
party’ in the upstream oil and gas industry (Vinnem, 2007). It is stated that when assessing the 
risk to workers in offshore operations, the risk to the public is not taken into consideration 
(Vinnem, 2014a). Human risk assessment is usually subjected to impairment and fatality 
hazards analysis. Employees performing upstream activities may be susceptible to impairment 
and fatality risks. The literature defined four main elements that constitute the hazards to 
human risks: occupational accidents, major accidents, transportation accidents and diving 
accidents.  
  
The occupational accidents that may occur to individuals are summarised to include the 
following: trips, slips, strains, falls from height or dropped object, cut, puncture, scrape, caught 
in or under or between, overexertion, struck by or impact, electric exposure and confined space 
(Skogdalen et al., 2011; Vinnem, 2014a; Vinnem, 2014b; Hauge & Øien, 2016; IOGP, 2019a; 
IOGP, 2019a). These accidents have relatively high frequency but low consequence events at 
the workplace. Major accidents are defined as the potential to cause five fatalities or more 
Vinnem (2014a). In the event of the probability of major accidents, workers may be exposed 
to fatality risk, which usually occurs relatively in low frequency but has great consequent 
events. Occupational disease refers to any disease that is contracted from exposure to factors 
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emanating from the workplace (Naafs, 2018). Niven and McLeod (2009) found five groups of 
potential hazards in terms of health risks associated with the activities of the industry: physical 
hazards (e.g. hearing noise), chemical hazards (e.g. haematopoietic cancers), biological hazards 
(e.g. food-poisoning), ergonomic hazards (e.g. musculoskeletal disorders), and psychological 
hazards (e.g. job stress). Health risks such as medical malaria, gastric and food poisoning are 
more prevalent in the developing countries’ offshore oil and gas operations (IOGP, 2019b). 
Transportation accidents relate to the risks to fatality when transporting employees to or from 
shore for operational activities. The literature captures air transport (helicopter). Diving 
accidents are mainly required in offshore operations, particularly in the aspect of drilling, 
construction, production and decommissioning activities. Divers are exposed to 
lifting/slinging, power tools, noise and vibration, underwater explosions resulting from burning 
or cutting, high-pressure water jetting, and among other hazardous risks (HSE, 2018). It is 
important to indicate that workers performing diving activities are usually exposed to several 
fatality risks in offshore oil and gas operations.  
 
  
2.6.4.2.2 Equipment Risk 
It is established that hazard risks may have potential consequences to the equipment of the 
organisation in the upstream oil and gas industry (Vinnem, 2007; 2014a; 2014b, Hauge & Øien, 
2016; IOGP, 2019a). The risk to the facilities is expressed in the following: possible damage 
to structures and equipment, possible duration of the production delay, and frequency of 
incidents that may have similar consequences (i.e. either in the magnitude of damage or 
duration of production delay). In other words, the risk to asset of the organisation is made up 
of potential damage to equipment, structures and disruption of production. Hydrocarbon 
releases were found to be the root causes of major hazard precursors on offshore installations 
(Sklet, 2006; Vinnem et al., 2007; Vinnem et al., 2010; Vinnem, 2012). Explosions were found 
as key hazard elements that caused damage to many facilities in the oil and gas industry 
(Dadashzadeh et al., 2013; Puskar, 2015; Blair et al., 2017). From the literature, gases, vapours 
and dust explosions constitute the real hazards that continue to be a serious threat to upstream 
oil and gas operations and that require an adequate assessment to control their risk. 
  
Given the past experiences of major incidents and accidents in the oil and gas industry, the 
literature found that sources of hazards emanating from offshore production operations are 
flammable materials usually in the risers, separators, slug catchers and also high-speed rotating 
 109 
equipment (e.g. compressors, turbines, export pumps). The frequency of fire cannot occur 
without the emergence of ignition event in the situation of a flammable oil or gas or other 
liquids leaks (Paik et al., 2011). In other words, ignition of hydrocarbon oil or gas leaks plays 
a key role in fires occurrence. Blowout hazard is explained as the uncontrolled flow of 
subterranean formation of fluids (e.g. oil, saline, natural gases, water) or well fluids into the 
atmosphere or an underground formation. The resultant consequence of the Loss of Well 
Control (LWC) is the blowout. The occurrence of LWC is explained as when formation 
pressure exceeds the pressure, which applies to it by a column of the fluid (API, 2010). The 
fluid could be cement spacer fluid, cement slurry, brine completion fluid, drilling fluid, or a 
combination of any of the column of fluid. A typical example of a blowout hazard incident was 
the Deepwater Horizon event (Macondo blowout) that occurred as a result of the consequence 
of not maintaining sufficient well integrity (Skogdalen et al. 2011). Nivolianitou et al. (2006) 
found equipment failure as one of the hazards that cause a major accident in the oil and gas 
industry. Such accidents may lead to damage to the facilities. In the analysis of lessons learnt 
from the offshore oil and gas incidents, Necci et al. (2019) found evidence of a collision 
between platforms and supply vessels. Pengfei1 et al. (2016) noted in their study that the 
consequences of any collisions with the offshore platform may be costly relative to human 
safety, cost of facility damage and environmental pollution. Weather and wind conditions have 
been indicated to cause consequences to upstream oil and gas operations such as a helicopter 
crash as well as damaging offshore facilities (Kaiser, 2008). Research has found that unsafe 
act like sabotage by workers may negatively affect the systems, processes or production at the 
workplace (Theophilus, 2017). The term sabotage act refers to an intentional act to negatively 
influence the system, work or production, a process that may result in serious damage or 
accident in a reaction to a challene identified as an organisational factor (Reinach & Viale 




2.6.4.2.3 Environmental risk 
The environmental risks from upstream oil and gas activities are dominated by substantial 
volumes of spill which could come from process leaks, pipeline leaks, storage leaks and 
blowout events (Vinnem, 2007; 2014a; 2014b, Hauge & Øien, 2016). This was indicated that 
despite the frequency of process leaks during upstream oil and gas operations, they could not 
cause extensive damage to the environment. However, spills from pipeline leaks, storage leaks 
 110 
and blowout events may result in a large spilled amount or the frequency of it and cause 
pollution to the environment.  
 
Table 2. 6 Literature summary of hazards 
Risk Dimensions Hazards Sources 
Human Trips, slips, strains, falls from 
height/dropped object, confined space, 
cut/puncture/scrape, caught in/ 
under/between, overexertion, 
struckby/impact, electric exposure, 
Exposure noise/chemical, 
biological/vibration, medical malaria, 
gastric or food poisoning, diving 
accidents.  
Vinnem (2007), Niven & 
McLeod (2009), Vinnem 
(2014a), Skogdalen et al. 
(2011), Hauge & Øien 
(2016). HSE (2018), IOGP 
(2019a), IOGP (2019b). 
Equipment Hydrocarbon releases, explosion and 
fire, blowout, equipment failure, vessel 
collision interruptions, weather and 
wind conditions, sobotage acts, 
 
 
Kalelkar &Little (1988), 
Sklet (2006), Vinnem et al. 
(2007), (Kaiser, 2008), 
Vinnem et al. (2010), Vinnem 
(2012), Paik et al. (2011), 
Skogdalen et al. (2011), 
Nivolianitou et al. (2006), 
Pengfei1 et al. (2016), Necci 
et al. (2019), Hauge & Øien 
(2016), IOGP (2019a) 
Environment Oil spills  Vinnem (2007), Vinnem, 
(2014a), Vinnem (2014b),  









2.7 Safety Management Systems in Upstream Oil and Gas Industry 
The previous section examined the concept of safety climate as a leading indicator for 
improving safety performance, and common hazards applicable to the upstream oil and gas 
industry. However, in improving safety performance, safety management needs to have a 
structured control system. This structured conrol is termed as the safety management system. 
This concept has become a critical requlatory requirement for oil and gas organisations to 
implement. This section critical review the concept of safety management systems, purposes, 
dimensionality and potential drivers and barriers related to its implementation in the upstream 
oil and gas industry.  
 
 
2.7.1 Safety Management System defined 
According to Fernández-Muñiz, et al. (2007), the concept of safety management system has 
not yet been defined. Several defintions have been given to this concept in both the professional 
and research literature. It has been related to a formalised way of dealing with practices, roles, 
policies and procedures for achieving the safety functions (ICAO, 2009; Wold & Laumann; 
2015; Yorio et al., 2015). Some scholars conceived it as a planned documented and vierified 
approach for managing risks (Thomas, 2012). In Li and Guldenmund (2018) review work, it is 
either employed to manage and control safety or as a management system that specifically aims 
at safety. Three perspectives have been identified from their review that are linked to the safety 
management systems: safety, management, and systems. Safety related to the states or 
conditions of being free from negative consequences. This could be accident, risk, or loss. 
Management generally involves plan, organise and control functions. This could be a 
prevention and control fashion. System is basically the input-and output functions. This relates 
to approach, model, framework, technique and assessment.  
 
However, there is a lack of consensus on the definition of safety management systems and how 
it can be differentiated from other safety programs in an organisation. In other words, there is 
no a universal agreement on what constitutes safety management systems and its scope. To 
differentiate safety management system from other safety programs, Fu and Chan (2014) 
reckoned that safety management system has a broader scope, while other safety programs are 
usually a core constituted part of a contractor’s safety management systems. Effective safety 
programs involve proactive processes or safety management systems which are more than a 
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program but a ‘philosophy’ (Watson, 1993). This philosophy is referred to as “a method of 
management made up of common concepts and improvement” (Watson, 1993: p.1). However, 
this distinction appears vague and requires an explicit meaning of safety management systems.  
 
From the literature, several definitions have been given to the meaning of safety management 
systems. In a critical glance of these definitions, safety management systems are characterised 
as part of an organisational overall ‘management systems’ and that the organization has an 
integrated set of interacting elements. Management system is seen as an attempt to systematise 
(Wold & Laumann, 2015). Management being systemic means that it assumes an emergent 
property which considers its entire constituted parts as more useful or functional than some 
constituted parts. The integrated set of interacting elements of the organization involves 
elements or components that interact to give meanings to its defined goal and objectives. These 
elements are broadly defined and therefore making it challenging to constitute a specific set of 
elements to other organizations with varied management practices. Safety management system 
is more seen operating as a system due to its key features of interdependence and 
interrelatedness which seek to achieve a common goal (Haight, et al., 2013, 2014).  If safety 
management system is a systemic, then the safety outcomes must emerge from a complex 
network of causal interactions. Dakker et al. (2011) relate a system approach to sociotechnical 
complexity as a web of dynamic, evolving relationships and interactions, and not as constituted 
parts and their interactions. This considers a holistic view of the whole system and their 
interactions.  
 
However, there is lack of clarity of what constitute the components of the management systems. 
For instant, Robson et al. (2005) noted some ambiguity in the composition of management 
system in terms of whether it is made of management components or technical/operational 
components. They argue that technical/operational components play a critical role in the 
implementation of safety policy and management of risks. On challenge that is noted from their 
argument relates to the fact that safety management systems are not well-defined set of 
management systems and for that matter they lack clear boundaries between safety activities, 
safety management and safety management systems. This challenge may be attributed to the 
fact that different organizations have different management practices and different ways of 
controlling safety hazards, therefore making it difficult to adopt a general set of components of 
safety management systems as a ‘one size fits all’ for all organizations. The prevailing 
management practices of an organization may be influenced by the difference in the culture of 
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the organizations. This may justify why the components of management systems are not 
universally well-defined for the management of safety.  
 
It is clear from the literature that the characterization of any safety management system for any 
organization must have appropriate defined management systems with its constituted 
interacting components and must be systematic in approach. The management systems must 
define the safety policies (the safety goals and means for goal attainment), procedures (the 
tactical guidelines for actions relating to these goals), and practices (implementation of policies 
and procedures). This understanding of safety management system is applied to the current 
study. How and why is safety management system a critical tool in managing safety in the 
upstream oil and gas industry? These questions are answered in the next discussion.  
 
 
2.7.2 Adoption of Safety Management System in the Oil and Gas industry 
The requirement for companies to develop safety management system started to arise after 
several major accidents had occurred particularly in Europe (e.g. Flixborough Explosion in 
1974; Seveso Incident in 1976; Piper Alpha disaster in 1987). The oil and gas industry had 
always had a long tradition of technical integrity until these major accidents occurred (Hudson, 
2007). Flixborough accident in 1974 which occurred at Nypro Ltd’s caprolactam production 
facility led to the first requirement for all oil and gas organisations to present a Safety Case as 
recommended by Lord Robens Committee. In view of this requirement, the United Kingdom’s 
Health and Safety Executive in 1984 issued the Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards 
(CIMAH) regulations requiring the operators to provide to the regulator a written report on the 
installation which was designated as the Safety Case.  Once the report was accepted, it had to 
be used as a basis for inspection strategy by the regulator. The Seveso incident in 1976 
eventually, brought about the development of Seveso Directive I (also known as European 
directive 82/501EEC) and this directive had grown and currently updated to Seveso Directive 
II (Council Directive 96/82/EC). The aftermath of the Piper Alpha offshore disaster in 1987, 
Lord Cullen Committee made recommendations for the oil and gas companies to “develop and 
adopt a Safety Management System” (Cullen, 1990, p. 387). This was the formal safety 
assessment which required to be performed by each hazardous installation and frequently 
updated at regular time interval (Safety Case). This became the safety management system. 
Emerging studies after considering lessons learnt in past accidents in 1980s, focused attention 
on  safety management system as an approach to integrate technology, people and management 
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in response to loss prevention in the process industries in 1995 (Pasman, et al., 1992; Visser, 
1994). The oil and gas industry in its mandatory development and adoption of this safety 
management system, extended further to incorporate occupational health and environmental 
management system which led to the implementation of integrated health, safety and 
environmental systems.  
 
 
2.7.2.1 Purposes of Safety Management Systems 
Safety management system is understood to as a rationalised management system that defines 
the policies, procedures, tactical guidelines and practices for achieving the safety function. As 
indicated in the literature, the goal of safety management is to protect human beings, machines 
and the physical environment from unacceptable risks. In view of this, the purposes of safety 
management systems are driven by two perspectives: control and compliance basis (Li & 
Guldenmund, 2018; Álvarez-Santos et al., 2018).  
 
 
2.7.2.1.1  Control Perspective 
The main purpose for the development of safety management systems is to control hazards, 
loss, accidents and risks. Following the several major accidents that characterised the oil and 
gas industry in 1970s, led to the quest for management approaches to control system 
performance. It is indicated that the standardisation of work procedures can help an 
organisationto reduce accidents (Wold & Laumann, 2015). Furtherly, the safety management 
systems help an organization to identify and manage risk adequately (Santos-Reyes & Beard, 
2002; Santos et al., 2013). The PDCA-cycle (e.i. Plan-Do-Check-Act) control process is an 
example of the control system of organisations’ safety management systems.  
 
 
2.7.2.1.2  Compliance Purpose 
Compliance of safety laws, regulations and standards has become another important basis that 
drive an organisation to develop safety management systems. Cullen (1990) inquiry report of 
the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988 recommended safety management systems to the oil and gas 
industry. Given this requirement, the industry and countrie started to develop safety laws, 
regulations, standards and guidelines to reflect these safety management systems. Li and 
Guldenmund (2018) noted that companies strived to develop and improve safety management 
systems because they want to obtain certification for their operations. Countries develop safety 
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laws and regulations to explicitly stipulate the norms of safety actions that would underlie the 
legal framework for which risk is accepted or tolerated. The literature identified three aspects 
of safety compliance: understanding, comparison and integration. The understansing in this 
context connotes the explication of clues on how existing organisational management systems 
can conform to standards. Comparison aspect relates to the general understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of particular standards as several countries or institutions employ 
different safety standards. This is in the view of realising suitability of the safety standards of 
certain institutions or organisations. Integration denotes that companies incorporate the needed 
regulations or standards into their own management systems for specific goals. Safety 
management systems are developed to contain regulations and standards that may have several 
goals to accomplish in particular areas.   
 
 
2.7.2.2 Dimensionality of Safety Management Systems 
The dimensionality in this context relates to those elements that characterise the safety 
management systems. Many elements have been found constituting safety management 
systems. Usually, the number of elements of safety management systems determines the level 
of detail of a safety management system. In most elements of safety management systems used 
in the upstream oil and gas sector are commonly found in many international safety standards. 
Figure 2.5 presents examples of safety standards comprising many different elements of safety 
management systems used in the upstream oil and gas industry. Although there may be some 
elements commonly found in many safety standards (e.g. US OSHA; AICHE/CCPS; RC), 
some of the elements may be different. Experience has indicated that, sometimes, many 
organisations fail to implement effective safety management systems (Cambon et al., 2006). It 
had been cautioned that if due diligence were not considered especially when the safety 
management systems was designed and formalized, it could potentially result to being quite 
superficial, disconnected from real work situations, be poorly dynamic and can have the 
propensity to introduce further limitations to workers or rigidity in terms of the way safety is 





Fig. 2. 5 Examples of elements found in safety standards 
                              Source: Bridges and Tew (2010). 
 
Cambon et al. (2006) suggested two dimensions of safety management systems: structural and 
operational facets. The former connotes the formal description of all the efforts required by a 
company to manage safety at the workplace.  It involves those safety management processes 
that are usually found in sections or chapters of safety standards. Such processes may include 
the definition of safety policy, safety program, implementation of communication or 
documentation systems, hazard identification, and among others. The later relates to those 
efforts or actions put in place by the organisation to implement the safety management systems. 
It implies how those internal processes of the safety management process are implemented by 
the company. In other words, the efforts that company has to put in place in managing the 




In comparison, the PSM standard that was issued by US OSHA (29 CFR 1910.119) in 1992 (and has been 
essentially unchanged since) is devoid of human factor controls with a few exceptions. The only direct 
reference to the term “human factors” is mentioned in paragraph (e), Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), 
which states that the PHA team must consider human factors (presumably in the review of the causes and 
the quality of the safeguards).  The other mention that alludes to human factors, is in Operating 
Procedures (see paragraph (f)) which states procedures “must be written clearly and understandably.”  
This is accomplished by following best practices for human factors as they relate to procedures discussed 
later in this paper.  Paragraph (g) defines standards for Training but does not directly address how to 
design training programs to address controlling human errors.  In summary PSM systems based on 
compliance with OSHA’s PSM standard are likely addressing human factors only through the standard’s 
SOP, training and PHA element requirements.  These OSHA based PSM systems likely lack the 
fundamental human factor standards that when applied across the applicable PSM elements, work 
together to reduce human error. 
 
Clearly more guidance is needed to fully implement human factors in PSM systems.  While the newly 
developed Risk Based Process Safety industry standard from the CCPS does contain the human factor 
standards, they are not presented under a stand-alone human factor element.  This organization does not 
provide a needed road map to help companies wanting to transition to RBPS from the minimum PSM 
systems defined in OSHA’s PSM standard.  A starting point for this transition is implementing a human 
factor element comprised of the human factor categories missing from most OSHA based PSM systems, 
that when combined with the RBPS standards, provides the roadmap. 
 





on the operational facets because it requires actions that drive the formal internal processes 
established by the company.  
 
Li and Guldenmund (2018) indicated that the generic safety management system has two main 
elements: risk control and the learning systems. The former relates to the management 
processes that involves business processes that are covered in all life cycle, the risk inventory 
analysis in all life cycle and the interactions between them, the risk barriers and controls for all 
the life cycle, and the management systems that provides the entire requirements for effective 
functioning of the technical or procedural barriers and controls. The latter involves the 
inspection and monitoring, auditing and management review, and incident and accidents 
registration and analysis.  
 
The literature provided different ways to view the dimensionality of safety management 
systems. Those elements explicate the content of safety management systems and their 
processes in implementation. However, they are more of industry specific with no or limited 
theoretical drive. They mainly represented a mechanical means in fulfilling the content of the 
safety management systems. What drive the actions of the dimensionality of the safety 
management systems must be explicitly accentuated.  
 
 
2.7.3 Effectiveness, Performance and Robustness Concepts in Safety 
Management Systems 
The terms ‘effectiveness’ and ‘performance’ are used interchangeably in the safety literature to 
describe the same phenomenon. The confusion in these two terms relating to their definition, 
measurement and explanation are virtually identical. Henri (2004) related the concept of 
performance to output of individual or an organisation. From this meaning, the concept of 
performance is linked to an action of an individual or organisation. The literature pointed out 
that when conceptualising performance, the disparities between action (bahaviour) and 
outcome aspects of performance must be differentiated. This is because not every action is 
subsumed under the performance concept, but only those actions that are relevant to the 
organisational goals (Sonnentag & Frese, 2002). The outcome aspect of performance has to do 
with the consequences or the results of the individual behaviour. This means that the 
judgmental and evaluative processes do not define performance, rather it is the action.  
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In contrast, Robbins and Judge (2007) related effectiveness to the extent to which stated goal 
is achieved. In the actual sense, effectiveness reflects goal attainement. Evaluating the 
effectiveness of safety management systems from the perspective of goals attainment can have 
the tendency of obscuring the deficiencies in the safety systems. Usually, organisations’ 
implementation of safety management systems only seeks to address “mechanism elements” 
such as a structure and system of controls for companies, and establishing competency 
(knowledge of the structure, control, and norms and ability to perform) for individual workers. 
Defining effectiveness of safety management systems from the perspective of goal attainment 
means that it only follows the structural performance of the designed and formalized systems. 
The structural performance of the safety management systems is defined as “the level of 
compliance of the internal processes as established by the company with the existing safety 
management standards. In the literature, some scholars have assessed implementation of safety 
management systems based on effectiveness (e.g. Robson et al., 2007; Thomas, 2012; Bianchini 
et al., 2015; Ghani et al., 2017). Effective implementation is related to something that is in 
utilisation or operation (Davies, 2008). However, transformation of safety policies into actions 
towards achieving the safety function is not just a paperwork. It is far more complex because 
it requires engagement of stakeholders. Today, the oil and gas industry continues to emphasises 
on an effective implementation of safety management systems to prevent major accidents. If 
the indication that the effectiveness of safety management systems is the successful 
implementation of the structural requirements of the prevailing safety regulations and 
staandards, then the implementation of safety management systems does not by itself guarantee 
the improvement in the effectiveness of safety management systems (Ghahramani, 2016). Most 
of the existing tools developed to-date are purely audit tools that help in determining the degree 
to which safety management has been implemented, which in the actual sense, is not the same 
as determining whether safety management systems are effective or not (Brady & Stolzer 
2016).  
 
Robson et al. (2007) provided a general systematic analysis of scientific literature on the safety 
management systems performance carried out by the team of the Canadian Institute for Work 
and Health (CIWH) which showed that no enough evidence confirmed the effectiveness of 
safety management systems. In another study by Thomas (2012) which provided a systematic 
review of scientific literature on the effectiveness of safety management systems, indicated a 
distinct lack of consistency of findings confirming the effectiveness of safety management 
systems by its critical components. Pitblado and Bjerager (2015) linked effectiveness of 
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implementation of safety management systems in terms of its ability to improve major hazards 
occurrence. They stated that its implementation had not improved major hazard risks in the oil 
and gas industry. Podgórski (2015) reviewed the requirement of safety management systems 
to prevent major accident in the oil and gas industry. He found that since the implementation 
of the safety management systems in the industry, no sufficient evidence had been linked to its 
effectiveness in relation to accident reduction. It must be indicated that over three decades of 
proliferation of implementation of safety management systems in the industry, no conclusive 
and clear evidence had been adduced to its effectiveness. The literature indicated that its 
implementation had helped to improve the general occupational safety performance level. 
However, the critical concern to the industry is how to improve major hazard incident risks.  
 
The upstream oil and gas operations are characterised with complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiquity. The literature had failed to view implementation of safety management systems 
from an integrative approach. An integrative risk governance is a critical requirement to realise 
a robust safety management. Linking implementation of safety management systems to 
effectiveness may be inadequate to address the issues of uncertainty of knowledge and potential 
surpirses that are always the triggers of major accidents. Several companies had implemented 
their safety management systems along with the traditional safety framework developed by the 
Health and Safety Executive labelled as the “Successful Health and Safety Management (see 
Figure 2.6). Several researchers including Ahmed (2016) continued to employ this framework 
to improve safety performance in the upstream oil and gas industry. This framework provides 
the key features of management concept. The management features include plan, organize, lead 
and control functions. It is the plan-do-check-act fashion espoused by both the professional 
and research literature. This framework is important as it described the key elements of 
management. However, it does not address how to deal with complexity, uncertainty and 





Fig. 2. 6 Successful health and safety management 
                                   Source: HSE (1997) 
 
The concept of Robustness is linked to system effectiveness. According to Hoffman and 
Hancock (2017), robustness can be expressed as the capacity of a system to maintain 
effectiveness through a spectrum of tasks, situations and contexts. Safety management in the 
oil and gas industry is a control problem. It is not only about achieving the stated safety 
outcome but addressing complexity, uncertainty and ambiquity issues.  This is because the 
upstream oil and gas industry involves complex exploration and production activities that 
require coordination of the performance of the industry (drilling rig owners, operators), 
contractors and the government authorities. The gap associated with the current safety 
management framework is that it does not address risk governance adequately. To fill this gap, 
researchers need to base implementation of safety management systems on robustness thinking 
that emphases integrative risk governance in which the principal features of the systems are 
always maintained with learning capability towards changed conditions. Implementation of 
safety management systems under self-regulatory regime benefits all the stakeholders involved 
that include the drilling owner, operator, contractor and the government agancies (Ghani et al., 
2017). Therefore, its implementation equally requires an integrative approach of risk 




2.7.4 Robust Implementation of Safety Management Systems 
Robson et al. (2007) identified three main outcome changes in assessing the effectiveness of 
safety management systems. They include implementation, intermediate outcome and final 
outcome. Implementation is referred to the course of actions taken to put into the utilisation of 
an idea, decision, procedure or program (Klein & Sorra, 1996). Othman (2010) characterised 
implementation with two things: allocating resources and changing the organisational 
structure. It relates to the act of putting a plan into action to achieve a goal. Implementation of 
safety management systems can be defined as the act of placing safety policies into action to 
achieve the safety functions. The primary safety functions are to prevent human beings, 
property and the physical environment from unacceptable risks. Immediate outcome relates to 
the initial utilisation of the safety idea. The final outcome is linked to the accident rate. 
Implementation is regarded as one of the parameters or indicators for assessing safety 
management systems. The literature established safety climate as a robust indicator of 
organisational safety performance. Safety climate drives the implementation of organisational 
safety management systems. In this context, implementation of organisational safety 
management systems becomes robust when a positive safety climate drives it. There are several 
drivers and barriers associated with implementing an organisational safety management 
system. This section discusses those potential drivers and barriers to the implementation of 
safety management systems.  
  
  
2.7.4.1 Drivers  
Ismail et al. (2012) investigated several factors that could influence the implementation of 
safety management systems. The factors were categorised into resources, management, 
personal, incentive and relationship areas. The resource factor included both hardware (e.g. 
PPE and any requirement of the industry) and software. The management factor included 
vision, statement of objectives, leadership, direction, commitment, safety analysis, supervision 
and prevention planning. The personal factor involved good communication, safety 
awareness, safety culture, individual competence and group positive. The incentive 
factor included promotion, remuneration, campaign, motivation, merit rating, PPE, working 
conditions, welfare and safety rules. The relationship factor comprises two areas: the 
globalisation and the interfaces with stakeholders, and internal personal relationships at the 
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work environment. However, personal awareness and good communication were found to be 
the main drivers of implementing safety management systems. 
  
Yiu et al. (2019) examined the literature on the critical factors that drive the implementation of 
safety management systems. In their review, they categorised the drivers into five areas: safety 
commitment, competence profile, safety climate, project management, and safety requirement 
and incentives. They indicated that safety commitment must reflect visibility of senior 
management, investment in safety-related issues, allocation of sufficient manpower and 
provision of adequate time. Competence profile must cover personal quality of safety manager, 
personal competence of the safety manager, training, education, safety behaviour and 
leadership of the project manager and the senior manager. The safety climate includes elements 
such as workers’ participation in safety, safety awareness, the attitude of the workers and the 
safety culture of the operation. The project management covers the existence of teamwork, 
effective communication systems, safety organisation indicating responsibility and 
accountability of the workers, frequency of safety meetings and selection strategy of 
subcontractors. The safety requirement and incentives reflect the incents from both the workers 
and the organisation, legal requirement in both contractual and certification of standards. 
However, they found two elements that critically drove the safety management systems 
implementation in their study: visual senior management commitment to safety and 
competence of safety managers.  
  
Several other studies have identified drivers of implementation of safety management systems. 
Othman (2010) identified adequate monitoring of progress and outcomes as critical drivers of 
implementing safety management systems. It involves active and reactive monitoring. The 
active monitoring (before things go wrong) establishes that there is the existence of procedures 
specifically for the activities at the workplace. Reactive monitoring relates to learning from 
incidents. Several studies found that investment in safety education and training of workers 
concerning their unsafe behaviour would drive safety management systems implementation 
(Paul et al., 2007; Whysall et al., 2006; Álvarez-Santos et al., 2018). Stolzer et al. (2018) noted 
that the active participation of every worker in the organisation is a key driver of safety 
management systems implementation. Rajaprasad et al. (2015) assessed the factors influencing 
the implementation of OHSAS 18001 that included continual improvement, safety culture, 
moral of workers and safety training were considered as the dependable variables. The study 
found that safety commitment and safety policy were the main drivers of safety management 
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systems implementation. Álvarez-Santos et al. (2018) identified organisational culture as a key 
driver of safety management implementation. It must reflect on the social domain of labour 
relations as well as the integration of the technical security that would improve the processes 
of implementation. Durán and Patiño (2018) found the following factors as key in driving 
implementation of safety management system in the industry: inappropriate use of PPE by 
workers, commitment from management and the signing of the policy, collaboration of the 
heads of the department of the organisation, resources allocation, participation of the workers, 
safety awareness and trust between workers and their superiors. Kim et al. (2019) investigated 
the influence of safety climate in the implementation of organisational safety management 
systems. The authors identified safety motivation, the involvement of sub-contractors in safety 
meetings and training and safety empowerment as essential drivers of implementing safety 
management systems. The main drivers found by the literature are summarised in the table 2.7. 
However, these drivers are more related to safety culture influences.  
  
 
Table 2. 7 Literature summary of drivers 
Potential Drivers Literature Source(s) 
Safety policies  Rajaprasad et al. (2015), Durán & 
Patiño (2018) 
Safety incentives  Kim et al. (2019) 
Appropriate use of PPE by workers Durán & Patiño (2018), Yiu et al. 
(2019) 
Adequate monitoring Othman (2010) 
Safety involvement  Kim et al. (2019) 
Adequate training and competence Paul et al. (2007), Whysall et al. 
(2006), Rajaprasad et al. (2015), 
Álvarez-Santos et al. (2018), Yiu et 
al. (2019), Kim et al. (2019) 
Organizational safety culture Rajaprasad et al. (2015) 
Sufficient resources allocation Durán & Patiño (2018) 
Safety awareness Durán & Patiño (2018) 
Safety empowerment  Kim et al. (2019) 
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Favorable working environment for problem-
solving 
Álvarez-Santos et al. (2018) 
Safety awareness Durán & Patiño (2018) 
Satisfaction of stakeholders Álvarez-Santos et al. (2018) 
Trust between workers and superiors Durán & Patiño (2018) 
Adequate communication among stakeholders Ismail et al. (2012), Yiu et al. 
(2019), Silva & Amaral (2019) 
Learning from incidents Othman (2010) 
Workers’ participation Durán & Patiño (2018), Stolzer et al. 
(2018),  
Management commitment  Rajaprasad et al. (2015), Durán & 
Patiño (2018), Yiu et al. (2019), 
Silva & Amaral (2019) 





2.7.4.2 Barriers  
Zeng et al. (2007) investigated the implementation and certification of safety management 
systems in organisations. The authors found that the factors the negatively affect the 
implementation of the safety management systems can be categorized in to internal and 
external. The internal factors involve understanding and perception, human resources, 
organisational structure and company structure. The external factors are made up of 
stakeholders and customers, technical guidance, certification bodies and institutional 
environment. They suggested a multi-level synergy model for the implementation of safety 
management systems. 
  
Silva and Amaral (2019) conducted a systematic review of the literature on critical success 
factors and barriers related to the implementation of safety management systems. The authors 
found the following as critical barriers to implementation of safety management systems: high 
cost of implementation and management, lack of management commitment, lack of workers’ 
involvement, the challenges relative to the functioning of the safety control and documentation 
systems, the failure in the process of assessing the risks, challenging of changing the 
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organisational policy and culture, challenge in defining the suitable safety management 
indicators, and difficulty in integrating different safety standards, attribute compliance to the 
organisational culture. 
  
Several other studies have identified various factors that constitute barriers to the 
implementation of safety management systems. Yiu et al. (2019) reviewed the literature to 
identify barriers to the implementation of safety management systems. The potential barriers 
were categorised into three areas: competence profile, project management and leadership, 
and project constraint and system limitation. They noted that poor project management and 
leadership were the most frequently cited ones from the literature. For examples, Goh and Chua 
(2013) found insufficient resources and tight project schedule posed challenges to safety 
management implementation. Yiu et al. (2018) found high turnover rates of labour, lack of 
financial commitment to safety and high stress for project completion as potential barriers to 
safety management systems. Agyekum et al. (2018) identified inadequate communication in 
terms of coordination of work planning and schedules targeting identification and resolution 
of conflicts could obstruct the implementation of safety management systems. Bianchini et al. 
(2017) found that the lack of incentives for small companies affects the implementation of 
safety management systems. Garnicaa and Barrigaa (2018) surveyed to determine the main 
barriers to the implementation of safety management systems. The authors found that 
inappropriate behaviour from management, lack of communication and lack of safety 
prioritisation were the key barriers to implementation of safety management systems. The main 
potential barriers to the implementation of safety management systems identified in the 
literature are summarised in the table 2.8.  However, it can be stated that all these drivers and 
barriers are linked to safety climate dimensions. A robust implementation of safety 
management systems requires a strong safety culture drive. As indicated in an earlier review 
(sections 2.6.2 & 2.6.3), safety climate is a manifestation of organisational culture. Therefore, 
an improvement in organisational safety climate would influence a robust implementation of 







Table 2. 8 Literature summary of barriers 
Potential Barriers Literature Source (s) 
Lack of safety prioritization Garnicaa & Barrigaa 
(2018) 
Inadequate training and competence Agyekum et al. (2018) 
Insufficient communication Agyekum et al. (2018), 
Garnicaa & Barrigaa 
(2018) 
Insufficient resources Goh & Chua (2013) 
High cost of implementation and management  Silva & Amaral (2019) 
High turnover rates of labour Yiu et al. (2018) 
Lack of management commentment Silva & Amaral (2019) 
Lack of workers’ involvement Silva & Amaral (2019) 
challenges relative to the functioning of the safety control and 
documentation systems 
Silva & Amaral (2019) 
Failures in the process of assessing the risks Silva & Amaral (2019) 
Inappropriate management safety behaviour  Garnicaa & Barrigaa 
(2018) 
Challenging of changing the organisational policy and culture Silva & Amaral (2019) 
Challenge in defining the suitable safety management indicators Silva & Amaral (2019) 
Difficulty in integrating different safety standards, attribute 
compliance to the organisational culture 
Silva & Amaral (2019) 
Lack of incentives for small companies Bianchini et al. (2017) 





2.8 Theoretical Framework of the Study 
This section provides the theoretical framework of the research that would help to provide 
empirical data analysis to achieve the aim of the present study (see figure 2.7). The upstream 
oil and gas operations represent a complex sociotechnical system as several players are 
interacting to achieve the production goals. Such interactions always produce complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity of risk (Renn, 2014).  The complexity issue associated with the 
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upstream operations relates to the difficulty or the poor knowledge about the consequences of 
the system, even if there is a strong knowledge about the consequences of its sub-systems. The 
interactive effects of all the components constituting the operational system are not adequately 
identified (Jensen & Aven, 2018). Complexity expresses the deficiencies or limitations of the 
knowledge of the hazards. The uncertainty issue emerges from the insufficient reduction of the 
complexity in indicating the cause-effect chains. This occurs in the risk assessment stage, 
where the knowledge of human contribution may not be adequately linked to the probability 
estimates or the numbers. An ambiguity of risk arises due to the several different contesting 
views on the justification and severity of the risk. In most cases, many different meanings and 
interpretations are associated with the risk acceptance criteria. The literature has indicated that 
there are always uncertainties of knowledge and potential surprises in the application of 
engineering probability-based risk assessment underpinned the current safety management in 
the industry. The current practice of obtaining system understanding by the use of simple linear 
models (e.g. fault trees, event trees, Bayesian networks, etc.) to quantify risk and compare with 
a predefined criterion for decision-making is inadequate. This is because the underlying 
assumptions may obscure relevant aspects of risk and uncertainties, and surprises occurrence 
is relative to probabilities expressions. In this regard, an adequate background knowledge of 
risk is critical in managing the safety of complex system operations like the oil and gas industry.  
 
The safety management is a control problem. This control problem identified through 
Rasmussen’s (1997) hierarchical model of sociotechnical system. There is interaction between 
humans, technology and the social and organisational processes which operates in these levels. 
This model of hierarchical safety control levels is established to address system complexity in 
decision-making (Carayon, 2015; Leveson, 2017; Jensen & Aven, 2018; Petukhov & Steshina, 
2018). The hierarchical safety control levels involved the government, regulatory authorities, 
company, management, staff and work. These safety control levels influence risk. From control 
and regulatory purposes, every organisation must implement safety management systems (Li 
& Guldenmund, 2018; Álvarez-Santos et al., 2018). The safety management systems are 
characterised by the sociotechnical dimensions of its goal-oriented outocmes (Rasmussen, 
1997; Grote & Künzler, 2000). They are rationalised management systems that define the 
policies, procedures, tactical guidelines and practices for achieving the safety function. The 
sociotechnical perspective implies that the safety management systems must be developed to 
value it social relationships. The safety management systems must be implemented with an 
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adaptive and integrative goveranace approach (HSE, 2013, Hale, 2014). In this regard, safety 
management must require an integrative risk governance.  
 
An integrative risk governance model developed by Renn (2014) is relevant in addressing the 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiquity associated with system operations. The risk governance 
must be required in four areas: framing the risk related issues, risk estimation, risk evaluation, 
monitoring and controlling risk, and risk information sharing.  It must be pointed out that an 
organisational culture that is capable to operate in the social domain of network relations needs 
to integrate risk governance to improve the processes of implementation and sustainance of its 
safety management systems. An organisation’s safety management system is conceptualised 
as an “artifact” or “a manifestation” of an organization safety culture (Mearns et al., 2003; 
Naevestad, 2009; Guldenmund, 2010; Reiman & Rollenhagen, 2014).  
 
The main attribute of a safer organisation is the extent to which it cooperatively optimises the 
social or organisatonal aspects of the safety of the work environment (Brian et al., 2015).  In 
systemic theory of accident causation, an accident is viewed as an emergent phenomenon that 
occurs because of the complexity of interactions between its components that cause 
degradation of the system performance leading to an accident (Qureshi et al., 2007). An 
accident occurs due to the defective processes involving interactions among people, social and 
organizational structures, engineering activities, and physical and software system components 
(Leveson, 2004; 2011). From this view, safety is understood as an emergent property because 
of its complex relationships and interactions between the components of the system 
constituting the safety. According to Brian et al. (2015), the main characteristic of the 
interations of the components parts is the joint optimisation. It is a dynamic state which is 
continuously subjected to modification and influenced by both organisational internal and 
external factors. The external factors are mostly beyond the direct control of the organisation. 
They may include the regulatory environment, market forces, cultural trends and others. The 
internal factors are more related to organisational climate influences.  The literature established 
that safety climate provides the avenues for assessing the extent of this joint optimisation 
between the organisation and the technical systems.  
 
The element of this joint optimisation is the performance vulnerability feedback. This safety 
performance is defined by the safety outcomes and safety behaviours (Christian et al., 2009).  
Safety outcomes relate to historical information or statistical data on indicators of incidents, 
accidents, injuries and fatalities. Safety behaviour has two aspects: safety compliance and 
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safety participation. A good safety climate would stremgthen regulatory, organisational and 
workforce safety culture. The safety indicators and organisational safety climate must be 
continuously be improved through the hierarchical sociotechnical levels with the incorporation 
of an integrative risk governance.  
 
From the literature review, it can clearly be stated that over the years, several scientific pieces 
of knowledge have been provided to support decision-making in safety management. It 
appeared there is inadequate integrative research that had been contributed in providing a 
conceptual framework to address the safety control problem. The current study seeks to 
strengthen integrative research in safety management by a detailed combination of the concepts 
of sociotechnical, risk governance and safety culture in addressing complexity, uncertainty and 









This chapter commenced by providing an overview of safety management in the upstream oil 
and gas industry. Safety management involves prescription of safety norms and the activities 
that would make these norms be duly complied. The study viewed safety as a control problem. 
The risk governance was discussed as a key concept to address the complexity, uncertainty am 
ambiquity associated with this control problem. There are modes of regulation to prevent major 
hazard risks which were discussed along with the prescriptive regulations, performance-based 
regulations and hybrid regulatory regimes. However, the study reviewed existing literature on  
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evaluation of safety regulatory regimes in the upstream oil and gas industry with a view to 
explore for the existing approaches for assessment and ascertain whether there is a consensual 
approach for determining a superior regulatory regime. The study found no literature 
suggesting superior regulatory regime style because of the differences in prevailing national 
cultural, definition and reporting of safety data, regulatory architecture and the scope of 
upstream oil and gas activities.  
 
The risk governance in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry was reviewed. The review 
identified some weaknesses in existing regulatory and institutional framework governing the 
industry. It appeared existing literature focused on examining the safety regulatory architecture 
and orientation. Ghana’s safety regulations are driven by the safety case regime which is 
mainly rooted in engineering propabilitiy-based risk assessments. The study found inadequate 
approach to handle the complexity, uncertainty, ambiquity of risk associated with Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. Given Ghana’s past experience of poor industrial hazardous risk 
management, there is the need to provide an appropriate approach to manage safety in the 
industry.  A review of the resilience versus robustness concepts of risk goverance was carried 
out to find the most appropriate approach to address the inherent complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiquity associated with the upstream oil and gas operations. This study argued that 
robustness concept tends to offer more proactive measures in dealing with the risk governance 
issues. The review provided review criteria to assess a robust safety regulatory regime in the 
industry.  
 
Existing indicators for safety management were examined as important to reveal system 
deficiencies for improvement. Such indicstors must reflect the safety domains and perspectives 
of the industry. Safety control problem can be exposed by both safety performance indicators 
(historical safety statisictical data) and safety climate indicators. Safety climate is a robust 
indicator for hazard incident risks.  The study examined the link between safety and risk and 
further identified the potential measures of safety climate and the dimensions of hazard 
incidents risk in the upstream oil and gas industry. The concept of safety management systems 
and its potential drivers and barriers related to implementation were examined. However, it 
was understood that a robust implementation of safety management systems requires a strong 
safety culture drive. A theoretical framework of the study was made to provide a guide to the 
empirical data analysis of the research.   
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The preceding chapter reviewed the literature on the risk governance in Ghana’s upstream oil 
and gas industry. This chapter presents the research methodology for the study. It covers the 
methodological approach, which defined its philosophical position, the design science research 
as the approach as well as its justification and weaknesses, the research strategy and research 
methods adopted for the study. This chapter will indicate the extent of the validity and 
reliability of the data for the analysis. It will show the ethical consideration of the research and 
summarises the research methodological framework. 
 
 
3.2 Purpose of the Research 
Research is a systematised effort to acquire new knowledge. Every research has the primary 
purpose of fulfilling or creating reliable and worthwhile knowledge that must be based on 
evidence and logical argument to solve a societal problem. Generally, it seeks to provide 
descriptive, explanatory and predictive knowledge of the world. However, another way of 
solving a societal problem is to provide prescriptive knowledge to solve a practical problem of 
society through a designed artefact (Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2014). The context of the current 
research is the risk governance in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. It seeks to understand 
the risk governance issues and find a more appropriate way to improve the complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity of risk in the industry. Given this, this research seeks to provide 
prescriptive knowledge to improve safety management in the Ghanaian upstream oil and gas 
industry. A methodological approach is required to fulfil the purpose of this research. The next 
section discusses the research methodological approach of this study. 
 
 
3.3 Research Methodological Approach  
A research methodology is a crucial stage in every scientific enquiry. Researchers have defined 
research methodology in different ways. Kothari et al. (2014) described it as a systematic way 
of solving a problem. Accroding to Easterby-Smith et al. (2004), it is the combination of 
techniques applied to enquire into a specific situation. It is also defined as the study of methods 
by which knowledge is acquired, and which gives the work plan of the research (Rajasekar et 
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al., 2013). Essentially, it is the procedures followed by researchers to obtain knowledge. 
However, it goes beyond this traditional process of employing a specific research method and 
includes the rationale and philosophical assumptions that underlie the study (Knight & 
Ruddock, 2008). Every research must go through procedures to gain knowledge. The indication 
of assumptions relating to personal values is essential when planning a research study. 
Therefore, every research methodology must clarify its philosophical stance. 
  
The process of creating knowledge begun with a substantive field of inquiry, known as 
'Philosophy' (Hanid, 2014). According to Dawood and Underwood (2010, p. 178), philosophy 
means "love of wisdom or love of Knowledge". Knowledge is a crucial aspect of inquiry to 
solve a societal problem. It elucidates the view of the researcher's understanding of knowledge, 
processes and phenomenon of the study area. It concerns with the establishment of rigorous, 
regulation, and improvement of the methods of knowledge creation in all fields of intellectual 
endeavour (Partington, 2002). Researchers recognise that the choice of a research methodology 
('how research') requires something far more in-depth than practicalities. It requires rational 
solutions to the 'why research'. Understanding of philosophical issues in an intellectual 
endeavour is essential in knowledge acquisition. Crossan (2016) stated that due to its 
'indirectness' and 'circular nature' of philosophical questioning, it usually encourages in-depth 
thinking, and generates more questions specific to the topic in question. According to Smith 
(1998), it is uncomplicated style and reliable way of questioning and which creates confusion 
and instability in our assumptions and ideas about the world, that makes the study of philosophy 
particularly relevant. Easterby-Smith et al. (1997) stated three reasons why research 
philosophy is vital to research: 
• It helps in refining and specifing the research methods to be employed in research, 
• It helps the evaluating the different methods by identifying the weaknesses of the 
approaches at the initial phase of the research.  
•  It helps in original and innovative work by employing methods that were previously 
outside his or her experience.  
  
The development of a philosophical view concerning the world requires critical assumptions 
relating to these two dimensions: the nature of science and the nature of society (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979; cited in Holden & Lynch, 2004). These fundamental assumptions relate to 
ontological, epistemological, methodological, axiological concerns of the world. Vaishnavi 
and Kuechler (2007) have explained and summarised these assumptions. Ontology is the study 
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that relates to the description of the nature of reality. Ontological questions relate to the 
following: what reality is, what does entities exist, how do they relate and interact with each 
other. In other words, what is real and what is not, and what is fundamental and what is 
derivative. Epistemology is explained as the study that sought to explore the nature of 
knowledge. It expresses what knowledge is depended and how to be curtained about what is 
known. Methodology expresses the procedures to follow in obtaining the 
knowledge. Axiology is the study of values. In other words, it expresses what values guide the 
reason for all human actions (Heron, 1996). Every researcher is required to show axiological 
skill by expressing their values as the grounds for their judgement about the conduct of the 
research. However, these underlying assumptions about the world are divided over several 
research perspectives which are discussed in the next section. 
 
 
3.3.1 Research Paradigm 
A research paradigm is understood as a set of beliefs and assumptions that are commonly held 
within a research community about the concerns of ontology, epistemology and methodology 
(Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). In other words, it creates a mental model that must influence 
and organise how the members of a research community perceive their area of study. Vaishnavi 
and Kuechler (2007) and Johannesson and Perjons (2014) indicated that every research 
paradigm must address the questions of the following fundamental beliefs of the world: 
Ontology asks, What is the world? Epistemology asks, “What can be known about the world, 
and how can knowledge be obtained?” Methodology asks, “Which procedures can be 
employed to obtain knowledge?” And Axiology asks, “What is a value?” There are numerous 
varieties of research paradigms which are divided across ontological, epistemological, 
methodological and axiological concerns. It appears positivism and interpretivism are the most 
common established research paradigms. However, in contrast with existing positivism, 
interpretivism and other research paradigms that are implicit in the natural sciences and social 
sciences research, this division did not differentiate another meta-level assumption from the 
sociotechnical or developmental approach (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2007; Hanid, 2014). Gregg 
et al. (2001) added another meta-level assumption of DSR, which underscores iteration 
circumspection and how it determines or reveals reality and knowledge that develop from the 
research effort. Table 3.1 presents these philosophical assumptions of these three research 
perspectives: positivism, interpretivism and DSR. These research perspectives are well 
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documented in Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2007) and Johannesson and Perjons (2014), which are 
discussed here. 
 
Table 3. 1 Philosophical assumption of the three research perspectives 
 
Source: Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2007) 
 
  
Positivism was introduced by the sociologist and philosopher, Augustine Comte in 19th 
century. According to Johannesson and Perjons (2014), Comte attempted to establish sociology 
as a science by application of natural science perspective on social phenomena.  He presented 
positivism as a reaction to metaphysical and theological world perspective that accepted 
tradition, divine revelation and authority as legitimate knowledge sources. However, 
positivism viewed knowledge based on sense, experience and positive verification. On the 
ontological deposition of the world, positivist researchers view that there is a single reality that 
exists independently of human actions and experiences. Epistemologically, positivist 
researchers view objective knowledge about the social world that can only be acquired through 
observation and experimentation. What it means is that social inquiry must be carried out in an 
unbiased manner where the researcher completely assumes as a disinterested observer who 
detaches himself or herself from the subject of being investigated. On methodological 
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deposition, the positivist researchers assert that researchers must engage in an objective and 
value-free investigation. That is, researchers should be detached from the participation of the 
research by remaining emotionally neutral to distinguish between feeling and reasoning 
(Carson et al., 2001). Research evidence is claimed to be obtained from quantitative studies. 
Experiments constitute the primary research strategies for a subject investigation because they 
can provide highly objective knowledge. For axiological concern, positivism asserts that the 
values of the subject investigation reflect the truth and are highly universal and predictive. 
Although positivism is more appropriate for natural science, it does not capture important 
aspects of the social world, particularly the subjective construction of social phenomena. 
  
Interpretivism was introduced by a German sociologist, Max Weber in reaction to positivism 
in the 20th century. Max Weber asserted that the social world, as well as the social actions, are 
only understood through the grasping of subjective meanings and purposes attached to people’s 
actions. From the ontological view of the world, interpretivism argued that the social world 
does not exist independent of human interaction or influence. Human actions construct the 
social world and give meanings to it. Every social phenomenon originates from the interactions 
and experiences of people. Therefore, there are multiple social realities of the world that are 
dependent on the subjective interpretations of people based on their actions and experiences. 
Epistemologically, a social phenomenon is characterised with actions, experiences and 
subjective meanings of people who participate in it. Knowledge is obtained by viewing people 
as objects. A social phenomenon can be understood by active participation with the people. In 
a methodological sense, interpretivism employs qualitative research strategies. In terms of 
axiological view, knowledge obtained from the social world is situated and descriptive. 
 
Since Gregory Sydney’s distinction between scientific method and design method in 1965, 
researchers like Herbert Simon and Karl Compton advanced this difference. Simon’s first 
publication on “The Sciences of the Artificial” stimulated further development of systematic 
and formalised design methodology relevant to design fields. DSR is research that creates the 
missing type of knowledge by employing design, analysis, reflection, and abstraction 
(Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2004). DSR focuses on the development and performance artefacts to 
improve the functional performance of the artefact. It employs scientific study and develops 
artefacts to solve a practical problem which seeks to provide an understanding of the human-
machine interface and improving human performance. Ontologically, design science 
researchers argued that the world exists in multiple realities that are contextually situated and 
 136 
sociotechnically enabled. This means that any of the positivist (e.g. survey, experiments, field 
studies) and interpretivist (e.g. case studies, action research, ethnographic studies) research 
strategies can apply to the ontological sense of the world. In an epistemological sense, design 
science researchers strive for knowing through making. Methodologically, they focus on 
systematic methods to develop an artefact which can use either of the positivist and 
interpretivist research strategies or methods. The value of knowledge focuses on understanding 
and relevance.  
 
With the present study, safety management in the upstream oil and gas industry reflects 
characteristics of complex sociotechnical systems. It implies that the value of knowledge is to 
drive the truth and relevance of the knowledge. Therefore, any of the research methods of the 
positivist and interpretivist will b relevant so far as it can help to achieve the aim of the study. 
 
 
3.3.2 Philosophical Position of this Study – Pragmatism  
Given the fact that the development of DSR emerged primarily from the information systems 
field, there has been an explicit demand of paradigmatic foundation for DSR. The reason is 
that the scientific foundation that underlies the application of DSR in the information systems 
field had not been adequately developed (Purao, 2002). Given the researcher’s interest to 
strengthen bridging the gap between research and relevance, the DSR becomes more useful. 
Pragmatism is a paradigmatic foundation that places a critical emphasis on the relations 
between truth and practical utility (Darke et al., 1999; Goldkuhl, 2011). In other words, it 
underscores both the truth and relevance of knowledge.  It considers knowledge as a way to 
improve action and experience. The aspects of truth and practical utility is essential to improve 
existing safety in a sociotechnical working environment like the upstream oil and gas industry.  
This study is positioned within the pragmatist philosophy. 
 
 
3.4 Research Approach – Design Science Research 
The choice of an appropriatapproach for this research is dependent on the pragmatic 
philosophical stance that will help to achieve the research aim. This study aims at developing 
a framework for robust safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas operations. This 
study adopts DSR as the research approach. The DSR paradigm of pragmatism has been 
increasingly discussed in recent years and also gaining more ground for both building 
knowledge and improving knowledge (Winter et al., 2010). The main goal of the DSR project 
 137 
is to prescribe a practical solution to a real-life problem (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). Unlike 
natural and social sciences that describe, explain and predict knowledge, DSR prescribes 
knowledge by identifying and understanding the real-world problem and propose specific 
artefact (useful solution) to solve it (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2007; Ostrowski et al., 2012; 
Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). It is shown that DSR involves the study of methods, behaviours 
and best practices related to the problem analysis and the artefact development process (Winter 




3.4.2 Justification for Adopting Design Science Research 
Typical research in safety management in the oil and gas industry has followed mainly 
descriptive, explanatory and predictive approach. The current safety management perspective 
is based on engineering risk assessment tradition driven by purely probabilistic-based 
expression of uncertainty of events and consequences (Aven & Ylönen, 2018). However, this 
practice is being criticised as lacking the capacity to solve complex systems and inadequate to 
base safety management on a set of identified scenarios that linked to probability estimates 
(Flage et al., 2014; Aven & Ylönen, 2018; Jensen & Aven, 2018). In managing safety in a 
complex system like upstream oil and gas operations, it is impossible to predict the 
performance of the systems accurately and estimate the risk on the mere ground of knowing 
the system components performance (Aven & Ylönen, 2018; Jensen & Aven, 2018). There is 
the complexity of the interaction of the systems which is always susceptible to surprises relative 
to the application of the knowledge of analysts, experts and models. One approach to deal with 
the complexity of the systems is to increase the understanding of the system by a robust 
approach to safety management. The main characteristics of robustness in safety management 
have examined in chapter two (section 2.4). The main emphasis is the critical recognition of 
multi-actor and multi-objective governance structure for the conceptualisation of the issues 
constituting the threats to safety and setting up of institutions and procedures to deal with those 
threats in upstream oil and gas operations. It must be underscored that the primary significance 
of the application of DSR approach is the development of an artefact that is driven by the 
requirement of its research rigour and problem relevance (Hevner et al., 2004; Ostrowski et 
al., 2012). In terms of the research rigour, the current study chose several different data 
collection techniques to establish the awareness of the problem confronted safety management 
in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. For the problem relevance, the current study involved 
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multi-actor participation throughout the entire activities of the DSR process. The multi-actor 
refers to the several relevant stakeholders in the upstream oil and gas industry that are 
experiencing the problem. The application of DSR approach will help to prescribe the 
knowledge that is required to strengthen the robustness in managing safety in the upstream oil 
and gas industry. DSR prescribes knowledge by identifying and understanding the real-world 
problem and propose specific artefact to solve it (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2007; Ostrowski et 
al., 2012).  
  
Moreover, the link between DSR projects’ essential characteristics and safety management 
research provides another basis for justifying the adoption of DSR as an approach for the 
current study. Their relationship explicitly appeared lacking clarity in the research literature. 
Table 3.2 presents the DSR projects common characteristics identified in the literature that 
links to safety management research. Those common characteristics found in the DSR projects 
may include prescription of knowledge, tailored to management research, multi-
dimensional, Continuous improvement, and systemic driven. These characteristics discussed to 
make the DSR approach more relevant in its application to safety management research. 
 
 
Table 3. 2 The link between DSR characteristics and safety management research 
Author(s) 
 
Description of DSR 
Characteristics 
Classification of Safety Management 








artefacts to solve a real-
world problem 
 
Safety management projects produce 
prescriptive knowledge for both researchers 
and practitioners. Examples include the 
domain of government prescriptions, codes 
of practice and instructional pamphlets such 
as Australia’s AS/NZ 4801; UK’s BSI-
OHSAS 18001; ISO 9001; API 75. 




Tailored to management 
research: DSR projects 
have also been applied in 
management research to 
solve managerial and 
organisational issues   
Safety management is an aspect of the 
overall management functions that 
determine and implement safety policies. 
The primary characterisation of safety 
management lies in its management 
systems involved in managing the complex 
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 interaction of people, the technology and 
organisation.   
Shenhar & Dvir 
(2007),  




projects based on 
novelty, technology, 
complexity and pace 
                                       
 
Safety management research involves 
different topics being studied which makes 
the outcome of the study emerged from the 
contribution of various scientific 
disciplines. It includes many stakeholders 
and requires a solution to address the 
complexity in the performance variability of 





Designed to contribute to 
a new solution for a 
known problem 
 
In the generic safety management systems 
(i.e. Plan–Do-Check-Feedback system), 
management takes corrective action and 
improve on the outcomes from the auditing 
events. This process takes a cyclical effect 
at all times for continuous improvement.  
Wintter et al. 
(2010) 
Systemic driven: 
Interaction of its parts 
based on technologic, 
people and organisational 
variables. 
   
  
Safety management systems are systemic - 
accident is found as an emergent 
phenomenon in that it emerges from the 
interactions of many variables within a 
system. Safety management project 
identifies sources of injury, near-misses, 
fatalities, incidents from the whole parts of 
its constituted components.  
  
 
3.4.2.1 Prescription of Knowledge 
Prescription of knowledge is an essential feature of any DSR project outcome (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2007). The prescriptive knowledge contribution of DSR may be in the form of 
artefacts. These artefacts may include constructs, models, methods, instantiations, frameworks, 
architectures and design principles (March & Smith, 1995; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2007). 
Zanko and Dawson (2012) identified several prescriptive knowledges that are related to safety 
management including: scholars’ textbooks (containing concepts, tools, techniques, 
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technologies and insights) and domain of national standard prescription (purview of 
government prescriptions, codes of practice, advisory pamphlets) directed at students and 
practitioners in health and safety. Additionally, safety standards also provide prescriptive 
knowledge such as Australia’s AS/NZ 4801 OHSMS – Specification with Guidance for 
use; UK’s BSI-OHSAS 18001 Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems – 
Specification; and DuPont’s proprietary OHS programs and systems. However, these 
prescriptive knowledge contributions are not either empirically grounded representations of 
what constitutes safety management, nor their conceptualizations are verified or validated 
through systematic study (Zanko & Dawson, 2012). DSR offers prescriptive knowledge 
contributions to the research community and industries which its research rigour and problem 
relevance are rooted in the traditional research processes, and the industry needs respectively 
(vom Brocke & Lippe, 2010; Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). The adoption of DSR as the 
research approach for the present study will contribute to bridging the gap between knowledge 
and practice through artefact development. 
 
 
3.4.2.2 Tailored to Management Research 
DSR projects have also been applied in management research to solve managerial and 
organisational issues (Van Aken, 2005). Several studies have used DSR as a research approach 
in construction management (e.g. Rocha, 2011; Tezel, 2011; Hanid, 2014) and project 
management (e.g. vom Brocke & Lippe, 2010). It is indicated that the DSR approach can help 
in developing and implementing innovative managerial tools in construction management 
(AlSehaimi et al., 2012). It can also be used in the construction of varied sociotechnical 
artefacts such as decision support systems, modelling tools, governance strategies and many 
more outcomes (Gregor & Hevner, 2013). These DSR projects link research and practice that 
further strengthens the relevance of the problem understudied (Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2004; 
Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). This makes the DSR approach applicable to management 
research. From the DSR literature, it is clear that several studies have been carried out within 
the sphere of management disciplines. However, it appears that the DSR approach has not been 
considered in the study of safety management. Safety management is an aspect of the overall 
management functions that determine and implement safety policies (Harms-Ringdahl, 2004; 
Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011). The primary characterisation of safety management lies in its 
management systems. Management systems are the administrative controls put in place by the 
organisation to manage the people, the technology and the processes under consideration 
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(Bridges & Tew, 2010). This is similar to information systems research process, which is 
shown in Figure 3.1. In this example, the environment defines the problem space, which also 
contains the phenomena of interest (Hevner, 2004). In the information system research, the 
environment space is a confluence of people, technology and organisation. The goals, tasks, 
problems and opportunities are defined by the business needs which are perceived by the 
people. This perception is shaped by the roles, capabilities and characteristics of the people in 
the organisation. The needs of the business are appraised in the context of the existing 




Fig. 3. 1 Information systems research framework 




Similarly, the system of safety management in a sociotechnical environment like the oil and 
gas industry involves the interaction of technology, human and organisation (Jensen & Aven, 
2018). The interactions between humans and technology create outcomes that emerge from 
their collaboration, and such a system consisting technical artefacts and human agents are 
usually embedded within the complex social structures such as organisational goals, policies 







































aevner et al/Design Sclence ln i S Research
tified business need. The goal of behavioral-
science research is truth.2 The goal of design-
science research is utility. As argued above, our
position is that truth and utiliiy are inseparable.
Truth informs design and utility Informs theory. A
artifact may have utility because of some as yet
undiscovered truth. A theory may yet to be devel-
oped to the point where its truth can be incorpor-
ated into design. ln both cases, research assess-
ment via the justify/evaluate activities can result in
the identification of weaknesses in the theory or
:Theories posed in behavioral science are principled
axpl36311en. of phenomena. We recognize that such
:reories are approximations and are subject to numer-
:;s assumptions and conditions. However, they are
:',aluated against the norms of truth or explanatory
::irer and are valued only as the claims they make are
i3:ne out in reality.
artifact and the need to refine and reassess. The
refinement and reassessment process is typically
described in future research directions.
The knowledge base prov des the raw materials
from and through which lS research is accom-
plished. The knowledge base is composed of
foundations and methodologies. Prior lS research
and results from reference disciplines provide
foundational theories, frameworks, instruments,
constructs, models, methods, and instantiations
used in the develop/build phase of a research
study. Methodologies provide guidelines used in
the justify/evaluate phase. Rigor is achieved by
appropriately applying existing foundations and
methodologies. ln behavioral science, methodol-
ogies are typically rooted in data collection and
empirical analysis techniques. ln design science,
computational and mathematical methods are
MIS Quarterly Vol. 28 No. l/March 2004
a
Figure 2. lnformation Systems Research Framework
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performance variability in the systems. According to Holnagel (2005), when variables within 
the system become too high for the system to absorb them through the interaction of these 
variables of humans, technology, underlying conditions and barriers (organisation) the effect 
will be undetectable and unwanted outcomes. From the literature, both information systems 
research and safety management research involve the interaction of these variables such as 
technology, human and organisation. This, therefore, makes the DSR approach equally relevant 




The literature (e.g. Shenhar & Dvir, 2007; vom Brocke & Lippe, 2010) identified DSR projects 
as multi-dimensional such that it classified projects based on novelty, technology, complexity 
and pace. These studies indicate that DSR is regularly paced and high-tech technology which 
deals with different topics to determine the long-term organisational needs of the company. It 
is suggested that the degree of complexity depends on the individual project scope. Similarly, 
safety management is a research field that involves a large number of different topics being 
studied. This makes the outcome of the study emerging from the contribution of various 
scientific disciplines and therefore making safety management a multi-dimensional field of 
study (Quinian et al., 2012). There exist several different stakeholders involved in industrial 
safety management in the oil and gas industry (Baram et al., 2014). For example, the industry 
may include the following stakeholders: the government, operators, contractors, service firms, 
the workforce, the community, and the media. The interaction of these stakeholders may 
contribute to the performance variability of the safety systems. The oil and gas industry is also 
a complex sociotechnical environment involving a complex interplay of technology, people 
and organisation. The exploration, development and production aspect of the oil and gas 
operation is complex that requires the effort of these stakeholders in managing safety in the 
industry. With these kinds of characteristics, it is necessary to develop a solution to address the 
complexity in the performance variability of the sociotechnical systems in place. This, 
therefore, makes the DSR approach equally relevant to safety management research. 
 
 
3.4.2.4 Continuity of Improvement 
According to Gregor and Hevner (2013), DSR is designed to contribute to knowledge in four 
kinds: Invention (inventing new knowledge/solution for new problems), Adaptation (known 
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knowledge/solution for new problem), Routine Design (known knowledge/solution for known 
problem), and Improvement (new knowledge/solution for known problem). Figure 3.2 shows 
these knowledge contributions for DSR projects. It must be indicated that the 4th quadrant 
(i.e. Improvement) falls within the aim of the present study. DSR contributes to new knowledge 
or solution to address a known problem in practice. When people engage in practices, they may 
experience a practical problem. The practical problem is the gap between the current state and 
a desirable state, as perceived by the people involved in the practice (Johannesson and Perjons, 
2014). In other words, the gap between the current state and the desired state of the practice is 
not always explicitly noted in the local (e.g. organisation or industry levels) for a generalisation 
to be made as a problem exists. According to Gregor and Hevner (2013), such a known problem 
will require new knowledge or solution to address it.  
 
 
Fig. 3. 2 Design science research knowledge contribution framework 
                   Source: Adapted from Gregor & Hevner (2013) 
 
 
Safety management is required to be improved in the industry. Given the highly hazardous 
nature of the oil and gas industry, it is always needed the professional and research 
communities to provide new knowledge or solution to address existing problems. Continuous 
improvement of safety performance is a critical emphasis in the oil and gas industry, as 
reflected in the generic safety management systems model (Hudson, 2001) shown in figure 3.3. 
In all the activities carried out in each broad element (i.e. Plan–Do-Check-Feedback system) 
of the safety management systems, management takes corrective action and improve on the 
Medical science is, in many ways, akin to design science. There is a practice, the
medical practice, that aims to heal people. There are practical problems that have to
do with the effectiveness, safety, and cost of engaging in this practice. There are
artefacts that address practical problems and support the practice, such as pharma-
ceutical drugs, medical devices, and therapies. A large part of medical science is
devoted to studying, in a scientific way, how such artefacts can help solve practical
problems in medical practice. Thus, many of the notions and principles behind
design science are also relevant to medical science.
1.7 Kinds of Design Science Contributions
A design science contribution can take several different forms. It can be based on a
new artefact that is radical in the sense that it opens up entirely new avenues of
human endeavour. However, a new artefact can also be an improvement upon an
established solution to a well-known problem or just a marginal modification of an
existing artefact. Another kind of design science contribution is the use of an
existing artefact for a new purpose.
In order to classify the various kinds of design science contributions, Gregor and
Hevner (2013 ) suggest that they can be positioned along two dimensions: applica-
tion domain maturity and solution maturity. Application domain maturity is about
the maturity of the practice for which the contribution is intended. Solution maturity
is about the maturity of artefacts that could be used as a starting point for finding
solutions. Based on these dimensions, Fig. 1.4 depicts a matrix that identifies four
kinds of design science contributions:
Invention—New Sol tions for New P oblems This k nd of contribution is a radical
innovation that addresses an unexplored problem context and offers a novel and
Fig. 1.4 Kinds of design science contributions [adapted from Gregor and Hevner (2013 )]
10 1 Introduction
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outcomes from the safety feedbacks. This process takes a cyclical effect at all times for 




Fig. 3. 3 Generic safety management framework 
                                    Source: Hudson (2001) 
                         
3.4.2.5 System Driven 
System theory is a principle in the sociotechnical system. It is an emergent phenomenon and 
designed to solve a practical problem for humans. It is a critical feature that drives DSR projects 
(Winter et al., 2010). It involves the interaction of parts based on technologic, people and 
organisational variables in sociotechnical systems. This system theory applies to safety 
management study. Safety management systems are systemic that emerge from the interactions 
of many variables within their sub-systems (Hollnagel, 2004; Skyttner, 2005). According to 
Johannesson and Perjons (2014), the design of sociotechnical systems may create a number of 
challenges because of their distinctive characteristics, in terms of their roles and perspectives 
of people in such systems, the vagueness of systems boundaries, the need for rules and 
coordination mechanisms, and the low degree of systems controllability. In Hollnagel (2004) 
accident causation model, such characteristics may contribute to the performance variabilities 
of the systems. Given this relationship between system theory and sociotechnical systems, they 
be systematic, referring to the ISO 9000 and BS 5750 standards for general man-
agement systems (1). Figure 1 shows such a management system. Finally Cullen
required that the concept of a Safety Case serve as a proof of assurance that the
g als w re being met by the management ystem, be revived. Safety cases were
originally required after Flixborough and Seveso, but fell into disrepute because
such doc ments were usually still-born and only collected dust on bookshelves
after they had been written. Cullen wanted the Safety Case to be a living document,
providing assurance that safety management was active and serving as a basis for
continuous safe operations.
Figure 1. A generic Safety Management System The elements of a Safety Management
System (SMS). A number of important ele e ts are specified that have to do with the
setting of policy and creation of plans and organisational capacity to realise that policy
(PLAN) , the analysis of hazards and effects leading to planning and implementation
of those plans in order to manage the risks (DO) and the control on the effective
performance of those steps (CHECK). A number of feedback loops are specificed to see
where the information gained should be sent (FEEDBACK).
Leadership and Commitment
Policy and Strategic Objectives
Organisation, Responsibilities







Audit Corrective Actionand Improvement






6  - OHSMS Pro ceedin g s o f th e First Natio n al Co n feren ce
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are relevant in safety management research of a complex sociotechnical environment like the 
oil and gas industry (Aven & Ylönen, 2018). Thus, the systemic approach is used to find 
solutions to existing complex sociotechnical systems issues found in both DSR projects in 
information system and safety management research. 
 
 
3.4.3 Artefact Type - Conceptual Framework 
DSR seeks to provide artefacts to solve a practical problem. These artefacts can be products or 
processes (Gregor & Jones, 2007). Product artefacts are mostly technical, whiles process 
artefacts are more of sociotechnical which focuse on the human interactions to produce its 
intended functions (Venable et al., 2012; cited in Elragal & Haddara, 2019). The literature 
makes it clear that these artefacts may vary from those formal logics, mathematical equations 
and models, software applications, to a more straightforward narrative and description of the 
phenomenon (Elragal & Haddara, 2019). There are several artefacts suggested by the literature 
that DSR produces. March and Smith (1995) initially categorised the outputs of DSR into four 
artefacts: constructs, models, methods, and instantiations. However, other researchers have 
extended the DSR artefacts to cover architecture, frameworks, design principles and theories 
(Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2004; Chatterjee, 2015). Such outputs of DSR are produced either in 
the form of design practice or meta-design (Goldkuhl, 2004; Ostrowski et al., 2012). The meta-
design provides abstract design knowledge, while design practice produces situational design 
knowledge and other situational results.  
  
The research output that seeks to be achieved at the end of the current study is to produce a 
framework for robust safety management in the upstream oil and gas industry. It provides a 
process in the form of an abstract framework that is linked to the sociotechnical environment 
like the upstream oil and gas industry. There are two types of frameworks: theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks. These two types of frameworks appear to be used synonymously. 
However, there are differences between them, and these distinctions are well documented in 
Imenda (2014). The definitions of these two terms were traced to their original words: theory 
and concept. Fox and Bayat (2007, p.29) defined theory as “a set of interrelated propositions, 
concepts and definitions that present a systematic point of view of specifying relationships 
between variables with a view to predicting and explaining phenomena”. The theory identifies 
the relationships between variables to provide explanation and prediction of the phenomenon. 
Contrarily, Chinn and Kramer (1999, p.252) defined concepts as “the components of a theory 
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which “convey the abstract ideas within a theory”. Imenda (2014) related framework to a 
structure that guides researchers to check whether their research objectives and questions are 
linked to the findings of the data analysis. This forms the context for the Imenda’s distinction 
between theoretical framework and conceptual framework. The theoretical framework relates 
to the theory that researchers select to guide their research. It relates to the application of one 
or more theories or a set of concepts drawn to explain the problem. Contrarily; conceptual 
framework offers an integrative way of bringing together several related concepts from the 
study. This requires synthesising the existing theoretical and empirical findings of the study. 
From this background, this study seeks to develop a conceptual framework that could be used 
to a practical tool to guide the management of safety in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
3.4.4 Challenges Associated with Design Science Research 
Although DSR has been more popular in the information systems literature over the last three 
decades, it is just recently that several researchers have found its relevance in other disciplines. 
However, researchers have identified some challenges associated with its application. Cloutier 
and Renard (2018) indicated that DRS engages their readers into complex data governance. 
The steps in DSR required several data acquisition. The literature pointed out that big data 
governance has a consequence to individuals, organisations and society. Therefore, this epoch 
of big data governance had not been adequately understood. This poses challenges to the 
researcher in terms of collecting different data sets to carry out the various steps in the DSR. 
  
Elragal and Haddara (2019) stated that the evaluation stage of the DSR poses a challenge to 
researchers as various evaluation mechanisms provide appropriate interpretations of the 
problem and the feedback to advance the quality of the artefact produced. It is challenging to 
identify appropriate guidelines in terms of how to choose, design and execute a suitable 
evaluation strategy. However, given all these challenges, this study adopts a more flexible data 
collection techniques that would help to fulfil the aim of this study. 
 
 
3.5 Design Science Research Processes 
In this section, the DSR processes established in the literature (e.g. Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 
2007; Offermann et al., 2009; Ostrowski et al., 2012; Johannesson & Perjons, 2014) followed 
to achieve the research aim of the current study are discussed. In the literature, there are 
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different names used for the various activities of the DSR projects. However, the DSR 
processes adapted by Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2007) appeared to be the general DSR processes 
model adopted in the literature (figure 3.4).  
 
In these studies, most of the DSR activities are renamed but seek to achieve the same DSR 
goal. It must be indicated that what matters most in any DSR project is the critical requirement 
for research rigour and problem relevance (Hevner et al., 2004; Ostrowski et al., 2012). The 
current study adopts the following activities of the DSR process as established in the DSR 
literature: establishing awareness of the problem, defining requirements of the artefact, 
Developing the artefact and evaluating the artefact. As shown in figure 3.5, in an effort to fulfil 
the research rigour and the problem relevance of this DSR project, each activity of the DSR 
adopted for this study has its own data collection and data analysis techniques that help to 
achieve the research objectives of the current study.  
 
 
Fig. 3. 4 General design science research methodology model 
                         Source: Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2007) 
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two models of research process framework and the process of generating and accumulating 
knowledge, this research proposes a revised framework as in Figure 8: to address shortcomings and 
better understanding.  The reason for these selections are because the core process concluded based 
on the comparison done as shown in Table 3 are similar with the model suggested by Vaishnavi and 
Kuechler (2004) and Hevner (2007).   
In this revised framework, the research process is divided into three main activities which include 
Section 1: Establish Awareness of Problem, Section 2: Design Science Evaluation; and Section: 3: 
Evaluation.  These three sections house different activities, multiple research methods and paradigms.  
Three design cycles are involved too, i.e. relevance cycle, design cycle and rigor cycle. 
 
Figure 5: General Methodology of DSR 
(Source: Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2007))  
 















Figure 3.  Reasoning in the Design Research Cycle
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Fig. 3. 5 Adopted DSR process, research methods and research objectives 
 
 
3.5.1 Establishing Awareness of the Problem 
The explication of the problem is the first activity of the DSR research process which seeks to 
investigate and analyse a practical problem. As indicated by Johannesson and Perjons (2014), 
this activity aims at formulating the initial problem precisely, justify its importance and 
investigate its underlying causes. When the initial problem is obscurely expressed or 
incompletely understood, it requires an investigation into it so that a suitable solution can be 
found. DSR is sometimes called Improvement Research because it emphasises the problem-
solving or performance-improving nature of the practice (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2007). In 
its application to this study, the following techniques are used to collect data to establish 
awareness of the issues confronting safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
industry: 
• Documents 
• Statistical safety data 
• Questionnaire surveys 
• Semi-structured interviews 
In this activity, oil and gas professionals from operating and contracting organisation as well 
as professionals from the government (Ministry of Energy) and the regulatory agencies are 
recruited to elicit information on issues confronting safety management in Ghana upstream oil 
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and gas industry. The results of this activity will be based on and compared with existing related 
work to ensure well-founded and original results. 
 
 
3.5.2 Defining Requirements of the Framework 
Defining requirements of the artefact is the second activity of the DSR process that suggests 
the ways to address the problem defined by the first activity of the DSR processes. In other 
words, it identifies and outlines the requirements that can solve the practical problem in 
practice. This stage aims at identifying and outlining an artefact that can address the problem 
and to gather requirement on the solution (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). The suggestions for 
a problem solution are abductively drawn from existing knowledge or theory base for the 
problem area (Peirce, 1931; cited in Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2007). The requirements are 
properties of an artefact that are considered as desirable by the stakeholders in a practice, and 
that are to be used for guiding the development of the artefact (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). 
The tentative design (solution) is used to implement an artefact in the next activity of the DSR 
processes. 
  
In this study, the application of this activity is carried out through a workshop where the same 
participants recruited for the establishment of the awareness of the problem confronting safety 
management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry are used to define the requirements of 
the artefact to address the problem. The results of this activity are based on and related to 
existing safety management practices in the oil and gas industry. The requirements are 
formulated in a precise, concise, and easily understandable way. Justification is made to each 
requirement as well as specifying the sources of the requirements and describe how the 
requirements have been defined. 
 
3.5.3 Developing the Artefact  
Development of an artefact constitutes the third activity of DSR processes. This artefact 
development is based on the activity of the earlier activities (i.e. the establishment of awareness 
of the problem and definition of the requirements) of the DSR processes. In this activity of the 
DSR processes, no research method is needed to develop the artefact. Not to rule out the 
relevance of research methods in the development of an artefact in the DSR process, the 
purpose of this activity is to produce prescriptive knowledge by creating an artefact. Because 
of this, research methods are less influential in this activity of DSR processes (Johannesson & 
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Perjons, 2014). This activity is applied by developing a framework that addresses the 
established safety management issues and fulfils the requirements of those issues that were 
defined by the stakeholders in the previous activity. In this case, it will include both the 
functionality and structure of the framework for robust safety management. This activity 
involved the utilisation of the following resources: 
• Knowledge from the research literature. 
• Views from relevant stakeholders. 
 
 
3.5.4 Evaluating the Artefact 
The evaluation of the artefact represents the fourth activity of the DSR processes. This activity 
seeks to determine how well the developed artefact can solve the established safety 
management problem and the extent it fulfils the requirements defined by the stakeholders. 
Because of the practical difficulty in getting most of the relevant stakeholders together for 
another workshop to evaluate the model, focus group as a research method will be selected to 
evaluate the relevance of the artefact to the upstream oil and gas industry. In the DSR literature, 
there is no consensus regarding criteria to evaluate an artefact. Prat et al. (2014) developed 
evaluation criteria from their review of several dimensions of the artefact. This study adopts 
the following criteria to evaluate the artefact: goal generality, understandability to people, 
applicability to an organisation, harnessability of technology, comprehensiveness in structure, 
clarity in structure, consistency with activity, and Robustness and learning capability. In terms 
of the type of evaluation strategy, this study adopts Ex ante evaluation. The ex-ante evaluation 
requires the artefact to be evaluated without being utilised or even being fully developed 
(Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). This study will choose a naturalistic evaluation to validate the 
produced artefact. In other words, because the artefact will be the process type, it will not 
require an artificial setting to evaluate it. The researcher will evaluate the proposed artefact in 
a real-world setting where the industry participants will assess the relevance of the artefact in 
the process of addressing the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk-related issues that 




3.6 Research Methods 
Although research methods have been used in many different studies, a review study by Chu 
and Ke (2017) has revealed that no consensus exists among researchers what constitute 
research methods and how it is categorised. Many different researchers have different 
understanding and interpretation of what constitute research methods. Research methods are 
defined as methods for collecting and analysing data (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014; Chu & 
Ke, 2017). Thus, it strictly includes two things: data collection techniques and data analysis 
techniques.  
  
In considering what Wallace (1971) referred to as the instrumentation in social research, Baker 
(1999, p. 203) recapped the two defined types of instrumentation that are important for 
scientific investigation: those that are exclusively based on “human sensory organs” (i.e. 
“seeing” things); and those that are based on “technological augmented sensory organs. The 
former instrumentation is the type that requires scientific investigation to be made based on 
participant observation, whereby the researcher’s basic instruments are confined to his or her 
eyes and ears. The latter instrumentation is the type that requires surveys whereby the 
researcher employs a questionnaire or an interview technique to support the primary sensory 
data collectors. In terms of the difference between the two defined types of instrumentation, 
Riley (1963) and Baker (1999) have clarified that data emanating from observation reflect an 
objective perspective of the system. Thus, the data represent the network of actions and 
reactions among the constituents of the group. Data from surveys (e.g. questionnaire, 
interview) represent the subjective network of orientation and interpersonal relationships 
among the members of the group. In other words, the data collected reflect the underlying 
ideas, feelings, and depositions of the members in acting to others as well as to define and 
assess these others in varied ways. In the current study, the latter instrumentation forms the 
primary method for data collection, which incorporates quantitative and qualitative methods of 
collecting data.  
  
Amaratunga et al. (2002) discussed these methods as the research traditions have received 
controversies regarding their relative virtues in a methodological application. Quantitative 
methods emerged from the perspective that places more considerable trust in making numbers 
represent concepts or opinions. In contrast, qualitative methods emerged from the perspective 
that focused on words and observations to express reality because of describing people in 
natural situations. As shown in Table 3.3, each method has its advantages and disadvantages. 
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In the current study, mixed methods of data collection are adopted since different data 
collection techniques are required to define the problem confronting safety management in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. This will help to strengthen the research rigour of the 
current study. 
 
Table 3. 3 Research method types and their strengths and weaknesses 
Methods Strengths Weaknesses 
Quantitative Ability to collect a large sample. 
Ability to test the hypothesis. 
Ability to generalise findings 
Inflexible and artificial in nature. 
Inability to capture the human 
phenomenon. 
Qualitative Ability to understand people’s 
meaning. 
Data is collected openly. 
Ability to develop theory. 
  Ability to generate data in natural 
setting 
Time coming. 
Interpretation of data becomes 
cumbersome. 
Associated with limited sample 
Mixed Strengthens research rigour. 
Offers a complete knowledge 
relevant to inform theory and 
practice. 
Offers deeper insights and 
understanding of the findings.    
More expensive to conduct. 
Difficult to analyse and provide 
inferences to interpret findings. 








3.6.1 Data Collection Methods 
To achieve the aim of this study, there are five different data collection methods adopted. They 
include the following methods: documents, questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, 
workshop and focus groups. Table 3.4 presents the objective for adopting these methods, the 









Sample Frame Sampling 
Procedures 
Documents Contains existing 
safety statutes and 
regulations as well as 
official safety 
statistics which will 
help to achieve 
research objective 1 
& 3.  
Existing safety 
statutes and 
regulations as well as 
official safety 
statistics 
Relevant to the 






Elicit views from a 
larger group of 
workers from various 
organisations in 
Ghana’supstream oil 
and gas industry. 
Employees working 
in Ghana’s upstream 
oil and gas industry 





Obtain in-depth  
information on the 
 issues confronting  








regulators in the 
upstream oil and gas 
industry. 
Purposive sampling 





regulators in the 
upstream oil and gas 
industry. 
Purposive sampling 





regulators in the 








Documents form an essential source of data in research. It usually contains textual data but 
may also encompass some information such as audio or video files, images, or photographs. 
 154 
Johannesson and Perjons (2014) identified several types of documents used for scientific 
research that include: government publications (e.g. official statistics, laws, regulations, etc), 
organisational records (e.g. annual reports, sales figures, personnel records, etc), academic 
publication (e.g. journals, conferences, workshops, doctoral thesis, etc), newspapers and 
magazines, personal communication and social media streams. Documents as sources of data 
can help to obtain a great deal of information within a short period and cheaper in terms of cost 
implications. However, one key issue relating to the use of documents for scientific research is 
the judgement of its credibility and biases factors. It is well acknowledged that documents such 
as academic publications and government publications are more credible mainly because they 
are produced by the state that usually uses experts for scientific investigation (Johannesson & 
Perjons, 2014).  In this study, safety statutory and regulatory documents relevant to Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry are collected. This will help the researcher to assess the 
robustness of existing safety regulatory regime for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
3.6.1.2 Safety Statistical Data 
Safety statistical data represent the quantitative safety data that were reported to the regulator. 
The collection of these data will be based on the IOGP reporting classification, as examined in 
chapter two (section 2.5.1.1). Data collections on these classifications will help to determine 
the safety performance indicators for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry (table 3.5). All 
operating organisations, contracting organisations, and any other organisations with the license 
to undertake upstream oil and gas activities are required by the regulations to report all their 
safety performance indicators to the regulatory agency. These documents will help the 
researcher to examine the safety performance indicators for the upstream oil and gas industry 
in Ghana. 
 
Table 3. 5 IOGP safety reporting classification 
Quantitative Data Classifications 




• Medical treatment cases 
• Reported diseases 
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• Restricted work cases 





3.6.1.3 Questionnaire Surveys 
Questionnaires are written documents that contain several questions to be distributed to a 
defined number of respondents for responses (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). They are 
generally considered to be one of the most used data collection techniques in social science 
research. It is seen as a type of survey usually used to collect data that requires each person to 
respond to the same set of questions in a predetermined manner (De Vaus, 2014; cited in 
Saunders et al., 2016). There are two different types of questionnaires exist for researchers to 
consider: Self-completed and Interviewer completed questionnaires. The differences occur due 
to how they are delivered, returned or collected and the number of contacts you have with 
respondents (i.e. the accessibility to respondents). These two types of questionnaires are 
described as follows: 
• Self-completed questionnaire: This type of questionnaires requires respondents to 
complete a set of questions, and the distribution of the questionnaires could be done 
through the internet, postal or mail, and delivery and collection. The postal or mail 
questionnaires require the researcher to post the questionnaires to each respondent who 
is also required to return the completed questionnaires. The delivery & collection 
questionnaires require the researcher to deliver the questionnaires by hand to each 
respondent and collect them later.  
• Interviewer-completed questionnaire: This particular type of questionnaire requires 
the interviewer to record the answers from each respondent. These questionnaires can 
be undertaken through either telephone or face to face where the interviewer physically 
meets the respondent and asks the questions face-to-face. This interview is different 
from the usual semi-structured and unstructured interviews as there exists a defined set 
of questions that the interviewer must not deviate at all.  
  
In this study, a self-completed questionnaire type was used through delivery and collection 
means to assess workers’ perceptions of the predictive influence of safety climate factors on 
hazard risks in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. Questionnaires can help to elicit views 
from a larger group of workers on the current safety climate in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
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industry. There are different stakeholders in the oil and gas industry, which in many cases 
contribute to varying views of the problem at hand and thereby making these differences 
explicit. The basis for using the questionnaires was to provide an overview of workers’ 
perceptions of human and organisational factors influencing safety management in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. Questionnaires are more appropriately used for descriptive and 
explanatory research (Saunders et al., 2016). In terms of its appropriateness in descriptive 
research, it is usually used to obtain information on attitude and opinion, and organisational 
practices. The descriptive study is more helpful in identifying and describing the variability in 
a different phenomenon. It is also appropriate in explanatory research that helps to examine 
and explain the cause-effect relationship of the variables. The weaknesses of using 
questionnaires may include difficulty to design, time-consuming and do not provide in-depth 
information about the phenomenon understudied (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). However, a 
closed questionnaire kind is adopted to offer more elaborative and creative responses. Because 
of its lack of in-depth investigation of the phenomenon, there are other different data collection 
techniques (i.e. semi-structured interviews) that have been adopted by the current study to 
provide an in-depth investigation of the phenomenon understudied.  
 
 
3.6.1.3.1 Questionnaire Survey Design and Measures 
After a decision was made to conduct questionnaire surveys, the researcher designed the 
questions into three sections: demographic information, workers’safety climate perceptions 
and workers’ hazard risks perceptions. The demographic information section sought to elicit 
general information about the background of the respondents which covered gender, age, 
nationality, education qualification, organization classification, location of activities, job 
categories, relevant job experience before the current job and current job experience. The 
workers’safety climate perceptions section sought to collect information about the safety 
climate of Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The workers’ hazard risk perception sought 
to elicit information on hazard risk in the industry.  The invitation letter to these surveys are 
attached in appendix B1.  
  
The questionnaire surveys were measured by a 5-point Likert scale as captured in the 
instrument (see appendix C). Likert scale instrument is used to measure the attitudes of people 
in certain conditions (Joshil, 2015). It is more useful in understanding opinions or perceptions 
related to the single phenomenon of interest. The strengths of these instruments included that 
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they are suitable for a larger sample size,  based on empirical data pertaining to subjects’ 
responses as against judges’ subjective opinions and also produces a high reliability and 
validity due to its ability to create homogeneous scales and increases the probability of a uni-
dimensionality of measures (Burns, 2000). However, their weaknesses lie in the fact that the 
total score of the individual construct may have little meanings because there are several 
patterns of items that measure the same score. Additionally, such an instrument may produce 
a ‘fake score’. This is because such measures are always associated with acquiescence and 
social desirability. The acquiescence emerges when respondents are inclined to agree to 
statements irrespective of their content. The social desirability arises when respondents agree 
or disagree to statements which the social consensus would direct. Burns (2000) suggested that 
acquiescence can be avoided by performing an order of positive and negative items randomly.  
 
Table 3.6 presents the the 5-point Likert items scales for the safety climate and hazard risk 
measures.  Respondents are asked to indicate their agreement scores of a 5-point Likert items 
scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree with 67 items that covered the following 
constructs; safety policies safety priority, safety training, safety rules and procedures, 
management commitment, equipment maintenance, safety communication, supportive 
environment, safety involvement safety empowerment, management of change, safety 
supervision, safety motivation and safety behaviour. These constructs were identified as latent 
variables from the literature review (section 2.6.3.2). It requires respondents to indicate their 
agreement scores of a 5-point Likert items scale from Very unsafe to Very safe with 22 items 
that covered the following hazards: slips or trips, falls from height or dropped object, cut or 
puncture or scrape, medical malaria or gastric or food poisoning, overexertion or strains, struck 
by or impact, confined space, asset damage, caught in or under or between, exposure noise or 
chemical or biological or vibrations, electrical exposure, diving accident, fire or explosion or 
burn, equipment failure, hydrocarbon releases, spills, weather and wind conditions, transport 
accidents (e.g. car, helicopter crashing), vessel interruptions, sabotage act and other hazards. 
These hazards were identified from the literature review (section 2.6.4.2).  
 
Table 3. 6 A 5-point Likert items scales 
Safety Climate Scale Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Undecided Agree Strongly 
agree 
Hazard Risk Scale Very unsafe Unsafe Undecided Safe Very safe 
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Score 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
However, a random sampling technique was used to collect the questionnaires data. It must be 
indicated that the questionnaires were distributed to 300 respondents from six organisations in 
the oil and gas industry which received 70.7% (N = 212) response rate. These respondents were 
workers with their backgrounds in the following job categories: engineering professionals, 
operation management, contractors, maintenance/craft technicians, maintenance management 
and other related job categories in the upstream oil and gas industry. The respondents were 
recruited from six companies in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry which included 
operating and contracting organisations. Copies of the questionnaires (including the consent 
forms, information sheets) were made available to the workers at the reception desk of each 
organisation. Both the completed and non-completed self-completed questionnaires were 




The literature (Hamid, 2014; Saunders et al. 2016) identifies two main types of interviews: 
1.    Standardised Interviews: it involves a researcher developing an interview schedule in  
                                                questionnaire form which lists the wording and sequencing 
                                                of the question sets. 
2.   Non-standardised Interviews: This type of interviews involves two different forms  
                                                  that include one-to-one and one-to-many.  
• One-to-one – It may include face to face interviews, telephone interviews and  
                      electronic interviews. 
• One-to-many – It may include group interviews, workshop, focus groups and  
                      electronic group interviews. 
In this study, non-standardised interview type is used for the qualitative research which 
adopts both forms: face-to-face interviews (i.e. semi-structured interviews) and workshop and 
focus groups. 
     
                                                  
 3.6.1.4.1 Semi-structured Interviews 
Generally, qualitative research that involves interviews is categorised into three main parts that 
include the following: 
 159 
• Structured Interviews 
• Semi-structured Interviews 
• In-depth Interviews 
  
• Structured Interviews: This category of interview employs questionnaire base that 
involves a pre-determination and standardisation of questions (Saunders et al., 2016). 
This is referred to as interviewer-administered questionnaires, where the interviewer 
reads the questions to the interviewee and then records the answers in a standardised 
schedule (Hamid, 2014). This category of the interview is less time consuming and 
more applicable to ‘quantitative research interviews’. It is quantitative research 
interviews because they are usually used to elicit data to collect quantifiable data for 
analysis. However, its application does not provide in-depth information about the top.  
 
• Semi-structured Interviews: This category of interview requires a list of themes and 
questions prepared by the researcher before the interview. The order of questions may 
vary depending on how the conversation flows. The conversations are recorded either 
by video-recording, audio-recording or note-taking. The literature refers to this 
category of an interview as a participant interview because the conservation is such that 
the interviewer directs the interviewee to respond to the questions. It provides some 
degree of in-depth information on the top and easy for the researcher to identify the 
answers to the themes. However, it is time-consuming, and sometimes the materials 
used for the recording may breakdown thereby obstructing the recording of the 
conversations.  
 
• In-depth Interviews: This category of the interview is employed to explore for in-
depth information of a general area of interest (Hamid, 2014). In this interview, there 
is no pre-determination of a list of questions to make interviewee respond to them. The 
literature refers to this category of the interview as the informal process and is ‘non-
directive’ as the interviewer allows the interviewee to respond generally to the 
questions. It provides highly in-depth information on the top. However, it is time-
consuming concerning the conversations and the transcription of the interviews.  
 
In this study, semi-structured interviews are adopted to help establish the awareness of the 
problem confronting safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. Appendix 
H provides key informant guide to these semi-structured interviews. The list of questions used 
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to design the semi-structured interviews are derived based on the findings of the literature 
review chapter. The semi-structured interview is designed from the main themes that emerged 
from literature review findings. The themes were derived from the main elements 
characterizing robustness regulation and barriers to the implementation of safety management 
systems. 
 
Purposive sampling technique was employed for the semi-structured interview data, which 
helped to recruit 14 professionals working in the industry in different managerial and 
supervisory roles. The participants worked in different organisation types that include 
regulatory institutions, government agencies, operating companies, contracting companies and 
the Labour union. After this process, the participants contacts details were taken and were 
informed of the subsequent study.  
 
2.6.1.5 Workshop 
Workshop is defined as an arrangement whereby a group of people learn, acquire new 
knowledge, perform creative problem-solving, or innovate concerning a domain-specific issue 
(Ørngreen & Levinsen, 2017). The literature found the design of workshop to fulfil to three 
main perspectives: as a means, as practice and a research methodology. Workshop as a means 
aims at domain-specific issues and characterize a large body of literature in which the 
workshop is understood as a means to achieve a goal. Workshop as a practice focuses on 
investigating the link between the workshop and its form and outcomes. Workshops as research 
methodology emphases on the studying of domain-related cases employing the workshop 
format as a research methodology. Workshop produces an avenue for engagement and 
collaboration and sharing experience in the subject area (Ørngreen & Levinsen, 2017; Ahmed 
& Asraf (2018). However, there are some challenges with organizing workshops such as cost, 
time-consuming, and the difficulty of getting the participants to confirm their availability to a 
pre-date. 
 
In this study, a workshop is used to fulfil participants’ expectations on the outcomes that sought 
to improve safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry that linked to their 
interests. While at the same time, use as a promising tool for collecting data that produce 
reliable and valid data for the study. The appendix I provided the workshop guide. The 
workshop was conducted under the theme: “Robustness thinking in safety management: How 
do we improve the issues in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry”. This theme was 
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necessitated by the findings of the literature review and the earlier empirical results of the 
documents, safety statistical data and the semi-structured interviews. The essence of the 
workshop was to elicit suggestions from the participants on how to address the issues found in 
the first stage of the DSR. Purposive sampling technique was used for the recruitment of the 
participants for this study. The participants used for the semi-structured interviews are also 
used for the workshop.  However, 12 participants took part of the workshop. 
 
 
2.6.1.6 Focus Group  
A Focus group is a form of an interview in which a group of participants participate and discuss 
a specific topic of interest (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). It involves a small group of people 
from similar backgrounds or experience that have volunteered to discuss a specific of interest. 
There are several advantages of conducting a focus group including the ability to offer a large 
amount of data, provides access to information that might be otherwise unobservable and offer 
an opportunity to make comparisons that participants make between their experiences. 
However, it is costly to conduct and time-consuming to conduct it. In this study, a focus group 
is conducted to validate the framework produced by the research findings.  Purposive sampling 
technique was used for the recruitment of the participants. Participants used for the elicitation 
of the requirements of the framework in the second stage of the DSR are recruited for this 
process. It must be indicated that 9 participants were involved in the focus group validation. 
 
 
3.6.2 Data Analysis Techniques  
Data analysis provides derivation of valuable information from data for scientific investigation 
(Johannesson & Perjons, 2014).  Because data do not speak for themselves, these large volumes 
of data are required to be transformed (i.e. prepared, interpreted, analyse and presented) into 
manageable and meaningful information for description, explanation, prediction and 
prescription of phenomena under investigation. There are two main types of data analysis: 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. In this study, data collected are analysed in both 




3.6.2.1 Quantitative Data Analysis  
This section describes the quantitative analysis adopted for this study. In this study, quantitative 
data obtained from upstream safety outcomes and questionnaires will be subjected to 
descriptive statistical analysis, factor analysis and multiple regression analysis. 
 
 
3.6.2.1.1 Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistics are numbers used to summarise a sample of data to describe what entails 
in the sample (Bagley, 2009). It involves summarising and organising a sample data 
quantitatively that can be easily be understood. It works perfectly in describing a sample data 
but not to make inferences from a sample to the entire population. It helps the researcher to 
compare one sample from one study to another and also identify sample characteristics that 
have the possibility of influencing the conclusion. Descriptive statistics are basically presented 
in several forms such as tables for displaying detailed data, charts for viewing data visually 
(e.g. bar chart for showing frequencies; and pie chart for showing proportions), line 
graphs for showing trends in data, and aggregate measures such as mean, median, mode, 
range, and standard deviation (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). In the current study, quantitative 
safety data obtained from the regulatory agency will be analysed in a combination of tables, 
bar charts and pie charts. This would help to describe and provide a quick understanding of the 
data on the safety performance indicators for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. 
Descriptive statistics were performed on the demographic background of the safety climate 
data. The focus group data were analysed in descriptive statistics where pie charts were used 
to indicate the percentages of feedback on criteria defined for the evaluation of the framework. 
 
 
3.6.2.1.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis  
Factor analysis is an old structural model developed by Spearman in 1904. It explains the 
correlations among several different variables to indicate the latent sources of variance that 
explain for the relationships among several variables. Factor analysis works under the idea 
observable variables can be reduced to fewer latent variables that share a common variance 
and are unobservable. It is useful when large datasets made up of several variables can be 
reduced by observing groups of factors (Yong & Pearce, 2013). It is suitable for research that 
involves several variables, items from questionnaires that can be reduced to a smaller set. 
Factor analysis can be employed in two ways: confirmatory factor analysis (confirming or 
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negating the hypothesized structure) and exploratory factor analysis (discovering a latent 
structure). In this study, given a large number of variables understudied, factor analysis is 
performed to explore the latent constructs. There were 14 potential factors identified in the 




3.6.2.1.3 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Regression is a statistical method used to determine the linear relationship between two or more 
variables. It is basically used for prediction and causal inference. Multiple regression analysis 
was chosen as an appropriate data analysis technique to assess the predictive influence of the 
safety climate factors on the perception of hazard risks. Regression analysis helps to examine 
the relationship between two or more variables of interest and infer the causal link between the 
independent variables and dependent variables (Hinton et al. 2014). This technique would help 
to achieve the research objective 4. 
 
 
3.6.2.2  Qualitative Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis is more applicable to qualitative data that may include text, photo, 
videos, images, and sounds. There are three different ways to analyse qualitative analysis that 
include: content analysis, discourse analysis and grounded theory (Johannesson & Perjons, 
2014). Content analysis works by classifying themes from the texts into categories where the 
frequencies are calculated. Discourse analysis focuses on the implicit and concealed meanings 
of the texts, which consider a broader context covering the interviewee’s or the writer’s 
intentions, and primary assumptions. In this case, the writer has to make use of concepts and 
theories to make meanings of the texts. Apart from being used as a research strategy, grounded 
theory can be employed in analysing qualitative data. The coding emerges from the 
researcher’s text and not pre-existing theory. In this study, the semi-structured interview data 
are analysed in the content analysis approach. 
 
 
3.6.2.2.1  Content Analysis 
The content analysis approach is applied in the quantification of words, themes and categories 
within texts (Kulatunga, 2008). The essence of content analysis is to organise the themes of the 
texts into categories where the frequencies are calculated in each category. With the application 
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of content analysis, inferences, objectivity and systematic are key features that make up the 
analysis. The literature identified the ways to carry out the content analysis, which include the 
following: 
• choosing a sample of a text 
• breaking down the texts into units 
• developing categories for analysis 
• coding the units in line with the categories 
• calculating the frequency of the units for the individual category 
• analysing the texts about the frequencies 
Some strengths are associated with the application of content analysis. Its use is simple and 
clear, which contributes to high reliability where research will arrive at the same results. It is 
more suitable for studying non-complex texts. The underlying assumption underpinning the 
counting of the words indicates that the most mentioned words usually expresses the essential 
concerns of the interviewees. However, there are some weaknesses with the application of the 
content analysis as it is oblivious to context because mainly the individual units form the 
analysis (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). This means that the link between the units and the 
intentions of the interviewees are not explicitly considered. This study, there two coding types 
that were applied to analyse the semi-structured interviews: deductive and inductive coding. 
Inductive coding is more suitable for exploratory research stage that makes it possible for 
categories and codes to originate from the texts (Kulatunga, 2008). There is some coding that 
falls in between the induction and deduction approach in coding. As some categories can be 
earlier organised from the literature review, which increases it by adding more as one goes 
along with the text. This approach was also applied in this study. According to Kulatunga 
(2008), deductive coding starts with the prior organisation of the categories with the coding 
reflecting the theory and linking them to the texts. It must be indicated that it is more 
appropriate for confirming the stage of the study. However, it is noted that such an approach 




3.6.3 Softwares for the Data Analysis  
There are several available software packages for data analysis that may include the following: 
NVivo, MATLAB, SAS, IBM SPSS, QSR N6, Decision explorer, and host of others. However, 
researchers (e.g. Lewins & Silver, 2006; Saunders et al, 2007) have indicated that the choice 
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of appropriate softwares will depend on several factors including the amount of data available 
for analysis, the research methodology used, the amount of time available for the study; the 
kind of the computer’s operating systems and memory, and the availability of support required 
to learn the softwares. In this study, the researcher seeks to use SPSS, and Nvivo to help in 
handling the data process. The SPSS software provides an easy way of analysing quantitative 
data and reduces errors. The Nvivo software helps to organise extensive qualitative data into 
themes, retrieve data quicker and most efficient as well as identifying themes across the data 
set.   
 
 
 3.6.4 Sampling Approach 
Sampling is the process of choosing a representative group from the population, which is 
understudied. This is a vital part of the research process because it helps in determining the 
accuracy of the distribution of the data. There two different main approaches to sampling: 
probability and non-probability. Probability sampling gives every member of the population 
an equal chance to be selected for the study. As indicated in section 3.6.1, random probability 
sampling and purposive sampling are applied to this study. A random sampling technique was 
used for the questionnaire survey because it gives an equal chance to each element of the 
population (Alvi, 2016). Purpose sampling technique was adopted for the sem-structured 
interviews because it allows the researcher to identify and select participants of information 
risk cases that linked to the study (Palinkas et al., 2015). 
 
 
3.8 Pilot Study 
A pilot study refers to a small study to test research protocols, data collection instruments, 
sample recruitment strategies, and other research techniques in preparation for a larger study 
(Hassan et al., 2006). It is determining if the questionnaire survey instrument, the key informant 
interview guide or the observation form is understood well on a few samples. In this case, the 
problem areas and deficiencies associated with the survey instrument, interview guide or the 
observation form are identified before the main study. It helps to reveal the confusion and other 
problematic questions before the main research commences. In the context of this study, pilot 
studies were conducted on the questionnaire survey instrument and the semi-structured 
interview guide. It helps to become familiar with the procedures in the protocol. In this process, 
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invitation letters and informed consent forms were made available to the respondents and the 
interviewees. 
  
• Questionnaire Survey Instrument: A pilot study was conducted with 50 sample size 
which yielded the following 11 items deleted from the instrument: “name of 
installations” (demographic information); “I am not even aware if there is existence of 
safety policies at this organisation”, “I ignore safety regulations to get the job was”, “I 
don’t adhere to code of practice when under pressure”, “my line manager/ supervisor 
does not always inform me of current concerns and issues of safety”, “operational 
pressures don’t lead to cutting corners where process safety is raised”, “I am not 
adequately trained to respond to emergency situations in my work environment”, 
“experiences with near-missess”, experience of workplace injuries (safety climate); and 
“violent acts”, “oil spills”, “crashes” (hazard risks).  
 
The main reason for deletion of these items was due to the negative wording and 
repetition of meanings of the items which could seriously affect the factorial 
construction and criterion validity (McLarnon et al. 2016) and the reliability of the 
scales (Salazar 2015). In short, the main instrument for the study was made up of 99 
items containing the following: demographics information (10 items), safety climate 
measure (67 items) and hazard risks (22). 
 
• Semi-structured Interviews Guide: It is cumbersome to predict how the participants 
will interpret the questions. A pilot study was conducted for two interviewees in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The main objectives for this pre-test were to 
assess the quickness of responses to the questions, assess how the concepts and words 
were adapted to the context of the interviewees, determine the understanding of the 
questions and finally determine how long or short the interview guide lasted? The 
researcher found that many of the questions received quick responses, some concepts 
were not understood within the context of the study, and the interview guide lasted for 
more than 60 to 90 to minutes because the researcher lost control of the interview along 





3.9 Reliability and Validity of Data 
Noble and Smith (2015) defined reliability as the consistency of the analytical procedures that 
include controlling the research method and personal biases which may have influenced the 
research findings. The authors defined validity to mean the precision in which the research 
findings accurately reflect the data. Both quantitative and qualitative research must reflect 
reliability and validity of findings.  
 
• Quantitative Research: Reliability of a scale of the questionnaire can be determined 
in two different ways: Temporal stability and Internal consistency (Pallant, 2016). The 
former is tested by administering the questionnaires to the same people on two distinct 
periods, and the computation of the correlation between the two scores are obtained. 
The latter is the Cronbach’s Alpha test developed by Lee Cronbach in 1951 that 
measures the extent to which the items constituting the scale all measure the same 
underlying attribute or construct (Tavakol et al., 2011; Ursachi et al., 2015). Thus, it 
describes the degree to which all the items measure the same construct which must be 
determined before any test can be performed. It expresses as a number between 0 and 
1. A general rule governing the internal consistency determines that Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient of 0.6 – 0.7 indicates an acceptable level of reliability, and 0.8 and above 
implies a very good level (Ursachi et al., 2015). In this study, the internal consistency 
test is adopted to determine the reliability of the scale of the questionnaire. This is 
because it can easily be computed by using IBM SPSS, which economises time. 
 
• Qualitative Research: There is no accepted consensus on the standard for judgement 
of qualitative research. Researchers have been criticised qualitative research because it 
lacks transparency in terms of analytical procedures, lacks scientific rigour with an 
inadequate justification of the methods adopted, and the findings being merely a 
collection of personal opinions subject to researcher bias (Sandelowski, 1993; Rolfe, 
2006, Noble & Smith, 2015). However, Noble and Smith (2015) have suggested that 
researchers need to incorporate strategies to enhance the credibility of a study during 
research design and implementation. It must be indicated that credibility of this study 
has been enhenced through piloting of the interview guide, purposive sampling 
employed, the use of Nvivo software for organising the data, the use of direct quotations 
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3.10 Research Ethics 
The researcher has obtained ethical approval from the University of Salford after satisfying all 
of the ethical requirements in order to proceed with empirical data collection and recruit 
participants for survey and interviews (see appendix B1).  
 
 
3.11 Summury  
This chapter presented the research methodological framework for the study. It defined 
pragmatism as the philosophical position of the study. It adopted DSR as an approach for the 
study. A conceptual framework is chosen as the main DSR artefact to be produced. The DSR 
process selected for the study included establishing awareness of the problem, defining 
requirements of the framework, developing the framework and evaluating the framework. 
These processes employed research methods covered both quantitative and qualitative 
research. Random sampling and purposive sampling are used at the main sampling approaches 
for the study. Both the questionnaire surveys and semi-structured interviews were piloted. The 
reliability and validity of both quantitative and qualitative research are indicated. It indicated 
the ethical consideration of the study.  
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The preceding chapter presented the research methodology of the study that adopted design 
science research as the approach for the current study. The current chapter presents the data 
analysis and the research findings for the four stages of the DSR process adopted for the study. 
These stages of the DSR activity include the following: 
• Stage 1: Establishment of awareness of the problem of the current study. Data analysis 
from documents, safety statistical data, questionnaire surveys and semi-structured 
interviews are provided to present the key research findings for the succeeding stage of 
the DSR process. 
 
• Stage 2: Define the requirements of the framework for robust safety management in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. Data analysis from a workshop will be made to 
present the key research findings for the next stage of the  DSR process. 
 
• Stage 3: Develop a framework for robust safety management in Ghana's upstream oil 
and gas industry. The research findings of stages one and two of the DSR activity as 
well as the literature, are synthesised to develop a conceptual framework. 
 
• Stage 4: Evaluate the framework for robust safety management. Data analysis from the 
validation focus groups will be analysed to refine the framework.  
The research findings of these stages are summarised for discussion in the next chapter. 
 
 
4.2 Stage 1: Establishing Awareness of the Problem 
This section presents the first activity of the DSR. The first activity is to establish the awareness 
of the problem of this study. Thus, it defines the problem facing safety management in Ghana's 
upstream oil and gas industry. The goal of stage 1 is to formulate precisely the initial problem 
facing safety management in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry, justify its relevance and 
investigate its underlying causes. It establishes the problem experienced by the relevant 
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stakeholders involved in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry and its importance. The study 
reviews documents on existing safety statutes and regulations; examines the safety statistics on 
safety performance indicators, analyse the data from the questionnaire surveys to identify the 
safety climate factors that have a predictive influence on hazard incidents risks, and analyse 
the semi-structured interview data to provides an in-depth understanding on issues affecting 
robust safety management. The key issues from the empirical findings are defined as the 
problem confronting safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
4.2.1 Data Presentation and Analysis for Stage One 
In stage 1 of this chapter, several different sources of data were used to establish the awareness 
of the problem confronting safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. These 
data are presented and analysed to establish the awareness of the problem confronting the safety 
management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
4.2.1.1 Documents  – Safety Statutes and Regulations 
From the literature review chapter (section 2.3.2.2.1), Table 4.1 presents the documents 
constituted Ghana’s safety statutes and regulations that are relevant to the upstream oil and gas 
operations: 
 
Table 4. 1 Safety statutory and regulatory documents 
• The Factories, Offices, and Shops Act (Act 328), 1970. 
• The Labour Act (Act 651) 2003. 
• Environmental Protection Act (Act 490), 1994. 
• Ghana Shipping (Protection of Offshore Operations and Assets) Regulations 
• Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act (Act 919), 2016. 
• The Petroleum Commission Act (Act 821), 2011. 
• Petroleum (Exploration and Production) HSE Regulations (L.I 2257), 2017 
 
 
These statutes and regulations are reviewed in assessing the robustness of existing safety 
regulatory regime for Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. The assessment is conducted 
based on the following criteria derived from the literature review in section 2.4.2.3:  
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I. Scope of regulatory properties governing upstream oil and gas operations 
II. Features of the integrative risk governance 
III. Sustainability of system functionality 
IV. Adaptability to changed situations. 
 
4.2.1.1.1 Assessment of Robustness of  Ghana’s Safety Regulatory Regime 
The study carried out document review on the existing safety statutes and regulations relevant 
to Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry (see appendix D). Table 4.2 summarises the results.  
Criterion 1 examined the extent to which the following safety topics were covered: the safety 
and health protection of personnel and facilities, environmental protection, employment 
standards and work environment, emergency planning, management systems with clear 
responsibilities, division of authority and the regulatory approach. However, oil spill 
preparedness requirements and liability for the accident were not adequately covered in 
existing safety statutes and regulations. In criterion II, the link between the features of Ghana's 
safety regulatory regime and the critical requirements of Renn's model was reviewed. The 
assessment revealed that Ghana's safety regulatory regime for its upstream oil and gas industry 
appeared limited in several ways in addressing the essential elements constituting an integrative 
risk governance. 
 
With criterion III, the assessment indicated no established procedures in existing safety statutes 
and regulations that addressed the issues of sustainability of the functionality of the system. In 
criterion IV,  the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental 
Regulations reflected some provision for adaptability to changed situations as it requires 
standards for blowout preventers. The need for the regulatory regime to reflect the requirement 
for standards for blowout preventers became a lesson learnt from the Deep Horizon Disaster 
in 2010.  Ghana adjusted this lesson to its current safety regulations. Presently, there is a 
requirement for operators, contractors, and any entity conducting upstream oil and gas 
activities to ensure that there is a well control equipment designed to have the capacity to ensure 
barrier integrity and well control. However, there are no existing safety guidelines that have 
reflected the detailed adjustment of the prevailing safety advances in the upstream oil and gas 






Table 4. 2 Summary of results of the review of the existing safety regulatory regime 
Criteria Key Elements Assessed Main Findings 
Present 
I. Scope of regulatory properties governing 
upstream oil and gas operations 
 
Safety and health protection of personnel and facilities. 
Environmental protection. 
Employment standards and work environment.   
Emergency planning. 
Oil spill preparedness requirements 
Liability for accident. 
Management system requirements with clear responsibilities. 
Division of authority. 










II. Features of integrative risk governance 
 
A requirement for multiple actor-network involvements of risk framing                              
Incorporation of human and organizational factors into risk assessment. 
The requirement for the legitimisation of the judgement of risk. 
The requirement for safety culture and inclusive 






III. Sustainability of system functionality  Sustainability of the principal features of the Safety Case regime. No 




4.2.1.1.1.1 Key Findings of the Documents Survey 
Table 4.3 presents the key findings of the review of the existing safety regulatory regime for 
Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. The analysis points to several gaps in the current safety 
regulatory regime governing Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. In terms of the existing 
scope of regulatory properties, there appeared to be incoherence and limitation. Features of 
integrative risk governance which are critical requirements for handling complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity were not addressed in the existing safety case regime. The study 
found that the current safety regulatory regime has not had an adequate experience of the 
establishment of procedures for the development of an open and transparent dialogue on risk.  
The study found no safety guidelines required to implement the change management regime.  




Table 4. 3 Key findings of the assessment of the safety regulatory regime 
Criteria           Main Issues Identified 
      I                  Incoherent and limited scope of the existing regulatory properties 
 
     II                   Lack of requirement for multiple actor-network involvements in risk framing.  
                        The limited requirement for human and organizational issues. 
                        Lack of legitimization of the methods and processes for judgement of risk. 
                       The use of traditional compliance monitoring strategies 
                        Lack of requirement for inclusion and discourses among stakeholders. 
 
    III                Inexperience in sustainability of the functionality of the Regime. 
 




4.2.1.1.1.1.1 Incoherent and Limited Scope of the Existing Regulatory Properties  
The findings on the scope of regulatory properties governing Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
operations indicate that the existing safety regulatory regime appeared incoherent and limited 
in scope. There are only two safety laws that are directly relevant to Ghana’s upstream oil and 
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gas industry. They include Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act and the Petroleum 
(Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations. The Petroleum 
(Exploration & Production) Act provided general statutory requirements for both the safety 
and efficiency exploitation of the oil and gas resources for the full benefit and welfare of the 
citizens of Ghana. This Act appeared in the form of a separate statute that further mandated the 
minister to make regulations and guidelines towards its effectiveness. The Petroleum 
(Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations were established 
in 2017 that specifically provided for the health and safety of personnel and facilities, 
environmental protection, work environment, emergency planning and management system in 
the upstream oil and gas operations. Existing regulations were not adequately developed to 
deal with oil spill preparedness requirements particularly on spill preparedness, roles and 
responsibilities in spill response, and capacity for response. Existing legal provisions on the 
handling and managing oil spill response were limited to deal with major oil spill response. 
Liability for an accident was not adequately provided in the existing statutes and regulations. 
 
 
4.2.1.1.1.1.2 Lack of Requirement for Multiple Actor-Network Involvements  
The review found that there were no institutionalised procedures for operators, contractors or 
state entities to set up a framing structure that characterised multiple actor-network 
involvements in screening the risk issues. Both the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act 
and the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations 
required organisations to submit a risk assessment to the regulator for approval to undertake 
upstream oil and gas activities. Existing safety laws emphasised the Safety Case concept that 
required the operators, contractors or the state entity to demonstrate that the system and process 
that had been adopted was safe in terms of ensuring the health and safety of the personnel, 
facilities and the environment. No explicit requirement emphasised multiple actor-network 
involvements in framing the risk issues. 
 
 
4.2.1.1.1.1.3 Limited Requirement for Human and Organizational Issues   
Existing safety regulation required the operators, contractors or any entity undertaking 
upstream oil and gas activities to perform a risk analysis following best industry practice.  It 
involved the establishment of their criteria for risk estimates. Given the high technical 
competence requirements in the performance of such engineering frame by operating 
companies, there was some level of room in the existing safety statutes and regulation for the 
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outsourcing of this QRA to include the involvement of specialist consultants. In the review, it 
was found that the current Safety Case regime was mainly characterised with engineering frame 
that had limitation in emphasising on the requirement for incorporation of human and 
organizational factors into the risk estimates.   
 
 
4.2.1.1.1.1.4 Lack of Legitimization of the Processes for Judgement of Risk  
The analysis indicated that existing safety statutes and regulations provided for ‘Risk 
Acceptability Criteria’ as the method to evaluate risk. They required the operators, contractors 
or any entity undertaking upstream oil and gas activities to identify and minimize risk to a level 
as “low as possible". These methods have their challenge as their outcomes are derived from 
probability-based estimates. Probability-based evaluation for decision making about risk 
appeared to provide no or limited room for the legitimisation of the practices and processes on 
the judgement of risk. Involvement of the stakeholders in the judgement of risk is one of the 
critical ways of addressing the uncertainties of knowledge and potential surprises associated 
with existing upstream oil and gas operations. It requires legitimization to provide transparent 
and democratic processes on the judgement of risk evaluation. Ghana’s safety statutes and 
regulations governing the Safety Case approach does not explicitly require the legitimization 




4.2.1.1.1.1.5 The Use of Traditional Compliance Monitoring Strategies 
The analysis established that existing safety statutes and regulations applicable to the upstream 
oil and gas industry required the regulator to use traditional compliance monitoring strategies 
such as the auditing and checklists tools to enforce compliance. It must be indicated that 
fulfilling the compliance requirements cannot adequately guarantee a sustainable safety 
performance. Given the challenges in terms of deficit in technical competence and availability 
of resources that are usually associated with public agencies may affect the effectiveness of 
monitoring and controlling of safety standards in the industry. The current safety statutes and 
regulations do not emphasise the requirement for these elements of cooperation and dialogues 
with several actors involved in the upstream oil and gas operations in working to improve 




4.2.1.1.1.1.6 Lack of Requirement for Inclusion and Discourses among Stakeholders 
In risk governance, the key features of communication strategies may require the inclusion of 
all relevant actors in the deliberation of risk issues and institutionalisation of the fora for 
discourses on risk issues. The analysis indicated that existing safety statutory and regulatory 
requirements for strategies regarding risk information sharing lacked the emphasis on inclusion 
of all relevant actors in the deliberation of risk issues and requirement for the incorporation of 
procedures to facilitate discourses among the various stakeholders that emanated from different 
background in view of promoting meaningful interactions towards confrontation of 
uncertainties.   
 
 
4.2.1.1.1.1.7 Inexperience Towards Sustainability of the functionality of the Regime 
One of the essential indicators for robust safety regime is to survive for a longer period with 
no detailed modifications to preserve its principal functional characteristics in confrontation to 
both internal and external disturbances. The review indicated that the current principal 
functional features of Ghana's safety Safety Case regime for its upstream oil and gas industry 
had lasted for less than ten years. The balance of interests of different stakeholders appeared 
less effective as there had been no statutory and regulatory requirement of the establishment of 
procedures for the development of open and transparent dialogue in addressing the complexity 
uncertainties and ambiguity issues associated with the upstream oil and gas operations. 
 
 
4.2.1.1.1.1.8 Limited Emphasis on Learning Capability 
The analysis indicated a limited level of adaptability to changed situations. It was found from 
the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations that 
there was an incorporation of the requirements for blowout preventers in the areas of drilling 
and well systems. The requirement for standards for blowout preventers in the areas of drilling 
and well systems emerged from the lessons that were learnt from the Deep Horizon Disaster 
in 2010. The true reflection of adaptability to changed situations in existing safety regime can 
be found in existing safety guidelines designed by the regulator. However, there are currently 





4.2.1.2 Safety Statistical Data 
This section presents the descriptive statistical analysis of quantitative safety data that covered 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas operations from 2014 to 2018. The purpose of this section is to 
analyse the safety performance indicators. The data were analysed to cover the IOGP standard 
classification that include the following indicators: Fatalities, Injuries, Incidents, Near-misses, 
First Aid Cases (FAC), Medical Treatment Cases (MTC), Restricted Work Cases (RWC), 
Reported diseases and Loss Time Injuries (LTI). The data were reported to the regulatory 
agency by the various operating companies, contracting companies and other organisations that 
had the mandate to undertake upstream oil and gas related activities in Ghana. It must be 
indicated that these unpublished data covered the period from 2014 to 2018. In this analysis, 
these data were subjected to descriptive statistical analysis to determine the safety performance 
indicators for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry for the same period. This analysis 
addresses the research objective 3 of the current study. 
 
 
4.2.1.2.1 Safety Performance Indicators for Ghana’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry 
Figure 4.1 presents the safety performance indicators for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry 
from 2014 to 2018. The analysis has shown that incident cases continued to indicate an 
increasing trend from 2014 to 2018 (i.e. 95 to 266 cases). Injury cases were relatively low 
within only two years (2016-2017) and increased in 2018.  Near-miss cases relatively risen 
from 2014 to 2017 and shown a decrease in 2018. The FAC continues to increase from 2016 
to 2018. The MTC, RWC, and LTI are relatively low from 2015 to 2018. Apart from the 4 
fatalities cases in 2014 which were due to a helicopter crash in transporting workers for 
offshore operations, there have not been fatality case up to 2018.  There have not also been 
Reportable diseases from 2014 to 2018. However, from the analysis. It is indicative to note 
that incidents occurrence appeared to be the critical issue regarding the safety performance of 
Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. It is essential to ascertain the kinds of the incident 




Fig. 4. 1 Safety performance indicators for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry 
 
 
4.2.1.2.1.1 Incident Categories 
It must be indicated that the data set for incident category cases that covered the period from 
2014 to 2016 were not made available for this study.  Therefore, this analysis is limited to the 
last two years of data for incident category cases. Figure 4.2 presents the analysis of incident 
category cases that were recorded between 2017 and 2018. It indicated that Struck by/Impact 
recorded the highest contribution to the rising trend of incidents in upstream oil and gas 
activities from 34 cases in 2017 to 68 cases in 2018. The Releases (oil, gas & chemicals) is the 
next incident category that contributed to the rising trend of incidents occurrence from 43 cases 
in 2017 to 57 cases in 2018. Falls from height/Dropped objects also provided to the occurrence 
of the increasing incident recorded 32 cases in 2017 and decreased to 28 cases in 2018. The 
Cut/puncture/scrape, Equipment failure and Electrical exposure appeared to have relatively 
















2014 95 4 2 75 21 9 2 0 9
2015 161 0 27 124 27 3 0 0 5
2016 203 0 8 159 16 4 0 0 1
2017 231 0 2 178 27 1 7 0 4
















activities. It must be indicated that incident categories such as the struck by/Impact, 
hydrocarbon releases, and falls from height/dropped objects are the main contributors to the 
occurrence of the rising incident in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry.   
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 4.2.1.2.1.1.1 Upstream Oil and Gas Activities and their Incidents Contributions 
To ascertain the interface between these incidents and activities involved, an analysis of the 
various upstream oil and gas activities carried out relative to their incident categories' 
contributions. In Figure 4.3, it is clearly indicated that production operations related activities 
produced 101 cases to incidents in which hydrocarbon releases and equipment failure 
represented its main contribution.  The office/warehouse related activities contributed 94 cases 
of the incident of which struck by/impact and falls from height/dropped objects mainly 
represented its main contribution. The lifting/crane/rigging/deck operations related activities 
contributed 73 cases to the incidents with falls from height/dropped objects and struck 
by/impact represented its main contribution. The construction/installation/subsea related 
activities produced 52 cases of the incidents in which hydrocarbon releases and struck 
by/impact made its main contribution. The transport-related activities contributed 50 cases to 
these incidents occurrent. Moreover, upstream activities (accommodation/catering/services, 
maintenance/inspection/testing, drilling/workover/well services) produced several incident 
categories that contributed to this rising trend of the incidents. However, upstream activities 





Fig. 4. 3 The interface between activities and incident categories 
 
 
From the analysis, among other upstream oil and gas activities, the following played key roles 
in incidents occurrence: 
• Production operations 
• Office/warehouse 
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•  Lifting/crane/rigging/deck operations 
•  Construction/installation/subsea 
• Transport 
 
The main incident categories produced by these upstream oil and gas activities have indicated 
several contributions. It must be indicated that 56% and 30% of production operation related 
activities contributed to the occurrence of hydrocarbon releases and equipment failure incidents 
respectively (see figure 4.4). 37% and 25% of lifting/crane/rigging/deck operation related 
activities contributed to falls from height/dropped objects incidents and to cut/puncture/scrape 
incidents respectively (see figure 4.5). It is shown that 29% of transport-related activities 









































































































































































Fig. 4. 6 Contribution of incident categories by transport related activities 
 
 
4.2.1.2.1.1.2 Incidents Contribution to the Risk Dimensions 
As indicated in the literature review chapter (see section 2.3.2.2.), the upstream oil and gas 
activities are inherently hazardous that may result to incidents occurrence with its potential 
consequences to human, equipment and the environmental risks.  Figure 4.5 shows the 
contribution of incidents to the risk dimensions in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. In 
the last two years, the interface between incidents and personnel, including environmental 
risks, has declined. Whereas, the interface between incidents and equipment risk continues to 
rise. In terms of the contribution of these incidents to the risk dimensions, the equipment risks 
represented the highest (70%) followed by human (23%) and the environment (7%). The 
incidents contribution to human risk is mainly related to impairment as occupational accidents 
continue to reduce despite there was a higher recorded case in the occurrence of struck 
by/impacts incidents. The incidents contribution to environmental risk appeared relatively low 



































is the continuous increase in incidents that imply the risk of equipment. The occurrence of 








4.2.1.2.2 Key Findings of the Safety Performance Indicators 
The analysis of the safety performance indicators shows a rising trend of the incident from the 
past five years in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. The main incident categories driving 
this increment include the following: 
• Struck by/impact 
• Hydrocarbon releases 
• Falls from height/dropped objects 
• Cut/puncture/scrape 
• Equipment failure 
• Electrical exposure 
 
These incidents were primarily contributed by the following upstream oil and gas related 
activities: production operations, office, warehouse, lifting, crane, rigging, deck operations, 









































Incidents Contribution to Risk Dimensions
 187 
from these analyses is to identify the main factors that drove the increasing trend of incidents 
occurrence in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. This becomes the main task for 
consideration in the next sections. 
 
 
4.2.1.3 Questionnaire Surveys 
This section presents the empirical analysis and findings of the assessment of workers' 
perceptions of the predictive effect of safety climate factors on hazard incident risks in Ghana's 
upstream oil and gas industry. The questionnaires were distributed to full-time workers from 
eight organisations in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. The data obtained from the 
questionnaire surveys were analyzed concerning achieving the research objective 4 of this 
study. This section covers the demographic information of the respondents, data analysis and 
the key findings of the questionnaire surveys.  
  
 
 4.2.1.3.1 Demographic Information of the Respondents 
Self-completed questionnaires were distributed to 300 workers which recorded a response rate 
of 70.7%. Table 4.4 presents the demographic information of the respondents. It indicates that 
78.8% of the respondents were male. Majority of the respondents (44.3%) had their ages within 
the range of 30 to 39 years. About 89.6% of the respondents were Ghanaians, and the majority 
of them (50.5%) had a bachelor's degree qualification. In terms of organisational classification, 
57.1% of the respondents worked in operating companies. Concerning their areas of operation, 
69.9% of the respondents worked in the offshore environment. The respondents worked in 
many different job categories that included: engineering professionals (42.5%), 
maintenance/craft technicians (20.3%), operation management (20.3%), contractors (7.5%), 
maintenance management (17%) and other jobs (8%). It was found that most of the respondents 
(51.9%) had no related work experience before their current position. It must be indicated that 
the majority (45.8%) of the respondents had their current job work experience ranging between 
7 and 10 years. What it means is that most of the respondents were employed from the 




Table 4. 4 Demographic information of the respondents 
Variable                                                        Frequency (N=212)              Percent (%) 
Gender       
     Male                                                           167                                        78.8 
     Female                                                         44                                        20.8       
Age 
     Under 25                                                       5                                          2.4 
     25 - 29                                                         53                                         25 
     30 – 39                                                        94                                        44.3           
     40 – 49                                                        56                                        26.4 
     50 or above                                                   4                                          1.9   
Nationality    
  Ghanaian                                                     190                                        89.6 
  Other                                                              22                                        10.4 
Education qualification 
     SSCE                                                             5                                        2.5 
     Diploma                                                      24                                      11.3 
    Bachelor Degree                                        107                                      50.5 
    Master Degree                                             70                                       33 
Doctoral  Degree                                          6                                         2.8     
 Organisation Classification  
  Operating Company                                    121                                       57.1 
  Contracting Company                                   91                                       42.9 
Area of operation 
    Offshore                                                    146                                        69.9                                                                       
    Onshore                                                       65                                       30.7 
Job functioning Category 
     Engineering professionals                          90                                      42.5 
     Maintenance/craft technicians                    43                                      20.3 
    Operation management                                10                                     12.3 
     Contractors                                                   7                                       3.3 
     Maintenance Management                          22                                      10.4 
     Other  
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Work Experience before Current Job                                                                                                                                                                                      
     None                                                       110                                       51.9 
     1-3 years                                                  33                                       15.6 
     4-6 years                                                  32                                       15.1 
     7-10 years                                                28                                       13.2 
     Above 10 years                                          9                                         4.2 
Current Job Work Experience 
     Less than I year                                       10                                         4.7 
     1-3 years                                                  48                                       22.6 
     4-6 years                                                  53                                       25.0 
     7-10 years                                                97                                       45.8 




4.2.1.3.2 Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficients of the Constructs 
To test the reliability of the items, Cronbach’s Alpha was used as the most appropriate approach 
since it measures the internal consistency of the scale. It expresses as a number between 0 and 
1. A general rule indicates that Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (α) of 0.6 – 0.7 implies an 
acceptable level of reliability, and 0.8 and above implies a very good level (Ursachi, et al., 
2015). However, it indicated that values greater than 0.95 suggested not necessarily useful 
because of its possibility of showing redundancy of the scale (Hulin et al., 2001). In this study, 
the Cronbach's alpha was computed for all the factors that included: safety climate factors (14 
elements) and the hazard risks. As shown in table 4.5, the results of the internal consistency of 
all the items indicate an acceptable level of reliability (α = .619). 
 




Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 





4.2.1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations of the Variables 
Table 4.6 presents the means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation coefficients of all 
the measured variables. Supportive environment (M = 4.32; S.D. = .432), safety priority (M = 
4.19; S.D. = .44), safety policies (M = 4.09; S.D. = .37), equipment maintenance (M = 4.09; 
S.D. = .34), and safety behaviour  (M = 4.04; S.D. = 1.21) indicated the higher scores of the 
mean. In terms of the correlations among the constructs, the Pearson correlation was performed 
because the data distribution was normal. This parametric analysis relies on these assumptions: 
that the relationship between the variable is linear, the existence of normality of the data 
distribution to the population and evenly distributed points on the straight line. It must be 
indicated that these assumptions were not violated before the analysis was carried out. The 
Pearson correlation test indicates a pattern of relationship among all the variables studied. In 
terms of the direction of the relationship, there exists a positive relationship among the safety 
climate variables in general. Importantly, the Pearson correlation indicates a statistically 
significant negative relationship between many of the safety climate variables and the hazard 
incident risks. Workers’ perceptions of feeling “unsafe”  for hazard incident risks were found 
negatively correlated with these safety climate variables: safety policies (r = -.18, p < 0.5), 
safety training (r = -.04, p < 0.5), management commitment (r = -.09, p < .05), equipment 
maintenance (r = -.15, p < .05), safety communication (r = -.07, p < 0.5), safety motivation (r 




Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables 
                  M       S.D.       1           2          3            4           5           6         7           8           9         10          11          12           13          14     15 
1. SP         4.09     .37      
2. PR        4.19      .44     -.19**      
3. TR        1.95      .60     -.17*     .15* 
4. RP        1.88      .32     -.59**    -.04      -.04 
5. MC       2.64    1.00      -.27**     .04        .10      -.25** 
6. EM       4.06      .34       .07      -.18**     .12      -.14*         .28**  
7. CM       3.16    1.29      .04       -.05      -.01      -.16*         .19**         .20 
8. SE        4.32      .42     -.34**        .18**      -.11       .06       -.20       -.13      -.07 
9. IN         2.47     .96      .11        .01       -.03     -.11        .31**         .22**       .16*         -.09   
10. EP      2.64    1.00       .30**       .27**      .00     -.28**       .54**          .10        .21**    -.15*       .45** 
11. MG    2.75    1.15       .23**      -.02       .06      -.24**       .51**          .08        .21**      -.20**    .42**        78** 
12. SV      2.87    1.10       .24**       -.03      -.00     -.25**       .39**           .09       .24**      -.13      .41**      .72**        .82** 
13. MO    3.62    1.06      .26**      -.01      -.08     -.20**      .22**         .04       .10         .01      .25**    .32**          .31**        .53** 
14. BE      4.04    1.21      .04        .04       -.06     -22**        -.31**         .01       .05        .10      -.20**   -.31**       -.31**       -.28**       -.10 
15. HZ       1.6       .48     -.18*           .07       -.04      .17*         -.09       -.15*        -.07       .14*        .12       .13         .17*           .10        -.01      -.03 
     N = 212,  *. p< 0.05.  **. p< 0.01.   
Abbreviated factors: 1=Safety Policies (SP); 2=Safety Priority (PR); 3=Safety Training (TR); 4=Safety Rules & Procedures (RP); 
5=Management Commitment (MC); 6=Equipment Maintenance (EM); 7=Safety Communication (CM); 8=Supportive Environment (SE); 
9=Safety Involvement (IN); 10=Safety Empowerment (EP);11 =Management of Change (MG); 12=Safety Supervision (SV); 13=Safety 
Motivation (MO); 14=Safety Behaviour (BE); and 15= Hazard Incident Risks (HZ). 
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4.2.1.3.4 Results of the Exploratory Factor Analysis 
The study identified many factors from the literature review that measured safety climate 
perceptions (see section 2.3.4.2.4) in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. Given this, 
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was performed to identify the latent variables for safety 
climate perceptions. Before the computation of the EFA, four essential requirements must be 
met on the suitability of the data set that includes: sample size must be higher than 150, the 
strength of the relationship among the factors, linearity and outliers among cases (Pallant, 
2016). The sample size used for the current study is higher than 150. Table 4.7 presents the 
results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett's Test 
of Sphericity. The general rule of thumb indicates that for satisfactory factor analysis to be 
computed, KMO measure of sampling adequacy should be higher than .5 (Hinton et al., 2014). 
The data set was appropriate for the principal component analysis as KMO indicated .709 and 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity of the relationship between the factors was significant (x2 = 
1005.969, p < .05). Based on these results, the EFA was computed.  
 
 
Table 4. 7 Results of the KMO and Bartlett's test for the variables 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .709 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1005.969 
Df 91 
 Sig. .000 
 
 
The 14 safety climate factors derived from the literature were subjected to principal 
components analysis with orthogonal varimax rotation using IBM SPSS (version 25). Figure 
4.6 and table 4.8 show the scree plot and the Total Variance Explained about how many 
components to extract respectively. Using Kaiser's criterion (Kaiser, 1974), components with 
eigenvalues greater than one were extracted. The scree plot shows that five components had 
eigenvalues greater than 1. The Total Variance Explained also revealed the presence of five 
components with eigenvalues greater than 1, explaining 28.6%, 11.8%, 9.7%, 8.8% and 8% 
Of the variance, respectively. This is further supported by the Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel 
Analysis (see appendix F) which indicated only five components with eigenvalues higher than 
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the corresponding criterion values for the randomly produced data matrix of the same size (14 
variables x 212 respondents). 
 
 










Table 4. 8 Total variance explained for the safety climate variables 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 








Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.998 28.557 28.557 3.998 28.557 28.557 
2 1.649 11.776 40.333 1.649 11.776 40.333 
3 1.352 9.658 49.991 1.352 9.658 49.991 
4 1.232 8.801 58.792 1.232 8.801 58.792 
5 1.124 8.032 66.824 1.124 8.032 66.824 
6 .848 6.057 72.881    
7 .817 5.835 78.716    
8 .716 5.116 83.832    
9 .653 4.663 88.495    
10 .545 3.891 92.387    
11 .450 3.217 95.604    
12 .254 1.811 97.415    
13 .233 1.663 99.077    
14 .129 .923 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.9 presents the combined outputs of the Rotated Component Matrix and the 
Communality coefficients of the components. The results indicated that four components were 
extracted with eigenvalues greater than 1, which had communality coefficient scores above 
50%. Table 4.10 presents a summary of the main factors that were retained in the EFA. The 
first component (1) retained four factors that included: Safety supervision, Management of 
change, Safety empowerment, and Management commitment. The second component (2) 
retained three factors, such as Safety policies, Safety rules and procedures, and Safety 
behaviour. The third component (3) retained two factors that included: Safety priority and 
Supportive Environment. The fourth component (4) retained two factors that included: 
Equipment maintenance and Safety communication. Finally, the fifth component (5) kept  
two factors, such as Safety Training and  Safety priority. These five components (i.e. F1, F2, F3, 
F4, & F5) retained in the EFA constituted the underlying latent variables for the safety climate 
measure which are used as independent variables for the multiple regression analysis to 
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determine which factors have more predictive influence on the hazard risks in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. 
 
 
Table 4. 9 Results of the exploratory factor analysis for the variables 
Factors 
     Rotated Component Matrixa Communality 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 (h2 =100%) 
Safety Policies  .730    .829 
Safety Priority   .531  .584 .706 
Safety Training     .812 .687 
Safety Rules and Procedures  -.849    .788 
Management Commitment      .561 
 Equipment Maintenance     .780  .679 
Safety Communication .601   .667  .520 
Supporting Environment   .773   .633 
Safety Involvement      .441 
 Safety Empowerment .862     .767 
 Management of Change .876     .790 
 Safety Supervision .876     .793 
Safety Motivation      .488 
Safety Behaviour  .536    .672 
 Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 




Table 4. 10 Summary of the latent factors retained in the EFA 
Components Extracted Main Factors Retained 
1 • Safety supervision 
• Management of change 
• Safety empowerment 
2 • Safety policies 
• Safety rules and procedures 
• Safety behaviour 
3 • Safety priority 
• Supportive Environment 
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4 • Equipment maintenance 
• Safety communication 
5 • Safety training 




4.2.1.3.5 Multiple Regression Analysis 
Multiple regression analysis was used to test which factors have a more predictive influence 
on hazard incident risks. The results presented in table 4.11 indicate that the model is 
statistically significant, explaining 14.4% of the variance in influencing the hazard incident 
risks. The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tested the statistical significance of the multiple 
regression analysis (see appendix G). Table 4.12 presents the results of multiple regression. 
The results indicate F(5, 206) = 6.937, p < .0005, which confirms its statistical significance. 
Factor 1 (F1) indicates a more predictive influence on incident incident risks (β = .210,  p < 
.05). Factor 2  (β = -.194,  p < .05), factor 3 (β = .163,  p < .05) and factor 4 (β = -.163,  p < 
.05) indicate predictive influence on hazard incident risks accordingly.   
 
 
Table 4. 11 Model summary of the multiple regression analysis 













.144 .123 .44864 .144 6.937 5 206 .000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score   5 for analysis 1, REGR factor score   4 for  
analysis 1, REGR factor score   3 for analysis 1, REGR factor score   2 for analysis 1,  
REGR factor score 1 for analysis 1 









Table 4. 12 Results of multiple regression 












   F1                          .101                       .210              3.266                .001 
   F2                         -.093                      -.194            -3.011                .003 
   F3                          .078                        .163             2.527                .012 
   F4                         -.078                      -.163            -2.522                .012 
   F5                         -.046                      -.096            -1.487                .139 




4.2.1.3.6 Key Findings of the Questionnaire Surveys 
Safety climate perceptions have a predictive influence on hazard incident risks in Ghana's 
upstream oil and gas operations. From the workers' perspective, the following organisational 
safety climate factors have a relatively higher predictive effect on hazard incident risks in the 
upstream oil and gas operations: safety supervision, management of change and safety 
empowerment. It was indicated that safety policies, safety rules and procedures and safety 
behaviour have a relatively high predictive effect on hazard incident risk. Factors such as safety 
priority, supportive environment, equipment maintenance and safety communication have a 
relative effect on hazard incident risks in the upstream oil and gas operations. 
 
 
4.2.1.4 Semi-structured Interviews 
This section presents the analysis of the empirical investigation of the semi-structured 
interviews conducted for this study. This section seeks to identify the issues confronting safety 
management in the upstream oil and gas industry. Safety management involves two key 
aspects: the prescription of safety norms and ways to ensure that these norms are complied. 
Focusing on issues relating to safety regulations and implementation. The analysis was carried 
out to grasp the real problems that are influencing robust safety management in the industry 
currently. This section covers the background of the interviewees (referred to in this study as 
participants), the themes for ascertaining the issues affecting safety management, the analysis 
of the issues and the key findings from the semi-structured interviews. The details regarding 
the participant information sheet, semi-structured interview protocol, semi-structured 
interview questions and semi-structured interview transcript are attached in appendices H1, 





4.2.1.4.1 Background of the Participants 
The research commenced the semi-structured interview with questions seeking to capture the 
background information of the participants. Background information elicited from the 
participants covered these areas: central position or role in the organisation, core functions or 
operations of your organisation, the location of the company’s activities and years of current 
job experience. Table 4.13 presents background information of the participants. The data were 
obtained from 14 professionals working in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry in different 
managerial and supervisory roles. The participants worked in different organisation types that 
covered regulatory institutions, government agencies, operating companies, contracting 
companies and the labour union. Most of these organisations engaged in both offshore and 
onshore related oil and gas activities. The average years of participants current job experience 
is eight years. 
 
 
Table 4. 13 Background information of the Interview participants 
Participant 
Code 




Years of Current 
Job Experience 








PO2 HSE manager Operating 
Company 
Offshore 4 






PO4 HSE manager  Contracting 
Company 
Onshore 7 
















PO8 Contractor  Contracting 
company  
Onshore 7 







































4.2.1.4.2 Main Themes Investigated in the Semi-structured Interviews 
The argument for this study is the need to adopt an integrated risk governance approach for 
safety management in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. This requires a multi-stakeholder 
involvement in all the processes of remaining proactive in handling risks associated with the 
upstream oil and gas operations. Given this, the semi-structured interviews were designed to 
focus on five main themes identified in the literature:  
• integrative risk governance framework 
•  sustainability of the functional characteristic of the safety case regime 
• adaptability to changed situations 
•  issues influencing safety regulations 
•  barriers to the implementation of safety management systems.  
These themes were investigated to identify the issues affecting safety management in Ghana's 
upstream oil and gas industry. Table 4.14 provided the number of responses for the the various 





Table 4. 14 Key themes and their number of responses 




Multiple stakeholders’ involvement in framing risks 
Interdisciplinary estimation of risk 
Legitimization of the risk appraisal 
Management of risk issues  
Risk information sharing  
Sustainability of the functionality of the Safety Case 
Adaptability to changed situations 
Issues influencing safety regulations 























4.2.1.4.2.1 Integrative Risk Governance Framework 
Under the integrative risk governance framework, the study identified five key elements which 
include the following: multiple stakeholders’ involvement in framing risks, interdisciplinary 
estimation of risk, the legitimisation of the risk appraisal, management of risk issues and risk 
information sharing.   
 
 
4.2.1.4.2.1.1 Multiple stakeholders’ Involvement in Framing Risks 
The study investigated the multiple actor-network involvement in the framing of the risks in 
the upstream oil and gas industry. The participants were asked to indicate their views on which 
stakeholders were involved in the framing of the risk issues. There were four responses (i.e. 
PO2, PO5, PO6, PO14) that indicated broader stakeholders’ involvement were made to their 
organisations' risk framing. These participants stated that there were representatives from the 
following institutions and organisations involved in the risk framing: Ministry of Energy, 
Petroleum Commission, Environmental Protection Agency, GNPC, Ghana Maritime 
Authority, Fisheries Commission, contractors, suppliers and community authorities. These 
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stakeholders are involved in the initial stage of the facility, and this was indicated in one of the 
responses of the participants: 
“In our recent contract, and you know our company is a multinational with most of our 
operations offshore, we had to perform a risk assessment of the contract area and the 
facility which started by identifying the various potential impacts and risks that our 
activities will pose to the environment and the people. So, we conducted several 
meetings that we engaged several representatives from various institutions such as the 
energy ministry, GNPC, PC, EPA, GMA,  fishing communities, our contractors and 
suppliers to work together.  We have traditional authorities from those communities 
that will be affected by our activities. So, we have a broader net to screen and  identified 
the issues…" [PO2].  
 
However, the study found that these multiple stakeholders' involvement as indicated by these 
participants were mainly limited to the framing of social and environmental risks and responses 
of the participants show this as evident in PO3 response: 
“The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (EIA) regulations require us to 
identify the potential impacts and risks of our operations that will have consequences 
to human lives and the environment. This makes us to follow the process stipulated in 
the regulations.” 
The participants indicated that the process in multiple actor-network involvements is 
complicated in framing the risk issues as most of their contracts have limited schedule which 
will not make it possible to involve all the stakeholders required in screening for the problems. 
They pointed out that there was a delay in responding and honouring of the invitation of 
stakeholders to frame as pointed out below: 
"I must say it is very cumbersome and challenging to have our invitation letters 
acknowledged and honoured by several of the stakeholders. Because of such 
challenges, we hardly go to that extent of involving several stakeholders to such 
exercise. We do our best! We only look at the most relevant ones. Don't forget, we have 
a time limit to get our contract executed, and we are very conscious of that…" [PO3]. 
 
Moreover, some of the participants indicated that because the industry is operating a safety 
case regime, which is a self-regulation regime. Therefore, the essence of multiple stakeholders' 
involvement in the safety case is less significant. This impression was pointed as follows: 
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“With the safety case regime, it is a self-assessment thing. So, it is you assess the risk 
associated with your facility, and you are telling us that you have put in place adequate 
measures to reduce the risk as low as possible. You do it out of the state engagement. 
However, before the starting of the facilities, we have what we called the Endurance 
Test Operation, where your safety case is tested at its full working operations. There is 
no need to have stakeholders' engagement on safety case document when it is pre-
produced. However, since there are local risks, like the fishing activities, malaria, 
weather, you have to submit this to the commission” [PO1]. 
 
These comments give the impression that there were limited stakeholders involved in the 
framing of risk issues in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. Existing risk framing was more 
skewed to eliciting knowledge of environmental and related social problems. Workers involved 
in the framing of risk issues under the safety case regime was essential in prioritisation of the 
understanding of risk. Labour union involvement appeared missing from the risk framing. 
 
 
4.2.1.4.2.1.2 Interdisciplinary Estimation of Risk  
This study investigated the interdisciplinary nature of existing risk estimation in Ghana's 
upstream oil and gas industry. Participants were asked to indicate the extent of their 
interdisciplinary approach in estimation risk in their respective organisations. As pointed in the 
literature, risk estimation must cover both assessments of the physical harm in which a risk 
source produces and the investigation of the state and quality of knowledge that are linked to 
the hazards risk. In other words, how human and organisational influences are linked to the 
hazard, risks or vulnerabilities. The existing risk estimation reflected more on the aspects of 
the risk assessment. Most of the participants indicated that the current risk assessment is 
extensive, which covers health, safety, environment and economics risk as pointed out in the 
response of PO11:   
“Our risk assessment is based on a cost-benefit approach where we assess the risk 
broadly covering the economic risk, the fatalities and injuries risks of our personnel, 
the facilities risk and the environmental risk” 
Several of the participants indicated that existing risk assessment on the facilities was 
comprehensive and experienced risk assessment groups always conducted this. This was 
evident in one of the participants by PO1: 
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There is quite extensive work they do that mostly covers health, safety, environmental, 
economic risks. Most often they meet the requirements. With the risk assessment, the 
IOCs are quite well vested in that given their vast experience of that. They do internal 
risk engagement for hazard identification which is a significant engagement activates 
where they engage the large crowd to perform the risk assessment for various risks they 
could have encountered with the project. So, for that sense, the likelihood that they 
would miss risks in their operations for risk assessment they had done for over 15 years 
is very low. So, for risk assessment, I will say they are well vested. 
 
However, there were areas in the risk assessment that required more attention such as the 
weather conditions, corrosions and fishing activities. It was found that these areas have critical 
risk implications for offshore facilities.  Again, in terms of the assessment methods, QRA was 
mostly applied in the industry. PO1 further elucidated these issues: 
"… there is always the need to incorporate the local risks I mentioned earlier. Beyond 
the weather and the fishing activities that had been a problem in the offshore 
environment, salinity in salt, which is causing most of the facilities, causing rust. Some 
of these risks are to be identified in Ghana. Most of our risk analyses are a quantitative 
risk assessment. For qualitative risk, I say big no, hardly! We don't do most of these 
qualitative risk assessments. We have a lot of drilling analysis. We rely on an 
assessment that you can measure immediately. So, it is a quantitative way”. 
The study found that risk assessment had been the main focus on risk estimation in the upstream 
activities. Existing risk assessment needs to adequately capture the weather conditions, 
corrosions and fishing activities risks. However, the gap in existing risk estimation relates to 
the limitation in the application of qualitative risk assessment methods to identify the issues 
that are linked to the risks. 
 
 
4.2.1.4.2.1.3 Legitimization of the Risk Appraisal 
Stakeholders involvement in the judgement of risk is critical in addressing uncertainty, and this 
requires legitimization to provide transparent and democratic processes on the judgement of 
risk evaluation. The study investigated existing approaches to evaluating risk issues in Ghana's 
upstream oil and gas industry. Most of the participants indicated ‘mechanistic approach' where 
companies were only interested in satisfying the risk acceptance criteria, which in context 
reducing risk as "low as possible".  The participants indicated the application of the ALARP 
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principle driven by several tools for evaluation of their risks. Examples of such tools are 
presented as follows: 
 PO7 response: "The risk matrix method, the cost-benefit criteria are key for our 
decision making here. Various standards are consulted in line with each facilities risk 
limit." 
PO11 response: "Our operations are governed by various international safety 
standards and national safety regulations. Although no risk limit is prescribed to us, 
we are required to reduce risk to a low level. 
PO11 response: "We have various methods to make the decision on the risk that 
includes risk matrix criteria, cost-benefits, individual risk criteria, societal risk criteria 
and qualitative risk criteria". 
PO1 response: "We have the filling modes, HAZID, HAZOP, Bow-tie. These are some 
of the tools they use in the risk evaluation process because we are dealing with the 
process and not occupational nature. It is more process-oriented. So the FMEA and 
others are the most preferred tools being used in the risk evaluation so far”.  
 
However, in terms of legitimisation of the appraisal process where relevant stakeholders are 
involved in the decision making, the study found limited involvement of the stakeholders as 
evident in participant response: 
“The HSE regulations require us to reduce risk as low as possible. There is some little 
level of consultation in terms of getting the government agencies to be part of our 
decision making. You know we cannot ignore the regulator. Sometimes we engage them 
in our decision making on risks” (PO7).   
It was found out that the main feature on risk appraisal present in Ghana's safety case regime 
was the relatively mechanic approach which was more rooted in satisfying the regulatory 
requirement of reducing risk as low as possible. There was a limited involvement of the 
regulator as the underlying model of risk regulation was self-regulation. The government 
agencies appeared not adequately involved in the decision making on risks. 
 
 
4.2.1.4.2.1.4 Management of Risk Issues 
Managing risk issues is related to the safety culture and monitoring and controlling risk. The 
study investigated the issues influencing the safety culture and the monitoring and controlling 
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of risk. The participants indicated safety culture practices as a gap for both the local workforce 
and contractors in the upstream oil and gas operations, as shown as follows: 
PO1: “The culture here is the seriousness of the management. With the IOCs in terms 
of their financial loan regimes from the IFCs, there are high expectations of 
environmental and safety sensitivity. So culturally, their sides continue to improve. The 
challenge has always been the local environment where Ghanaian safety performance 
is quite low. The average Ghanaian does not consider safety as a major threat to our 
existence. The challenge has always been to transfer the corporate perception to the 
local contractors. The difficulty has been to get them to a level where they need to 
accept to operate in a safe manner. This has always been a challenge for the industry. 
The local workforce does in the Ghanaian way where they don't understand they are 
always required to work in a safe way. They don't accept to work in a safe manner”. 
 
PO3: "There is a lot to be done in that regard, bringing up the local contractors and 
service providers and other relevant stakeholders to that level to appreciate the safety 
and the role of safety in the operations, there is a gap there, so we must work to bridge 
that gap".  
 
In relation to the monitoring and controlling of risk, the study found compliance monitoring as 
the primary mechanism employed in the oil and gas industry. It was found that both operating 
and contracting organisations are required to comply with existing safety regulations. Some of 
the operating companies have multi-stakeholder auditing activities that were carried out as 
indicated: 
PO5: “We have various institutions and bodies that conduct their independent audit, so 
the regulatory agency audit forms part of the many other audits and monitoring works. 
The banks are doing that the funding agencies are doing that, the insurance companies 
are doing that, i.e. carrying out their independent audit”.  
 
PO1: “For monitoring, the expectation is that the IOCs who are contracting has to have 
assurance from their contractors, but they themselves have a periodic audit of the 
contracting activities and engage the regulator on the course of the year”. 
 
However, some of the participants indicated the inadequacy of the existing compliance 
monitoring mechanism used by the regulatory authorities. 
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4.2.1.4.2.1.5 Risk Information Sharing  
As ascertained in the literature, communication of risk featured establishment of procedures to 
facilitate discourses on uncertainties, supporting the development and sustainability of trust 
among several stakeholders, and inclusion of multiple stakeholders. The study investigated 
how communication of risk was handled in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. Several 
participants indicated the inadequacy of existing strategies for risk information sharing as 
highlighted here: 
PO6: “We do share information on the outcomes of our risk assessment, incident 
investigations to our personnel, management and the commission”. 
 
PO7: “If you share information on letters, emails, and during meetings, how effective 
will you advance an effective risk information sharing? It is certainly not the way 
forward. We need to have discourse on risks. I think we must look beyond these”. 
 
PO1: “The IOCs use the bulletin system where they share information about incidents 
across the operations. They submit a report to us, and we also share with the other 
actors within the petroleum space. The internal communication has always been the 
bulletin system. Where I sit, it is down! Communication is down”.  
Several of the participants indicated these techniques for sharing information on risks: letters, 
emails, morning meetings and permit meetings as revealed: 
PO1: “They use emails, letters, morning meetings, permit meetings. So, incidents 
report go through these techniques. These techniques have been used by the IOCs to 
the contractors too. 
The study found that existing strategies for sharing information on risk were not adequate as 




4.2.1.4.2.2 Sustainability of the Principal Functionalities of the Safety Case  
The study investigated the issue on the sustainability of the principal functionalities of Ghana's 
safety case regime.  It was indicated that the safety case approach was not a new concept in the 
global oil and gas industry. Its fundamental functionalities have been implemented under the 
self-regulatory styles, and that have been successful as pointed out as follows: 
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PO1: “With the functional features of the safety case, it is accepted generally, and I 
don't think the Ghanaian risks are higher than the southern American risk or the North 
Sea risks. It is the same risk we all use the same safety case.  It is appropriate and 
exhaustive. So, it is appropriate”. 
Some of the participants indicated that it was too early to judge its sustainability in Ghana fully. 
They noted that practising safety case regime under self-regulation does not guarantee zero 
risks but depends on the joint partnership of the stakeholders. This was highlighted here:  
PO12: “Our industry is young, so we have not had enough time to realise the full 
benefits of this safety case implementation in terms of accidents. I know and I am sure 
you have read much about that, this safety case thing originated from the UK and other 
countries have also adopted it. Can we say that since its implementation, the UK had 
not experienced several incidents in their upstream activities? Definitely no! For me, 
the sustainability of it has to be looked at from the working partnership between the 
industry and the regulatory agencies”.  
However, several participants disclosed a gap regarding the working partnership among the 
stakeholders in the industry, as indicated below: 
PO1: “ It requires a lot more engagement from the stakeholders. This is where there is 
a challenge, particularly engagement of the regulator, contracting parties, state 
agencies and the implementation of all these requirements in the safety case. This 
comes to periodic audits, and unfortunately, there is a gap in our national agenda as it 
is not a high priority. We need the support of the leadership for the HSE department to 
ensure that operating companies put their things to ensure safe operations in our 
industry”.  
The study found that existing safety case governing the self-regulatory regime of Ghana has 
not been sustained for a longer period. There appeared to be a limited engagement of 
stakeholders in implementing the safety case approach in the industry. 
 
 
4.2.1.4.2.3 Learning Capability 
As indicated in the literature, because of the market competition in the upstream oil and gas 
industry, several activities undergo rapid changes in technology and organisational 
management. Given this, there were alterations in technology, chemical processes, equipment, 
procedures and changes to facilities which required the engagement of stakeholders. This study 
investigated the issues associated with adaptability to changed situations. The study found that 
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there were few instances where the regulatory authorities were engaged in the process for major 
changes to facilities as indicated below: 
PO10: “There have been some few cases where those earlier operating companies had 
changes in their facilities, and they had to engage us on how to implement that on their 
management systems, and we went through, and it was accepted by the commission 
[Regulator]. In these days of our operations, we have not had such engagement for this 
management of change situations’.  
 
PO1: “Management of change regime exists in the HSE regulations that should work 
in case there is a major change in the facilities, they should be brought to the attention 
and engagement of the regulator. It is reactive in the sense that in case of any major 
change in the facility, you have to react to the regulator for engagement where you are 
required to submit a risk assessment on that change for approval by the regulator'.   
The participants acknowledged the existence of management of change requirements in the 
upstream oil and gas operations. The reactive nature of the existing change management regime 
gave the impression that companies responded to changes when incidents had happened. This 
was an apparent deficit of the requirement for proactive management of safety in the industry.  
It was found that operators only engaged the regulatory authorities on major changes to the 
facilities. The definition of major change to facilities was not clearly stated. There were some 
changes to facilities that were not brought to the attention of the regulatory authorities. These 
issues might account for an inadequacy in adaptation to changed situations which was a critical 
requirement in robust safety management.    
 
 
4.2.1.4.2.4 Issues Influencing Safety Regulatory regime 
The study investigated the issues influencing safety regulations in Ghana’s upstream oil and 
gas industry. Table 4.15 presents the issues identified by the participants as those that 
influenced safety regulatory regime in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. From the 
analysis, the 14 (100%) participants indicated that lack of national safety policies, lack of safety 
guidelines and lack of independence of the regulatory body affect existing regulatory regime. 
Here is the presentation of some examples of the responses of the participants:  
PO8: "As a country, safety is not a top priority to our leaders, and that is why up to 
now,    there are no existing national safety policies”. 
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PO12: "Ever since we started the oil and gas industry, there have not been single HSE 
guidelines developed by the state. We rely on those international standards…”.  
P011: “There have been conflicting views on the independence of the PC (regulator). 
We have many people that are saying we should separate the HSE functions of the PC 
from its core mandate of licensing. I share this view because a single body responsible 
will fill its gap of independence”. 
13 (92.9%) of the participants disclosed that there is no regulatory policy on safety research 
and development in the current state of the upstream oil and gas industry.  For example, 
PO10 response revealed the following: 
PO10: “As we speak now, there is no regulatory policy on safety research and 
development for the country to develop adequate capacity in addressing safety risks 
in the industry”.  
12 (85.7%) participants pointed out existing safety laws are scattered, which affect the 
coherence of safety regulations in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. For example, PO3 
shared this: 
“like I said we have laws scattered; we have the factory inspectorate, we have the 
environmental protection regulations, health and safety regulations for the upstream 
sector, so these pieces of regulations are those that governing the sector as of today 
and it affects the coherence of how effective we must regulate the upstream activities”.  
10 (85.7%) and 9 (64.3%) of the participants revealed that insufficient resource and inadequate 
safety requirements in procurement for local contractors affect the efficacy of the safety 
regulation in upstream oil and gas industry.  6 (42.9%) of the participants shared the view that 
corruption emanating from officials in regulatory institutions affect the effectiveness of 
enforcement of the safety regulations. For example, PO10 revealed his experience: 
“When fishermen are picked up by the Navy, and when they come to shore, they make 
some few calls, you must relinquish and give them back their motor. And this is a very 
simple issue that can be dealt with, but if you look at the intricacies of the thing, nobody 
wants to take a gaze. And this is straightforward enforcement that we ought to have 
done, but we can't do at this state because fishermen are crying, they know politicians, 
they will call their MP, they will come, and you don't have a case with them. So, it's a 
major problem because of ‘whom you know' and stuffs like that; you are unable to 
complete the enforcement fully we must have done”. 
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In short, the study found the following issues to have influenced safety regulations in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry: lack of national safety policies, lack of safety guidelines and 
lack of independence of the regulatory body, lack of policies for investment in safety training 
and development, scattered safety laws, insufficient resources, inadequate safety requirements 
in procurement for local contractors and corruption.  
 
Table 4. 15 Regulatory Issues identified by interview participants 
Issues Identified  Participants (N = 14) 
Number of Responses Percent (%) 
Lack of national safety policies 14 100 
Lack of safety guidelines 14 100 
Lack of independence of the regulatory body 14 100 
Lack of policies for investment in safety 
training and development 
13 92.9 
Scattered safety laws 12 85.7 
Insufficient Resources 10 71.4 
Inadequate safety requirements in 
procurement for local contractors 
9 64.3 




4.2.1.4.2.5 Barriers to Robust Implementation of Safety Management Systems  
The study explored the barriers to robust implementation of safety management systems in the 
upstream oil and gas operations (table 4.16). 18 (100%) responses of the participants indicated 
poor safety culture practice among the workforce and the local contracting companies affect 
the implementation of the companies' safety management systems. 14 (100%) of the 
participants indicated a knowledge gap and 12 (85.7%) pointed out inadequate safety 
involvement as barriers to the implementation of safety management systems.  11 (78.6%) of 
the participants revealed the following barriers to implementation of safety management 
systems in their respective organisations: lack of supporting environment, inadequate 
communication and lack of awareness creation. 10 (71.4%), 9 (63.3%), and 8 (57.1%) of the 
participants indicated lack of motivation, poor contractor safety management and limited 
resources as the barriers to the robust implementation of safety management systems in the 
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upstream oil and gas operations. However, from the analysis, the main barrier was the safety 
culture practice among the workforce and the local companies. Several of the barriers can be 
linked to the safety climate constructs. 
 
 
Table 4. 16 Identified barriers by interview participants 
Barriers Participants (N = 14) 
Number of References Percent (%) 
Poor safety culture 14        100 
Knowledge gap 14        100 
Inadequate safety involvement 12 85.7 
Lack of supporting environment 11 78.6 
Inadequate communication 11 78.6 
Insufficient monitoring 11 78.6 
Lack of awareness creation 11 78.6 
Lack of motivation 10 71.4 
Poor contractor safety management 9 63.3 




4.2.1.4.3 Key Findings of the Semi-structured Interviews 
The analysis of the semi-structured interview pointed to several weaknesses associated with 
existing safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The key findings are 
summarised as follows: 
• Inadequate integrative risk governance framework: The issues identified here 
included: insufficient multiple stakeholders' involvement in the risk frames; 
limitation in application of qualitative risk assessment methods to identify the 
problems that were linked to the risks; the weather conditions, corrosions and 
offshore fishing activities were critical to the risk of offshore oil and gas operations; 
existing risk acceptance criteria was relatively mechanical as it aimed at satisfying 
the regulatory requirement; poor safety culture practice by contracting 
organisations; lack of independence of the supervisory authority and lack of 
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institutionalization of discourses for risk information sharing among all the 
stakeholders. 
• Existing safety case regime lacks robustness: The safety case regime has not been 
sustained for a more extended period under the self-regulations. 
• Inadequate change management regime: Existing change management regime is 
reactive to incidents and lacks adequate engagement of stakeholders in 
implementation. 
• Limited support for safety regulation. Existing safety regulations are challenged 
with several issues such as lack of national safety policies, lack of safety guidelines 
and lack of independence of the regulatory body, lack of policies for investment in 
safety training and development, scattered safety laws, insufficient resources, 
inadequate safety requirements in procurement for local contractors and corruption. 




4.2.2 Defining the Problem of the study 
Since the commencement of commercial oil and gas production in Ghana in 2010, safety is 
now beginning to receive attention in both the industry and the research community. A review 
of the current safety regulatory regime points to several gaps which include incoherence and 
limitation of the scope of the regulatory properties, features of integrative risk governance as 
critical requirements for handling complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity were not reflective in 
the existing safety case regime and no safety guidelines.  An earlier analysis of the unpublished 
data indicated a rising trend of hazard incidents in Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry. These 
hazard incidents were mainly occurred during production operations, office, warehouse, lifting, 
crane, rigging, deck operations, constructions, installation, subsea and transport-related 
activities and have most interfaces with existing facilities. However, to identify the issues 
influencing these hazard incidents, questionnaire surveys were conducted, which indicated that 
poor safety culture practices determined by safet climate measures, have a predictive influence 
on hazard incident risks. The semi-structured interviews conducted among the professionals in 
safety managerial or supervisory and compliance monitoring related positions revealed several 
key issues such as existing safety case regime lacks robustness, inadequate integrative risk 
governance framework, insufficient change management regime, limited support for safety 
regulation and poor safety culture poses difficulties to the robust implementation of safety 
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management systems. Therefore, the current safety management regime is inadequate to 
address the complexity, uncertainty and the ambiguity associated with Ghana's upstream oil 
and gas operations. 
 
 
4.3 Stage 2: Defining Requirements of the Framework 
This section presents the second activity of the DSR process. The purpose of this activity is to 
define requirements and outline a solution to address the explicated probem established in 
section 4.2.2. In this context, a requirement is defined as a property of the framework that is 
considered desirable by the stakeholders in the industry and that is to be utilised for guiding 
the development of the framework (Johannesson & Perjons, 2014). The study organised 
workshop and elicited views on ways to address the issues defined.  These views were outlined 
for consideration for the development of a framework for robust safety management in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
4.3.1 The Workshop 
The workshop was organised under the theme: “Robustness thinking in safety management: 
how do we improve the issues in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry”. In this workshop, 
the same participants recruited for the semi-structured interviews in the first DSR activity were 
the only target population considered for this activity. Because these participants are the main 
beneficiaries of the DSR outcome, they must be used throughout the rest of the DSR activities. 
However, it must be indicated that only 85.7% of the participants attended the workshop. The 
organisation of this workshop confronted several challenges including several postponements 
of the workshop due to unavailability of the participants and insufficient resources. 
 
 
4.3.1.1 Key Areas to Elicit Solutions  
This section presents the results of the participants suggestions regarding ways to improve 
safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. There were three main 
categorised issues that were presented to the participants for elicitation of solutions:  
• Regulatory influences 
• Integrative risk governance  
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• Improving existing safety culture 
 
 
4.3.1.1.1 Regulatory Influences 
There were nine mechnisms suggested by the participants to improve the regulatory issues 
identified in phase activity (see section 4.2.). Table 4.16 presents the mechanisms suggested 
by the participants to address the regulatory issues. 11 (91.7%) participants suggested that the 
country’s upstream oil and gas industry must have a separate independent HSE regulatory 
agency. This suggestion represented the first solution to fill or address the existing regulatory 
issues in the industry. The current arrangement in terms of the main role of the PC covers both 
the granting of licenses and safety compliance monitoring of companies’ upstream oil and gas 
activities. The second suggestions made by 10 (83.3%) participants covered both government 
formulation of national HSE policies and the development of national regulatory framework to 
capture relevant safety statutes, regulations and guidelines. It was suggested that government 
formulates national HSE policiesthat incorporates the upstream oil and gas industry. Presently, 
there is no developed HSE policies at the level of the ministry of energy (Petroleum) and there 
are existing pieces of safety laws. These safety laws relevant to the upstream oil and gas are 
required to be brought under one regulatory framework.  9 (75%) participants representing the 
third suggestions indicated that government should set up a fund that would be utilised 
specifically for investment in safety training and development of the technical competence of 
the HSE department and the local contractors. This could help to improve the knowledge gap 
in the industry. 8 (66.7%) participants which represented the fourth suggestions indicated an 
establishment of adequate contractors’ safety development and reward schemes and regulatory 
agencies must provide adequate resources for addressing HSE issues in the industry. 7(58.3%) 
participants reprenting the fifth suggestions pointed out that contractors must be made to 
demonstrate enough HSE content during tender process. 6 (50%) participants representing the 
sixth suggestion pointed out a pre-assessment of contractors’ safety skills, capacity and 
equipment on sites, and the requirement for an effective co-ordination, supervision, 
communication and co-operation as on site.  
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Table 4. 17 Mechanisms to address the regulatory issues in the workshop 







Establishment of a separate HSE regulator 1st 11 91.7 
Government formulates national HSE policies  2nd 10 83.3 
Development of an integrated regulatory 
framework to capture relevant safety statutes, 
regulations and guidelines 
2nd 10 83.3 
Establishment of fund for investment in technical 
safety training and research 
3rd 9 75 
Establishment of adequate contractors’ safety 
development and reward schemes  
4th 8 66.7 
Provision of adequate resources for safety  4th  8 66.7 
Contractors must be made to demonstrate 
sufficient HSE content during tender process 
5th  7 58.3 
There must be requirement for pre-assessing 
contractors’ safety skills, capacity and equipment 
on sites before allowed to start work 
6th  6 50 
Operating companies must provide effective co-
ordination, supervision, communication and co-
operation on sites 




4.3.1.1.2 Adequate Integrative Risk Governance 
The study elicited suggestions from the particpants on how to improve the current risk 
governace in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. There were five main areas that 
characterised the elements of integrative risk governance which had issues in the upstream oil 
and gas operations. They include inadequate stakeholders’ involvement in the risk frames, 
limited application of qualitative risk assessment methods to identify the human and 
organisational issues that were linked to the risks; mechanistic nature of risk appraisal as it 
mainly satisfied regulatory requirements; poor safety culture practice particularly by 
contracting organisations, and inadequate risk information sharing. This section presents the 




4.3.1.1.2.1 Multiple Stakeholders’ Involvement in Risk Framing 
The study identified several local actors that were required to be involved in the risk framing. 
Table 4.17 presents the relevant stakeholders that must be considered in the framing of the risk 
issues. It must be indicated that 12 (100%) participants suggested that the following 
stakeholders as important for the risk framing: PC, EPA, operators, shareholders, management 
(staff), workers, contractors, GFC, GAF, NADMO, and GFS. 11 (91.7%) participants 
suggested GFS, GCAA, and GMET as relevant stakeholders. 10 (83.3%) participants 
suggested the labour union as an important stakeholder to the risk framing. 9 (75%) and 8 
(66.7%) participants indicated GMA, GPHA and the local authorities as relevant stakeholders 
for the risk framing respectively.  
 
 









PC Health and safety protection 12 100 
EPA Environmental protection 12 100 
Operators Oil and gas operating activities 12 100 
Shareholders Funding the operating activities 12 100 
Management 
(staff) 
Managing day-to-day operations 12 100 
Workers Undertaking operational activities 12 100 
Contractors Oil and gas contracting activities 12 100 
GFC Regulation of offshore fishing activities. 12 100 
GAF Marine security 12 100 
NADMO Disaster management  12 100 
GFS Fire prevention 11 91.7 
GCAA Regulation of air transport 11 91.7 
GMET Provision of meteorological information 11 91.7 




GMA Protection of marine environment 9 75 
GPHA Port regulations (FPSOs) 9 75 
Local 
authorities 




4.3.1.1.2.2 Risk Estimation 
The study elicited suggestions on the best methods to ensure that human and organisational 
issues were incorporated into the risk estimations. As shown in table table 4.18, 7 (58.3%) 
participants stongly agreed that objective risk assessment rooted in engineering probabilitics 
modelling of scenarios and events should continually be employed. 5 (41.7%) participants 
stongly agreed with the suggestion of qualitative risk assessment of the background knowledge 
of the risks. In terms of these two types of risk assessment, the majority of the participants 
favoured the engineering probabilistic modelling of the scenarios and events. However, the 12 
(100%) participants strongly agreed to the need to utilise both the engineering probabilistic 
modelling of the scenarios and events, and the concern assessment of the issues linked to these 
scenarios and events.  
 
 
Table 4. 19 Views on interdisciplinary risk estimation 








modelling of scenarios 











































4.3.1.1.2.3 Ligitimization of Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC) 
Table 4.19 presents participants suggestions on ways to improve RAC in the risk evaluation. 
Existing practice mandated the industry to reduce risk as low as possible. However, 11 (91.7) 
participants suggested that government (i.e. the regulator) must set the RAC and not the 
industry. In addressing the legitimacy issues in the industry, majority of the participants 10 
(83.3%) suggested the presence of transparency to avoid the propensity of the company or the 
industry to obscure the real risk. 9 (75%) participants indicated accountability and trust 
between the regulator and the companies as mechanisms to address the legitimacy issues in the 
risk evaluation. 8 (66.7%) and 7 (58.3%) participannts suggested the involvement of experts in 




Table 4. 20 Participants suggestions on improving risk appraisal 







Government must set the RAC 1st  11 91.7 
Transparency  2nd  10 83.3 
Accountability 3rd  9 75 
Trust between companies and PC 3rd  9 75 
Involvement of experts 4th  8 66.7 
Workshop involving key stakeholders on risk 
deliberations 





4.3.1.1.2.4 Monitoring and Controlling of Risk Isuess  
The particpants suggested some ways to improve risk management in the upstream oil and gas 
industry. Table 4.21 presents the participants’ suggestions to improve risk governance. 11 
(91.7%) suggested dialogue and the strengthening of safety culture in the industry as important 
ways to address the risk management issues in the industry. 10 (83.3%) were of the view that 
collaboration between the companies or the industry the government (regulator) should exist 
 219 
to improve safety performance in the industry. In addition to this, 7 (58.3%) particpants 
suggested that the need to ensure enough competence in the auditing activities by the regulator.  
 
Table 4. 21 Participants suggestions to improve risk management 







Development of dialogue between companies 
and PC 
1st  11 91.7 
Strengthening of safety culture 1st  11 91.7 
Collaboration between companies and PC 2nd  10 83.3 
Frequent and surprise visits to companies’ sites 3rd  9 75 




4.3.1.1.2.5 Risk Information Sharing 
Several means to share information about risk have been suggested.  Table 4.21 presents the 
participants’ suggestion of mechanisms to improve risk information sharing. The first 
mechanism is the email messages as 12 (100%) participants acknowledged that it was fast to 
share information to stakeholders. 11 (92.7%) suggested permit meetings and companies’ 
morning meetings as another way information about risk could be shared. 9 (75%) and 8 
(66.7%) participants suggested the need to have quarterly roundtable discussions with the 
players of the industry and the regulatory agencies respectively. 
 
 
Table 4. 22 Participants’ suggestions of mechanisms improve risk information sharing 







Email messages  1st  12 100 
Permit meetings 2nd  11 91.7 
Companies morning meetings 2nd  11 91.7 
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Quarterly round table discussions with players 
and the regulatory agencies 
3rd  9 75 





4.3.1.1.3 Safety Culture Drivers 
It must be indicated that all the participants acknowledged that improving safety culture was a 
complex issue. This means that it requires a collective effort from all the stakeholders involved 
in the upstream oil and gas industry. Table 4.22 shows several suggestions that can drive safety 
culture improvement in the industry. 12 (100%) participants suggested the need for investment 
in safety training and development and behavioural change of workers. 11 (91.7%) indicated 
that leadership commitment must reflect on both safety values and actions. 10 (83.3%) 
suggested effective change management, active participation and involvement in safety and 
effective communication channels, both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches. 9 (75%) 
participants submitted that a positive supporting and guiding working environment must be 
created at the sites. 8 (66.7%) indicated the need for reward packages to stimulate safety 
behaviour at the workplace. It must be stated that 7(58.3%) suggested the need for learning 
from incidents and accidents and continuous improvement of safety in the industry.  
 
Table 4. 23 Suggested drivers of safety culture improvement in the workshop 
Drivers  Participants (N = 12) 
Ranking of 
Suggestions 




Investment safety training and development 1st  12 100 
Behavoural change 1st 12 100 
 Leadership commitment to both safety values and 
actions  
2nd  11 91.7 
Effective change management  3rd  10 83.3 
Active participation and involvement in safety 3rd  10 83.3 
Effective communication channels both ‘top-
down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches  
3rd  10 83.3 
Positive supporting and guiding working 
environment  
4th  9 75 
Reward packages  5th  8 66.7 
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Learning from incidents and accidents 6th  7 58.3 




4.3.1.2 Outline of the Solution 
There were three main themes that the participants suggested mechanisms to improve in the 
industry: regulatory influences, integrative risk governance and culture influences. These 
themes have influences on incidents and accident risks in the industry. 
 
Regulatory influences have been identified in the literature as critical contributors to numerous 
incidents and accident in the oil and gas industry (Carden et al, 2017; Theophilus et al., 2017).  
These contributory influences relate to deficiencies in the governance of national statutes, 
regulations and international standards. The participants suggested seven ways to improve 
existing regulatory issues in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry:  
• There must be a separate independent HSE regulatory. 
• Government must establish national HSE policies. 
• There must be a unified safety regulatory framework to cover statutes, regulations and 
guidelines. 
• Government must set up fund for investment in safety capacity training and research. 
• There must be establishement of adequate contractors’ safety delopment and reward 
schemes. 
• Provision of adequate resources. 
 
Integrative risk governance has become a critical approach to address the complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity issues associated with risk in the oil and gas industry (Marjolein et 
al., 2011; Renn, 2014). The basic aim of the integrative risk governace is to involve the relevant 
stakeholders in the gathering, assessing, evaluating, managing and communicating the risks 
knowledge. The participants suggested the following mechanisms to address the the risk 
governance deficiencies in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry: 
• Multi-stakeholder involvement approach in risk frames: It must cover the various 
government agencies, the industry actors (shareholders, operating organisations, 
contracting organisations, staff and workers), labour union and the local authorities.  
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• Interdisciplinary risk assessment: Existing engineering probabilistic risk assessment 
must incorporate the backgound knowledge of human and organisational issue that link 
to the risk. 
• Legitimisation of the risk evaluation: This requires the government setting the RAC, 
tranparency between the company or the industry and the regulator, accountability to 
stakeholders and the government, involvement of experts in the risk appraisal and the 
deliberation of the risk isues among the relevant stakeholders.  
• Controlling and monitoring of risk: It involves dialogue between the companies or the 
industry and the government regulatory agencies, strengthening of safety culture, 
collaboration between the companies or the industry and the government regulatory 
agencies, regular visitation to companies’ sites and the sufficient technical capacity in 
auditing.  
• Risk information sharing: Various mechanisms have been suggested to improve risk 
information sharing which include the following: emails messages, permit meetings, 
organisations’ morning meetings, qaurterly roundtable discussion with the companies 
or the industry players and the government regulatory agencies, and the establishent of 
annual safety forums or conferences.  
 
Safety culture has been established to improve safety performance in the industry. It drives 
regulatory performance (Yang, 2019), organisation’s implementation of safety management 
systems (NEB, 2014), and workers safety behaviour at the workplace (Álvarez-Santos et al., 
2018). The study suggested several drivers that would improve existing poor safety culture in 
the regulatory agencies, companies and the workers.  The following drivers are required to 
improve safety culture in the upstream oil and gas industry: investment safety training and 
development, behavoural change, leadership commitment to both safety values and actions, 
effective change management, active participation and involvement in safety, effective 
communication, positive supporting and guiding working environment, safety motivation, 
learning from incidents and accidents and continuous improvement of safety.  
 
 
4.4 Stage 3: Developing the Framework 
This section presents the third activity of the DSR process. It seeks to develop a framework 
that fulfills the defined problem and requirements in stage 1 and 2 of the DSR process 
respectively. The main resources for this activity were drawn from the literature and the 
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empirical findings of this study. The main concepts that formed the structure of the proposed 
conceptual framework were outlined and linked to the empirical findings of stage 1 and 2 of 
the DSR process. The conceptual framework was developed and described.  
 
 
4.4.1 Proposed Conceptual Framework 
As indicated in chapter 1 (see section 1.4), the final research objective of this study is to develop 
and refine a framework for robust safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
According to Imenda (2014), a framework provides a structure that are based on data collected 
from various sources.  
 
In this section, a proposed conceptual framework was developed which focused on the key 
concepts from the literature and the main information through the documents review, 
questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews and the workshop (figure 4.7.).  Given this 
context, the key components forming the structure of the framework was defined for the 
proposed conceptual framework. This proposed conceptual framework could be used as a 
practical tool to guide robust safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
4.4.1.1 The Core Components Defining  the Proposed Conceptual  Framework 
Based on the literature and the empirical findings of this study, four components were derived 
to constitute the structure of the proposed conceptual framework. They include the following:  
• Level 0: Sociotechnical structure  
• Level 1: Integrative risk governance  
• Level 2: Safety climate drivers  
• Level 3: Feedback  
These components were linked to the literature and the empirical findings of the study.  
 
 
4.4.1.1.1 Level 0: Sociotechnical Structure  
As indicated in the literature review chapter (section 2.2), safety management is a control 
problem (Rasmussen, 1997; Björn & Rollenhagen, 2014; Li & Guldenmund, 2018). In a high-
risk environment like the oil and gas industry, there is a complexity associated with the 
upstream oil and gas operations that involves the interactions of the government, regulatory 
agency, industry (drilling-rig owners, operating organisations and various different contracting 
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organisations) and the workers. Such complexity of the systems has interations of the 
technology, humans and the organisation which features interwoven domains of knowledge. 
This complexity may create performance variability in the systems. Therefore, safety becomes 
a dynamic property of the systems. Given this, all these stakeholders are required to be co-
ordinated systematically in a manner that will control the performance of the manchine 
(technology), workforce (humans) and the physical environment (organisation). In this context, 
the first start of the conceptual framework is to recognise the critical importance of 
sociotechnical system theory in safety control. It addresses the complexity issues in the 
systems. The sociotechnical systems feature captures the hierarchical safety control structure 
in the upstream oil and gas operations. It identifies the roles of the government, regulatory 
agency, industry and the workforce towards fulfilling the primary aim of the safety function. 
As pointed out in the literature review chapter (section 2.2), the basic functions of safety 
management include the protection of human beings, property and the environment from 
unacceptable risks.However, from the data analysis (see section 4.3.1.1.1), the participants 
indicated the need for national HSE policies for the industry. They also pointed out the need 
for an integrated HSE regulatory framework for the industry that captures the relevant national 
safety statutes, regulations, guidelines as well as the international standards and industry best 
practices.   
 
As indicated in the document review (see section 4.2.1.1.1.1), the current regulatory framework 
for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry lacks coherence and adequacy relative to the scope 
of the regulatory properties.  From the literature review chapter (see section 2.7), the industry 
is required to robustly implement its safety management systems. Within the context of this 
study, the industry broadly covers both the operating and contracting organisations.  In the 
industry, in some cases, the operating organisations may lack the technical expertise to execute 
the tasks and therefore require outsourcing. Therefore, contracting activities are critical for the 
industry. Ghana’s local content regulations for the upstream oil and gas industry puts a 
mandatory requirement of the operating companies to recuit both th local workforce and the 
local contracting organisations. However, the data analysis (see section 4.2.1.4.2.5) indicated 
existence of knowledge gap in HSE requirements among local contractors. From the data 
analysis (see section 4.3.1.1.1), it is important that operating organisations when outsourcing, 
must emphases the requirement for an adequate HSE scope in contractors’ qualification 
process, pre-assessment of contractors’ safety skills, capacity and equipment used for their 
work. These requirements would help to improve the contractors’safety management systems 
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implementation. The findings of the questionnaire surveys also indicated workers’ unsafe acts 
in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry (see section 4.2.1.3.6). Such unsafe acts have an effect 
on the implementations of the safety management systems in the industry. 
 
To address the complexity of the risk related issues that are imbedded in the hierarchincal level 
of the upstream oil and gas operations, safety must be conceived as an emergent property of a 
sysatem. This requires that the interwoven domain of knowledge relating to risk in all the 
hierarchical levels that are linked to the upstream oil and gas operations must be considered. 
Government is to develop policies towards the fulfilment of the safety functions (i.e. HSE 
policies). The regulatory agency is required to make safety rules and enforce them. In other 
words, it must develop a regulatory framework that must reflect both national and international 
contexts. This is because the upstream oil and gas industry reflects globalisation characters 
(Mearns & Yule, 2009; Blakstad, 2014). The regulatory agency must provide for national 
safety statutes, regulations and guidelines. It must also provide for international best industry 
practice to reflect those international characters. This regulatory framework must be enforced 
to ensure that the industry comply with to achieve the safety goal. The industry is required by 
regulation to implement a safety management system. It must develop HSE competence 
assessments for their outsourcing activities. This must involve the interation between operating 
and contracting companies in terms of HSE competence. Contractors must demonstrate an 
adequate HSE scope in the qualification process, pre-assessment of contractors’ safety skills, 
capacity and equipment must be conducted. There must be collaboration, supervisions and 
effective communication between them. Workers’ unsafe acts are key barriers to 
implementation of organisational safety management systems. This is because a high-quality 
human performance in terms of its interaction with with technology and organisational 
processes is critical to improve safety performance. However, after identification of the various 
safety control issues emerging from the hierarchical sociotechnical systems, an effort must be 
made to integrate the institutional structure, policy process guiding and confining the collective 
operaions of the various stakeholders. This requires an integrative risk governance.  
 
 
4.4.1.1.2  Level 1: Integrative Risk governance 
Given the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity risk-related issues associated with upstream 
oil and gas operations, the literature review chapter (section 2.4.2.1) indicated an integrative 
risk governance approach is critical to handle such issues. It must cover the requirement of 
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multiple actor-network in framing the risks, interdisciplinary risk assessment, legitimisation of 
the method and process in evaluating the risk, management of the risk which requires 
monitoring and controlling of the risk, and risk information sharing which emphasises 
inclusion of stakeholders (Renn, 2014; Hale, 2014; Linkov et al., 2018). The main research 
findings from the documents review (section 4.3.1.1.2.1) suggested the need to have a multi-
stakeholder involvement in the framing of the risk issues that must cover the various 
government agencies, industrial actors, labour union and the local authorities. The activities of 
these stakeholders influence the risk of the upstream oil and gas industry. For instance, from 
the semi-structured interview (section 4.2.1.4.3), it was indicated that the weather conditions, 
corrosions and offshore fishing activities pose a risk to the offshore oil and gas operations. 
Regulatory agencies such as the GMET and GFC must be involved in the framing to help in 
profiling the localised knowledge of risk. The findings of the workshop suggested the need to 
have interdisciplinary risk assessment which must incorporate human and organisational 
factors to the QRA. The legitimisation of the RAC has become a vital issue in the literature. 
The authority to control the risk of upstream oil and gas activities is inherent in the sovereignty 
of the state, which is exercised through the regulatory agencies. The current safety regulatory 
regime reflects government-enforced self-regulation. The participants (see 4.3.1.1.2.3) 
indicated that the government should set the RAC as well as providing procedures that defined 
transparency, accountability, trust, investment of experts and stakeholders’ deliberation of the 
risk. The workshop (see section 4.3.1.1.2.4) suggested the need for dialogue, strengthening of 
safety culture, collaboration and regular surprise visitation and to sites and adequate 
competence in auditing as essential ingredients to have an effective monitoring and controlling 
of risk in the industry. The study indicated the need to have an improved strategy to 
communicate risk information to the stakeholders. The study (see section 4.3.1.1.2.4) 
suggested these strategies such as emails, permit meetings, morning meetings, monthly 




4.4.1.1.3 Level 2: Safety Climate Drivers  
Safety culture influences safety performance. The literature (section. 2.6) indicated that safety 
culture drives policies and procedures, implementation of an organisational safety management 
systems and the behaviours of the individual workers. In other words, it drives the regulatory, 
organisational and workers’ influences. One primary assumption in the safety literature is that 
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workers’ safety or unsafe behaviours are a function of the prevailing safety culture of the 
organisation. Because of the conceptual challenges in measuring organisational safety culture, 
safety climate is mostly applied to measure the tangible outputs or indicators of an 
organisation’s safety culture (Guldenmund, 2010). Safety climate has been established as a 
robust indicator that drives the implementation of safety management systems (Kim et al., 
2019).  
  
However, from the data analysis, both the documents review (see section 4.2.1.1) and the semi-
structured interviews (section 4.2.1.42.4), participants identified several regulatory issues in 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The participants (section 4.3.1.1.1) suggested 
fundamental mechanisms to improve the current regulatory issues in the industry. These 
mechanisms are summarised to include the following: establishment of a separate independent 
HSE regulator, development and review of HSE policies to improve safety performance, 
provision of adequate safety statutes, regulations and guidelines, establishment of fund for 
investment in capacity building and research, provision of sufficient contractors’ safety 
development and reward schemes, and provision of adequate resources for safety. 
  
Moreover, from the data analysis of the semi-structured interviews (section 4.2.1.4.2.5), the 
main barrier to robust implementation of organisational safety management systems in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry was the poor safety culture practice among the local workforce 
and the local companies. The data analysis of the questionnaire surveys (section 4.2.1.4) 
indicated the following as key essential factors of safety climate that influence organisational 
safety performance: safety supervision, management of change, safety empowerment, 
management commitment, safety policies, safety rules and procedures, safety prioritisation, 
supportive environment, safety communication and safety behaviour. To improve safety 
supervision in the organisations, active participation of line managers, supervisors and the 
workforce, swift response to safety-related issues and provision of sufficient safety technical 
knowledge. Improvement in management of change issues requires adequate specification of 
roles and responsibilities of line managers, supervisors and management, regular update of 
information on the change procedures and the facilities, and effective controlling of the process 
continuity, resources and the outsourcing. Safety empowerment can be improved when there 
is a creation of a free working environment where workers are encouraged to influence safety 
decisions and permitted to correct safety-related issues. The main important ways to improve 
management commitment is where leaders are committed in their values and actions towards 
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driving safety performance. Safety policies are required to be well understood and 
implemented in the activities of the managers and workers. Safety rules and procedures must 
be adequately written to reflect the working safety requirements of the facilities. The best way 
to improve safety prioritisation is where safety-related issues are prioritised in decision making 
as against production. There must be a supporting and guiding working environment of the 
activities of the individual workers. 
 
 
4.4.1.1.4 Level 3: Feedback Mechanisms  
The emphasis of safety key performance indicators is to monitor the system performance. 
Monitoring system performance requires both reactive and proactive indicators. Feedback 
mechanism offers an important avenue for the industry to learn from its failures. It must address 
both the reactive and active indicators. The former are the safety outcomes relating to incidents, 
accidents, injuries and fatalities. The latter reflects on the active monitoring of risk control 
systems to provide feedback on performance. Feedback on the safety outcomes and the safety 
climate will help to improve safety in the Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. In this study, 













4.5 Stage 4: Evaluating the Framework 
The previous section (section 4.4) presented stage 3 of the DSR activity, which developed a 
framework to be utilised as a practical tool to robustly manage safety in Ghana’s upstream oil 
and gas industry. The current section presents the final stage of the DSR activity. The purpose 
of this section is to determine how well the initial proposed conceptual framework addresses 
the explicated problem (section 4.2) and to what extent it fulfils the defined requirements 
(section 4.3) of the study. It establishes the evaluation criteria and strategies, validates the 
initial proposed conceptual framework through a focus group of industry professionals and 
presents the refinement of the final proposed conceptual framework.   
 
 
5.5.1 Evaluation Criteria and Strategy 
According to Elragal and Haddara (2019), the stage of evaluating DSR artefact is challenging 
as there exist several different evaluation techniques to provide the suitable interpretations of 
the problem and the feedback to improve the quality of the artefact produced. Such diversity 
of evaluation techniques poses a more challenge for the process. However, the characteristics 
of the DSR evaluation on the designed artefacts have to be clearly defined (Pries-Heje et al., 
2008). As indicated in chapter 3 (section 3.4.3), a designed artefact can be distinguished 
between product and process. In this study, the designed artefact (i.e. initial proposed 
conceptual framework) focuses on processes in improving safety management.  
 
It adapted the hierarchy evaluation criteria developed by Prat et al. (2014) from their review of 
the DSR literature. As shown in figure 4.8, the evaluation criteria were derived from five main 
dimensions of a system: goal, environment, structure, activity and evolution. An artefact must 
have a broader goal to accomplish. The generality of goal forms the first criterion to validate 
the framework. The second dimension of an artefact is its environment. According to the 
literature, the environment of a DSR artefact must reflect a sociotechnical system. Given this, 
people understanding of the artefact function and its consistency with application to the 
organisation is important to be assessed. The third dimension of an artefact is its structure. The 
structure of the artefact can be assessed based on the level of details of the constructs and its 
clarity. The fourth dimension is the activity of the artefact. In this study, the consistency of the 
artefact in the safety activities is assessed. The final dimension of an artefact is its evolution 
which must be assessed by its robustness and learning capability. The evaluation strategy 
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adopted by this study was the Ex ante evaluation which assessed in a naturalistic setting. Ex 
ante evaluation allows the proposed framework to be validated without being used or even 
being fully developed. Because this artefact is a process type, it requires that its users validate 
it in a real-world setting without laboratory evaluation. It speeds up the evaluation process. It 
allows the proposed framework, which is the initially developed framework to be assessed 





Fig. 4. 6 Hierarchy of evaluation criteria used to validate the proposed framework 
                         Source: Adapted from Prat et al. (2014) 
 
 
5.5.2 Framework Validation through Focus Group  
The evaluation of the framework was carried out through a focus group of industry 
professionals who participated in the earlier stages of establishing awareness of the problem 
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(section 4.2.1.4.1) and defining the requirements of the framework (section 4.3.1). It must be 
indicated that nine professionals out of fourteen were available for the participation of the focus 
group. These participants held safety managerial, supervisory, compliance monitoring and 
management positions from their regulatory institutions, operating and contracting companies. 
The focus group was important to be carried out to allow the industry professionals to 
contribute to the assessment of the relevance of the framework to their respective organisations. 
The focus group guide is provided in appendix J of this study. The researcher commenced by 
presenting the framework, which was on a powerpoint presentation to the participants. The 
researcher presented the literature and empirical findings of the study and explained how the 
framework was developed. The main theories and concepts and their relationships, which 
underpinned the development of the framework were clearly explained to the participants. The 
researcher elicited participants’ opinions on the assessment criteria indicated in section 5.5.1. 
The main feedback and ideas for improvement on the framework were recorded for the 
analysis. The time duration for this validation activity was 45 minutes.  
  
Figure 4.9 presents the responses of the focus group participants on the validation of the 
framework. The researcher assessed the general goal of the framework. The framework seeks 
to provide a practical guide to improve the handling of risk complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity associated with the managing safety in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. In 
terms of the goal dimension of the framework, the results indicated that 50% of the participants 
agreed to a high extent that this framework fulfils the generality of the safety goal. However, 
10% reported the need to improve it further. Given the environmental dimension of the 
framework, it is required to reflect the sociotechnical features of the frameworks such as its 
understandability to the industry professionals, applicability to their organisations and the 
harnessability of technology. The results have shown that 45% agreed that this framework was 
very well understood. But, 22% of them pointed out the need for further explanation on the 
framework. 78% of the participants agreed that the framework is highly applicable to their 
organisation. However, 11% indicated that the framework needs further changes. Whereas 70% 
of the participants agreed that the framework could be harnessed to improve technological 
systems safety, 10% disagreed. The structure dimension of the framework was assessed in 
terms of its comprehensiveness and clarity. 56% of the participants thought that the framework 
captured more details of the mechanisms to improve safety in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
industry. Nonetheless, 33% pointed out the need to incorporate further minor details to the 
framework. 45% of the participants agreed to a high extent that the structure of the framework 
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is clarified. However, 22% were on the contrary view that the structure required a few further 
clarifications. The activity dimension of the framework was evaluated on the basis of its 
consistency. Whilst 45% of the participants thought that the framework was consistent with 
upstream oil and gas activities, 33% expressed the contrary view that it needed minor 
improvement. The evolution dimension of the framework was assessed on its robustness and 
learning capability. The results show that 45% of the participants agreed to some extent that 
the framework reflects some features of robustness. However, 33% pointed out that the 
framework needed a minor change. In terms of its learning capability, only 22% agreed that 
the framework reflects learning capability features. Majority of the participants indicated that 
the framework needs major improvement on its learning capability. The researcher took note 
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5.5.3 Refinement of the Framework 
After the validation of the initial proposed conceptual framework, some participants indicated 
additional comments that needed to be addressed to improve the relevance of the proposed 
framework. Most of these comments were related to the sociotechnical structure (Level 0), the 
feedbacks definition and links (Level 3) and the requirement for additional creation of a level 
purposely to address the element of continuous improvement (i.e. Level 4). At Level 0, some 
participants indicated that the initial proposed framework failed to specify the primary role of 
the regulator. Some comments by the participants were related to the need to define the rule 
making and rule enforcement roles of the regulator. Others suggested that the industry also 
relied on international safety standards as well as a national regulatory framework which have 
to be captured. At Level 3, some participants indicated that the feedback must be well defined 
and linked to further improvement. Many comments were related to the need to incorporate 
continuous improvement of the feedback. These comments were considered in the final 
framework. However, the feedback component (levels 3) was removed from the right-hand 
position and repositioned at the bottom of the final framework. The feedback component was 
linked to all aspects of the final framework which included the new component, Continuous 
Improvement. The Sociotechnical Structure (Hierarchy of safety control levels), Integrative 
Risk Governance and Safety Culture Drivers have been linked to the Feedback component. 
The feedback in each level of the final framework is to be improved continuously.  Therefore, 
the feedback and continuous improvement components were linked to all aspects of the final 
framework.  
 
The primary roles of the regulator were clearly defined to include safety rules making and 
safety rules enforcement. In the safety rules making, the regulator is required to provide an 
integrated regulatory framework that must capture both the national safety regulatory 
framework and international industry standards. The national safety regulatory framework 
must provide for safety statutes, safety regulations and safety guidelines. Both the national 






5.5.4 Description of the Refined Framework 
Figure 10 presents the refined conceptual framework for robust safety management in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. This framework aims at providing a practical tool to guide 
policymakers, regulatory agencies and safety managers or supervisors to identify the 
hierarchical sociotechnical structure for safety control (Level 0), follow an integrative 
governance process to address complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk-related issues 
(Level 1), strengthen the safety culture by driving existing safety climate through regulatory, 
organisational and workers’ influences (Level 2), provide feedback on safety statistics and 
safety climate and ensure continuous improvement of the safety indicators in all aspects of the 
framework. The refined framework comprises three levels: the sociotechnical structure (Level 
0), integrative risk governance (Level 1) and safety culture drivers (Level 2). Each of these 
levels was linked to the feedback and continuous improvement components. The thicker dotted 
arrow lines connect one level to another in their respective colours. The arrow lines show the 
direction of components consideration and the construct dependency. The red thickest dotted 
double arrows cyclically link the feedback and continuous improvement components to all 
aspects of the framework.  
  
Level 0: This level allows organisations or practitioners to identify the hierarchical safety 
control levels in managing safety in the upstream oil and gas industry. The idea behind the 
identification of this sociotechnical structure is that there are technological, human interfaces 
and organisational processes involved in the complexity of the upstream oil and gas operations. 
Each of these safety control levels has a role to play in term of the interaction of technology, 
human and organisational influences in the system operations. For safety management, all the 
levels and their component must be identified for control. The first level of the hierarchical 
sociotechnical structure is the government. The government considers the safety policies 
component. That is, the government through the ministry of energy is required to develop 
safety policies to ensure that its implementation protects human lives, facilities and the 
environment from unacceptable risks of the upstream oil and gas activities. The next safety 
control level of the hierarchical sociotechnical structure is the regulator. The regulator is a state 
agency established through an act of parliament with the primary responsibility of making and 
enforcing safety rules. In this case, the regulator considers two main components: enactment 
of safety rules and enforcement of safety rules. In terms of its safety rules making component, 
it is required to provide an integrated regulatory framework that must reflect both national and 
international regulatory characteristics. The national regulatory framework covers the safety 
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statutes, safety regulations and safety guidelines. The international industry standards are 
required to be incorporated since the designs of the technology reflect global context. This 
integrated regulatory framework is enforced in the industry by the regulator. The next level of 
the sociotechnical structure is the industry. The industry is required to implement safety 
management systems. The respective operating and contracting organisations perform safety 
management systems. Because the operating companies most times outsource some of their 
activities due to limited expertise, they must ensure the following: contractors demonstrate 
sufficient HSE scope during tender process; pre-assessment of contractors’ safety skills, 
capacity and equipment on sites; provision of an effective co-ordination, supervision, 
communication and co-operation of the activities of the contractor on sites. The final level of 
safety control on the sociotechnical structure is the workers. Workers’ activities for both 
operating and contracting organisations are identified and controlled. The feedback from the 
sociotechnical system must be continuously improved and this is indicated by the red thickest 
dotted double arrows. Level 0 is connected to Level 1 by the blue thicker dotted arrow lines. 
 
Level 1: After the identification of the hierarchical safety control levels within the 
sociotechnical system, it follows an integrative risk governance process as shown by the blue 
thicker dotted arrow line. The purpose of this integrative risk governance is to purposely 
address the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk-related issues associated with the 
upstream oil and gas operations. This integrative risk governance considers these components: 
multi-stakeholder involvement frames, interdisciplinary risk estimation, the legitimisation of 
risk acceptance criteria, monitoring and controlling of risk and risk information sharing. The 
multi-stakeholder involvement frames depend on government agencies, industry organisations, 
labour union and the local authorities. The interdisciplinary risk estimation relies on the 
incorporation of human and organisational factors into the risk assessment. The legitimisation 
of risk acceptance criteria is dependent on government setting up the RAC, transparency, 
accountability, trust, expert involvement and stakeholders’ deliberation of the risk associated 
with the upstream oil and gas operations, the monitoring and controlling of risk depends on 
dialogue, strengthening of the safety culture, collaboration, regular and surprise visit on sites 
and adequate technical competence in auditing. The final component of the integrative risk 
governance is the risk information sharing which depends on emails massages, permit 
meetings, morning meetings, monthly roundtable discussion and annual safety forum. The 
integrative risk governance leads to strengthening the safety culture drivers through the thicker 
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brown dotted arrow line. The feedback from the integrative risk governance must be 
continuously improved and this is indicated by the red thickest dotted double arrows.  
  
Level 2: After the incorporation of the integrative risk governance level, the next level is the 
safety climate. As indicated in the literature that safety climate was the manifestation of the 
safety culture, it was driven by three main components: regulatory, organisational and workers’ 
influences. The regulatory influences were dependent on the following: separate independent 
safety regulator; develop and review safety policies; adequate safety statutes, regulations and 
guidelines; establishment of a fund for investment in capacity building and research; 
appropriate contractor safety development and reward schemes; and provision of adequate 
resources. These regulatory influences may improve robustness of the government-supervised 
self-regulations in the industry. The organisational influences considered these components: 
safety supervision, management of change, safety empowerment, management commitment, 
safety policies, safety rules and procedures, safety prioritisation, supportive environment and 
safety communication. Safety supervision depends on active participation, swift responses to 
safety issues and enough safety technical knowledge. The management of change depended on 
the precise specification of roles and responsibilities, regular updates of information relative to 
the change of procedures and facilities, and effective control of process continuity, resources 
and outsourcing. The safety empowerment was depended on workers’ encouragement to 
influence safety decisions and workers permitted to take actions to correct issues. The 
management commitment component depended clearly on leadership commitment to safety 
values and actions. Safety policies must be understood and well implemented. There must be 
adequate, written safety rules and procedures. Safety issues must be prioritised against 
production. There must be a supportive and guiding environment. Safety communication was 
depended on information sharing relative to investigative reports on near-misses, incidents and 
accidents. These influences must drive towards the robust implementation of organisational 
safety management systems in the industry. The workers’ influences were driven by their safety 
behaviour which must be depended on the creation of ownership of safety, learning from 
incidents and accidents, reward and encouragement of safety compliance, and encouragement 
of safety participation. These influences must contribute to workers’ safe behaviour in the 
workplace. The feedback from the safety culture must be continuously improved and this is 




Fig. 4. 8 Refined framework for robust safety management 
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4.6 Summary  
This chapter presented the data analysis and the research findings of the four stages of the DSR 
activities adopted for the study. Stage 1 established the awareness of the problem through the 
data analysis of the documents on existing safety statutes and regulations relevant to Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry, quantitative safety data, questionnaire surveys and semi-
structured interviews. The main findings indicated several regulatory gaps, increasing incidents 
trends, poor safety culture practices and inadequate integrative risk governance.  
  
Stage 2 defined the requirements of the framework which outlined the regulatory influences, 
adequate integrative risk governance and the safety culture drivers. In terms of the regulatory 
influences, the following were suggested to improve government-enforced self-regulations: a 
separate independent HSE regulator, government establishing national HSE policies, a unified 
safety regulatory framework, government setting up fund for investment in safety capacity 
building and research, establishment of adequate contractors’ safety development and reward 
schemes and provision of enough resources. The following were suggested to address the 
inadequacy of the current risk governance: the need for multi-stakeholder involvement frames 
(i.e. government agencies, industry organisations, labour union and local authorities), 
interdisciplinary risk estimation where human and organisational factors are incorporated in 
the risk assessment, legitimisation of the risk acceptance criteria (emphasising on government 
setting the risk acceptance criteria, transparency, accountability, trust, expert involvement, and 
stakeholders deliberations of the risk), monitoring and controlling of risk (requiring dialogue, 
strengthening of safety culture, collaboration, regular and surprise visits to sites and adequate 
development of technical competence in auditing) and risk information sharing (requiring 
email messages, permit meetings, morning meetings, monthly roundtable discussion and 
annual safety forum). The following were suggested to drive safety culture: investment safety 
training and development, behavioural change, leadership commitment to both safety values 
and actions, effective change management, active participation and involvement in safety, 
effective communication channels both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches, positive 
supporting and guiding working environment, effective change management, reward packages, 
learning from incidents and accidents and continuous improvement.  
  
Stage 3 developed a conceptual framework based on the literature and empirical research 
findings. Stage 4 presented the proposed conceptual framework for the participants for 
evaluation. The validation of the initial proposed framework was done through a focus group. 
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The feedbacks and additional comments from the focus group were addressed to refine the 















































The previous chapter presented the data analysis and the key findings of the participants. It 
followed the DSR process to establish the problem of the study, which was a foundation of the 
formulation of the requirements for the development of a conceptual framework to address it. 
The conceptual framework was evaluated through validation by the participants. The purpose 
of the current chapter is to bridge the gap between the literature findings (chapter 2) and the 
empirical findings (chapter 4) of the study. It mainly discusses the results of the literature 
relating to the risk governance issues and the key findings of the data analysis. The discussion 
is structured into two parts: problem facing safety management and solution to address the 
problem.  
  
   
5.2 Part One: Safety Management Problem in the Industry 
As indicated from the beginning of the study, safety management is a control problem. This 
means that an improvement of the governance of risk would help to address the issues of 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity in operations. In this regard, the complex manner to 
coordinate the regulatory processes for collective decision making relative to risk becomes a 
critical matter. The consequences of upstream oil and gas operation affect human lives, 
facilities and the environment. This requires institutional structure and the policy process that 
must guide and check the activities of individuals, companies and the public. Hazard incident 
risks continue to show a rising trend in the industry which point to inadequacies in existing 
control systems in the industry.  
  
  
5.2.1 The Rising Trend of Hazard Incidents in the Industry 
The safety performance indicators measure the safety outcomes of the systems. It covers near 
misses, incidents, accidents and safety (Guo & Yiu, 2015). The analysis of available statistical 
data has indicated a continuous rising trend of near-misses and incidents since Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas operations. The near-misses are those unplanned or uncontrolled events 
that have not resulted in recordable injury or physical damage or environmental damage but 
 243 
have the potential to do so in other situations. From Heinrich’s accident Triangle theory 
(Heinrich, 1931), it points out that near-misses may have no or fewer consequences but can 
rise to result in major accidents. The research findings indicated the main rising incident 
categories to include struck by or impact, hydrocarbon releases, falls from height or dropped 
objects, cut or puncture or scrape, equipment failure and electrical exposure. The struck by or 
impact, falls from height or dropped objects, cut or puncture or scrape, and electrical exposure 
are more of occupationally related injury cases. These hazard incident categories are more 
linked to personal safety domain of the industry. It must be pointed out that different types of 
hazards have its implications for managing safety in the industry. They have negative health 
consequences on workers’ lives (Broni-Bediako & Amorin, 2010). They have a high frequency 
in terms of their occurrence but with low consequences to human risks.  
 
Equipment failure and hydrocarbon releases were found in the empirical analysis as the main 
process-related hazards incidents occurring in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas operations. 
Equipment failure is one of the hazards that cause a major accident in the oil and gas industry. 
Such accidents may result in multiple consequences, including damage to the facilities 
(Nivolianitou et al., 2006). Hydrocarbon releases are noted to be the root causes of major 
hazard precursors on offshore installations (Sklet, 2006; Vinnem et al., 2007; Vinnem et al., 
2010; Vinnem, 2012). Much of these hydrocarbon releases occurred in production operations 
and offtake activities. In all, these incidents appeared more frequent in the following upstream 
oil and gas related activities: production operations, office, warehouse, lifting, crane, rigging, 
deck operations, constructions, installation, subsea and transport.  
 
It must be indicated that whether these incident categories reflected personal or process safety 
domains of the industry, they have potential consequences to human, equipment and 
environmental risks. As noted in the data analysis (section 4.2.1.2.1.1.2), much of these hazard 
incidents had critical interfaces with the equipment (70%) and human risk (23%). Near-misses 
and other hazard incidents may have less severe consequences but point to weaknesses in the 
system that may contribute to major accidents (Bellamy, 2012; Reason, 2016). These safety 
performance indicators indicated the inadequacies of the existing safety controls. Although 
these safety performance indicators are essential in providing valuable information about how 
the safety controls have performed in the past, they cannot adequately capture the knowledge 
of the causal links to these safety outcomes. This takes to the next discussion on the key 




5.2.2 Safety Climate Influences on Safety Performance in the Industry 
The questionnaire surveys assessed workers’s perception of safety climate influences on hazard 
incident risks. These factors were found to have relatively higher extent of predictive influence 
on safety performance: safety supervision, management of change, safety empowerment and 
management commitment. Some factors such as safety policies, safety rules and procedures 
and safety behaviour were found to have relatively high effect on hazard incident risk. 
However, factors such as safety priority, supportive environment, equipment maintenance and 
safety communication appeared to have influence on hazard incident risks in the upstream oil 
and gas operations.  
 
It must be indicated that safety supervisory deficiencies related to unsafer maintenance 
procedures, lack of swift response towards resolving process safety issues and limitation in 
discussing process safety related issues between supervisors and workers. These supervision 
deficiencies may cause major incidents if not resolved. As noted in the review of Bell and 
Healey (2006), safety supervision had been a key factor in major accidents findings. These 
deficiencies found in supersory behaviour must be critically considered for remediations. 
Workers’ perceived management of change issues included vague specification of roles and 
responsibilities, sporadic update of information on change of working procedures and 
inadequate control of the process of activities continuity, resources and outsourcing 
arrangement. Changes in technology, chemical processes, equipment and procedures may 
increase the complexity of the processes and systems operations as well as contributing to the 
changes in hazards. These may have significant potential consequences to the risk of major 
industrial incidents (Theophilus et al., 2017; Jain et al., 2018). The research found perceived 
lack of safety empowerment in the industry. According to Kines et al. (2011), it affects 
promoting trust and social exchanges at the workplace.  Trust and social exchanges need to be 
created to influence safety performance in the organisations. Workers’s perceived lack of 
management commitment to safety was found to have predictive influence on hazard risks. The 
key issues here is about leadership value and action towards safety. In most cases, management 
commitmnent to safety are not linked to their values and actions at the workplace. The link 
between leadership and workplace accidents is evident that most managers’ behaviour at the 
various levels of the organisations influence safety performance (Willis et al., 2017; Stiles et 
al., 2018). Leaders must drive safety improvement through their values and actions.  
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Furthermore, safety policies in various organisations were not well understood by the workers 
Safety policies are meant to commit the management in various levels of the organisations to 
follow the expressed safety decisions. When such safety policies are not well understood by 
the workers, it affects implementation of the safety management systems. This is because 
safety policies are key aspects of the organisations’ safety management systems. Safety rules 
and procedures were perceived to have influence in hazard incident risks in the upstream oil 
and gas operations. These influences related to inadequacy, short-cut and infrequent 
compliance to written operating procedures at the workplace. The design of safety rules and 
procedures are meant to provide a chronological sequence of needed actions that must be 
followed to accomplish safe operations. They are indispensable elements of safety 
management, particularly for high-risk industries. However, factors such as safety priority, 
supportive environment, equipment maintenance and safety communication were found to 
have relatively limited influence on safety performance. These factors must be given an 
attention as they have influence in causing accidents at the workplace (Cox & Cheyne, 2000; 
Konstantinidou, 2012; Okoh & Haugen, 2013; Amiri et al., 2015). Safety behaviour was 
perceived to influence safety perofmance in the industry. Conditions at the workplace made 
workers sometimes ignored safety rules and procedures, take short cuts, non-compliance to 
code of practice and lack of participation in safety related activities. Such behaviours at the 
workplaces influence safety performance at the workplace. These safety behavioural practices 
confirmed the earlier literature that indicated poor safety culture practices in the Ghanaian 
industrial working environment (Donkoh & Aboagye-Nimo, 2017; Agyekum & Simons, 
2018).  
 
Having regarded accident as an emergent property, the critical characteristic of the complex 
interactions of its components parts is the joint optimisation. It is a dynamic state which is 
continuously subjected to changes and influenced by both organisational internal and external 
factors. Safety climate measures this joint optimistion (Brian et al., 2015). The multilevel 
measurement which was reflected in the various categories of workers from different level of 
organization that constituted the sample gives more credence to the safety climate findings. For 
example, the samples included engineering professionals, maintenance or craft technicians, 
operations management, contractors, maintenance management and other workers. The safety 
climate measure captured the shared perception of the human and organisational issues from 
various levels of the upstream oil and gas operations. The measure indicated several 
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weaknesses from the complex sociotechnical system in the industry. It reflected the overall 
status of safety in the industry as perceived by the workers. This means that safety climate is a 
product of the sociotechnical systems. However, in this study, the external factors related to 
the issues related to existing regulatory and institutional framework which are discussed in the 
next section.  
 
 
5.2.3 The Strength of Regulatory and Institutional Frameworks 
Government has the primary responsibility to control the hazardous activity of the industry. 
This goal must be expressed in policy form which must be reflected in the existing regulatory 
framework. The empirical findings (section 4.2.1.4.2.4) indicated a lack of national safety 
policies. Safety policies contribute to influencing the safety climate of the industry (Mearns et 
al. (2003; Petitta et al., 2017). These safety policies commit the actors involved in the upstream 
oil and gas operations. It defines the tasks, responsibilities, and how decisions are to be carried 
out or made towards fulfilling the requirement of protecting workers, facilities and the 
environment from unacceptable risks. The practice in the country is that various organisations 
may have their safety policies which are followed throughout in their operations. However, 
when the state lacks a policy direction in controlling the hazardous activities of the oil and gas 
resources, organisations may result in compromising safety for production most times. Ghana 
was not prepared in terms of how to control the hazardous activities in the industry and for that 
matter that state safety management role was left to the industry where various companies have 
adopted their internal safety controls since the country’s first oil and gas production.  
  
However, existing regulatory and institutional framework before the first oil and gas 
production could have managed the industry without the reliance on the companies’ internal 
safety control frameworks. The simple reason is that existing regulatory and institutional 
frameworks are weak and therefore, depending on them could result in several inadequacies in 
managing major hazard risks associated with the upstream oil and gas operations. Annan et al. 
(2015) and Norman et al. (2015) noted the general increasing trends of industrial accidents in 
Ghana. This evidence gives more credence to the ineffectiveness of existing risk governance 
in Ghana. The research findings in both the documents (section 4.2.1.1) and semi-structured 
interviews (section 4.2.1.4.2.1) revealed several issues associated with the governance of risk 
in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. The research findings on the review of the documents 
containing existing safety statutes and regulations relevant to the industry indicated 
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incoherence and limited scope of the existing regulatory properties. Hence, there is the need 
for this framework. The literature (Dagg et al., 2011; Mendes et al., 2014; Burton et al., 2017; 
Acheampong & Akumperigya, 2018) pointed out the importance of regulatory properties in 
determining the efficacy of existing safety regulatory regime in the industry. These safety 
statutes and regulations must reflect the safety of workers, facilities and the environment. They 
are required to cover employment standards and work environment, emergency planning, oil 
spill response and liability for accidents. Much of these regulatory properties are captured in 
different statutes. Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act and Petroleum (Exploration 
and Production) HSE Regulations have limited scope in covering the regulatory properties. 
This means that various pieces of regulatory features have to be coordinated to fulfil the safety 
functions. This may affect the efficacy of the existing regulatory regime. However, in terms of 
ensuring the coordination and effectiveness of the various regulatory properties, an integrated 
approach is required to provide a ‘single window’ to the regulatory regime. The research 
findings from the workshop (section 4.3.1.1.1) indicated the need to develop an integrated 
framework to capture all the regulatory properties. This confirms the literature findings of the 
importance of regulatory features in the determination of the efficacy of a regulatory regime.  
  
The institutional framework plays a critical role in risk governance. Generally, the process of 
making and implementing collective safety decisions requires institutions. Such an analysis of 
the institutional framework is much placed in terms of its regulatory approach. In other words, 
the roles of institutions in risk governance are influenced by its regime style. The power to 
control the risks of industrial activities is exercised by the sovereignty of the state, which is 
usually conferred to a public institution through a legislative means. In this case, an institution 
represents a vehicle and an outcome of a decision.  Existing safety regulatory regime in Ghana 
before the industry commenced in 2010 was the prescriptive approach. This approach has 
several limitations in controlling hazardous activities. This is because the boundaries between 
the state and private organisations, and between the business interests and the regulatory needs 
of the society are all vague (Renn, 2014).  The performance-based regime has become one of 
the regulatory regimes to regulate safety. This requires an effective and independent public 
regulatory authority to control the risk of industrial activities in the country.  The empirical 
findings indicated that the PC lacked independence and performs dual roles in terms of 
regulating the licensing of the petroleum exploration and production activities as well as 
ensuring safe operations. This confirms earlier literature (Addulai, 2016; Acheampong & 
Akumperigya, 2018). Ghana’s safety case is a performance-based regime that focuses on 
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ensuring companies reduce the risk associated with their operations as low as possible. This 
regime approach requires a collaboration between government agencies and the industry. The 
industry has several organisations that contribute to the risks of the operations 
 
 
5.2 Part Two: Manage Safety in the Industry 
This section discusses the ways to address the safety management problem in the industry. The 
ways to manage safety in the industry are based on five areas such as identification of the 
hierarchical sociotechnical structure for safety control, requirement for an integrative 
governance process to address complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk-related issues, 
strengthen the safety culture by driving existing safety climate through regulatory, 
organisational and workers' influences, provide feedbacks on safety performance and ensure 
continuous safety improvement.   
 
As pointed out from the literature, safety management is a control problem. Therefore, to 
manage safety robustly, it requires all the hierarchical safety control levels to be identified. The 
main reason for identifying the safety control levels in the upstream oil and gas operations is 
to address the complexity issue. The main concern associated with complexity in the safety 
management context is because there is inadequate knowledge at the overall system level. The 
complexity of a system arises when there is insufficient knowledge about the consequences of 
the system, although there is a strong knowledge about the consequences of its sub-systems 
(Jensen & Aven, 2018). The use of probability-based risk assessment approach, which 
underpins the current safety management in the industry increases the complexity issue in 
operations. Those probability risk estimates do not adequately capture the background 
knowledge linked to the risk. This results in uncertainties of knowledge and potential surprises 
in the industry. One critical approach to address the complexity issue is to adopt sociotechnical 
thinking. Given this performance variability in the systems as associated with the complex 
upstream oil and gas operations, the roles of the government, regulatory agency, industry and 
the workforce towards achieving the safety functions must be identified. In this regard, a 
hierarchical sociotechnical structure is provided to identify all the levels where technology, 
humans and organisational processes interact to influence safety outcomes. Government 
becomes the first level of the sociotechnical structure that must develop the national safety 
policies to reflect the broader safety goals of the industry. The second level is the regulatory 
authority that must integrate the HSE regulatory framework for the industry. As indicated in 
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the research findings (section 4.2.1.1.1.1), the current regulatory framework for Ghana's 
upstream oil and gas industry lacks coherence and adequacy relative to the scope of the 
regulatory properties. This regulatory framework must capture the relevant national safety 
statutes, regulations, guidelines, as well as the international standards and industry best 
practices. The regulator must enforce this regulatory framework. It must be indicated that 
statutory and regulatory influences major accidents in the industry. A typical example is 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster which, among other factors, included national and 
international regulatory deficiencies (Theophilus et al., 2017).   
 
The industry constitutes the next safety control level that is required to implement the safety 
management systems. The key actors in this context that have a direct influence on the safety 
performance of the industry are the operating organisations and their vendors (i.e. contracting 
companies). Both the operating and contracting organisations are required by the regulator to 
carry out their activities in a safe manner. Ghana's safety case regime requires both operating 
and contracting organisations to adopt internal safety controls to ensure that their activities do 
not expose humans, facilities and the environment to unacceptable risks. Although the adoption 
of the internal safety controls, including best industry practices, are mainly required by the 
existing regulatory framework, they have to be justified by the companies and approved by the 
regulator. However, the research findings (section 4.2.1.4.2.5) indicated lack of knowledge gap 
in the HSE requirements among local contractors in Ghana's upstream industry. It is imperative 
that operating organisations when outsourcing, must stress the requirement for an adequate 
HSE scope in contractors' qualification process, pre-assessment of contractors' safety skills, 
capacity and equipment used for their work. These strategies may help to understand the safety 
gaps of the contracting organisations. They are necessary because as indicated by Bianchini et 
al. (2017), investment in safety management systems are considered as unprofitable by small 
companies. This is because such companies have no real perceptions of the accident risk and 
also the economic benefits are not clear to them in the short run of their activities. In a country 
with a poor safety culture where its regime emphasised local content mandatory requirements, 
the local companies' safety management needed a critical attention in the industry. The 
increasing growth of construction-related activities in the upstream oil and gas operations 
makes local companies more relevant in the industry (Misiti & Hebert, 2016; Popat et al., 
2018). These local companies may be found in the supply of supports, fabrications, 
maintenance and repair of equipment, demolitions, waste management and fabrication 
activities. However, the literature revealed that several Ghanaian companies lack the pre-
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requisites to carry out activities that fulfil the standards required in the industry (Ackah & 
Mohammed, 2018). The operating companies must support their local clients (local companies) 
to implement safety management systems. The last safety control level of the sociotechnical 
structure is the Workers. Workers' unsafe acts influence safety performance in the industry. 
The quality of human performance relative to interaction with technology and organisational 
processes is critical to improve safety performance. Technical training and competence 
influence safety performance but are not only sufficient to assure operational integrity (SPE, 
2014). The right safety behaviours of workers in operating and contracting companies are 
important to assure the operational integrity of the industry.  
 
The findings of the literature review indicated that the requirement for integrative risk 
governance is a vital feature to drive robustness of a safety regime. It contributes to addressing 
the issue of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk-related issues associated with 
upstream oil and gas operations. The empirical research findings (section 2.4.2.1 and section 
4.3.1.1.2.1) highlighted poor risk governance in the Ghanaian upstream oil and gas industry. A 
multi-stakeholder approach is required in the implementation of all the steps involved in the 
governance of risk in the industry. Given the influence of several actors in the risk 
characterisation in the upstream industry, a multi-stakeholder approach which captures several 
government agencies, industry actors, labour union and the local government authority would 
help to conceptualise the risk issues of the operations. An inadequate risk framing may affect 
the risk assessment of the upstream oil and gas operations (Renn, 2014). The framing structure 
must take into consideration the identification of all relevant stakeholders that may influence 
the risk of the upstream oil and gas industry. The research findings of the workshop suggested 
the need to have interdisciplinary risk estimation, which must incorporate human and 
organisational factors to the QRA. QRA is an aspect of safety engineering that requires a 
probabilistic risk assessment. Such probabilities are limited in terms of incorporating those 
background knowledges to the hazard risks. This requires companies to employ qualitative 
assessment of the issues that are linked to the hazards. Those perceptions are critical in decision 
making of the risk (Aven & Ylönen, 2016). The risk evaluation requires to be instituted with 
the legitimisation process with the government setting up the RAC. This reinforces the 
argument made by Abrahamsen and Aven (2012). This is because the authority to control the 
risk of upstream oil and gas activities is inherent in the sovereignty of the state. Therefore, the 
government must take the responsibility to set the RAC for the companies. However, this must 
be done in terms of providing procedures that defined transparency, accountability, trust, the 
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involvement of experts and stakeholders in the deliberation of the risk. This would contribute 
to reducing ambiguity issues associated with the risk evaluations between the regulator and the 
industry players. It has been noted that existing regulatory authority responsible for safety 
compliance monitoring lacks the capacity of this role. Given the nature of the government-
enforced self-governance of the industry, elements such as dialogue, strengthening of safety 
culture, collaboration, regular surprise sites visitation and capacity building would help to 
control the risk associated with the upstream activities. Such a partnership role between the 
government and the industry would boost the reinforcement of trust and accountability in the 
industry. However, discursive approach in disseminating information about risk must be 
emphasised along with the traditional strategies for communication.  
  
Strengthening the safety culture in the industry is a key feature to drive robust safety 
management. In the oil and gas industry, safety culture has been a long journey. Strengthening 
safety culture helps to improve human and organisational factors influencing safety 
performance. Human and organisational factors still continue to contribute to many of these 
hazard incidents and process failures today (Pariyani & Reniers, 2018). Strengthening the 
culture of the oil and gas industry must cover the regulatory agencies, companies and the 
individual workers. It must be noted that both the literature (section 2.3.1.2) and the empirical 
findings of this study (section 4.2.1.4.2.5) revealed weak safety culture in the Ghanaian 
industrial environment including local companies involved in the upstream oil and gas 
industry. Strengthening the safety culture of the regulatory agencies would help to improve 
safety performance in the upstream oil and gas industry (NASEM, 2016). The regulatory 
authority must go beyond compliance monitoring approach to develop its competency. A safety 
case regime only functions well when there are a competent, independent, well-resourced 
regulator and a high level of expertise (Hopkins, 2012). In this view, the existing regulatory 
authority must be a separate and independent body. The national safety policies relating to the 
upstream oil and gas operations must be developed and reviewed to meet the safety standards 
required in the industry. The regulator must develop an adequate safety statutes, regulations 
and guidelines required in the industry. It must invest in the capacity building of its staff and 
research as wells as developing supporting stimuli scheme for its local companies in view of 
addressing the challenges found in the local content implementation in the industry. In driving 
organisational safety climate in the industry, existing safety supervision, management of 
change, safety empowerment, leadership commitment to safety, safety policies, safety rules, 
safety prioritisation, supportive environment and communication must be improved to 
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strengthening existing safety culture in the industry. However, workers' safety behaviour can 
be improved by making the employees own the safety of their operations, learn from incidents 
and accidents motivation and encouraging them to participate in safety at the workplace. These 
elements would help to contribute to strengthening the existing safety culture.  
  
An effective feedback mechanism from safety performance is critical for the industry to learn 
from its failures. Safety performance involves safety outcomes and safety behaviours 
(Christian et al., 2009). Provision of feedback mechanism must address the safety outcomes 
and safety behaviours. The safety outcomes are related to the reported information on safety 
performance indicators that including incidents, accidents, injuries and fatalities. Safety 
outcomes are necessary for two main reasons: to determine appropriate strategic responses and 
act as a warning or 'prodromes' of future accidents (Fink, 1986). Safety behaviours are related 
to safety compliance and safety participation. A safe behaviour at the workplace can be 
promoted through a positive organisational safety climate. The feedback mechanism improves 
the learning capability of the safety management framework that is relevant for the 
reinforcement of continuous improvement of safety performance in Ghana's upstream oil and 
gas industry. The feature of continuous safety improvement reinforces the learning capability 
of the regime. Continuous improvement is part of the change that is required in the upstream 
to adapt to the dynamism in technology, human actions organisational processes (Pasmore et 
al., 2019). It strengthens the learning capability of a sociotechnical system. This continuous 




5.4 Summary  
This chapter discussed the main research findings of the study. It highlighted the safety 
management problem in the Ghanaian oil and gas industry and how safety must be managed 
to minimize the complexity, uncertainty and the ambiguity of the risk-related issues. It 
indicated how it has contributed to bridging the safety research gap in the Ghanaian upstream 
oil and gas industry.
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This study started with the discussion and synthesis of the critical issues of safety management 
in the upstream oil and gas industry in a comprehensive review of the literature, as presented 
in chapter two. It was followed by a research methodological framework which indicated the 
philosophical position, adoption of DSR as the research approach, research methods which 
defined the various data collection and data analysis techniques used for the study were 
presented in chapter three. Chapter four presented the data analysis and research findings for 
each step of the DSR process. Chapter five presented a discussion on the research findings. 
The current chapter provides a conclusion of the research by summarising the key results for 
all the research objectives, contribution to knowledge and presentation of the research 
limitations and further research. 
 
 
6.2 Synthesis on the Research Objectives  
As indicated in chapter one, the aim of this study was to develop a framework for robust safety 
management in the upstream oil and gas industry in Ghana. In achieving this aim, six research 
objectives were set. The first objective was to assess the robustness of existing safety regulatory 
regime. This was achieved by way of review of current safety statutory and regulatory 
documents as well as semi-structured interviews of industry professionals. The second research 
objective was to identify the safety regulatory issues influencing the upstream oil and gas 
operations, and the semi-structured interviews of industry professionals addressed this. The 
third research objective was to examine the safety performance indicators in the industry, 
which was achieved by the safety statistical data. The fourth research objective was to assess 
workers’ perception of the safety climate influence on hazard risks which was addressed by 
way of questionnaire surveys. The fifth research objective explored the drivers and barriers to 
a robust implementation of safety management systems in the industry. Semi-structured 
interviews of the industry professionals addressed this. The final research objective was to 
develop and refine a framework for robust safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
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industry. This was addressed by the findings of the literature review, findings of the review of 
existing safety statutory and regulatory documents, questionnaire surveys of workers, semi-
structured interviews, workshop and the focus group of the industry professionals. The main 




6.2.1 Research Objective 1: Assess the Robustness of Existing Safety 
Regulatory Regime 
As the literature review findings indicated (section 2.4), robustness has become an important 
concept which, in many cases, realised as an ‘official solution’ for dealing with potential policy 
issues. As noted in the literature review (section 2.3.1.2), there are pres-existing weaknesses of 
risk governance in the Ghanaian industrial environment before the emergence of the upstream 
oil and gas industry. Given the inherent hazardous nature of the industry coupled with the 
complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity risk challenges, a theoretical framework defining 
robustness features was reviewed to assess Ghana’s safety regulatory regime. The main 
findings of the documents (section 4.2.1.1.1.1) and the semi-structured interviews (section 
4.2.1.4.2) indicated incoherent and limited scope of the existing regulatory properties, critical 
characteristics of integrative risk governance were not addressed in the current safety case 
regime, insufficient engagement of stakeholders in implementing the safety case approach, 
existing self-regulatory regime had not been sustained for a longer period and the learning 
capability of the regime reflects more reactiveness as there was limited engagement of the 
stakeholders in changes to facilities. These findings are indicative that Ghana’s safety 
regulatory regime does not demonstrate the ability to sustain the principal characteristics of the 
government enforced-self-regulatory regime with adequate learning capabilities. Therefore, 
Ghana’s safety regulatory regime lacks robustness.  
 
 
6.2.2 Research Objective 2: Identify the safety regulatory issues  
The literature indicated the importance of safety regulatory influences on major accidents in 
the global oil and gas industry. Incidents or accidents goes beyond organisational failures; it 
involves national and international industry and its governance. It can be indicated that any 
deficiency in the national and international regulatory framework may influence safety 
performance. The semi-structured interviews revealed several regulatory issues in the industry. 
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The main findings include the lack of national safety policies and guidelines, lack of 
independence of the regulator, lack of policies for investment in safety training and 
development, scattered safety laws, insufficient resources, inadequate safety requirements in 
procurement for local contractors and corruption. These issues are critical to influence 
regulatory failure in the industry. 
 
 
6.2.3 Research Objective 3: Examine the safety performance indicators 
As indicated in the literature review (section 2.5), safety performance indicators are critical 
because they can monitor system performance. They identify and report on incidents with the 
purpose to check the adequacy of existing safety controls. Therefore, they indicate the safety 
outcomes of the control systems. As noted in the literature, no adequate safety performance 
indicators had been examined since the emergence of Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. 
This study examined the safety performance indicators in the industry. The main findings of 
the safety statistics indicated rising trends of near-misses and incidents in the industry. The 
critical incident categories driving this rise include struck by or impact, hydrocarbon releases, 
falls from height or dropped objects, cut or puncture or scrape, equipment failure, and electrical 
exposure. These incidents mainly occurred during the following upstream oil and gas related 
activities: production operations, office, warehouse, lifting, crane, rigging, deck operations, 
constructions, installation, subsea and transport. However, these hazard incidents had 
interfaced with humans, equipment and the environment dimensions of risk. The results 
indicated that these incidents had relatively the highest interfaces with equipment risk. They 
had some interfaces with human risk as well. However, these incidents had relatively less 
contribution to environmental risk as cases in water leaks and spills related cases were barely 
low.  The safety performance indicators in the industry have been driven by increasing trends 
of near-misses and incidents. 
 
 
6.2.4 Research Objective 4: Assess workers’ perceptions of the influence of 
safety climate on hazard risks 
As noted in the literature review findings (section 2.3.1.2), Ghana had a poor safety culture in 
its industrial environment before the emergence of the upstream oil and gas industry. For some 
years of upstream oil and gas operation, the safety culture in the industry has to be assessed 
through safety climate measures. The study evaluated workers' perceptions of the influence of 
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safety climate on hazard risks in upstream oil and gas operations. The safety climate has 
become a key concept that reflects and manifests the organisational safety cultural 
assumptions. It measures the shared workers' perceptions about the relative importance of safe 
conduct in their workplace behaviour. As indicated in the literature review findings, it provides 
early warning indications on the performance of the system as it relates more to active 
monitoring of risk control systems to provide feedback on performance before an incident 
occurs. However, the study found that safety climate perceptions have a predictive influence 
on hazard risks in Ghana's upstream oil and gas operations. Factors such as safety supervision, 
management of change and safety empowerment have a relatively higher predictive effect on 
hazard risks. It indicated that safety policies, safety rules and procedures and safety behaviour 
have a relatively high predictive effect on hazard incident risk. Factors such as safety priority, 
supportive environment, equipment maintenance and safety communication had some 
influence on hazard risks. Given the rising tof near-misses and incidents in the upstream oil 
and gas operations, these factors give the impression for a critical need to improve the safety 
culture in the industry. 
 
 
6.2.5 Research Objective 5: Explore the drivers and barriers to a robust 
implementation of safety management systems 
This study investigated the issues associated with the implementation of safety management 
systems in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. As indicated in the literature review (section 
2.7.2.1), it is as a rationalised management system that defines the policies, procedures, tactical 
guidelines and practices for achieving the safety function. For control of risk and fulfilment of 
regulatory requirements, organisations in the industry are required to implement them. The 
study found safety culture as the primary construct that drives a robust implementation of safety 
management systems. However, the empirical findings (section 4.2.1.4.2.5) indicated several 
barriers that influenced a robust implementation of safety management systems in the industry. 
They include poor safety culture, knowledge gap, inadequate safety involvement, lack of 
supporting environment, inadequate communication, insufficient monitoring, lack of 
awareness creation, lack of awareness creation, poor contractor safety management and limited 
resources. These barriers are more related to safety climate issues. Therefore, the existing 





6.2.6 Research Objective 6: Develop and refine a framework for robust 
safety management 
The final research objective was to develop and refine a framework for robust safety 
management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas operations. Having established the awareness of 
the problem confronting safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry, it was 
imperative to outline the requirements to address the problem in the industry. The problem was 
defined by way of review of safety statutory and regulatory documents (section 4.2.1.1), 
statistical analysis of quantitative safety data (section 4.2.1.2), assessment of safety climate 
influences through questionnaire surveys (section 4.2.1.3) and investigation of the issues 
through semi-structured interviews of industry professionals (section 4.2.1.4). The study 
elicited suggestions from the industry professionals to address the problem (section 4.3.1). 
However, a conceptual framework was developed based on the empirical findings of the 
problem and requirements definitions and theoretical findings of the study (section 2.8). The 
framework was developed based on the theory of sociotechnical systems that defined the 
hierarchical safety control levels of the industry, integrative risk governance model that 
addresses the issues of uncertainties and ambiguities of risk in the industry, the safety culture 
that defines the drivers of the regulatory authority, industry organisations and the workers, and 
the learning capability concept that establishes the feedback mechanisms. However, the 
framework was refined through a focus group validation by industry professionals. The key 
findings of the focus group included the following: the majority of the participants agreed that 
the framework fulfils the generality of the safety goal, understandable to practitioners, 
applicable to their industry, harnessable of technology, structure comprehensive and clarified, 
consistent with the upstream oil and activities and sustainable. However, in terms of its learning 
capability, the participants disagreed. The comments suggested by the participants were 
addressed in the refined framework. This framework provides a practical guide to practioners, 
policy makers and researchers on how to manage safety robustly in Ghana’s upstream oil and 
gas industry.  
 
In short, the main conclusions of this study are presented as follows: 
• The safety management regime for Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry does not 
reflect the robustness thinking development. 
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• Existing safety regulatory regime for Ghana's upstream oil and gas industry is limited 
in terms of national safety policy directions and guidelines, coherence and 
independence of the regulatory authority, capacity development and leadership 
commitment. 
• There is an increasing trend of incidents in the industry dominated by struck by or 
impact, hydrocarbon releases, falls from height or dropped objects, cut or puncture or 
scrape, equipment failure, and electrical exposures. These incidents had relatively the 
highest interfaces with equipment and human risks. 
• Safety climate perceptions have a predictive influence on hazard risks in Ghana's 
upstream oil and gas operations.  
• Safety culture influences the robust implementation of the organisations' safety 
management systems in the industry.  
• There is the need for the upstream oil and gas industry to focus on robustness thinking 
in safety management which must be characterised with an integration of the 
perspectives of sociotechnical systems, integrative risk governance, safety culture and 
learning capability.  
 
  
6.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
The study identified a gap in the current body of knowledge in safety management of Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. There was no adequate empirical research that has defined the 
safety management problem confronting Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry. This study 
used several different research methods to define the safety management problem in the 
Ghanaian upstream oil and gas industry. The improvement of the research rigour helped to 
provide a deeper understanding of the issues facing safety management problem in the industry.  
This study has contributed to bridging the gap identified in the literature and offered 
prescriptive knowledge underpinned by relevant integrated concepts and theories to address 
the needs of the industry that would benefit policymakers, industry practitioners and 
researchers. This study specifically contributed to theoretical and practical knowledge.  
 
 
6.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Given the gap of knowledge related to safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
industry, this study collected and analysed primary data to define the safety problem facing the 
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industry. In other words, the analysis of the primary data helped to establish the true picture of 
the safety performance and the robustness of the existing safety management of the industry 
which is hitherto unknown. The study established a continuous rising trend of hazard incidents 
and near-misses, and existing safety management lack robustness. It is important to indicate 
that various pieces of principle and method are provided to guide decision-making on risk in 
the industry. This study contributed to bridging the knowledge gap by providing an integrative 
research that offered broader views of managing safety in the upstream oil and gas industry. It 
merged the principles of sociotechnical systems, integrative risk governance, safety culture, 
feedback and continuous improvement into a framework. This integrated research helps to 
provide a better understanding of safety management in a complex system like the upstream 
oil and gas industry. 
 
  
6.3.2 Practical Contribution 
DSR is well developed in information systems; its application in safety management in the 
upstream oil and gas industry remains unclarified. Following the DSR process, this study has 
contributed to bridging the gap between research and relevance of knowledge in the industry. 
It has established that DSR is more applicable to safety management field in the upstream oil 
and gas industry as characters of DSR projects such as prescription of knowledge, tailored to 
management research, multi-dimensionality, continuous improvement, and systemic driven 
have reflected in the current conceptual framework developed to improving safety 
management. Every stage of the research involved multiple stakeholders’ participation of 
industry professionals. This helped to fulfil the needs of the stakeholders in the industry in 
addressing the safety management problem. Overall, this study developed a framework that 
can be used as a practical tool to guide policymakers, industry practitioners and researchers on 
how to carry out a robust safety management in the Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry.  
 
 
6.4 Limitation of the Research 
The findings of this study are associated with some research limitations. Firstly, the analysis 
of the questionnaire data did not differentiate between operating workers and contracting 
workers relative to the perception of safety climate influences on hazard risks. An indication 
was made in semi-structured interviews that it was the upstream oil and gas industry that is 
largely driving the safety culture in the country. An empirical analysis of the differences in 
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safety climates influences between operating and contracting workers would provide some 
evidence to this position.  
  
Secondly, the upstream oil and gas industry is a globalised environment where both technology 
and foreign companies are an integral part of the operations. National culture plays a critical 
role in terms of safety performance in the oil and gas industry. This study did not investigate 
the influence of national culture on safety performance. It can be recommended that further 
research examine the impact of national culture on safety performance in Ghana’s upstream oil 
and gas industry.  
 
Thirdly, the study did not provide an analysis on the Expected Utility theory on why the need 
for government to set the risk acceptance criteria for the industry. Although this study argued 
for the state to set the risk for the industry, there was no empirical analysis of the expected 
utility model to reinforce this position. Empirical research is required to strengthen this 
argument further.  
  
Finally, the analysis of the incident cases covered only two years periods (from 2017 to 2018) 
of Ghana’s upstream oil and gas operations. This obscures the full picture of the trends of the 
occurrence of the incident in the industry. Due to the challenge of obtaining a comprehensive 
safety performance data in the industry, this analysis was limited to two years period. A further 
study is needed to provide an updated review of the incidents for the whole periods of Ghana 
upstream oil and gas industry. This will help to identify the trends of occurrence of incidents 
categories in the industry.  
 
 
6.5 Recommendations to Policy Makers  
This study offers some recommendations to improve risk governance in the upstream oil and 
gas industry in Ghana. The recommendations include the following: 
1. There is currently no national comprehensive health and safety policies in the country 
that control major hazards operations. Given the state obligation to control the risk of 
hazardous industrial activities in the country, a new national comprehensive safety for 
major hazardous control must be developed. 
2. The current regulatory body for the upstream oil and gas industry plays two critical 
roles: licencing and safety compliance monitoring. There is a need for a separate 
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independent safety regulatory authority to provide an effective risk control of major 
hazardous operations of the industry.  
3. Guidelines are developed to help fulfilling those safety statutory and regulatory 
responsibilities in the industry. They provide an understanding of how the safety 
statutory and regulatory requirements can be achieved. There are no national safety 
guidelines for critical operations of the industry currently. This study suggests that the 
government must develop a national safety guideline for the safety regulatory 
framework, management regulations, information duty regulations, facilities 
regulations and activities regulations. 
4. Because of the dynamic nature of the upstream oil and gas operations, this study 
suggests that government through its regulatory agency must establish a special fund 
for specific investment in safety capacity development and research for the industry.  
5. Given the introduction of the local content policies in the upstream oil and gas industry, 
it is suggested that special incentive interventions must be provided to local employees 
and companies towards improving their capacity and safety standards that are required 
in the industry. 
6. There is a general challenge in terms of safety behaviour in the Ghanaian industries. 
This study recommends the development of safety behaviour change strategies that 




This chapter summarised the key findings of the research obtained from the review of the safety 
statutory and regulatory documents, statistical analysis of qauntitative safety data, 
questionnaire surveys, semi-structured interviews, workshop and the focus group. The research 
aim and objectives of the study were achieved. The study contributed to bridging the gap 
between safety management research and industry relevance. 
 262 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
 
Abrahamsen, E.B. (2011). On the rationality of using risk acceptance criteria based on the 
expected utility theory. International Journal of Business Continuity and Risk 
Management, 2(1), 70-78.  
Acakpovi, A., & Dzamikumah, L. (2016). An investigation of health and safety measures in a 
hydroelectric power plant. Safety and health at work, 7(4), 331–339.  
Achaw, O. W., & Boateng, E. D. (2012). Safety practices in the oil and gas industries in Ghana, 
International Journal of Development and Sustainability, 1(2), 456–18. 
Achaw, O.W., & Danso-Boateng, E. (2013). Environmental Management in the Oil, Gas and 
related Energy Industries in Ghana. International Journal of Chemical and Environmental 
Engineering. 4(2), 116-122.  
Acheampong, T., & Akumperigya, R. (2018). Offshore risk regulation: A comparative analysis 
of regulatory framework in Ghana, the United Kingdom and Norway. Energy Policy, 113, 
701-710.  
Ackah, C.G., & Mohammed, A.S. (2018). Local content law and practice: The case of the oil 
and gas industry in Ghana. WIDER Working Paper 2018/152. Retrieved from 
https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/Publications/Working-paper/PDF/wp2018-
152.pdf. (Accessed on 12/12/2018).  
Addulai, A. (2016). Regulating health and safety in the upstream oil and gas industry: Lessons 
for Ghana from the United Kingdom Continental Shelf and the United States Outer 
Continental Shelf. PhD Thesis, University of Aberdeen.  
Agyekum, K., & Simons, B.  (2018). Factors influencing the performance of safety 
programmes in the Ghanaian construction industry. Acta Structilia, 25(2), 39-68.  
Ahmed, S., & Asraf, R.M. (2018). The workshop as a qualitative research approach: Lessons 
learnt from a “critical thinking through writing” workshop.  Retrieved from 
http://www.tojdac.org/tojdac/VOLUME8-SPTMSPCL_files/tojdac_v080SSE201.pdf 
(Accessed on 14/05/2019).  
Ahmed, G.A.A. (2016). Development of a health and safety and environment (HSE) 
performance review methodology for the oil and gas industry in Libya. PhD thesis, 
University of Bradford.  
Akotia, J.K. (2014). A framework for social and economic sustainability benefits evaluation of 
 263 
sustainable regeneration projects in the UK. PhD Thesis. School of the Built Environment, 
College of Science and Technology, University of Salford.   
Akumperigya, R. (2015). Licensing or safety- the regulatory dilemma of the Ghana Petroleum 
Commission. PhD Thesis. University of Aberdeen.  
Al-Harthy, M.H. (2008). Motivation: A challenge for oil and gas companies an Omani case 
study. Retrieved from http://ogbus.ru/files/ogbus/eng/authors/Al-Harthy/Al-
Harthy_1.pdf. (Accessed on 20/05/2019). 
Alruqi, W.M., Hallowell, M, R., & Techera, U. (2018). Safety climate dimensions and their 
relationship to construction safety performance: A meta-analytic review. Safety Science. 
109, 165-173.  
Álvarez-Santos. J., Miguel-Dávila, J., Herrera. L., &  Nieto, M. (2018). Safety Management 
System in TQM environments. Safety Science, 101, 135-143.  
Alvi, M.H. (2016) A manual for selecting sampling techniques in research. Retrieved from 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70218/1/MPRA_paper_70218.pdf (Accessed 
23/08/2018).  
Amaratunga, D., Baldry, D. Sarshar, M. & Newton, R. (2002). Qualitative and quantitative 
research in the built environment: application of "mixed" research approach: a conceptual 
framework to measure FM performance. Work Study, 51(1), 17-31.  
Amir, S. (2018). Introduction: Resilience as Sociotechnical Construct. In: Amir, S. (eds.) 
The Sociotechnical Constitution of Resilience. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.   
Amir, S., & Kant, V. (2018). Sociotechnical Resilience: A Preliminary Concept. Risk Analysis, 
38(1), 8-16.  
Amiri, S., Mahabadi, H.A., Mortazavi, S.B., & Ghanbari, M. (2015). Investigation of Safety 
Climate in an Oil Industry in Summer of 2014. Health Scope, 4(2), e26071. 
Amponsah-Tawiah, K., & Dartey-Baah, K. (2011). Occupational Health and Safety: Key 
Issues and Concerns in Ghana. International Journal of Business and Social Sciences. 2, 
119-126. 
Amponsah-Tawiah, K., Jain, A., Leka, S., et al. (2013). Examining psychosocial and physical 
hazards in the Ghanaian mining industry and their implications for employees' safety 
experience. Journal of Safety Research, 45, 75-84.  
Amponsah-Tawiah, K., & Mensah, J. (2016). Occupational health and safety and 
organizational commitment: evidence from the Ghanaian mining industry. Safety and 
Health at Work, 7, 225-230.  
Amponsah-Tawiah, K., & Mensah, J. (2016). The impact of safety climate on safety related 
 264 
driving behaviors. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, 
40, 48-55. 
Amundrud, Ø., & Aven, T. (2015). On how to understand and acknowledge risk. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 142, 42–47. 
Annan, J.-S., Addai, E.K., & Tulashie, S.K. (2015). A call for action to improve occupational 
health and safety in Ghana and a critical look at the existing legal requirement and 
legislation. Safety and health at work, 6(2), 146-150. 
Andersen, J. (2017). Research strategy. In. Andersen, J., Toom, K. & Poli, S. Research 
management: Europe and Beyond. London; Sara Tenney.  
Andreas, S., Antonsen, S., & Haugen, S. (2016). Safety climate as an indicator for major 
accident risk: Can we use safety climate as an indicator on the plant level? International 
Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 18, 23–31.  
Asiedu, S. R. (2010). Developing and integrating a positive safety and health culture in an 
organisation in Ghana. Lecture notes for Postgraduate Diploma in Occupational Safety, 
Health and Environmental Management. GIMPA, Accra. [Unpublished]. 
Atombo, C., Wu, C., Tettehfio, E.O., Nyamuame, G.Y., & Agbo, A.A. (2017). Safety and 
Health Perceptions in Work-related Transport Activities in Ghanaian Industries. Safety 
and Health at Work, 8(2), 175-182.  
Attwood, D. (2017). Regulation of Chemical Process Safety: Current Approaches and Their 
Effectiveness. Methods in Chemical Process Safety, 1(1), 255-325.  
API (2010a). Isolating Potential Flow Zones During Well Construction, Recommended 
practice 65 – Part 2, First edition. Retrieved from: 
https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/Stnd_65_2_e2.pdf (Accessed on 
30/07/2017). 
Arghami, S., Nouri Parkestani, H., & Alimohammadi, I. (2014). Relaibility and validity of a 
safety climate questionnaire. Journal of Research in Health Science, 14(2), 140-145. 
Aven, T. (2009). Safety is the antonym of risk for some perspectives of risk. Safety Science, 
47(7), 925–930.  
Aven, T. (2016). Risk assessment and risk management: Review of recent advances on their 
foundation. European Journal of Operational Research, 253(1), 1-13.  
Aven, T. (2017). How some types of risk assessments can support resilience analysis and 
management. Reliability Engineering & System Safety. 167, 536-543.  
Aven, T., & Renn, O. (2018). Improving government policy on risk: Eight key principles. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 176, 230-241.  
 265 
Aven, T., & Kørte, J. (2003). On the use of risk and decision analysis to support decision-
making. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 79(3), 289-299.  
Aven, T., & Ylönen, M. (2016). Safety regulations: Implications of the new risk perspectives. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 149, 164-171.  
Aven, T., & Ylönen, M. (2018). A risk interpretation of sociotechnical safety perspective. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 175, 13-18.  
Backlund, A. (2002) The concept of complexity in organisations and information systems. 
Kybernetes, 31(1), 30-43.  
Bagley, C. (2009). Descriptive data analysis. Air Medical Journal, 28(2), 56-59.  
Baker, J., Bowman, F. L., Erwin, G., Gorton, S., Hendershot, D., Leveson, N., ... & Wilson, L. 
(2007). The report of the BP US refineries independent safety review panel. BP US 
Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. Retrieved from: 
http://sunnyday.mit.edu/Baker-panel-report.pdf. (accessed on 14/02/17). 
Baker, T.L. (1999). Doing Social Research (3 rd ed.). London: McGraw-Hill College. 
Baldwin, R., Cave, M. & Lodge, M. (2012). Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and 
Practice (Second Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baram, M., & Lindøe, P.H. (2014). Modes of risk regulation for prevention of major industrial 
accidents. In: Lindoe, P.H., Baram, M. & Renn, O. (eds.) Risk governance of offshore oil 
and gas operations. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Baram, M., Lindøe, P.H., & Renn, O. (2014). Introduction: In search of robustness. In: Lindoe, 
P.H., Baram, M. & Renn, O. (eds.) Risk governance of offshore oil and gas operations. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Barua, S., Gao, X. & Mannan, M.S. (2016). Comparison of prescriptive and performance-based 
regulatory regimes in the U.S.A and the U.K. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries, 44, 764-769.  
Basu, S. (2017). Chapter I - Basics of Hazard, Risk Ranking, and Safety Systems. In: Plant 
Hazard Analysis and Safety Instrumentation Systems (pp.1-81). London: Joe Hayton 
Baxter, G. & Sommerville, I. (2011). Socio-technical systems: from design methods to systems 
engineering. Interacting with Computers, 23(1), 4-17.  
Bellamy, L.J. (2012). A literature review on safety performance indicators supporting the 
control of major hazards. Retrieved from 
https://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/620089001.pdf (Accessed on 14/08/2017).  
Bell, J., & Healey, N. (2006). The Causes of Major Hazard Incidents and How to Improve Risk 
Control and Health and Safety Management: A Review of the Existing Literature. Health 
 266 
and Safety Laboratory Report HSL/2006/117. Retrieved 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/hsl_pdf/2006/hsl06117.pdf. 
Bengtsson, B. (2011). Frame dynamics and stakeholders in risk governance: A study of EU 
food safety and GMOs. Lund: Media-Tryck AB. 
Bennear, L.S. (2015). Offshore Oil and Gas Drilling: A Review of Regulatory Regimes in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Norway, Review of Environmental Economics and 
Policy, 9(1), 2–22. 
Bento, F. (2018). Complexity in the oil and gas industry: a study into exploration and 
exploitation in integrated operations. Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, 
and Complexity, 4(11), 1-17.  
Bergeron, S., & Mutimer, K. (2012). Jubilee Development HSE Management and Safety Case. 
10.4043/23463-MS. 
Bergh, M. Shahriari, M., & Kines, P. (2013). Occupational safety climate and shift work. 
Chemical Engineering Transactions, 31, 403-408. 
Bergman, M.E., & Payne, P.C (2018). Interdisciplinary collaborations facilitate safety climate 
research. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 56, 204-208.  
Bhave, A.G., Conway, D., Dessai, S., & Stainforth, D.A. (2016) Barriers and opportunities for 
robust decision-making approaches to support climate change adaptation in the 
developing world. Climate Risk Management, 14, 1-10.  
Bianchini, A., Donini, F., Pellegrini, M., & Saccani, C. (2015). Effective implementation 
measurability in a health and safety management system. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283513498 (13/03/2017). 
Bianchini, A., Donini, F., Pellegrini, M., & Saccani, C. (2017). An innovative methodology for 
measuring the effective implementation of an Occupational Health and Safety 
Management Systems in European Union. Safety Science, 92, 26-33.  
Binch, S., Sugden, C., Healey, N., Butler, C., & Lekka, C. (2012). Developing a process safety 
climate tool: the long and winding road. Symposium Series No.158, XXIII, 538-543. 
Björn, W., & Rollenhagen, C. (2014). Safety management – A multi-level control problem. 
Safety Science, 69, 3–17. 
Bjerga, T., & Aven, T. (2015). Adaptive risk management using new risk perspectives – an 
example from the oil and gas industry. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 134, 75-
82.  
Blair, B.D., McKenzie, L.M., Allshouse, W.B., & Adgate, J.L. (2017). Is reporting “significant 
damage” transparent? Assessing fire and explosion risk at oil and gas operations in the 
 267 
United States. Energy Research & Social Science, 29, 36–43. 
Blakstad, H.C. (2011). Safety indicators used by authorities in the petroleum industry of UK, 
US and Norway. Report Number SINTEF A20542. Trondheim: SINTEF Technology and 
Society.  
Blakstad, H.C. (2014). Safety indicators used by authorities in the petroleum industry of UK, 
US and Norway. In: Lindoe, P.H., Baram, M. & Renn, O. (eds.) Risk governance of 
offshore oil and gas operations. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Blau, P. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York: Wiley.  
Bond, A., Morrison-Saunders, A., Gunn, J. A. E., Pope, J., & Retief, F. (2014). Managing 
uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance in impact assessment by embedding evolutionary 
resilience, participatory modelling and adaptive management. Journal of 
Environmental Management, 151, 97–104.  
Borman, W.C., & Motowidlo, S.J. (1997). Task performance and contextual performance: The 
meaning for personnel selection research. Human Performance. 10, 99–109. 
Bosak, J., Coetsee, W.J., & Cullinane, S. (2013). Safety climate dimensions as predictors for 
risk behavior. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 55, 256–264.  
Boughaba, A. Hassane, C., & Roukia, O. (2014). Safety Culture Assessment in Petrochemical 
Industry: A Comparative Study of Two Algerian Plants. Safety and Health at Work, 5, 60-
65.  




Bratspies, R.M. (2011). A Regulatory Wakeup Call: Lessons from BP's Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster. Golden Gate University Law Review. Retrieved from 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1888609. (Accessed on 20/03/2017).  
Brian, M.K., Hettinger, L.J., David, M.D., Huang, Y.H., & Love, P.E.D. (2015). Sociotechnical 
attributes of safe and unsafe work systems, Ergonomics, 58(4), 635-649. 
Bridges, W., & Tew, R. (2010). Human factors elements missing from process safety 
management. Presented at 6th American Institute of Chemical Engineers Global Congress 
on Process Safety and 44th Annual Loss Prevention Symposium. March 22-24, Texas. 
Broni-Bediako, E., & Amorin, R. (2010). Effects of Drilling Fluid Exposure to Oil and Gas 
Workers Presented with Major Areas of Exposure and Exposure Indicators. Research 
Journal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and Technology 2(8), 710-719. 
 268 
Bryden, R., & Gibson, W. (2000). Workforce Involvement in Safety Programme. Presented at 
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) International Conference on Health, Safety and 
Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Stavanger, Society of Petroleum 
Engineers.  
Burns, R.B. (2000). Introduction to research methods. London: Sage Publication. 
Burrell, G. & Morgan, G. (1979). Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, Hants: 
Ashgate. 
Burton, A., Holman, P., & Banner, C. (2017). European downstream oil industry safety 
performance: statistical summary of reported incidents – 2017. Report Number 11/18. 
Retrieved from https://www.concawe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Rpt_18-11.pdf 
(Accessed on 12/04/2019). 
Cambon, J., Guarnieri, F., & Groeneweg, J. (2006). Towards a new tool for measuring Safety 
Management Systems performance. Presented at 2nd Symposium on Resilience 
Engineering. Juan-les- Pins: Paris. Retrieved from https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-
ouvertes.fr/hal-00637874/document (Accessed on 23/02/2017).  
Cameron, K.S., & Quinn, R.E. (1999). Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: 
Based on the Competing Values Framework. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Capano, G., & Woo, J.J. (2017). Resilience and robustness in policy design: a critical appraisal. 
Policy Sciences, 50, 399-426.  
Capano, G., & Woo, J.J. (2018). Designing policy robustness: outputs and processes. Policy 
and Society, 37(4), 422-440.  
Carayon, P., Hancock, P., Leveson, N., Noy, I., Sznelwar, L., & van Hootegem, G. (2015). 
Advancing a sociotechnical systems approach to workplace safety--developing the 
conceptual framework. Ergonomics, 58(4), 548-64.  
Carden, T., Goode, N., Read, G.J.M., & Salmon, P.M. Sociotechnical systems as a framework 
for regulatory system design and evaluation: Using Work Domain Analysis to examine 
a new regulatory system. Applied Ergonomics, 80, 272-280. 
Carson, D., Gilmore, A., Perry, C., & Gronhaug, K. (2001). Qualitative Marketing Research. 
London: Sage. 
Chatman, J.A., & O’Reilly, C.A. (2016). Paradigm lost: Reinvigorating the study of 
organizational culture. Research in Organizational Behavior, 36, 199-224. 
 269 
Chatterjee, S. (2015). Writing My next Design Science Research Master-piece: But How Do I 
Make a Theoretical Contribution to DSR? Retrieved from 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2015_cr/28 (Accessed on 10/12/ 2018).  
Chinn, P.L., & Kramer, M.K. (1999). Theory and Nursing: A Systematic Approach (5th Ed.). 
St Louis US: Mosby. 
Christian, M.S., Bradley, J.C., Wallace, J.C., & Burke, M.J. (2009). Workplace safety: A meta-
analysis of the roles of person and situation factors. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 
1103–1127. 
Christou, M., & Konstantinidou, M. (2012). Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations: 
Lessons from Past Accident Analysis. European Commission Report. Retrieved from: 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC77767/offshore-accident-
analysis-draft-final-report-dec-2012-rev6-online.pdf. (Accessed on accessed 
15/03/2019). 
Chu, H., & Ke, Q. (2017). Research methods: What's in the name? Library & Information 
Science Research, 39(4), 284-294.  
Cloutier, M., & Renard, L. (2018). Design science research: issues, debates and contributions. 
Retrieved from https://www.cairn.inforevue-projectique-2018-2-page-11.htm. 
(Accessed on 05/08/2018).  
CNSOPB (2018). Incident Reporting and Investigation Guideline. Retrieved from 
https://www.cnlopb.ca/wp-content/uploads/guidelines/incrptgl.pdf (Accessed on 
19/11/2019).  
Conchie, S.M. (2013). Transformational leadership, intrinsic motivation, and trust: 
amoderated-mediated model of workplace safety. Journal of Occupational Health 
Psychology, 18(2), 198–210.  
Cox, S., & Cheyne, A. (1999). Assessing Safety Culture in Offshore Environments. HSE 
Offshore Research Report, Loughborough University, UK. 
Cox, C.J., & Cheyne, A.J.T. (2000) Assessing safety culture in offshore environments. Safety 
Science, 34, 111-129. 
Cox, L.A. (2009). Limitations of Quantitative Risk Assessment Using Aggregate Exposure and 
Risk Models. In: Risk Analysis of Complex and Uncertain Systems. (pp. 3-33). Boston, 
MA: Springer.  
Cox, S., & Lacey, K. (1998). Measuring Safety Culture in Offshore Environments: Developing 
the Safety Climate Assessment Toolkit. Paper presented at Changing Health and Safety 
Offshore, The Agenda for the next 10 years, Aberdeen, 22-24 July.  
 270 
Cox, K., Black, J., Grand-Clement, S., & Hall, A. (2016). Human and organizational factors 
in major accident prevention: A snapshot of the academic landscape. Cambridge: 
RAND Corporation.  
Crossan, F. (2016). Research philosophy: towards an understanding. Nurse Researcher, 11(1), 
46-55. 
CSB (2016). FINAL REPORT: Macondo Investigation Report Volume 4. Retrieved from 
https://www.csb.gov/macondo-blowout-and-explosion/  (Accessed on 10/09/2018).  
Cullen, D. (1990). The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. Department of Energy 
London: HMSO 
Curcuruto, M., Guglielmi, D., & Mariani, M.G. (2013). Organizational citizenship for safety: 
psycho-social processes of mediation. Psicologia sociale, 8(2), 229–48. 
Curcuruto, M., Mariani, M.G., Conchie, S., & Violante, F. (2015). The role of prosocial and 
proactive safety behaviors in predicting safety performance. Safety Science. 80, 317–23. 
Dadashzadeh, M., Abbassi, R., Khan, F., & Hawboldt, K. (2013). Explosion modeling and 
analysis of BP Deepwater Horizon accident. Safety science, 57, 150-160.  
Dadzie, J. (2013). Perspectives of Consultants on Health and Safety Provisions in the Labour 
Act: A Study into Theory and Practicals. Engineering Management Research; 2(1),34-
42. 
Dagg, J., Holroyd, P., Lemphers, N., Lucas, R., & Thibault, B. (2011). Comparing the Offshore 
Regulatory Regimes of the Canadian Arctic, the U.S., the U.K., Greenland and Norway. 
Alberta, Canada: The Pembina Institute. Retrieved from 
https://www.pembina.org/reports/comparing-offshore-oil-and-gas-regulations.pdf 
(Accessed on 13/02/2018) 
Dahl, Ø., & Kongsvik, T. (2018). Safety climate and mindful safety practices in the oil and gas 
industry. Journal of Safety Research. 64, 29-36.  
Dahl, Ø., & Olsen, E. (2013). Safety compliance on offshore platforms: A multi-sample survey 
on the role of perceived leadership involvement and work climate. Safety Science, 54, 
17-26.  
Dakker, S. Cilliers, P., & Hofmeyr, J.-H. (2011). The complexity of failure: implications of 
complexity theory for safety investigations. Safety Science, 49, 939-945.  
Darke, P., Shanks, G.G., & Broadbent, M. (1998). Successfully completing case study 
research: combining rigour, relevance and pragmatism.  Information. Systems 
Journal, 8, 273-290. 
 271 
Davies, F., Spencer, R., & Dooley, K. (2001). Summary guide to safety climate tools. Health 
& Safety Executive. Retrieved from 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/otopdf/1999/oto99063.pdf. (Accessed on 
20/05/2016). 
Davies, J. (2008), Integration: is it the key to effective implementation of the EFQM excellence 
model? International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management, 25(4), 383-399.  
Davoudi, S., Shaw, K., Haider, L. J., Quinlan, A. E., Peterson, G. D., Wilkinson, C., et al. 
(2012). Resilience: A bridging concept or a dead end? ‘Reframing’ resilience: 
Challenges for planning theory and practice interacting traps: Resilience assessment of 
a pasture management system in Northern Afghanistan urban resilience: What does it 
mean in planning practice? Resilience as a useful concept for climate change 
adaptation? The politics of resilience for planning: A cautionary note. Planning Theory 
& Practice, 13(2), 299–333.  
Dawood, I., & Underwood, J. (2010). “Research methodology explained”. Paper presented at 
the Advancing project management for the 21st Century -Concepts, Tools and 
Techniques for Managing Successful Projects, Heraklion, Crete. 
De Almeida, A.G., & Vinnem, J.E. (2020). Major accident prevention illustrated by 
hydrocarbon leak case studies: A comparison between Brazilian and Norwegian 
offshore functional petroleum safety regulatory approaches. Safety Science, 121, 652-
665.  
De Biagi, V., & Chiaia, B. (2013). Complexity and robustness of frame structures. 
International Journal of Solids and Structures, 50(22-23), 3723-3741.  
DeJoy, DM. 2005. Behavior change versus culture change: divergent approaches to managing 
workplace safety. Safety Science, 43(2). 105–299. 
Dekker, S., Cilliers, P., & Hofmeyr, J.H. (2011). The complexity of failure: implications of 
complexity theory for safety investigations. Safety Science, 49(6), 939-945.  
Denison, D.R. (1996). What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational 
climate? A native's point of view on a decade of paradigm wars. The Academy of 
Management Review. 21 (3). pp. 619-654.  
De Vaus, D.A. (2014). Surveys in Social Research (6th edn). Abingdon: Routledge. 
De Walle, S. V. (2014). Building resilience in public organizations: The role of waste and 
bricolage. The Innovation Journal, 19(2), 1–18. 
Dhillon, B.S., & Liu, Y. (2006). Human error in maintenance: A review. Journal of Quality in 
Maintenance Engineering, 12(1), 21-36. https://doi.org/10.1108/13552510610654510. 
 272 
DHSG (2011).  Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout. Retrieved 
from https://ccrm.berkeley.edu/pdfs_papers/bea_pdfs/DHSGFinalReport-March2011-
tag.pdf (12/03/2017).  
Donkoh, D., & Aboagye-Nimo, E. (2017). Stakeholders' role in improving Ghana's 
construction safety. ICE Proceedings Civil Engineering, 170(2), 1-14.  
Duit, A. (2015). Resilience thinking: Lessons for public administration. Public Administration. 
94(2), 1-17.  
Duit, A., Galaz, V., Eckerberg, K., & Ebbesson, J. (2010). Governance, complexity, and 
resilience. Global Environmental Change, 20(3), 363–368.  
Durán, J.M., & Patiño, P.M. (2018). Implementation of safety management systems and health 
at work (case study in a telecommunications company). Journal of Physics: Conf. 
Series 1126, 1-4.  
Dwumfour-Asare, B., & Asiedu, S.R. (2013). Awareness of the Factories, Offices and Shops 
Act 1970 (Act 328) at KNUST, Ghana. Developing Country Studies, 3(10), 1-10.  
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., Lowe, A. (1997). Management research: An introduction. 
London: Sage.  
Eckhoff, R. K. (2016). Explosion hazards in the process industries. (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Gulf 
Professional Publishing. 
Eidelson, R. J. (1997). Complex adaptive systems in the behavioral and social sciences. Review 
of General Psychology, 1(1), 42-71.  
Eisenberger, R., Fasolo, P., & Davis-LaMastro, V. (1990). Perceived organizational support 
and employee diligence, commitment, and innovation. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 75(1), 51-59.  
Elgsæter, S. M., Slupphaug, O., & Johansen, T. A. (2010). A structured approach to optimizing 
offshore oil and gas production with uncertain models. Computers & chemical 
engineering, 34(2), 163-176. 
Elragal, A., & Haddara, M. (2019). Design science research: Evaluation in the lens of big data 
analytics. Systems, 7(2). 27.  
ENI (2019). Eni announces Akoma discovery in CTP-Block 4, offshore Ghana. Retrieved from 
https://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/2019/05/eni-announces-akoma-discovery-in-ctp-
block-4-offshore-ghana (Accessed on 26/09/2019).  
Fernández-Muñiz, B., Montes-Peón, J. M., & Vázquez-Ordás, C. J. (2007). Safety management 
system: Development and validation of a multidimensional scale. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 20(1), 52–68. 
 273 
Fink. S. (1986) Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable, New York: American 
Management Association. 
Flage, R., Aven, T., Baraldi, P., & Zio, E. (2014). Concerns, challenges and directions of 
development for the issue of representing uncertainty in risk assessment. Risk Analysis, 
34(7), 1196-1207. 
Fleming, M. (2010). Know where you are going, not where you have been. Presented at 
International Regulators’ Forum, Vancouver, Canada, 18-20 October.  
Flin, R., Mearns, K., O’Connor, P., & Bryden, R. (2000). Measuring safety climate: identifying 
the common features. Safety Science, 34, 177-192. 
Folke, C. (2006). Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems 
analyses. Global Environmental Change, 16(3). 253-267.  
Fox. W., & Bayat, M.S. (2007). A Guide to Managing Research. Cape Town: JUTA and Co 
Ltd. Shredding.  
Fruhen, L.S., Griffin, M.A., & Andrei, D.M. (2019). What does safety commitment mean to 
leaders? A multi-method investigation. Journal of Safety Research, 68, 203–214.  
Fu, Y.-K., & Chan, T.-L. (2014). A conceptual evaluation framework for organisational safety 
culture: An empirical study of Taipei Songshan Airport. Journal of Air Transport 
Management, 34, 101-108.  
Funke, M., & Paetz (2011). Environmental policy under model uncertainty: a robust optimal 
control approach. Climate Change, 107 (3-4), 225–239.  
Garnicaa, G.B., & Barrigaa, G.D.C. (2018). Barriers to occupational health and safety 
management in small Brazilian enterprises. Production, 28, e20170046.  
Geels, F.W. (2004). From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems: Insights 
about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory. Research Policy, 
33 (6-7), 897-920. 
Gerbec, M. (2017). Safety change management – A new method for integrated management of 
organizational and technical changes. Safety Science, 100, 225-234.  
Ghahramani, A., & Khalkhali, H.R. (2015). Developing and validating of a safety climate scale 
for manufacturing industry. Safety and Health at Work, 6(2), 97-103.  
Ghani, A. A., Md Sodari, M. D., Abd Rashid, R. L., Hazlim Husain, M., Abdullah, F., & Samat, 
S. M. (2017). Offshore Self-Regulation OSR Implementation in Malaysia Upstream 
Activities. Society of Petroleum Engineers.  Retrieved from 
https://www.onepetro.org/conference-paper/SPE-185253-MS (Accessed on 21/12/2018).  
Gillen, M. Schneider, S. Hecker, S., & Goldenhar, L. (2013). Safety Culture and Climate in 
 274 
Construction: Bridging the Gap Between Research and Practice.In: A joint Center for 
Construction Research and Training (CPWR) and National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH) Workshop. 11-12 June, Washington DC.  
Goh, Y. M., & Chua, D. (2013). Neural network analysis of construction safety management 
systems: A case study in Singapore. Construction Management and Economics, 31(5), 
460–470.  
Gregg, D., Kulkarni, U., & Vinzé, A. (2001). Understanding the philosophical underpinnings 
of software engineering research in information systems. Information Systems Frontiers, 
3(2), 169–183.  
Gregor, S., & Hevner, A. (2013). Positioning and presenting design science research for 
maximum impact. MIS Quarterly 37(2), 337-355.  
Griffin M.A., & Neal, A. (2000). Perceptions of safety at work: a framework for linking safety 
climate to safety performance, knowledge, and motivation. Journal of Occupational 
Health Psychology, 5(3), 347–58.  
Griffin, M.A., & Curcuruto, M. (2016). Safety climate in organisation. The Annual Review of 
Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 3, 191-212.  
Grote, G. (2012). Safety management in different high-risk domains – All the same? Safety 
Science, 50, 1983–1992.  
Grote, G., & Künzler, C. (2000). Diagnosis of safety culture in safety management audits. 
Safety Science, 34(1-3). 131-150. 
Groth, K., Wang, C., & Mosleh, A. (2010).  Hybrid causal methodology and software platform 
for probabilistic risk assessment and safety monitoring of socio-technical systems. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 95(12), 1276-1285.  
Guo, B. H., & Yiu, T. W. (2015). Developing leading indicators to monitor the safety 
conditions of construction projects. Journal of Management in Engineering, 32(1), 
04015016. 
Gunningham, N., Kagan, R., & Thornton, R.  (2004). Social License and Environmental 
Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance. Law & Social Inquiry, 29: 307–
41. 
Gyekye, S. A., Salminen, S., & Ojajarvi, A. (2012). A theoretical model to ascertain 
determinants of occupational accidents among Ghanaian industrial workers. 
International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, 42, 233-240.  
Haight, J.M., Yorio, P., Rost, K.A., & Willmer, D.R. (2014). Safety management system: 
comapring content and impact. Professional Safety, 44-50. 
 275 
Haight, J.M., Yorio, P., & Willmer, D.R. (2013). Health and safety management systems: A 
comparative analysis of content and impact. In: Proceedings of ASSE’s Safety 2013, 
Las Vegas, NV.  
Hale, A. (2009). Why safety performance indicators? Safety Science, 47, 479–480 
 
Hale, A. (2014). Advancing Robust Regulation: Reflections and Lessons to be Learned. In: 
Lindøe, P.H., Baram, M., & Renn, O. (eds.) Risk governance of offshore oil and gas 
operations. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hale, A., & Boris, D. (2013a). Working to rule, or working safely? Part 1: a state-of-the-art 
review. Safety Science, 55, 207-221.  
Hale, A., & Borys, D. (2013b). Working to rule or working safely? Part 2: The management of 
safety rules and procedures. Safety Science, 55, 222-231.  
Hanid, M. (2014). Design Science Research as an Approach to Develop Conceptual Solutions 
for Improving Cost Management in Construction. PhD Thesis, School of the Built 
Environment College of Science and Technology, University of Salford. 
Hansson, S.O. (2012). Safety is an inherently inconsistent concept. Safety Science, 50(7), 522–
1527. 
Harms-Ringdahl, L. (2009). Relationships between accident investigations, risk analysis, and 
safety management. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 111(1-3), 13-19.  
Harms-Ringdahl, L. (2009). Dimensions in safety indicators. Safety Science, 47, 481–482. 
Hart, S.M. (2002). Norwegian workforce involvement in safety offshore: Regulatory 
framework and participants’ perspectives. Employee Relations, 24(5), 486-499.  
Hassan, Z.A., Schattner, P., & Mazza, D. (2006). Doing a pilot study: why is it essential? 
Malaysian Family Physician, 1(2&3), 70-73.  
Hauge, S., & Øien, K. (2016). Guidance for barrier management in the petroleum industry. 
Retrieved from https://www.sintef.no/globalassets/project/pds/reports/pds-report---
guidance-for-barrier-management-in-the-petroleum-industry.pdf (Accessed on 17/ 
06/2018).  
Hayes, J. (2012). Operator competence and capacity – Lessons from the Montara blowout. 
Safety Science, 50(3), 563-574.  
Hayes, J. (2014). A new policy direction in Australian offshore safety regulation. In: Lindoe, 
P.H., Baram, M. & Renn, O. (eds.) Risk governance of offshore oil and gas operations. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hecker, S., & Goldenhar, L. (2014). Understanding Safety Culture and Safety Climate in 
 276 
Construction: Existing Evidence and a Path Forward. Report presented to Safety 
Culture/Climate Workshop at the Centre for Construction Research and Training. June 
11-12, 2013, Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
https://www.cpwr.com/sites/default/files/publications/hecker_goldenhar_lit_review_su
mmary_final_0.pdf. (Accessed on 15/04/2017). 
Heesom, D., Olomolaiye, P., Felton, A., Franklin, F., & Oraifige, A.  (2008). Fostering deeper 
engagement between industry and higher education: Towards a construction knowledge 
exchange approach, Journal for Education in the Built Environment, 3:2, 33-45.  
Heinrich, H.W. (1931). Industrial accident prevention: A scientific approach: New York: 
McGraw-Hill.  
Heinrich, H.W. Petersen, D., & Roos, N. (1980). Industrial Accident Prevention: A Safety 
Management Approach (fifth ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Henri, J.F. (2004). Performance measurement and organizational effectiveness: bridging the 
gap. Managerial Finance.30(6), 93-123.  
Heron, J. (1996). Co-operative inquiry: research into the human condition. London: Sage. 
Herwig, A., & Simoncini, M. (2016). Underpinning the role of law in disaster resilience: An 
introduction. In: Simoncini, M. & Herwig, A. (eds.) Law and the management of 
disasters: the challenge of Resilience. New York: Routledge.  
Hinton, P.R., McMurray, I., & Brownlow, C. (2014). SPSS Explained. (2nd Ed.). New York: 
Routledge. 
Hoffman, R. R., & Hancock, A. P. (2017). Measuring Resilience. The Journal of the human 
Factors and Ergonomics Society, 59(4), 564–581.  
Holand, P. (1997). Offshore Blowouts - Causes and Control - Barriers in Well 
Operations. Elsevier. Retrieved 
from  https://app.knovel.com/hotlink/pdf/id:kt003USEYK/offshore-blowouts-
causes/barriers-in-well-operations (Accessed on 30/07/2017). 
Holden, M.T., & Lynch, P. (2004). Choosing the appropriate methodology: understanding 
research philosophy. The Marketing Review, 4, 397-409. 
Holling, C.S. (2001). Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological, and Social 
Systems. Ecosystem, 4, 390-405.  
Hollnagel, E., (2004). Barriers and Accident Prevention. Ashgate Publishing Limited: 
Hampshire, England.  
Hollnagel, E., Wood, D.D. & Leveson, N. (2006). Resilience engineering: concepts and 
precepts. Aldershot: Ashgate.  
 277 
Hollnagel, E. (2017). Resilience engineering and the future of safety management. Handbook 
of safety principles, 23-41.  
Hood, C., Rothstein, H. & Baldwin, R. (2001) The government of risk: understanding risk 
regulation regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Horbah, F., Pathirage, C., & Kulatunga, U. (2017). Assessing the safety climate in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas sector. In: 13th International Postgraduate Research Conference 
(IPGRC). Salford. The University of Salford. September 11th-15th 2017. pp. 529-541.  
Hopkins, A. (2007a). Beyond compliance monitoring: new strategies for safety regulators. Law 
& Policy, 29(2), 210–225.  
Hopkins, A. (2007b). Thinking About Process Safety Indicators. Presented at the Oil and Gas 
Industry Conference, Manchester, November 2007. Retrieved from 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/536316c1e4b03715f2388918/t/5602010ae4b0ce
aec9081a62/1442971914428/WP+53+Thinking+About+Process+Safety+Indicators.p
df (Assessed on 02/04/2019). 
Hopkins, A. (2009a). Thinking about process safety indicators Safety Science, 47, 460-465.  
Hopkins, A. (2012a). Disastrous Decisions: The Human and Organisational Causes of the 
Gulf of Mexico Blowout. Sydney, CCH Australia Ltd. 
Hopkins, A. (2012b). Explaining “Safety Case”. In: Joint Regulators Forum on the Use of 
Performance-based Regulatory Models in the US Oil and Gas Industry, Texas City, 
Texas, September 21.  
Hood, R., Rothstein, H., & Baldwin, R. (2001). The Government of Risk. Understanding Risk 
Regulation Regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Howlett, M., Capano, G. & Ramesh, M. (2018). Designing for robustness: surprise, agility and 
improvisation in policy design. Policy and Society, 37(4), 405-421.  
HSE (1997). Successful Health and Safety Management. Retrieved from HSE%20guide4.pdf 
(Accessed on 23/05/2017). 
HSE (2005). Accident statistics for floating offshore units on the UK continental shelf (1980–
2003). HMSO RR 353. London: Health and Safety Executive. 
HSE (2013). Managing for health and safety. Retrieved from 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/priced/hsg65.pdf (Accessed on 16/09/2018). 
Hosny, G., Elsayed, E.A., & Shalaby, E.A. (2017). A comparative assessment of safety climate 
among petroleum companies. Egyptian Journal of Occupational Medicine, 41(2), 307-
324. 
 278 
Huang, Y.H. et al., (2017). Safety Climate: How can you measure it and why does it matter? 
Professional Safety, .28–35.  
Huang, Y-H., Lee, J., McFadden, A.C., Rineer, J. & Robertson, M.M. (2017) Individual 
employee’s perceptions of “Group-level Safety Climate” (supervisor referenced) 
versus “Organization-level Safety Climate” (top management referenced): 
Associations with safety outcomes for lone workers. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 
98,37-45. 
Hudson P.T.W. (2001), Corporate manslaughter: Bring corporations to account. In: Mullaer 
E.R., Stolker C.J.J.M. (Eds.) Ramp en Recht: Beschouwingen over rampen, 
verantwoordelijkheid en aansprakelijkheid. Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers. 
235-246. 
Hudson, P. (2007). Implementing a safety culture in a major multi-national. Safety Science, 
45(6), 697-722.  
Hulin, C., Netemeyer, R., & Cudeck, R. (2001). Can a Reliability Coefficient Be Too High? 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 10 (1), 55-58.  
Hystad, S.W., Bartone, P.T., & Eid, J. (2014). Positive organizational behavior and safety in 
the offshore oil industry: Exploring the determinants of positive safety climate. The 
journal of positive psychology, 9(1), 42–53.  
ICAO. (2009). Safety Management Manual (SMM). Report Doc 9859 AN/474. Retrieved from 
https://www.icao.int/safety/fsix/Library/DOC_9859_FULL_EN.pdf (Accessed on 
14/06/2016).  
ICS (2018). Oil and gas industry. Retrieved from 
https://www.icsi.edu/media/webmodules/publications/CS%20as%20Corporate%20Savi
our%20-%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Industry.pdf (Accessed on 11/10/2019).  
ILO (2015). Occupational safety and health and skills in the oil and gas industry operating in 
polar and subarctic climate zones of the northern hemisphere. International Labour 
Organization Report TSMOGI/2016. Retrieved from 
https://www.ilo.org/sector/Resources/publications/WCMS_438074/lang--en/index.htm. 
(Accessed on 20/08/2018). 
Imenda, S. (2014). Is There a Conceptual Difference between Theoretical and Conceptual 
Frameworks? Journal of Social Sciences, 38(2), 185-195.  
IRGC (2005). Risk governance: towards an integrative approach. White paper No.1. Geneva: 
IRGC.  
IOGP (2019a). Safety data reporting user guide – Scope and definitions (2018 data). Retrieved 
 279 
https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/2018su-safety-data-reporting-user-guide-scope-
and-definitions-2018-data/. (Accessed on 15/08/2019).  
IOGP (2019b). Risk Assessment Data Directory – Overview. Retrieved from 
https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/434-00-risk-assessment-data-directory-
overview/ (Accessed on 09/10/2019).  
Ismail, Z., Doostdar, S. & Harun, Z. (2012). Factors influencing the implementation of safety 
management systems for construction sites. Safety Science. 50, 418-423.  
Jain, P., Reese, A.M., Chaudhari, D., Mentzer, R.A., & Mannan, M.S. (2017). Regulatory 
approaches - Safety case vs US approach: Is there a best solution today?. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 46, 154-162.  
Jain, P., Pasman, H.J., Waldraw, S.P., Pistikopoulos, E.N. & Mannan, M.S. (2018). Process 
Resilience Analysis Framework (PRAF): A systems approach for improved risk and 
safety management. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 53, 61-73.  
Järvelin, K., & Vakkari, P. (1990). Content analysis of research articles in library and 
information science. Library & Information Science Research, 12, 395–421. 
Jensen, A. & Aven, T. (2018). A new definition of complexity in a risk analysis setting. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 171, 169-173.  
Johannesson, P., & Perjons, E. (2014). An Introduction to Design Science. Switzerland: 
Springer International Publishing. 
Johansen, I., & Rausand, M. (2014). Defining complexity for risk assessment of sociotechnical 
systems: a conceptual framework. Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers. 228, 272-290. 
Johansen, I., & Rausand, M. (2015). Barrier management in the offshore oil and gas industry. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 34, 49-55.  
Jordana, J., & Levi-Faur, D.  (2004). The politics of regulation in the age of governance. In: 
Jacint J. & Levi-Faur, D. (Eds) The politics of regulation (pp. 1-30). Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar.  
Joshil, A., Kale, S., Chandel, S., & and Pal1, D.K. (2015). Likert Scale: Explored and 
Explained. British Journal of Applied Science & Technology, 7(4), 396-403.  
Junge, M. (2010). Deficient risk understanding- the cause explanation that means all and 
nothing. University of Stavanger, Master’s Thesis. (Accessed 6th January 2019).  
Kaiser, H.F. (1974). An index of factorial simplicity. Psychometrika, 39, 31-36. 
Kaiser, M. (2008). The impact of extreme weather on offshore production in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 32(10), 1996-2018.  
 280 
Kalelkar, A.S., & Little, A.D. (1988). Investigation of large-magnitude incidents: Bhopal as a 
case study. London: AD Little. 
Kilaparthi, J. (2014) Assessment of Safety Culture in Global Offshore Environments. Journal 
of Environmental Protection, 5, 1003-1021.  
Kim, N.K, Rahim, N. F.A., Iranmanesh, M. & Foroughi, B. (2019). The role of the safety 
climate in the successful implementation of safety management systems. Safety 
Science, 118, 48–56.  
Kines, P., Lappalainen, J., Mikkelsen, K.L, Olsen, E., Pousette, A., Tharaldsen, J., Tomasson, 
K., & Torner, M. (2011). Questionnaire (NOSACQ-50 Nordic Safety Climate): A new 
tool for diagnosing occupational safety climate. International Journal of Industrial 
Ergonomics; 41634-646.  
Kirwan, B. (1998). Safety management assessment and task analysis—a missing link? In: Hale, 
A., Baram, M. (Eds.), Safety Management: The Challenge of Change. Oxford: Elsevier.  
Kjellén, U. (2009). The safety measurement problem revisited. Safety Science. 47, 486– 489.  
Klein, J.A. & Vaughen, B.K. (2008). A revised program for operational discipline. Process 
Safety Progress, 27, 58–65.  
Klein, K.J., & Sorra, J. S. (1996). The challenge of implementation. Academy of Management 
Review, 21, 1055-1080. 
Klinke, A., & Renn, O. (2012). Adaptive and integrative governance on risk and uncertainty, 
Journal of Risk Research, 15(3), 273-292.  
Koop, C., & Lodge, M. (2017) What is regulation? An interdisciplinary concept 
analysis. Regulation and Governance, 11 (1), 95-108. 
Kotey, J. A. (2016). Five years of oil production in the Jubilee Field: operational safety lessons 
learned for TEN and other oil fields in offshore Ghana. Presented at the SPE African 
Health, Safety, Security, Environment, and Social Responsibility Conference and 
Exhibition, Accra, Society of Petroleum Engineers. October 4th-6th 2016. pp. 1-7.  
Kouabenan, D.R.,  Ngueutsa, R., & Mbaye, S. (2015). Safety climate, perceived risk, and 
involvement in safety management. Safety Science, 77, 72-79.  
Knill, C., & Tosun, J. (2012). Public policy: a new introduction. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Kringen, J. (2014). Contested terrains in risk regulation: Legitimacy challenges in the 
implementation processes. In: Lindoe, P.H., Baram, M. & Renn, O. (eds.) Risk 
governance of offshore oil and gas operations. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Kuechler, B., & Vaishnavi, V. (2004). Design Science Research in Information Systems. 
 281 
Retrieved from http://www.desrist.org/design-research-in-information-systems 
(Accessed on 15/07/2017). 
Kulatunga, U. (2008). Influence of performance measurement towards construction research 
and development. PhD thesis.  University of Salford.  
Kuusisto, A. (2001). Safety management systems auding tools and reliability of auditing. 
Doctoral Thesis, Technical Research Centre of Finland. 
Kvalheim, S.A., Antonsen, S. & Haugen, S. (2016). Safety climate as an indicator for major 
accident risk: Can we use safety climate as an indicator on the plant level? International 
Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 18, 23-31.  
Kvalheim, S.A., & Dahl, Ø. (2016). Safety compliance and safety climate: A repeated cross-
sectional study in the oil and gas industry. Journal of Safety Research, 59, 33–41. 
Kyriakidis, M., Kant, V., Amir, S., & Dang, V.N. (2018). Understanding human performance 
in sociotechnical systems – Steps towards a generic framework. Safety Science, 107, 202-
2015.  
LaDou, J. (2003). International Occupational health. International Journal of Environmental 
Health, 206, 303-313. 
Larsson, A., Westerberg, M., Karlqvist, L., & Gard, G. (2018). Teamwork and Safety Climate 
in Homecare: A Mixed Method Study. International Journal of Environmental 
Research and Public Health. 15, 2495.  
Latham, G.P., & Pinder, C.C. (2005). Work motivation theory and research at the dawn of the 
twenty-first century. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 485–516.  
Le Coze, J.C., Pettersen, K.A., Engen, O.A. Morsut, C., Skotnes, R.O., Ylönen, M., & Heikkilä, 
J. (2017). Sociotechnical systems theory and the regulation of safety in high-risk 
industries - White paper. Teitnakiinke: VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd. 
Lee, Y.H., Lu, T. E., Yang, C.C., & Chang, G. (2019). A multilevel approach on empowering 
leadership and safety behavior in the medical industry: The mediating effects of 
knowledge sharing and safety climate. Safety Science,117, 1-9.  
Leveson, N.G. (1995). Safeware-system safety and computers: a guide to preventing accidents 
and losses caused by technology. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
Leveson, N. G. (2002). System safety engineering: Back to the future. Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology.  
Leveson, N.G. (2004). A new accident model for engineering safer systems. Safety Science, 
42(4), 237-270.  
Leveson, N. G. (2011). Engineering a safer world: Systems thinking applied to safety. 
 282 
Cambridge, MA: MIT.  
Leveson, N.G. (2017). Rasmussen's legacy: A paradigm change in engineering for safety. 
Applied Ergonomics, 59, 581-591.  
Levi-Faur, D. (2011). Regulation and regulatory governance. In: David Levi-Faur (Eds) 
Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (pp. 3-21). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Levovnik, D., & Gerbec, M. (2018). Operational readiness for the integrated management of 
changes in the industrial organizations – Assessment approach and results. Safety Science, 
107, 119-129.  
Li, Y. & Guldenmund, F.W. (2018). Safety management systems: A broad overview of the 
literature. Safety Science, 103, 94-123.  
Lindøe, P.H. (2016). Risk regulation and resilience in offshore oil and gas operation. In: 
Herwig, A., & Simonici, M. (eds.).  Law and management of disasters: the challenge 
of resilience. New York: Routledge  
Lindøe, P.H,  Baram, M., & Paterson, J. (2012). Robust offshore risk regulation - an assessment 
of US, UK and Norwegian approaches. In: European Safety and Relaibility (ESREL) 
and International Association of Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management 
(IAPSAM) Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Helsinki, Finland, 25–29 
June.  
Lindøe, P.H., Baram, M., & Renn, O. (2014). Risk governance of offshore oil and gas 
operations. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lingard, H., Hallowell, M. Salas, R., & Pirzadeh, P. (2017). Leading or lagging? Temporal 
analysis of safety indicators on a large infrastructure construction project. Safety 
Science, 91, 206-220.  
Linkov, I., Trump, B. D., & Fox-Lent, C. (2016). Resilience: Approaches to risk analysis and 
governance. In: Florin, M.-V., & Linkov, I. (eds.). IRGC resource guide on resilience. 
Lausanne: EPFL International Risk Governance Center (IRGC). 
Liyanage, J.P. (2006). A socio-technical perspective on integrated operations for high-risk and 
complex industrial assets: experience from North Sea oil and gas industry. In: Mathew, 
J., Kennedy, J., Ma, L., Tan, A. & Anderson, D. (eds.) Engineering asset management. 
London: Springer.  
Lofstedt (2003). Risk communication: Pitfalls and promises. European Review, 11(3), 417-
435.  
Luxhøj, J.T., Joyce, W., & Luxhøj, C. (2017). A ConOps derived UAS safety risk model. 
Journal of Risk Research, https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2017.1409253.  
 283 
Lyu, S., Hon, C.K.H., Chan, A.P.C., Wong, F.K.W., & Javed, A.A. (2018). ID Relationships 
among safety climate, safety behavior, and safety outcomes for ethnic minority 
Construction workers. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public 
Health, 15, 1-16.   
Lu, C.S., & Yang, C.S. (2010). Safety leadership and safety behavior in container terminal 
operations. Safety Science. 48, 123–134.  
MackAskill, K., & Guthrie, P. (2014). Multiple Interpretations of Resilience in Disaster Risk 
Management. Procedia Economics and Finance, 18, 667-674.  
Manuele, F. (2009). Leading and lagging indicators. Professional Safety, 54(12), 28-33. 
Marjolein, B.A., van Asselt & Renn, O. (2011). Risk governance. Journal of Risk Research, 
14(4), 431-449.  
Martin, J., & Siehl, C. (1983). Organizational culture and counterculture: an uneasy symbiosis. 
Organizational Dynamics. 2(2), 52-64. 
March, S., & Smith, G. (1995). Design and natural science research on information technology. 
Decision Support Systems 15, 251-266.  
May, P. J. (2004). Performance-Based Regulation and Regulatory Regimes: The Saga of Leaky 
Buildings. Law and Policy 25 (4), 381-401.  
May, P.J. (2011). Performance-based regulation. In: David Levi-Faur (Eds) Handbook on the 
Politics of Regulation (pp. 3-21). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Mearn, K. (2014). Values and Norms – A basic for a safety culture. In: Lindoe, P.H., Baram, 
M. & Renn, O. (eds.) Risk governance of offshore oil and gas operations. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mearns, K., Flin, R., Gordon, R., & Fleming, M. (2001). Human and organizational factors in 
offshore safety. International Journal of Work, Health & Organisations, 15(2), 144-
160.  
Mearns, K., & Reader T. 2008. Organizational support and safety outcomes: an un-investigated 
relationship? Safety Science. 46(3), 388–97. 
Mearns K., Whitaker, S.M., & Flin, R. (2003). Safety climate, safety management practice and 
safety performance in offshore environments. Safety Science, 41(8), 641-680.  
Mearns, K., & Yule, S. (2009). The role of national culture in determining safety performance: 
Challenges for the global oil and gas industry. Safety Science, 47(6), 777-785.  
Mendes, P.A.S., Hall, J., Matos, S., & Silvestre, B. (2014). Reforming Brazil׳s offshore oil and 
gas safety regulatory framework: Lessons from Norway, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. Energy Policy, 74, 443-453.  
 284 
McLarnon, M.J., Goffin, R.D., Schneider, T.J., & Johnston, N.G. (2016) To be or not to be: 
Exploring the nature of positively and negatively keyed personality items in high-stakes 
testing. Journal of personality assessment, 98(5),480-490 
Mintzberg, H. (1979). Organisational Co-ordinating Mechanisms. Retrieved from 
http://sol.brunel.ac.uk/~jarvis/bola/mintzberg/mintstru.html. (Accessed on 20/05/2019) 
Misiti, A. & Hebert, D.P.E. (2016).  Modular construction in the oil and gas industry. 
Engineering 360. Retrieved from https://insights.globalspec.com/article/3002/modular-
construction-in-the-oil-and-gas-industry (Accessed on 17/09/2019).  
Ministry of Finance (2019) Ghana's oil production estimated to go up to 500,000 barrels per 
day by 2024. Retrieved from https://www.mofep.gov.gh/press-release/2019-02-
14/ghana%27s-oil-production-estimated-to-go-up-to-500%2C000-Barrels-per-day-by-
2024 (Accessed on 25/10/2019). 
Mitchell, M. (2009). Complexity: A guide tour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Mitnick, B.M. (2011). Capturing “capture”: definition and mechanisms. In: David Levi-Faur 
(Eds) Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (pp. 3-21). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Mohamed, S. (2002). Safety climate in construction site environments. Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 128(5), 375–384. 
Moller, N., Hansson, S.O., & Peterson, M. (2006). Safety is more than the antonym of risk. 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 23(4), 419–432. 
Mullen, J., Kelloway, K., & Teed, M. (2017). Employer safety obligations, transformational 
leadership and their interactive effects on employee safety performance. Safety Science, 
91, 405-412.  
Musa, R. A., Fadli, A., Kusminanti, Y., Erwandi, D., & Lestari, F. (2015). Safety Climate 
Survey among Workers at Oil and Gas Company. Society of Petroleum Engineers,  
Mustapha, Z. (2016). Revised health and safety compliance model for the Ghanaian 
construction industry. International Journal of Engineering, Science and Technology, 
8(2),46-51.  
Naafs, M.A.B. (2018). Occupational Diseases in the Petrochemical Sector and Offshore 
Upstream Petroleum Industry. Retrieved from: 
http://crimsonpublishers.com/pps/pdf/PPS.000535.pdf  (Accessed 03/09/2016). 
NAENRC (2012). Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout: Lessons for Improving 
Offshore Drilling Safety. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.  
NASEM (2016). Strengthening the Safety Culture of the Offshore Oil and Gas 
Industry. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.   
 285 
Ncube, F., & Kanda, A. (2018). Current status and the future of occupational safety and health 
legislation in low- and middle-income countries. Safety & Health at Work, 9(4), 365-371. 
Neal, A., & Griffin, M.A. (2002). Safety climate and safety behaviour. Australian Journal of 
Management, 27, 67-76. 
Neal, A., & Griffin, M.A. (2004). Safety climate and safety at work. In: Barling, J. & Frone, 
M.R. The Psychology of Workplace Safety, (pp. 15-34). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association. 
Neal, A., & Griffin, M.A. (2006). A study of the lagged relationships among safety climate, 
safety motivation, safety behavior, and accidents at the individual and group levels. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 91(4), 946–53.  
NEB. (2014). Advancing Safety in the Oil and Gas Industry - Statement on Safety Culture. 
Government of Canada, National Energy Board, (April 2010), 1–19.  
Necci, A., Tarantola, S., Vamanu, B., Krausmann, E., & Ponte, L. (2019). Lessons learned 
from offshore oil and gas incidents in the Arctic and other ice-prone seas. Ocean 
Engineering, 185, 12-26.  
Newnam, S., & Goode, N. (2019). Communication in the workplace: Defining the 
conversations of supervisors. Journal of Safety Research, 70, 19-23.  
Nielsen, K., & Randall, R. (2012). The importance of employee participation and perceptions 
of changes in procedures in a teamworking intervention. Work Stress 26(2): 91–111.  
Niven, K., & McLeod, R. (2009). Offshore industry: management of health hazards in the upstream 
petroleum industry, Occupational Medicine, 59(5), 304–309. 
Nivolianitou, Z., Konstandinidou, M., & Michalis, C. (2006). Statistical analysis of major 
accidents in petrochemical industry notified to the major accident reporting system 
(MARS).  Journal of Hazardous Materials, 137(1), 1-7).  
Nixon, H. (2018). Health and Safety Communication: A Practical Guide Forward. 
Occupational Medicine, 68(4), 291.   
Noble, H., & Smith, J. (2015). Issues of validity and reliability in qualitative research. Evidence 
Based Nursing, 18 (2), 34-35.  
Noy, I., & Yonson, R. (2018). Economic Vulnerability and Resilience to Natural Hazards: A 
Survey of Concepts and Measurements. Sustainability, 10 (1), 2850.  
NSC (2013). Near miss reporting systems. Retrieved from 
https://www.nsc.org/Portals/0/Documents/WorkplaceTrainingDocuments/Near-Miss-
Reporting-Systems.pdf (Accessed on 25/09/2019).  
 
 286 
O’Dea, A., & Flin, R. (2001). Site managers and safety leadership in the offshore oil and gas 
industry. Safety Science, 37(1), 39-57.  
OECD (2008). Guidance on Safety Performance Indicators for Industries. OECD 
Environment, Health and Safety Publications. Paris. 
https://www.oecd.org/chemicalsafety/chemical-accidents/41269710.pdf. (Accessed on 
14/05/2016). 
Ofosu, S. A., Boateng, P., & Asah-Kissiedu, M. (2014). Safety practices in the Ghanaian 
construction industry: New Juaben Municipality as a case study. Africa Development and 
Resources Research Institute Journal, 6(2), 59-79.  
OGUK (2019). Workforce report 2019. Retrieved from https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/Workforce-Report-2019.pdf (Accessed on 11/10/2019).  
O Johnsen, S., Kilskar, S.S., & Fossum, K.R. (2017). Missing focus on Human Factors – 
organizational and cognitive ergonomics – in the safety management for the petroleum 
industry. Journal of Risk and Reliability, 231(4), 400-410.  
Øien, K., (2001b). Risk Control of Offshore Installations. A Framework for the Establishment 
of Risk Indicators. Department of Production and Quality Engineering, PhD thesis. 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway. 
Øien, K. (2001). Risk indicators as a tool for risk control. Reliability Engineering & System 
Safety, 74(2), 129–145.  
Øien, K., Utne, I.B., & Herrera, I.A. (2011a). Building safety indicators: Part 1- theoretical 
foundation. Safety Science, 49(2), 148-161.  
Øien, K., Utne, I.B., Tinmannsvik, R.K. & Massaiu, S. (2011b). Building safety indicators: 
Part 2 – application, Practices and Results. Safety Science, 49(2) 162-171.  
Okoh, P., & Haugen, S. (2013). The Influence of Maintenance on Some Selected Major 
Accidents. Chemical Engineering Transactions, 31, 493-498.  
Oppong, S. (2014). Common health, safety and environmental concerns in upstream oil and 
gas sector: Implications for HSE management in Ghana. Academicus International 
Scientific Journal, 9, 92–105. 
Ørngreen, R., & Levinsen, K. (2017). Workshops as a Research Methodology. The Electronic 
Journal of eLearning 15(1), 70-81.  
Osei-Tutu, J.K. (2013). A study of Ghana’s oil and gas industry local (Ghanaian) content policy 
process. Retrieved from 
file:///Users/pvp691/Downloads/NKOSOO2015_AStudyofLocal-
GhanaianContentPolicyandPolicyProcess_MainDoc__2013.pdf.  (Accessed on 
 287 
24/09/2019).  
OSHA (2000). U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
OSHA 3132. Retrieved https://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3132.pdf (Accessed on 
18/04.2017). 
Ostroff, C. (1993). The effects of climate and personal influences on individual behavior and 
attitudes in organizations. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 56, 
56 –90.  
Ostrowski, L., Helfert, M., & Xie, S. (2012). A Conceptual Framework to Construct an Artefact 
for Meta-Abstract Design Knowledge in Design Science Research. In: 45th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, pp. 4074–4081.  
Oswald, D., Zhang, R.P., Lingard, H., Pirzadeh, P., & Le, T. (2018). The use and abuse of 
safety indicators in construction. Engineering, Construction and Architectural 
Management, 25(9), 188-1209.  
Othman, N.A. (2010). An exploratory study into the implementation of safety management systems 
of Malaysian contractors in processing plants. PhD Thesis, Loughborough University.  
Özer, B., & Şeker, G. (2013). Complexity theory and public policy: a new way to put new 
public management and governance in perspective. The Journal of Faculty of 
Economics and Administrative Sciences, 18(1), 89-102.   
Paik, J. K., Czujko, J., Kim, B. J., Seo, J. K., Ryu, H. S., Ha, Y. C., Janiszewski, P., & Musial, 
B. (2011). Quantitative assessment of hydrocarbon explosion and fire risks in offshore 
installations. Marine Structures, 24(2), 73-96. 
Pallant, J. (2016). SPSS survival manual: A step by step guide to data analysis using IBM SPSS 
(6th Ed.). Berkshire: Open University Press.  
Palinkas, L. A., Horwitz, S. M., Green, C. A., Wisdom, J. P., Duan, N., & Hoagwood, K. 
(2015). Purposeful sampling for qualitative data collection and analysis in mixed method 
implementation research. Administration and policy in mental health, 42(5), 533–544 
Panuwatwanich, K., Alhaadir, S., & Stewart, R.A. (2016). Influence of safety motivation and 
climate on safety behaviour and outcomes: evidence from the Saudi Arabian construction 
industry. International journal of occupational safety and ergonomics, 23(1), 60-75.  
Pandit, B., Albert, A., Patil, Y., & Al-Bayati, A.J. (2019) Impact of safety climate on hazard 
recognition and safety risk perception. Safety Science, 113, 44-53.  
Park, J., Seager, T.P., Rao, P.S.C., Convertino, M., & Linkov, I. (2013). Integrating risk and 
resilience approaches to catastrophe management in engineering systems. Risk 
Analysis, 33(3), 356–67.  
 288 
Partington, D. (2002). Essential Skills for Management Research, SAGE Publications. 
Pariyani, A., & Reniers, G. (2018). Risk analysis in the Process Industries: State-of-the-art and 
the future. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 53, 1-2.  
Pasman, H., Duxbury, H., & Bjordal, E. (1992). Major hazards in the process industries: 
achievements and challenges in loss prevention. Journal of hazardous materials, 30(1), 
1-38.  
Pasmore, W., Winby, S., Mohrman, S.A., & Vanasse, R. (2019) Reflections: Sociotechnical 
Systems Design and Organization Change. Journal of Change Management, 19:2, 67-85.  
Patriarca, R., Gravio, G.D., Costantino, F., Falegnami, A. & Bilotta, F. (2018). An analytic 
framework to assess organisational resilience. Safety and Health at Work, 9(3), 265-
276.  
Paul, P.S., & Maiti, J. (2007). The role of behavioral factors on safety management in 
underground mines. Safety Science, 45, 449–471. 
Pengfei1, Z., Minghua1, Z., Rajagopal, S. & Retouniotis, F. (2016). Research on Prevention of 
Ship Collisions with Oil Rigs. Journal of Shipping and Ocean Engineering 6, 279-283.  
Peter, A. & Arthur, E. (2014). Local content and private sector participation in Ghana's oil 
industry: An economic and strategic imperative. Africa Today, 61(2), 57-77.  
Petersen, D. (1978). Techniques of safety management. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Petersen, D. (2000). The barriers to safety excellence. Occupational Hazards, 62 (12), 37–42. 
Petitta, L., Probst, T.M. Barbaranelli, C. & Ghezzi, V. (2017). Disentangling the roles of safety 
climate and safety culture: Multi-level effects on the relationship between supervisor 
enforcement and safety compliance. Accident Analysis and Prevention. 99, 77-89. 
Pettigrew, A.M. (1979). On studying organizational cultures. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 24 (4), 570-581. 
Petukhov, I., & Steshina, L. (2018). Decision-making in sociotechnical systems. Retrieved 
from https://www.intechopen.com/books/management-of-information-
systems/decision-making-problems-in-sociotechnical-systems (Accessed on 
20/08/2019). 
PIAC (2018). Annual report on the management and use of petroleum revenues for the period 
2018. Retrieved from 
http://www.piacghana.org/portal/files/downloads/piac_reports/piac_2018_annual_rep
ort.pdf (Accessed on 24/10/2019). 
Pidgeon, N. (2010). Systems thinking, culture of reliability and safety. Civil Engineering and 
Environmental Systems, 27(3), 211–217. 
 289 
Pilbeam, C., Doherty, N., Davidson, R., & Denyer, D. (2016). Safety leadership practices for 
organizational safety compliance: Developing a research agenda from a review of the 
literature. Safety Science, 86, 110-121.  
Pitblado, R., & Bjerager, P. (2013). Offshore major accident safety: Is SEMS enough? In: 
Offshore Technology Conference held in Houston, Texas, USA, 6–9 May 2013.  
Podgórski, D. (2015). Measuring operational performance of OSH management system – A 
demonstration of AHP-based selection of leading key performance indicators. Safety 
Science, 73, 146-166. 
Popat, N., Perkins, B., Vassiliev, N., Reyes Valdes, O., Hawkes, C., & Carvalho, M. (2018). 
Development, Adoption and Implementation of Fabrication Site Construction Safety 
Recommended Practices. Society of Petroleum Engineers. Retrieved from https://www 
10.2118/190581-MS (Accessed on 15/09/2019).  
Prat, N., Comyn-Wattiau, I., & Akoka, J. (2014). Artifact evaluation in information systems 
design-science research – a holistic view. Retrieved from 
https://cedric.cnam.fr/fichiers/art_3208.pdf (Accessed on 03/07/2018).  
Pries-Heje, J, Baskerville, R., &Venable, J.R. (2008). Strategies for Design Science Research 
Evaluation. Retrieved from 
https://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1214&context=ecis2008  
(Accessed on 25/07/2018).  
Probst, T.M., Goldenhar, L.M., Byrd, J.L., & Betit, E. (2019). The Safety Climate Assessment 
Tool (S-CAT): A rubric-based approach to measuring construction safety climate. 
Journal of Safety Research, 69, 43-51.  
PSA (2013). Principles for Barrier Management in the Petroleum Industry (Technical Report). 
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. Retrieved from 
http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/1319891/PDF/Barrierenotatet%202013%20engelsk%2
0april.pdf (Accessed on 15/03/2018) 
Purao, S. (2002). Design research in the technology of information systems: Truth or dare. 
Retrieved from http://www3.cis.gsu.edu/vvaishnavi/9220Sp07/Documents/truth-dare-
Purao%202002.pdf (Accessed on 17/08/2017).  
Puskar, J.R. (2015). Fires & Explosions in the Fracking World – Where, Why, & How to 
Minimize Risks, ASSE Professional Development Conference and Exposition, American 
Society of Safety Engineers. Retrieved from: https://www.onepetro.org/conference-
paper/ASSE-15-769 (Accessed on14/05/2017). 
Quinlan, M., Bohle, P. & Lamm, F. (2010). Managing occupational health and safety: A 
 290 
multidisciplinary approach, (3rd ed.).  South Yarra, Vic: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Qureshi, Z.H. Ashraf, M.A. 
 
& Amer, Y. (2007). Modeling Industrial Safety: A Sociotechnical 
Systems Perspective. Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE IEEM.1, 1883-1887. 
Rajaprasad, S.V.S & Chalapathi, P.V. (2015). Factors influencing implementation of OHSAS 
18001 in Indian construction organizations: Interpretive structural modeling approach. 
Safety, Health and Work, 6(3), 200-205. 
Ramachandran, S.D., Chong, S.D., & Ismail, E. (2011). Organisational culture: An exploratory 
study comparing faculties' perspectives within public and private universities in 
Malaysia. International Journal of Educational Management, 25(6), 615-634. 
Ratnayake, R.M.C. (2012). Challenges in inspection planning for maintenance of static 
mechanical equipment on ageing oil and gas production plants: The state of the art. In: 
31st International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering, July 1st - 6th, 
Rio de Janeiro.   
Reiman, T., & Pietikäinen, E. (2012). Leading indicators of system safety – Monitoring and 
driving the organizational safety potential. Safety Science 50, 1993–2000.  
Reiman, T., & Rollenhagen, C. (2014). Does the concept of safety culture help or hinder 
systems think in safety? Accident Analysis & Prevention, 68, 5-15. 
Reinach, S., & Viale, A. (2006). Application of a human error framework to conduct train 
accident/incident investigations. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 38, 396–406.  
Renn, O. (2005). Risk governance. White paper no. 1. International Risk Governance Council, 
Geneva. 
Renn, O. (2008). White Paper on Risk Governance: Toward an Integrative Framework. In: 
Renn, O., & Walker, K. (eds.) Global risk governance: Concept and practice using the 
IRGC framework. Geneva: Springer. 
Renn, O. (2014). A generic model for risk giovernance: concept and application to 
Technological Institutiona. In: Lindoe, P.H., Baram, M., & Renn, O. (eds.) Risk 
governance of offshore oil and gas operations. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Renn, O, Klinke, A., & van Asselt, M. (2011). Coping with complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity in risk governance: A synthesis. AMBIO, 40(2), 231-246.  
Riley, M. W. (1963). Sociological research. New York: Harcourt Brace.  
Robbins, P., & Judge, T.A. (2007). “Organisational Behaviour”. Pearson: Upper Saddle River, 
New York.  
Roca, E., Gamboa, G., & Tambara, J.D. (2008). Assessing the multidimensionality of coastal 
erosion risks: Public participation and multicriteria analysis in a Mediterranean coastal 
 291 
system. Risk Analysis, 28(2), 399-412.  
Rocha, C. G. (2011). “A conceptual framework for defining customisation strategies in the 
house building sector”, PhD thesis, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. 
Rolfe, G. (2006). Validity, trustworthiness and rigour: quality and the idea of qualitative 
research. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 53, 304-310.  
Rosa, E. A. (2003). The logical structure of the social amplification of risk framework (SARF): 
Metatheoretical foundation and policy implications. In Pidgeon, N.K. Kasperson, R.E. & 
Slovic, P. (Eds.) The social amplification of risk (pp. 47-79). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Rosa, E., Renn, O., & Mccright, A. (2013). The risk society revisited: Social theory and 
governance. Philadephia: Temple University Press. 
Ruhl, J.B. (2011). General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal 
Systems - With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation. North Carolina Law 
Review, 89(5). 1374-1404. 
Salazar, M.S. (2015). The dilemma of combining positive and negative items in scales. 
Psicothema. 27(2). 192-199. 
Sandelowski, M. (1993). Rigor or rigor mortis: the problem of rigor in qualitative research 
revisited. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 16:1–8.  
Santos, G., Barros, S., Mendes, F., & Lopes, N. (2013). The main benefits associated with 
health and safety management systems certification in Portuguese small and medium 
enterprises post quality management system certification. Safety Science, 51(1), 29–36.  
Santos-Reyes, J., & Beard, A.N. (2002). Assessing safety management systems. Journal of 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 15, 77–95. 
Saunders, M.N.K, Lewis, P., & Thornhill, A. (2016). Research Methods for Business Students. 
(7th Ed.) Essex: Pearson Education Limited. 
Schneider, B., Ehrhart, B.M., & Macey, W.H. (2013). Organizational climate and culture. 
Annual Review of Psychology. 64. pp. 361-388.  
Schneider, B., González-Romá, V., Ostroff, C., & West, M. A. (2017). Organizational climate 
and culture: Reflections on the history of the constructs in the Journal of Applied 
Psychology. Journal of Applied Psychology, 102(3), 468-482.  
Schein, E.H. (2010). Organizational culture and leadership (4th Ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. 
Schein, E.H. (1992). Organisational culture and leadership (2nd Ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-
Bass. 
 292 
Schein, E.H. (1985). Coming to a new awareness of organisational culture. Sloan Management 
Review, 25(2), 3-16. 
Schoon, M., & Van der Leeuw, S. (2015). The shift toward social-ecological systems 
perspectives: insights into the human-nature relationship. Natures Sciences Sociétés, 
23(2), 166-174.  
Scott, N., Fleming, M., & Kelloway, E. K. (2014). Understanding why employees behave 
safely from a self-determination theory perspective. In M. Gagné (Ed.), Oxford library 
of psychology. The Oxford handbook of work engagement, motivation, and self-
determination theory (pp. 276-294). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press. 
Shannon, H.S., Mayer, J., & Haines, T. (1997). Overview of the relationship between 
organisation and workplace factors and injury rates. Safety Science, 26(3), 201-217. 
Shannon, H.S., & Norman, G.R., (2009). Deriving the factor structure of safety climate scales. 
Safety Science 47 (3), 327-329.  
Skaten, M. (2018). Ghana’s oil industry: Steady growth in a challenging environment. The 
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, OIES paper WPM 77. Retrieved from 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Ghanas-Oil-
Industry-Steady-growth-in-a-challenging-environment-WPM-77.pdf (Accessed on 
24/09/2019).  
Sheikhallshahi, M.,  Pintelon, L., &  Azadeh, A. (2016). Human factors in maintenance: a 
review", Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering, 22(3), 218-237.  
Shenhar, A. J., & Dvir, D. (2007). Reinventing project management: the diamond approach to 
successful growth and innovation. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Sjöberg, L. (2004). Explaining individual risk perception: The case of Nuclear Waste. Risk 
Management, 6(1), 51-64.  
Skroumpelos, G. (2010). Accident causes during repair and maintenance activities and 
managerial measures effectiveness. In: Kiritsis, D., Emmanouilidis, C., Koronios, A. 
& Mathew, J. (eds), Engineering Asset Lifecycle Management (pp. 922-927). Springer, 
London. 
Silva, S.L.C., & Amaral, F.G. (2019). Critical factors of success and barriers to the 
implementation of occupational health and safety management systems: A systematic 
review of literature. Safety Science, 117, 123-132.  
Singh, B., Jukes, P., Poblete, B., & Wittkower, B. (2010). 20 Years on lessons learned from 
Piper Alpha. The evolution of concurrent and inherently safe design. Journal of Loss 
Prevention in the Process Industries, 23(6), 936-953.  
 293 
Sklet, S., Vinnem, J. E., & Aven, T. (2006). Barrier and operational risk analysis of 
hydrocarbon releases (BORA-Release): Part II: Results from a case study. Journal of 
hazardous materials, 137(2), 692-708. 
Sklet, S., Ringstad, A.J., Steen, S., Tronstad, L., Haugen, S., et al. (2010). Monitoring of 
Human and Organizational Factors Influencing the Risk of Major Accidents. SPE 
International, (SPE 126530), pp.1–8. 
Skogdalen, J. E., Utne, I. B., & Vinnem, J. E. (2011). Developing safety indicators for 
preventing offshore oil and gas deepwater drilling blowouts. Safety science, 49(8-9), 
1187-1199. 
Skyttner, L. (2005). General system theory: problems, perspectives, practice (2nd ed). 
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.  
Smircich, L. (1983). Concepts of Culture and Organizational Analysis. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 28(3), 339-358.   
Smith, M.J. (1998). Social Science in Question. London: Sage.  
Soko, D. (2018). Onshore oil exploration in the Voltaian basin yielding dividends – President. 
Retrieved from https://www.ghanagrio.com/news/407492-onshore-oil-exploration-in-
the-voltaian-basin-yielding-dividends-president.html (Accessed on 20/10/2019).  
Sonnentag, S. & Frese, M. (2002). Performance concepts and performance theory. 
Psychological management of individual performance, 23(1), 3-25.  
SPE (2014). The human factor: Process safety and culture. SPE Technical Report.  
Spence, C., & Wang, Q.J. (2018). What does the term ‘complexity’ mean in the world of wine?. 
International Journal of Gastronomy and Food Science, 14, 45-54.  
Spicker, P. (2009). What is a priority? Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, 14 (2), 
112 -116. 
SRA (2015a). Glossary society for risk analysis. Retrieved 
from www.sra.com/resources (Accessed 28/01/2019). 
Stiles, S., Ryan, B. & Golightly, D. (2018). Evaluating attitudes to safety leadership within rail 
construction projects. Safety Science, 110, 134-144.  
Stolzer, A., Friend, M.A., Truong, D., Tuccio, W.A., & Aguiar, M. (2018). Measuring and 
evaluating safety management system effectiveness using Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Safety Science, 104, 55-69. 
Størseth, F., Hauge, S., & Tinmannsvik, K. (2014). Safety barriers: Organizational potential 
and forces of psychology. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 31, 50-
55.  
 294 
Stout, N.A., & Linn, H. (2002). Occupational injury prevention research: progress and 
priorities. Injury Prevention, 8 (suppl iv), 9-14.  
Swuste, P., Theunissen, J., Schmitz, P., Reniers, G., & Blokland, P. (2016). Process safety 
indicators, a review of literature. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
40, 162–173. 
Tanga, K.H.D., Dawala, S.ZM., & Olugu, E.U. (2018a). A review of the offshore oil and gas 
safety indices. Safety Science, 109, 344–352.  
Tang, D.K.H., Dawal, S.Z.M., & Olugu, E.U. (2018b). Actual safety performance of the 
Malaysian offshore oil platforms: Correlations between the leading and lagging 
indicators. Journal of Safety Research 66, 9–19. 
Tappura, S., Nenonen, N., & Kivistö-Rahnasto, J. (2017). Managers’ viewpoint on factors 
influencing their commitment to safety: An empirical investigation in five Finnish 
industrial organisations. Safety Science, 96, 52-61.  
Tavakol, M., & Dennick, R. (2011). Making sense of Cronbach's alpha. International Journal 
of Medical Education. 2(1), 53-55. 
Tench, W. H. (1985). Safety is no accident. London: Collins. 
Tezel, B.A. (2011). “Visual management: an exploration of the concept and its implementation 
in construction”, PhD thesis, University of Salford, UK. 
Tien, J.M., & Berg, D. (2003). A case for service systems engineering. Journal of Systems 
Science and Systems Engineering. 12(1), 13-38. 
Trist, E.L., & Bamfort, K.W. (1951). Some social and psychological consequences of the 
Longwall method of coal-getting. Human Relations, 4, 3–39. 
Theophilus, S.C, Esenowo, V.N., Arewa, A.O., Ifelebuegu, A.O., Nnadi, E.O., & Mbanaso, 
F.U. (2017). Human factors analysis and classification system for the oil and gas industry 
(HFACS-OGI). Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 167, 168-176.  
Thomas, M.J.W. (2012). A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Safety Management 
Systems. Report No. AR-2011-148, Australian Transport Safety Bureau. 
Thompson K.M., Deisler P.H. Jr., & Schwing, R.C. (2015). Interdisciplinary vision: The first 
25 years of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA), 1980-2005. Risk Analysis, 25, 1333-
1386. 
Tucker, S., Chmiel, N., Turner, N., Hershcovis, M.S., & Stride, C.B. (2008). Perceived 
organizational support for safety and employee safety voice: the mediating role of 
coworker support for safety. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 13(4), 319–30. 
Tulashie, K., Addai, E.K., & Annan, J.-S. (2016). Exposure Assessment, a Preventive Process 
 295 
in Managing Workplace Safety and Health, Challenges in Ghana. Safety Science. 84, 210-
215. 
Tullow Ghana (2014). Tullow Oil Plc 2014 Annual Report & Accounts. Retrieved from 
https://www.tullowoil.com/Media/docs/default-source/3_investors/2014-annual-
report/tullow-oil-2014-annual-report-and-accounts.pdf?sfvrsn=4 (Accessed on 
12/06/2016). 
Upham, P., Dütschke, E., Schneider, U., Oltra, C., Sala, R., Lores, M., Klapper, R., & Bögel, 
P. (2018). Agency and structure in a sociotechnical transition: Hydrogen fuel cells, 
conjunctural knowledge and structuration in Europe. Energy Research & Social 
Science, 37, 163-174.  
Ursachi, G., Horodnic, I.A.H., & Zait, A. (2015). How reliable are measurement scales? 
External factors with indirect influence on reliability estimators. Procedia Economics 
and Finance 20(1), 679 – 686. 
Vaishnavi, V., & Kuechler, B. (2004). Design Science Research in Information Systems. 
Retrieved http://desrist.org/desrist (Accessed on 26/04/2018). 
Vaishnavi, V., & Kuechler, W. (2007). Design Science Research methods and Patterns: 
Innovating Information and Communication Technology Boca Raton, FL, New York: 
Taylor & Francis Group. 
Van Aken, J.E. (2005). Management research as a design science: Articulating the research 
products of mode 2 knowledge production in management. British Journal of 
Management, 16(1), 19-36. 
Van Oss, L., & Van ‘t Hek, J. (2011). Why organizations fail? Robustness, tenacity, and change 
in organizations. London: Routledge. 
Veland, H., & Aven, T. (2015). Improving the risk assessments of critical operations to better 
reflect uncertainties and the unforeseen. Safety Science, 79, 206–212.  
Velentzas, J. O. H. N., & Broni, G. (2014). Communication cycle: Definition, process, models 
and examples. Recent Advances in Financial Planning and Product Development, 117-
131. 
Venable, J., Pries-Heje, J., & Baskerville, R (2012). A comprehensive framework for 
evaluation in design science research. Presented at the Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems, Las Vegas, NV, USA, 
14–15 May 2012; pp. 423–438. 
Vidal-Gomel, C. (2017). Training to safety rules use. Some reflections on a case study. Safety 
Science, 93, 134-142.  
 296 
Vijalapura, N.T., Renuka, S.D., & Srinivas, R. (2018). Identification of safety climate factors 
for major hazardous industries: A study in Karnataka state, India. Journal of Industrial 
Safety Engineering. 5(1), 1-12.  
Vinodkumar, M., & Bhasi, M. (2010). Safety management practices and safety behaviour: 
Assessing the mediating role of safety knowledge and motivation. Accident Analysis 
and Prevention. 42, 2082–2093. 
Vinodkumar, M.N., & Bhasi, M. (2011). A study on the impact of management system 
certification on safety management. Safety Science, 49, 498–507. 
Vinnem, J. E. (2010). Risk indicators for major hazards on offshore installations. Safety 
Science, 48(6), 770-787. 
Vinnem, J. E. (2007). Offshore Risk Assessment Principles, Modelling and Applications of 
QRA Studies (2nd Ed.). London: Springer-Verlag.  
Vinnem, J.E. (2012). On the analysis of hydrocarbon leaks in the Norwegian offshore industry. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 25, 709-717  
Vinnem, J. E. (2014a). Offshore Risk Assessment vol 1.: Principles, Modelling and 
Applications of QRA Studies (3rd Ed.). London: Springer-Verlag. 
Vinnem, J. E. (2014b). Offshore Risk Assessment Vol 2.: Principles, Modelling and 
Applications of QRA Studies (3rd  Ed.). London: Springer-Verlag.  
Vinnem, J. E., Aven, T., Husebø, T., Seljelid, J., & Tveit, O. J. (2006). Major hazard risk 
indicators for monitoring of trends in the Norwegian offshore petroleum 
sector. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 91(7), 778-791. 
Vinnem, J. E., Aven, T., Hauge, S., Seljelid, J., & Veire, G. (2004). Integrated barrier analysis 
in operational risk assessment in offshore petroleum operations. In: Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment and Management (pp. 620-625). Springer, London. 
Vinnem, J. E., Hestad, J. A., Kvaløy, J. T., & Skogdalen, J. E. (2010). Analysis of root causes 
of major hazard precursors (hydrocarbon leaks) in the Norwegian offshore petroleum 
industry. Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 95(11), 1142-1153. 
Vinnem, J.E., Seljelid, J., Haugen, S., & Husebø, T. (2007a). Analysis of Hydrocarbon Leaks 
on Offshore Installations. Stavanger: ESREL. 
Visser, B. (2002). Complexity, Robustness, and Performance: Trade-Offs in Organizational 
Design. Tinbergen Institute Working Paper No. 2002-048/1,  
Von Bertalanffy, L. (1969). General System Theory: foundations, development, applications. 
New York: George Braziller. 
 297 
vom Brocke, J., & Lippe, S. (2010). Towards management guidelines for collaborative 
research projects in information systems: Learning from project management 
contingency theory. In: D'Atri, A., De Marco, M., Braccini, A. M., & Cabiddu, F. 
(Eds.). Management of the interconnected world. Heidelberg, Germany: Physica-
Verlag HD. 
Walker, S. (2010). Presentation at the International Regulators’ Forum, 18th -20th October, 
Vancouver.  
Wallace, W. L. (1971). The Logic of Science in Sociology. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton. 
Wang, Y. F., Qin, T., Li, B., Sun, X. F., & Li, Y. L. (2017). Fire probability prediction of 
offshore platform based on Dynamic Bayesian Network. Ocean Engineering, 145, 112-
123. 
Wang, M., Sun, S., Du, H., & Wang, C. (2018). Relations between safety climate, awareness, 
and behavior in the Chinese construction industry: A hierarchicallinear investigation. 
Advances in Civil Engineering, 2018, 1-8.  
Ward, R., Brazier, A., & Lancaster, R. (2004). Different types of supervision and the impact 
on safety in the chemical and allied industries: Literature review. London: Health and 
Safety Executive. 
Watson, J. L. (1993). Effective safety management systems. Society of Petroleum Engineers. 
Retrieved from https://www.onepetro.org/conference-paper/SPE-26365-MS (Accessed 
on 13/03/2018).  
Weichbrodt, J. (2015). Safety rules as instruments for organizational control, coordination and 
knowledge: Implications for rules management. Safety Science, 80, 221-232.  
Whysall, Z., Haslam, C., & Haslam, R. (2006). A stage of change approach to reducing 
occupational ill health. Prevention and Medicine (Baltim).  43, 422–428.  
Wold, T., & Laumann, K. (2015). Safety Management Systems as communication in an oil and 
gas producing company. Safety Science, 72, 23-30.  
Wold, T., & Laumann, K. (2015). Safety management systems - definitions, challenges for use 
and recommendations for improvements. Safety Science Monitor, 19(1), 1-11. 
Wreathall, J. (2006). Properties of resilient organisations: An initial view. In: Hollnagel, E., 
Wood, D.D. & Leveson, N. (eds.) Resilience engineering: concepts and precepts. 
Aldershot: Ashgate.  
Wright, M., Turner, D., & Horbury, C. (2003). Competence assessment for the hazardous 
industries. Health & Safety Executive Research Report 086.  
 298 
Willis, S., Clarke, S., & O'Connor, E. (2017). Contextualizing leadership: Transformational 
leadership and Management-By-Exception-active in safety-critical contexts. Journal of 
Occupational and Organizational Psychology.  
Windle, M.J.S., Neis, B., Bornstein, S., Binkley, M., & Navarro, P. (2008). Fishing 
occupational health and safety: A comparison of regulatory regimes and safety 
outcomes in six countries. Marine Policy, 32(4), 701-710.  
Wu, C., Wang, F., Zou, P.X.W. & Fang, D. (2016). How safety leadership works among 
owners, contractors and subcontractors in construction projects. International Journal 
of Project Management, 34(5), 789-805. 
Wu, T.C., Chang, S.H., Shu, C.M., Chen, C.T., & Wang, C.P. (2011). Safety leadership and 
safety performance in petrochemical industries: The mediating role of safety climate. 
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 24(6), 716-721.  
Wu, X., Ramesh, M., & Howlett, M. (2015). Policy capacity: A framework for analysis. Policy 
& Society, 34(3–4), 165–171.  
Yang, D., Gao, X., Xu, L., & Guo, Q. (2018). Constraint-adaptation challenges and resilience 
transitions of the industry–environmental system in a resource-dependent city. 
Resources, Conservation and Recycling. 134, 196-205.  
Yang, Y. (2019). Reforming health, safety, and environmental regulation for offshore 
operations in China: risk and resilience approaches? Sustainability, 11, 1-22. 
Yang , X., & Mannan, M.S. (2010). The development and application of dynamic operational 
risk assessment in oil/gas and chemical process industry. Reliability Engineering & 
System Safety, 95(7), 806-815.  
Yang, Z.L., Bonsall, S., & Wang, J. (2009). Use of hybrid multiple uncertain attribute decision-
making techniques in safety management. Expert System with Applications. 36(2, Part 1), 
1569-1586. 
Ylönen, M., Engen, O.A., Le Coze, J.C., Heikkilä, J., Skotnes, R., Pettersen, K., & Morsut, K. 
(2017). Sociotechnical safety assessment within three risk regulation regimes. 
Teitnakiinke: VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd. 
Yiu, N. S.N., Sze, N.N., & Chan, D. W.M. (2018). Implementation of safety management 
systems in Hong Kong construction industry – A safety practitioner's perspective. 
Journal of Safety Research, 64, 1–9.  
Yiu, N. S.N., Sze, N.N., & Chan, D. W.M. (2019). Implementation of safety management 
system for improving construction safety performance: a structural equation modelling 
approach Buildings, 9(89), 1-19.  
 299 
Yong, A.G., & Pearce. S. (2013). A Beginner’s Guide to Factor Analysis: Focusing on 
Exploratory Factor Analysis. Tutorials in Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 9(2), 
79-94.  
Yule, S., Flin, R., & Murdy, A. (2007). The role of management and safety climate in 
preventing risk-taking at work. International Journal of Risk Assessment and 
Management, 7(2), 137-15.  
Zammuto, R.F., & Krakower, J.Y. (1991). Quantitative and qualitative studies of 
organisational culture.  In:  Woodman, R.W. and Pasmore, W.A. (Eds), Research in 
Organisational Change and Development. 5, 83-114. 
Zanko, M., & Dawson, P. (2012). Occupational health and safety management in 
organizations: A review. International Journal of Management Reviews, 14 (3), 328-344.  
Zeng, S.X., Shi, J.J., & Lou, G.X. (2007). A synergetic model for implementing an integrated 
management system: an empirical study in China. Journal of Cleaner Production, 15, 
1760–1767.  
Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: theoretical and applied 
implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65(1), 96–102.  
Zohar, D. (2008). Safety climate and beyond: a multi-level multi-climate framework. Safety. 
Science. 46(3), 376–87.  
Zohar, D. (2010). Thirty years of safety climate research: reflections and future directions. 
Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(5), 1517–22.  
Zohar, D., Huang, Y-h., Lee, J., & Robertson, M.M. (2014). A mediation model linking 
dispatcher leadership and work ownership with safety climate as predictors of truck driver 
safety performance. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 62, 17–25.  
Zohar, D., Huang, Y-h., Lee, J., & Robertson, M.M. (2015). Testing extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation as explanatory variables for the safety climate–safety performance relationship 
among long-haul truck drivers. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and 
Behaviour, 30, 84–96.  
Zohar, D., & Polachek, T. (2014). Discourse-based intervention for modifying supervisory 
communication as leverage for safety climate and performance improvement: A 
randomized field study. Journal of Applied Psychology, 99(1), 113-124.  
Zio, E. (2018). The future of risk assessment. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 177, 
176–190.  
 300 
Zuchowski, L.C. (2018). Complexity as a contrast between dynamics and phenomenology. 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Modern Physics, 63, 86-99.  
Zuofa, T. & Ocheing, E.G. (2017). Senior managers and safety leadership role in offshore oil 











Lists of Conference Papers Prior to the Submission of this Thesis 
 
Horbah, F., Pathirage, C.P., & Kulatunga, U. (2017). Assessing the safety climate in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas sector. In: 13th International Postgraduate Research Conference 
(IPGRC), 14-15 September 2017, University of Salford, UK. 
 
Horbah, F., & Pathirage, C.P. (2018). The influence of management of change, workforce 
involvement and safety climate on risk perception: a study of workers in Ghana’s oil and gas 
industry. In: 1st International Conference on Construction Futures (ICCF), 19-20 December 
2018, University of Wolverhampton, UK.  



























   
 303 
Appendix B2: Questionnaire Survey Invitation Letter 
 
                                  Francis Horbah, PhD Candidate         
                                                                                      Room   324a  
                                                                                      School of the Built Environment  
                                                                                      3rd  Floor, Maxwell Building,          
                                                                                      University of Salford,  
                                                                                      M5 4WT 
                  
                                                                                        
                                                                                      16th March 2017    
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN SAFETY STUDY 
 
I am currently conducting a research as part of my PhD study in the area of Disaster 
Management at the School of the Built Environment, University of Salford, UK. The research 
focuses on developing a framework for robust safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and 
gas industry. 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in this survey. The survey is designed to elicit your 
response on safety perception in the upstream oil and gas operations. The survey is expected 
to take approximately 30-45 minutes to complete. Ethical approval has been granted for this 
study by the Ethics Committee of University of Salford. 
 
I would like to emphasize that, any information provided for this survey will be kept strictly 
confidential and will only be used for the purpose of this research.  
 
If you decide to participate, please see the attached Participant Information Sheet and Consent 
Form. If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please contact me on:  
• Researcher [ Tel: +233547134644;  Email: f.horbah@edu.salford.ac.uk ] 
• Supervisor [Tel: +44161 295 4016;  Email: c.p.pathirage@salford.ac.uk ] 
 












Appendix C: Questionnaires Instrument 
 
Section A: Demographic Information 
(Please Tick only one box) 
1. What is your gender? 
         Male 
         Female 
2. What is your age? 
         Under 25 
         25-29 
         30-39 
         40-49 
         50 or above 
3. What is your nationality? 
         Ghanaian 
         Other national 
4. What is your highest education qualification? 
         SSCE 
         Diploma 
         Bachelor degree 
         Master degree 
         Doctorate degree 
5. Are you employed by: 
         An operating company 
         A contracting company 
6. Where is your work taking place? 
         Onshore 
         Offshore 
7. What is your job category? 
         Engineering Professionals 
         Maintenance/Craft Technicians 
         Operations Management 
         Contractors 
         Maintenance Management 
         Other 
9. How many years have you worked on installation before your current job? 
         None 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































         3-5 years 
         6-10 years 
         10 or more years 
10. How many years have you worked with this company? 
         Less than 1 year 
         1-2 years 
         3-5 years 
         5-10 years 
         10 or more years 
 
 
Section B: Workers’ Safety Climate Perceptions 
Please review each statement below and select the number from 1 to 5 that best expresses your 
response to the statement.  
1 = Strongly disagree      
2 = Disagree   
3 = Undecided 
4 = Agree  
5 = Strongly agree                           
 
                                                                                              
                                                                                                1.      2.        3.     4.        5 
                            Safety Policy 
11. I have read my company’s health and safety policy.                            
12. I do not understand what the policy requires me to 
      do in my workplace                                                                                 
13. I am not even aware if there is existence of health 
      and safety policy at the workplace.                                                       
                             Safety Priority 
14. When there is high operational cost we are not allowed                      
      to follow safety procedures to get the job done.                   
15. Manager/supervisor would not stop us working  
      if there are safety concerns.                                                                   
16. In my work group, process safety concerns are  


























































































































































17. Management puts a high priority on process safety  
      through actions and not just empty slogans.                                         
                            Safety Training  
18. The training that I have received does not provide  
       me with a clear understanding of the process safety                           
       risks at my workplace.                                                         
19. This company provides adequate training on hazard  
       identification, control and reporting.                                                    
20. New workers receive the necessary process safety  
      training to do their job safely.                                                              
 21. Experienced workers receive the necessary process  
      safety training to do their job safely.                                                    
22. I know how to use safety equipment and standard 
      work procedures.                                                                                  
23. I am not adequately trained to response to 
      emergency situations in my workplace.                                               
24. The process safety training that I have received  
      allows me to recognize when a process should be  
      shut down if safety critical interlocks, alarms or                                 
      other process-safety devices fail or become  
      unavailable during operation.                                       
25. The process safety training that workers receive  
       at my workplace is adequate to prevent                                              
      process- relate incidents, accidents and near misses.           
                   Safety Rules and Procedures 
26. The safety rules and procedures followed in my                                  
      workplace are not adequate to prevent incidents  
      occurring.               
27. Written operating procedures are regularly followed  
       and kept up to date.                                                                              
28. The safety procedures and practices at the workplace  
       are not useful and effective.                                                                 
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29. Creating unapproved shortcuts around process safety.     
       is not tolerated at my workplace.                                                         
             Management Commitment to Safety 
30. After a process-related incident, accident, or near miss, 
      management is more concerned with correcting                                   
      hazards than assigning blame or issuing discipline.          
31. In this company, process safety improvement is  
      a long-term commitment that is not compromised                                
      by short-term financial goals.                                                  
32. In my workplace managers/supervisors do not  
      show interest in the safety of workers.                                                   
33. When near-miss accidents are reported,  
      management acts quickly to solve the problems.                                  
34. When there is pressure for production, management  
      allow us to compromise on safety for increasing                                  
       production. 
                 Equipment Maintenance 
35. Interlocks, alarms, and other process safety-related                              
      devices are regularly tested and maintained.                  
 36. Maintenance checklists and procedures are easy 
       to understanding and use.                                                                    
37. Process equipment is not regularly tested and  
      Maintained.                                                                                          
38. In order to ensure process safety at my workplace,  
      inspection and maintenance are made high priorities.                          
                   Safety Communication 
39. I do not hesitate to report actions or conditions that  
      raise major hazards concern, even when a co-worker                           
      is involved.   
40. In general, workers don’t bother to report minor  
      process-related incidents, accidents, or near misses.                            
41. I can report hazardous conditions without fear of  
      negative consequences.                                                                        
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42. I believe a culture exists at the workplace that  
      encourages raising process safety concerns.                                        
43. I can report hazardous conditions without fear of  
      negative consequences.                                                                        
44. My line manager/supervisor does not always inform  
      me of current concerns and issues of safety.                                       
45. I do not always inform my line manager/supervisor  
      about safety issues I encounter at the workplace                                
46. Workers are informed about the results of process  
     related incident, accident, and near miss investigations.                        
                  Supportive Environment  
47. When people ignore safety procedures here, I feel it                            
      is none of my business.                                            
48. Employees here are not encouraged to raise safety  
      Concerns.                                                                                             
49. Co-workers often give tips to each other on how to  
       work safety.                                                                                        
50. I am strongly encouraged to report unsafe behaviour  
      at the workplace.                                                                                 
51. A no-blame approach is used to persuade people  
      acting unsafely that their behaviour is inappropriate.                         
                          Safety Involvement  
52. Workers sometimes work around process safety.                              
       concerns rather than report them.    
53. I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that help  
      to improve workplace safety.                                                              
54. Management do not involve us in updating, revising  
      and reviewing the policy.                                                                   
55. I involved in informing management of important  
      safety issues.                                                                                      
                         Safety Empowerment 
56. Workers at all levels in my company actively                                  
       participate in hazard reviews and assessments.               
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57. Workers at all levels of my workplace actively  
      participate in incident and accident investigations.                               
58. I feel that I can influence the process safety policies  
      implemented at this company.                                                                
59. Workers are empowered to take corrective action as  
      soon as possible (including shutting down when                                    
      appropriate) if process safety related devices fail  
      or become unavailable during operation.                          
60. When a process safety issue is involved, I can  
      challenge decisions made by management/supervisor.                         
      without fear of negative consequence.                                
61.  I feel free to refuse to participate in work activities  
       that are unsafe.                                                                                      
                      Management of Change 
62. Where there is a change in working procedures                                     
      workers are always kept fully up to date.                            
63. When there is a change in the facilities here you  
      are always kept up to date.                                                                      
64. Management always implement changes efficiently.                             
                             Safety Supervision 
65. My supervisor makes sure that procedures relating to                           
      maintenance is safe before such activities are initiated.    
66. My supervisor takes appropriate action in response 
      to my suggestions for process safety improvements.                           
67. My supervisor informs us about process 
     safety related information frequently.                                                  
68. We are freely allowed to discuss any process related  
      safety issue with our supervisors.                                                        
69. My supervisor takes a swift action when a worker 
       engages in a poor safety practice.                                                       
70.  Persons with appropriate supervisory authority  
      and expertise participate in hazardous.                                               
       process-related activities, such as start-up.                       
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                        Safety Motivation 
71. I feel that I can influence the process safety  
       policies implemented at this company.                                                 
72. I feel that it is necessary to put efforts to reduce  
       accidents and incidents at the workplace.                                              
73. I feel that it is important to encourage co-workers  
      to use safe practices.                                                           
                      Safety Behaviour 
74. Conditions at the workplace makes me ignore safety 
      regulations to get the job done.                                                                 
75. I take shortcuts which involves little or no risk.                                       
76. I do not adhere to codes of practice when 
      under pressure.                                                                                          
77. I willingly participate in safety related activities                                      
 
 
Section C: Workers’ Experience of hazard Risks 
Everybody assesses their level of safety at the workplace differently depending on the 
individual and on the hazard in question, how safe do you feel from the occurrence of the 
following events?  
Please select the number from 1 to 5 that best expresses your response to each hazard. 
1 = Very unsafe      
2 = Unsafe        
3 = Undecided 
4 = Safe      
5 = Very safe                              
 
                                                                                   1              2           3            4              5 
78. Slips/trips                                                                                                    
79. Falls from height/dropped object                                                                
80. Cut/puncture/scrape                                                                                    
81. Medical malaria/gastric/food poisoning                                                     
82. Overexertion/strains                                                                                    
83 Struck by/impact                                                                                           
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84. Confined space                                                                                             
85. Asset damage                                                                                                
86. Caught in/under/between                                                                              
87. Exposure noise/chemical, biological/vibration                                            
88. Electrical explosure                                                                                      
89. Diving accident                                                                                            
90. Fire/explosion/burn                                                                                      
91. Equipment failure                                                                                         
92. Releases (i.e. oil, gas, chemicals)                                                                      
93. Water leakes                                                                                                 
94. Spills                                                                                                             
95. Weather and wind conditions                                                                       
96. Transport accidents (e.g. car, helicopter crashing)                                      
97. Vessel  interruptions                                                                                     
98. Sabotage act                                                                                                  
99. Other hazards                                                                                                
 
 
Please provide any other comments you might have regarding safety at your workplace 








Appendix D: Review of Existing Safety Statutory and Regulatory Documents Relevant to Ghana’s 
Upsteam Oil and Gas Insutry 











Safety and health 
protection of personnel and 
facilities. 
The safety and health protection of personnel and facilities in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry are primarily governed by the Petroleum 
Commission Act, the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act, and the 
Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental 
Regulations. The Article 3(d)(i) of the Petroleum Commission Act provides 
for an enforcement role of the regulator to ensure compliance with health, 
safety and environmental standards. Articles 73 to 80 of the Petroleum 
(Exploration & Production) Act provide for the safety requirements and 
standards by operators, contractors and sub-contractors to conduct safe 
operations. The Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulations is the main regulation that basically focuses on 
providing health, safety and environmental requirements for the Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas operations. There are other statutes and regulations of 
general application that governs workplace health and safety of personnel 
and facilities in Ghana such as the Factories, Offices, and Shops Act, the 
Labour Act and the Ghana Shipping (Protection of Offshore Operations and 
Assets) Regulations. They are not mainly specific to the upstream oil and gas 
industry. These safety laws are incoherent and limited in scope.  




In Article 94 of the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act, it mandates 
the minister to make regulations to give effect to the requirements in this Act. 
Currently, there is only one regulation that regulates the safety of personnel, 
properties and the environment. 
Environmental protection. The environmental protection in upstream oil and gas industry are 
specifically governed by the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, 
Safety and Environmental Regulations. Articles 81 to 84 of this regulation 
provides for environmental principles and protection, environmental impact 
assessment, liability for pollution damage and compensation for pollution 
damage in upstream oil and gas operation. There is another legislation of 
general application (i.e. Environmental Protection Agency Act) that requires 
environmental protection in all activities undertaking in the country. This 
Act provides for the principal regulatory authority responsible for 
environmental protection compliance. The Petroleum (Exploration & 
Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations provided limited 
scope of the environmental protection of the upstream oil and gas operations.  
Present in both 
legislations and 
Regulation 
Employment standards and 
work environment. 
 
The employment standards for the upstream oil and gas industry are 
regulated in the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act. This legislation 
requires operators, contractors, sub-contractors or the state entity to ensure 
that workers recruited at the various level of activities in the upstream oil and 
gas industry have the requisite expertise or qualifications and must be 




employed in accordance with applicable laws, the terms and conditions of 
the petroleum agreement, licence or the petroleum sub-contract. 
There is other legislation of general application. The Labour Act provides a 
general statutory duty that imposes on all employers to ensure that every 
employee work under satisfactory safety and health conditions. This 
legislation imposes responsibility on workers to use the safety protective 
equipment provided by their employers in compliance with the employers’ 
instructions. However, it limits the liability of employers to the extent that 
an employer shall not be liable for injury suffered by a worker who 
contravenes his duty to use safety protective equipment and who suffers 
injury solely by his or her non-compliance of the legislation. The regulation 
of the health and safety of the Work Environment in the upstream oil and gas 
industry is governed by Articles 116 to 146 of the Petroleum (Exploration & 
Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations. This regulation 
requires the operators, contractors and sub-contractors to take steps to 
promote occupational health management; organisation of work to prevent 
physical and psychological strains on workers, hazardous exposure and 
reduce the probability of errors that could result to emergence of hazards and 
accidents; establishment of minimum age, working hours; and establishment 
and coordination of working environment committees. 
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Emergency planning. Emergency planning in the upstream oil and gas operations is regulated in 
the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act and the Petroleum 
(Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations. 
Articles 75 and 76 of the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act requires 
anyone conducting operations to ensure efficiency emergency plans to 
prevent, control and reduce accidents and emergencies that may result to 
fatality or injury, major damage to property and environmental pollutions. 
This Act also requires operators, contractors, sub-contractors or state entity 
to implement emergency preparedness plan against deliberate attacks. 
Articles 157 to 160 of the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, 
Safety and Environmental Regulations requires operators, contractors as well 
as sub-contractors to set up emergency preparedness plan to deal with 
hazards, pollutions and accident situations. The Act requires the setting up 
of a robust emergency preparedness organisation which is capable to deal 
with hazards and accidents situations. It further requires the operator to 
coordinate and notify through telephone and electronic email the regulator 
on potential near-misses, pollutions, hazards and accident situations. 
Present in both 
legislation and 
regulation 
 Oil spill preparedness 
requirements. 
There are current no legislations or regulations that specifically deal with the 
oil spill preparedness requirements. Thus, there are no specific requirements 
on the following: spill preparedness plan, roles and responsibilities in spill 
response, and capacity for response. As was the case in the Deep Horizon 




Disaster where the regulator failed to require adequate oil spill response plan 
(see Bratspies, 2011). Article 81 of the Petroleum (Exploration & 
Production) Act only provided environmental principles and protection that 
require the setting up and implementation of effective safety systems to 
dispose and treat waste and prevent pollution. The legal requirements in this 
Act to handle and manage oil spill response are not adequate to handle major 
oil spill response. 
 Liability for accident. Liability for accident is not clearly specified in the existing safety legislation 
and regulation. Article 59 of the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act 
provides for liability for damage. Major accident occurrence may lead to 
pollution damage. In view of this, Article 83 of this Act provides for liability 
for pollution damage. It requires operators, contractors, sub-contractors 
including the state entity undertaking activities in the upstream oil and gas 
industry to be strictly liable for pollution damage caused. In the case of joint 
operations by parties, in the failure by any party to pay its share of the cost 
of the damage, its participating interest are used to pay for the pollution 
damage.  
In the other legislation of general application such as the Labour Act, there 
is limitation in terms of the liability of employers as they are not liable for 
injury suffered by a worker who contravenes his or her duty to use safety 
Not clearly 
specified in the 
legislation. 




regime is not 
adequate to deal 
with liability. 
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protective equipment and who suffers injury solely by his non-compliance 
of the legislation.  
 Management system 
requirements with clear 
responsibilities. 
 
The regulatory requirement for a management system is provided in the 
Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental 
Regulations. Article 3 of this Regulation requires the operators, contractors, 
sub-contractors as well as the state entity undertaking activities in the 
upstream oil and gas industry to develop, maintain and implement a 
management system to comply with the safety regulations. The management 
system is shaped by the regulatory approach: prescriptive-based regulation 
and performance-based regulation: Ghana’s management system for the 
upstream oil and gas industry is shaped by its performance-based regulatory 
approach. This performance-based approach sets the safety goals and 
requires applicants for permit to demonstrate and prove to the regulator that 
their submitted safety plans and procedures can meet the safety goals. In 
other words, the management systems are not developed by the regulator but 
rather developed in the creation of the safety plan (Safety Case) by the 
applicants and submission to the regulator. It requires operators, contractors, 
sub-contractors or the state entity to communicate the management system 
in their safety plan to the workers and their representatives as wells as 
ensuring that they participate in the HSE matters including monitoring and 






continuous improvement of the process. This regulation does not specify the 
responsibilities underlying the implementation of the management system.  
 Regulatory approach. The safety regulatory approach for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry is 
based on performance-based or goal-setting that requires oil and gas 
organizations to show that they can take measures to reduce risk ‘As Low 
Reasonably Practicable’. Article 10 of the Petroleum (Exploration & 
Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations requires the 
operators, contractors, sub-contractors and the state entity to submit a Safety 
Case to the regulator for approval in not less than six months before 
beginning upstream oil and gas operation and decommissioning. The Safety 
Case must indicate the following: description of the facility, technical and 
control measures, risk analysis, emergency preparedness analysis including 
emergency preparedness plan, and information on the management systems 
that is in compliance with existing safety legislation and regulations.  
Present in 
regulation 
 Framing emphasisng a 
complex actor-network 
involvement in capturing 
all the issues. 
 
Existing legislations and regulations do not explicitly provide for procedures 
for setting up the risk frame that emphasises a complex actor-network 
involvement in capturing all the hazards, threats and issues in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas operations. Both the Petroleum (Exploration & 
Production) Act and the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, 
Safety and Environmental Regulations require every participating 
organisation to submit a risk assessment to the regulator. How this risk 




assessment captures all the safety issues from a complex actor-network 
involvement in the operations is not clearly provided in the existing safety 
laws. Existing safety laws only emphasises the Safety Case that requires the 
operators, contractors or the state entity to demonstrate that the system and 
process that have been adopted are safe in terms of ensuring the health and 
safety of the personnel, facilities and the environment.  
 Emphasis on incorporation 
of human and 
organizational factors in 
the risk estimations 
 
Existing safety regulation requires the operators, contractors or any entity 
undertaking upstream oil and gas activities to perform a risk analysis in 
accordance with best industry practice.  Articles 155 to 156 of the Petroleum 
(Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental Regulations 
provide general requirements for risk analysis. In terms of risk assessment, 
organisations are required to establish their own critera for assessing risks 
which takes into effect identification of hazards and accident situations, risk 
of deliberate attacks and threats, the possible causes of hazards and incidents, 
and their potential consequences. Ghana’s Safey Case regime which is 
underpinned by the goal setting approach is mainly characterised with 
engineering frame that requires Quantitivate Risk Analysis (QRA) to be 
conducted to identify the risks. In view of the inexperience of Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry, the involvement of specialist consultants had 
been a practice since the development of its offshore oil and gas resources.  
Absence in 
safety statutes 
but limited in 
HSE regulations. 
 320 
QRA in some cases are contracted to consultants. QRA are limited in terms 
of incorporation of human and organisational factors.  
 Legitimization of the 
methods and processes on 
the judgement of risk 
evaluation. 
 
The risk evaluation approach underpinning the existing safety regulatory 
regime for Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry is captured in Article 9 of 
the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulations. This regulation provides for ‘Risk Acceptability 
or Tolerability Criteria’ that requires operators, contractors or any entity 
undertaking upstream oil and gas activities to identify and minimize risk to 
a level as “low as possible”.  The requirement for application of this risk 
reduction principle, As Low As Reasonably Achievable has its own 
challenges as its outcome is derived from probability base. The main issue is 
that the industry mainly focuses on satisfying the minimum requirements for 
risk acceptability or tolerability criteria. However, it is challenging to 
realized significant improvement in safety so far as there is existence of such 
minimum criteria. The current risk evaluation approach is rooted in 
probability risk-based application. This requires the indication of the 
methods and processes to assess the knowledge on which these probabilities 
can be based including the strength of the knowledge. This requires to be 
legitimised to provide transparent and democratic process on the judgement 
of risk evaluation. However, this legitimisation of the methods and processes 





on the judgement of risk evaluation is not provided in the existing safety 
statutes and regulations. 
 Monitoring and controlling 
of risk through cooperation, 




The monitoring and controlling of risk are captured in Article 110 of the 
Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and Environmental 
Regulations. It requires the operators, contractors or any entity undertaking 
upstream oil and gas activities to ensure that relevant technical, operational 
and organisational factors are duly kept under control at all times. In Article 
51 of the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act provides for 
collaboration with relevant authorities of the state in supervision and 
inspection of safety standards in the upstream oil and gas industry. In Article 
3 (d) of the Petroleum Commission Act requires the operators, contractors or 
any entity undertaking upstream oil and gas activities to ensure compliance 
with the health, safety and environmental standards.  However, there 
appeared to be limited emphasis on the regulatory requirement for 
cooperation among the various stakeholders in monitoring and controlling of 
risk in the industry. The Petroleum Commission, which is the regulator for 
Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry performs a dual role: petroleum 
licensing and safety compliance monitoring. This raises critical issue of its 
independence in ensuring compliance monitoring of health, safety, and 
environment standards.  The regulator provides the resources required for its 
compliance activities. The usual resource challenges associated with state 





agencies may also affect its capacity to provide adequate resources for its 
safety enforcement activities. The traditional compliance monitoring tools 
used by the regulator may be associated with lack of adequate technical 
competence in ensuring safety performance.  
 Communication strategies 
emphasizing inclusion of all 
relevant actors in the 
deliberation of the risk 
issues 
Article 22 of the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and  
Environmental Regulations requires provision of communication equipment 
that must be based on operational needs, the activity type as well as the 
established hazard and accident situations. It further requires at least two 
independent means of notification that must be set up specifically employing 
permanent communication links (e.g. telephone and email). In the same 
regulation, Article 133 requires operators, contractors or any entity 
undertaking upstream oil and gas activities to share information on risk 
during their course of the operation. The regulation requires that the findings 
of risk assessment, analysis, measurement as well as the mappings of the 
causes of work-related health issues and investigation of accidents, incidents 
and near-misses be submitted to the regulator within one month. In relation 
to communication in risk governance, multiple actors’ involvement is critical 
in risk deliberations. Involvment of people in risk-related decision helps to 
make them gain ownership of the process. There is no requirement in existing 
Ghana’s Safety Case regime to incorporate procedures to facilitate discourses 
among the varuous stakeholders that emanate from different background in 
No requirement 
in existing Safety 










view of promoting meaningful interactions towards confrontation of 
uncertianities.  
 Sustainability of the 
functionality of the system 
The current principal functional characteristics of Ghana’s safety regulatory 
regime for its upstream oil and gas industry have lasted less than ten years. 
Ghana’s safety regulatory regime operates under the goal setting approach 
driven by Safety Case that uses QRA to identify the hazards and accident 
situations for decision making. Its Safety Case has not survived for many 
years with detailed modifications because the development of its existing 
statutes and regulations relevant to the upstream oil and gas operations 
commenced several years after the maiden production of oil and gas 
resources. The balance of interests of different actors appears less effective 
as there had not been established procedures for the development of an open 
and transparent dialogue in addressing uncertainties from the existing 
complexity of operations. Currently, there is no safety guidelines developed 
for the upstream oil and gas industry. Despite the current safety regulatory 
regime has not been challenged with major accidents, one cannot conclude 
that its robust because there had not been mobilisation of forces and 
discourses to maintain its principal functional characteristics. 
The Safety Case 
has not survived 







 Adaptability to changed 
situations 
The Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Health, Safety and 
Environmental Regulations reflected this feature of adaptability to changed 
situations. In articles 73-82 require standards for blowout preventers in the 




areas of drilling and well systems. This regulation provided for the 
requirement of operators, contractors or any entity undertaking upstream oil 
and gas activities to ensure that the there is a well control equipment designed 
to have the capacity to ensure barrier integrity and well control. The need for 
regulatory regime to reflect this requirement for standards for blowout 
preventers became a lesson learnt from the Deep Horizon Disaster in 2010.  
Ghana incorporated this lesson to its current safety regulation. Although the 
passage of this safety regulation came after the disaster which made its 
convenient for this adjustment.  The true determination of this feature of 
aadaptability to changed situations can be assessed in existing safety 
guidelines designed by the regulator. There are currently no safety guidelines 
designed by the regulator for the upstream oil and gas industry. Such safety 




been made as 
there are no 
existing safety 















1 2 3 4 5 
Management of change .855 .218    
Safety empowerment .852 .174    
Safety supervision .844 .157 .217   
Management Commitment .681  -.221 .159 -.129 
Safety involvement .576 .182   .275 
Safety motivation .508 -.116 .432  .163 
Safety policies .465 -.697  -.194 -.296 
Safety rules & procedures -.433 .643 -.188 -.338 .191 
Safety behaviour -.332 -.591 .240 .339 .201 
Equipment maintenance .260 -.178 -.571 .293 .410 
Supportive Environment -.291 .236 .553 .213 .375 
Safety Training  .229 -.356 .609 -.370 
Safety Priority  .304 .427 .583 -.294 
Safety communication .324 -.106 -.139 .294 .546 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 5 components extracted. 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 
1 .920 .261 -.206 .207 .009 
2 .332 -.841 .249 -.181 .296 
3 .191 .318 .750 -.491 -.243 
4 -.082 .275 .412 .394 .770 
5 -.006 -.219 .405 .727 -.510 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   

























Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis
Version 2.3
11/15/19   3:18:28 AM
Number of variables:     14
Number of subjects:     212
Number of replications: 100
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Eigenvalue #     Random Eigenvalue     Standard Dev
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
      1               1.4543               .0630
      2               1.3407               .0452
      3               1.2617               .0345
      4               1.1900               .0303
      5               1.1254               .0274
      6               1.0674               .0271
      7               1.0087               .0265
      8               0.9525               .0272
      9               0.9005               .0267
     10               0.8481               .0266
     11               0.7981               .0253
     12               0.7451               .0291
     13               0.6871               .0326
     14               0.6203               .0449
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
11/15/19   3:18:29 AM
Monte Carlo PCA for Parallel Analysis













1 REGR factor 
score   5 for 
analysis 2, 
REGR factor 
score   4 for 
analysis 2, 
REGR factor 
score   3 for 
analysis 2, 
REGR factor 
score   2 for 
analysis 2, 
REGR factor 
score   1 for 
analysis 2b 
. Enter 
a. Dependent Variable: Incidents Risk 









Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 6.981 5 1.396 6.937 .000b 
Residual 41.464 206 .201   
Total 48.445 211    
a. Dependent Variable: Incidents Risk 
b. Predictors: (Constant), REGR factor score   5 for analysis 2, REGR factor score   4 for analysis 2, REGR factor score   















t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.583 .031  51.383 .000 
REGR factor score   1 
for analysis 2 
.101 .031 .210 3.266 .001 
REGR factor score   2 
for analysis 2 
-.093 .031 -.194 -3.011 .003 
REGR factor score   3 
for analysis 2 
.078 .031 .163 2.527 .012 
REGR factor score   4 
for analysis 2 
-.078 .031 -.163 -2.522 .012 
REGR factor score   5 
for analysis 2 
-.046 .031 -.096 -1.487 .139 































Appendix H1: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Research Title: “Developing a framework for Robust Safety Management in Ghana’s 
Upstream Oil and Gas industry”. 
 
 
You are being invited to take part in this study being undertaken as a part of doctoral research 
project. This information sheet is intended to provide you with information about the research 
and your participation. The interview will take approximately 45-60 minutes to complete. 
 
Aim of the Study: 
The research aims at developing a framework for robust safety management in Ghana’s 
upstream oil and gas industry. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
Your knowledge and professional experience in the upstream oil and gas industry make you an 
ideal person for this study to solicit your views about the current understanding of the issues 
confronting safety management in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry  
 
Do I have to take part? 
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary; it is fully upon your discretion to decide 
whether or not to participate. You may choose not to participate, however due to the relevance 
of your participation for this research, you are encouraged to take part in these interviews. The 
researcher can provide more information if it helps in making your decision to participate and 
will ask you to grant your consent for participation in this study. You are free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving a reason. 
  
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All of the data and information obtained from you will be kept confidential and secured and 
will be used in maintaining anonymity. No personal information of participants will be used as 
codes and numbers will be allocated. Information gathered from the interviews will be 
anonymously processed. After the study, all of the data would be destroyed securely to comply 




What are the potential benefits of participating? 
There would be no financial reward for your participation in this research as it is completely 
voluntary. However, your knowledgeability and professional experience will make crucial 
contribution to the development of a framework for robust afety management in the upstream 
oil and gas industry industry. 
 
Is there any risk involved? 
Due to the nature of the study, the participant will not be exposed to any type of risk. 
 
Contact details: 
If you have any questions about this study, you can contact the person(s) below: 
Researcher: [ +233547134644 / +447435392030]    f.horbah@edu.salford.ac.uk  


































Appendix H2: Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
 
This study seeks to identify the issues confronting safety management in the Ghana’s upstream 
oil and gas industry. It seeks to define the safety management problem in the upstream oil and 
gas industry. The information elicited from you would help to understand the real safety issues 
facing the industry.  
The interview protocol is made up of two sections: 
Section A: Background Information about the interviewee  
Section B: The Main Semi-Structured Interview Questions. 
The main semi-structured interview questions are based on your current professional 
experience in the Ghanaian upstream oil and gas industry. The information obtained will 
remain confidential and will be used for the only purpose of the study.  
Thank you in advance for participating in this study. If you have any queries, do not hesitate 
to contact me.  
Contact details of the researcher  
Francis Horbah 
School of Science, Engineering and Environment 
University of Salford 
Salford, 
 M5 4WT 
UK  
 
Email:    f.horbah@edu.salford.ac.uk  






Appendix H3: Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
 
A. Background Information about the interviewee 
Please can you tell me your background in terms of the following:  
Ø Main position/role in the organisation 
Ø Core functions/operations of your organization 
Ø Location of the activities 
Ø Years of current job experience 
 
B. The Main Semi-structured Interview Questions. 
1. To what extent can you say the safety regime in Ghana is robust?  
PROBE: 
Ø Stakeholders involvement in framing risks  
Ø Interdisciplinary estimation of  risk . 
Ø Legitimization of the risk appraisal 
Ø Management of risk issues (safety culture and monitoring and controlling of risk) 
Ø Strategies for risk information sharing  
Ø Sustainabilility of the principal functions of the safety case application  
Ø Adaptability to changed situations 
 
2. What are the Issues influencing safety regulations in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry? 
 
3. What are the issues/barriers influencing robust implementation of safety management 
systems in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry? 
 
Please do you have further comments/contribution to make to this study? 
 
 








Appendix H4: Semi-Structured Interview Transcript 
 
SECTION A: Background Information about the interviewee 
 
R: Please can you tell me your background in terms of your position or role in this 
organization?   
I: Well, I am an HSE compliance monitoring officer. Basically, my work is to enforce HSE in 
the industry and we are government agency in the industry. We ensure compliance to HSE 
laws in the upstream industry. Basically, the role of the [organization name deleted] is to 
develop regulations and also ensure that all operators or anyone coming in to operate in the oil 
and gas space comply to the relevant national regulations first of all and the international 
standards and conventions. So basically, my role is to support the department to achieve that 
goal.  
 
R: Please can you tell me about the core functions/operations of your organization? 
I: The [organization name deleted] was established five to six years ago by an act of parliament 
and the HSE department is manned by six officers all from varied backgrounds and  
[organization name deleted] is a public sector as by law, like I said in my opening statement 
we are to ensure compliance to laws and regulations. So, the HSE is just one of those aspects 
of our work in this institution. We are to ensure compliance to the laws governing the 
[organization name deleted]. Aside the HSE, there are other roles that the [organization name 
deleted] plays that is economic, local content and also cost management so basically those are 
the areas we focus. 
 
R: Please, can you tell me where your work/operations are located? 
I: Yea, we ensure HSE compliance in the upstream oil and gas industry in this country. So, our 
work covers both offshore and onshore activities. We cover the two, yea! 
 
R: Please can you tell me about the years of experience with your current job? 
I: Well, year, years of experience in terms of health and safety? I have say, six years working 
with the [organization name deleted]. I have had work experiences that are not relevant to 
health and safety but specifically to health and safety, it’s six years and I work here at the 
[organization name deleted] as an HSE officer.  
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SECTION B: The Main Semi-structured Interview Questions. 
R: To what extent can you say the safety regime in Ghana is robust?  
I: Before 2016, the whole oil and gas industry in Ghana was governed by the various petroleum 
agreements between the government of Ghana and the International Oil Companies. After the 
repealing of these laws, a new petroleum law was enacted that contained the HSE laws. Within 
this laws that the current HSE regulation was developed. As you know what the safety is about, 
it was originally from UK and subsequently adopted by the Norwegian oil and gas industry 
and now Ghana has also adopted it. It requires that any organisation applying to undertake oil 
and gas activities has to demonstrate convincingly to the regulator that the management system 
put in place is adequate to ensure safety operations. Our safety case is a derived regime which 
already has an international acceptance. It is a self-regulation region. However, it has to be 
adopted to a Ghanaian law so that there is a liability in the state and not international laws. 
Although our laws allow the industry to also consider international best practices.  On 
robustness, our HSE law allows you to submit a safety case and safety plan according to the 
specifications of our MODUS requirements. Every facility has already a safety case document 
which we ask them to amend to reflect international laws that reliability as I mentioned earlier 
exists. So, for the safety case you are required to put in place all the requirements for all the 
various risks in your operations like for examples fire risk, blow-out risk, hydrocarbon releases 
risk, emergency response risk. That aside, the HSE law requires you to submit an HSE plan for 
the project which will include the safety case document. There are various requirements in the 
plan that you are supposed to demonstrate to us before you are given our consent to undertake 
your activities. And if you we are not satisfied with your document or assurance and in most 
cases the contractors management systems which is mandatory requirements, we don’t give 
out our consent. So, we are very sure.   
 
R: To what extent are stakeholders involved in the framing of risks? 
I: With the safety case regime, it is self-assessment thing. So, it is you assessing the risk 
associated with your facility and you are telling us that you have put in place adequate measures 
to reduce the risk as low as possible. You do it out of the state engagement. However, prior to 
the starting of the facilities, we have what we called the Endurance Test Operation where your 
safety case is tested at its full working operations. There is no need to have stakeholders’ 
engagement on safety case document when it is pre-produced. However, since there are local 
risks, like the fishing activities, malaria, weather, you have to submit this to the commission. 
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R: Is there adoption of interdisciplinary approach in estimation of the risks?  
I: There is quite extensive work they do that mostly covers health, safety, environmental, 
economic risks. Most often they meet the requirements. With the risk assessment, the IOCs are 
quite well vested in that given their vast experience of that. They do internal risk engagement 
for hazard identification which is a big engagement activates where they engage large crowd 
to perform the risk assessment for various risks they could have encountered with the project. 
So, for that sense, the likelihood that they would mis risks in their operations for risk 
assessment they had done for over 15 years is very low. So, for risk assessment I will say they 
are will vested. However, there is always the need to incorporate the local risks I mentioned 
earlier. Beyond the weather and the fishing activities that had been a problem in the offshore 
environment, salinity in salt, which is causing most of the facilities, causing rust. Some of these 
risks are to be identified in Ghana. Most of our risk analyses are quantitative risk assessment. 
For qualitative risk I say big no, hardly! We don’t do most of these qualitative risk assessments. 
We have a lot of drilling analysis. We rely on assessment that you can measure immediately. 
So, it is quantitative way. There is always the need to incorporate the local risks I mentioned 
earlier. Beyond that the weather had been a problem in the offshore environment, salinity in 
salt, which is causing most of the facilities, causing rust. Some of these risks are to be identified 
in Ghana. Most of our risk analyses are Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). For qualitative 
risk I say big no, hardly! We don’t do most of these qualitative risk assessments. We have a lot 
of drilling analysis. We rely on assessment that you can measure immediately. So, it is 
quantitative way. 
 
R: What procedures are used for the risk evaluation?  
I: We have the filling modes, HAZID, HAZOP, Bowtie. These are some of the tools they use 
in the risk evaluation process because we are dealing with the process and not the occupational 
nature. It is more process oriented. So, the failure modes, effects and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) are the most preferred tools being used in the risk evaluation so far.  
 
R: How is the monitoring and controlling of risk done in the industry? 
For monitory, the expectation is that the IOCs who are contracting have to have assurance from 
their contractors but they themselves have periodic audit of the contracting activities and 
engage the regulator on the course of the year. Active monitoring is what we critically need to 
employ using the Observation cards, the permit work system. There are things that are auditable 
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even if you at the offshore you continuously monitor the facilities performance. We come to 
organisational behaviour, they behaviour are from the management. The culture here is the 
seriousness of the management. With the IOCs in terms of their financial loan regimes from 
the IFCs, there are high expectations of environmental and safety sensitivity. So culturally their 
sides continue to improve. The challenge has always been the local environment where the 
Ghanaian safety performance is quite low. The average Ghanaian does not consider safety as 
a major threat to our existence. The challenge has always been to transfer the corporate 
perception to the local contractors. The difficult has been to get them to a level where the need 
to accept to operate in a safe manner. This has always been a challenge for the industry. The 
local workforce does in the Ghanaian way where they don’t understand they are always 
required to work in a safe way. They don’t accept to work in a safe manner! 
 
R: How is risk information shared in the industry? 
I: The IOCs use the bulletin system where they share information about incidents across the 
operations. They submit report to us, and we also share with the other actors within the 
petroleum space. The internal communication has always been the bulletin system. Where I 
sit, it is down! Communication is down! They use emails, letters and meetings. So, incidents 
report goes through these techniques. These techniques have been used by the IOCs to the 
contractors too. Communications are in two ways: one teaching you and one accepting. If you 
come to education, most of our offshore workers at the lower units are not adequately. You 
understand? I am talking about the riggers, the cleaners etc. The lower hanging jobs don’t have 
a requirement to have a degree for those jobs. These are the workers that are more risk and they 
need to be trained. So, training gap for those going for the offshore activities. That is a key 
challenge.  
 
R: To what extent can you say the existing principal characteristics of the safety regime 
are sustainable?  
I: As I said it earlier, the safety case regime is tested and proven before. With the functional 
features of the safety case, it is accepted generally, and I don’t think the Ghanaian risks is 
higher than the southern American risk or the North Sea risks. It is the same risk we all use the 
same safety case.  It is appropriate and exhaustive. So, it is appropriate! However, it requires a 
lot more engagement from the stakeholders. This is where there is challenge particularly 
engagement of the regulator, contracting parties, state agencies and the implementation of all 
these requirements in the safety case. This comes to periodic audits and unfortunately there is 
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a gap in our national agenda as it is not a high priority. We need the support of the leadership 
for the HSE department to ensure that operating companies put their things in order to ensure 
safety operations in our industry.  
 
R: To what extent is the industry adapted to changed situations? 
I: Management of change regime exists in the HSE regulations that should in case there is a 
major change in the facilities, they should be brought to the attention and engagement of the 
regulator. So, in that sense it is reactive. It is reactive in the sense that in case of any major 
change in the facility, you have to react to the regulator for engagement where you are required 
to submit a risk assessment on that change for approval by the regulator. There have been some 
few experiences where those earlier operating companies had changes in their facilities, and 
they had to engage us on how to implement that on their management systems and we went 
through and it was accepted by the regulator. In these days of our operations, we have not had 
such engagement for this management of change situations.  
 
R: What are the issues influencing safety regulations in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas 
industry? 
I: Like I said we have laws scattered, we have the factory inspectorate, we have the 
environmental protection regulations, health and safety regulations for the upstream sector, so 
these pieces of regulation are those that governing the sector as of today. Aside that the sector 
is highly regulated by international standards and international organizations, so there are a 
number of standards and principles that as a country we are signatories to so by default those 
standards become abiding principles for the industry so basically that it. we also have a 
guideline that EPA issued in 2010 governing the environmental protection and management in 
the absence of that so those are key guideline plus the regulations I mentioned early on; the 
environmental protection regulation, health and safety regulation that I said as of today 22nd of 
December is a law and also the standards. 
 
R: What are the issues/barriers influencing robust implementation of safety management 
systems in Ghana’s upstream oil and gas industry? 
I: I will say it’s going to be an issue of culture and mindset {interruption} and I must say that 
it is difficult changing the way people perceive and respond to things. But you cannot say you 
will not do anything because that how people are. I believe that continuous engagement, 
training… people or reorientation would help to get people to change their attitude and also 
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helping people see the result of their effort. For instance, when you implement or introduce a 
particular safety program and you achieve some result, positive result for that matter, it is 
important to communicate that to people as a form of encouragement for them to know that 
their efforts are yielding results. Another way is to established some sort of reward system to 
encourage good practices and entrenched it in people so those are ways of ensuring 
improvement but when you don’t do do that people begin to become resistance because there 
is no difference between those who are complying and those who are not complying or those 





























Appendix I: Workshop Guide 
 
Main Theme: “Robustness Thinking in Safety Management: How DO We improve the Issues 
in Ghana’s Upstream Oil and Gas Industry” 
 
Time Duration: 1.30 hrs 
Moderator: Researcher 
 
• Researcher welcomes participants 
• Introduction and roll call of participants 
• Moderator briefs participants on the research information, ethics, assurance of 
confidentiality of data and requirement for consents.  
• Taking of participants’ consents 
• Procedures for the session 
1. Moderator introduces the issues and elicits suggestions for improvement.  
2. Every participant is given opportunity to provide his or her suggestions.  
3. Participant’s submissions should not exceed three  munites for each 
submission. 
Session Commencement 




A: Inadequate integrative risk goveranace framework: 
1. Risk framing 
2. Risk estimation 
3. Risk evaluation 
4. Risk management 
5. Risk information sharing 
B: Regulatory Influences: 
1. Lack of national safety policies 
2. Lack of safety guidelines 
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3. Lack of independence of the regulatory body 
4. Lack of policies for investment in safety training and development 
5. Scattered safety laws 
6. Insufficient Resources 
7. Inadequate safety requirements in procurement for local contractors 
C: Poor safety culture 
 
Mechanisms/interventions to address the issues: 
 



























Appendix J: Focus Group Guide 
 
Time Duration: 45 Munites 
 
Researcher briefs participants on the research information and requires for consents for the 
validation study. 
 
Researcher presents the conceptual framework to the group 
 
Explain the structure of the conceptual framework to the participants: 
Ø Underpinning theories  
Ø Key concepts 
Ø Relationships 






1. To what extent does this conceptual framework fulfil the general goal of safety 
management in the upstream oil and gas industry? 
 
2. Environment 
To what extent is this conceptual framework Understandable to professionals? 
 




To what extent is the structure of this conceptual framework covers the level of details of 
safety management? 
 
4.  Activity 




To what extent is this conceptual framework consistent with the requirement of robustness in 
addressing complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of risk related issues in the industry? 
 
 To what extent is this conceptual framework consistent with the requirement of learning 
from its experience?  
 
 
Thanksgiving 
